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Abstract 
This thesis explores a relatively new and arguably innovative United States (US) international 
development initiative called the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which was 
launched by President Bush in 2004 as his flagship development programme for combating 
global poverty. Inciting transformational change, both in the delivery of aid and within the 
recipient countries themselves, lies at the heart of the MCA, which is housed in a new 
development entity named the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). In-depth semi-
structured interviews were utilised to facilitate the accumulation of rich and varied data, 
through which the rhetoric and discourses surrounding the MCA could be' challenged, 
contested and debated at a variety oflevels. This study critically engages with the MCA to 
reveal its core motivations and ideological underpinnings, through which we can better 
understand its origins and potential to deliver sustainable development in the South. In order 
to do this, specific attention is given to Nicaragua's involvement in the initiative; a country 
which has played host to a plethora of US foreign policy activities, actions and interventions 
over the years. An exhaustive exploration of Nicaragua's experience of the MCA is 
subsequently utilised as a platform for engaging with the core debates and issues surrounding 
the MCA and development discourse more broadly. In particular, the study's findings 
critically question the neoliberal model of development being promoted through the MCA 
and challenge the programme's ability to address the complexities of impoverishment. Part 
and parcel ofthis process involves examining the seemingly inseparable marriage between 
'democracy' and market liberalisation in development, through which it is argued in this 
thesis that transnationalliberalism has been extended as the hegemonic ideology of this 
epoch and a polyarchic system of rule promoted across much of the South. 
Key Words: United States, Millennium Challenge Account, Nicaragua, Poverty Reduction, 
Neoliberalism, Free-Trade, Democracy, Polyarchy 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis provides a unique insight into a relatively new and 'transformational' 
United States (US) development initiative called the Millennium Challenge Account (MeA). 
It reveals the ideas and ideologies behind this seemingly 'new' programme and analyses how 
these have been expressed within the specific context of Nicaragua. Through this process this 
study seeks to answer the following research question: 
Does the MeA live up to its 'transformational' rhetoric or is it yet another case of 
'old wine in new bottles '? 
In this regard, a core aim of this study is to strip away the fancy packaging and 'gimmicks' 
surrounding the MeA, to reveal the initiative's core motivations and ideological 
underpinnings. Through this process we can begin to understand the origins of the MeA, its 
subsequent role as fundamental tenet of the US' foreign aid system, and gauge its ability to 
address the underlying causes of impoverishment in the South. In setting the pretext to this 
investigation, this introduction begins by explaining my interest in the MeA and why I 
believe that this initiative warrants in-depth analysis and examination. This is followed by a 
discussion of the reasons for selecting Nicaragua as the geographical focus for this thesis. 
The chapter then presents the main themes that this research seeks to reveal and elucidate, 
and finishes by providing an outline of the thesis chapters. 
1.1 Why the MCA? 
Improving the effectiveness with which aid is delivered and channelled has become a 
core priority of the international development community in recent years, as the failure of 
past efforts to address the fundamental causes of poverty has placed increased pressure on 
international donors and their activities. This has been particularly noticeable in the activities 
of what one might consider to be the heavy-weights of the donor world, i.e. the International 
Financial Institutions (IFls) and powerful bilateral donors in the North I. In response to these 
I The label 'North' is used throughout this thesis in referring to those countries that are generally considered to 
be more economically developed than their 'less - developed' counterparts. Other descriptions could include the 
'first world' and 'developed world'. Whilst this crude separation is inevitably problematic, it still has an 
1 
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growing pressures, donors have reacted in a number of different ways, one of which has been 
to promote and enforce the adoption of 'sound policy enviromnents' in the South2• These 
environments constitute what many in the development arena consider to be the optimal 
conditions for delivering aid, with their promotion reflecting a perspective in which the past 
failures at combating poverty have been increasingly located as a product of 'deficiencies' 
and 'inadequacies' within the aid-recipient countries themselves. In line with this 
understanding, there has been a tangible shift in the policies and actions of the official 
institutions and bilateral donors over recent years, as efforts to maximise 'aid effectiveness' 
have informed development practice. It is within this context of change that the MeA was 
conceived and established in the US as a new mechanism for channelling and delivering 
international development assistance. 
The MeA represents a new and reportedly innovative foreign aid programme, which 
aims to answer many of the longstanding criticisms within the development community over 
international and/or, more specifically, US foreign assistance. In this regard, the MeA puts 
the new found wisdom/consensus on what makes aid effective to the test and this, in turn, 
makes it an extremely interesting and important initiative to study. As such, in choosing this 
subject for my thesis I was eager to explore the MeA's defining features, such as strict 
selectivity, country ownership, and its agenda for transformational development, and reveal 
what these tell us about the ideas and ideologies driving the initiative. As part ofthis process, 
I wanted to examine how the MeA's conceptual underpinnings and commitments have 
translated, and continue to translate, into praxis within the compact-countries3 themselves. As 
witnessed so many times in the past, there is often a disjuncture between the positive rhetoric 
of donors, financial institutions and the programmes/policies they promulgate, and the 
experience of the South. With this in mind, the analysis presented here draws upon the 
experience of a specific country within the MeA and utilises that country's experience as a 
platform for engaging with the programme and reflecting upon its potential to address the 
fundamental causes of poverty in recipient countries. This focus on a single compact-country 
has also provided a mechanism with which to locate the MeA in a more nuanced 
intellectual and/or political validity, in that it provides a platfonn with which to analyse and understand 
geopolitical relations. In contrast, MCC documentation tends to refer to the 'North' as 'developed countries'. 
2 In accordance with footnote I, the label 'South' is used here in referring to those countries that are generally 
considered to be less economically developed than the North. Other descriptions might include, the 'third world' 
and 'underdeveloped world'. In contrast, the MCC tends to refer to the 'South' as 'developing countries'. 
J Compact-countries are used within this thesis to refer to those countries that have signed MCA 'compacts' 
with the US. 
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understanding of the political, economic, social and cultural context within which the 
initiative is being implemented in the South. In this way it has facilitated a broader 
appreciation for how the MCA fits into the long-term relationships between the US and 
recipient countries, and offered an entry point with which to reflect upon the highly 
interventionist role of other external actors such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in the South. 
1.2 Why Nicaragua? 
Although the MCA is broadly conceived to be a global initiative, as witnessed by its 
stated mission to reduce' global' poverty (Millennium Challenge Corporation website), this 
study is predominantly interested in understanding the experience of a comparatively small 
country located within the Central American isthmus. Nicaragua, which has a population of 
approximately 5.7 million, represents an incredibly interesting and unique opportunity for 
exploring the MCA and how it has operated within complex and politically volatile 
conditions within the South. Being located in what is commonly referred to as the US' 
backyard, Nicaragua has played host to a plethora of US foreign policy activities, actions and 
interventions over the years. As discussed in detail in chapter 4, this reality was witnessed 
most visibly and controversially during the 1980s, when the US sponsored Contra army 
wreaked havoc across Nicaragua following the overthrow ofthe brutal Somoza dictatorship 
in 1979. The legacy of this hostile period, combined with many years of prior internal and 
external oppression, has resulted in a highly complex and challenging environment in which 
to undertake a development programme such as the MCA. As such, I was eager to explore 
and locate the initiative within the historical context of US-Nicaraguan relations and identify 
how the ideas/ideologies enshrined within the 'new' programme correspond to the country's 
development and experiences thus far. At the same time as appreciating the particular nature 
of US-Nicaraguan relations, however, the US' position as a world superpower means that 
many other countries have similar histories of US interference and intervention, and this 
presents opportunities within the research for drawing connections to other compact-countries 
engaged with the MCA. 
Another reason for focussing on Nicaragua in this research is rooted in the country's 
strategic position within both the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP) and the Dominican Republic -
3 
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Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). These economic initiatives are 
intrinsically linked, with the PPP helping to provide the regional infrastructure necessary for 
implementing and embedding free-trade across the isthmus. As demonstrated later in this 
thesis, the MCA is directly implicated in these two economic initiatives (see chapter 7 section 
7.7.2) and its proximity to these controversial programmes clearly warrants investigation. 
Indeed, I believe that its association with the PPP and DR-CAFTA speaks volumes about the 
MCA's driving logic and core reasoning, and tl!is has clear repercussions for how one 
interprets its pro-poor credentials. In this regard, focussing on Nicaragua's experience 
enables us to draw parallels between the MeA and these larger neoliberal mega-projects, 
which are ultimately aimed at opening up the region's economies to free-market competition. 
This analysis will, therefore, contribute significantly to how we can understand the MCA 
more broadly and help us to draw out the motivations propelling its creation and 
implementation within the South. 
1.3 Aims and objectives 
This study is broadly composed of four interrelated themes/objectives. The first 
objective of this research is to understand the specific experience of Nicaragua in the MCA. 
By looking at Nicaragua's engagement with the MCA, this thesis provides a unique and 
comprehensive insight into how a relatively un-researched and somewhat controversial 
international development initiative has been implemented in practice, and this is located 
within a thorough treatment of the country's historical relationship with the US. Secondly, 
this thesis seeks to engage with, and contribute to, the core debates surrounding the MCA as a 
development initiative. This involves, among other things, understanding the logic behind the 
initiative's strict approach to country selectivity, analysing the nature of the relationship 
between the MCC and USAID, and recognising the potential impact of severe under-funding 
on the MCA's ability to incite transformational changes in the South. A third key objective of 
this study is to locate the MCA within the context of dominant development discourse, 
looking specifically at the Washington Consensus (WC), Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) 
and neoliberalism. As part of this process, significant attention and thought is given to the 
role of the IFIs, and most noticeably the World Bank, in shaping and influencing 
development policy and practice. Through engagement with these key issues, this research is 
able to question the econocentric model of development being promulgated through the MCA 
4 
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and draw connections between its 'transformational' agenda and development doctrine. 
Finally, this research seeks to utilise this study of the MCA as a platform for examining the 
relationship between development discourse and 'democracy promotion'. In particular this 
thesis looks to unpick the seemingly inseparable marriage between 'democracy' and free-
trade, which has operated as a powerful tool for intervention within the South. Part and parcel 
of this involves reflecting upon the MCA's commitment to 'country ownership' and drawing 
out what this central concept of 'ownership' means in practice. 
1.4 Chapter outline 
In order to address the four themes/objectives set out above, this thesis is composed of 
nine interconnected chapters, which together provide a thorough and detailed analysis of the 
MCA and Nicaragua's experience within the initiative. Chapter 2 looks at the ideas, theories 
and discourses leading up to the creation of the initiative and in doing so focuses primarily on 
the WC and PWC, both of which represent a set of ideas that have been particularly 
influential in shaping and influencing the direction and content of international development 
policy. Chapter 3 builds upon the discussion in chapter 2 by locating the MCA within a 
general framework of power and it does this from a predominantly geopolitical perspective. 
This is followed by an examination of changes made to the US aid system over recent years 
and a discussion on the emergence of a 'transformational development' agenda within the 
US. Attention is then turned to exploring the MCA, its creation, scope, management, and 
defining characteristics. Chapter 4 provides the historical and geographical context to the 
study and looks at US-Nicaraguan relations prior to, during, and following, the volatilities of 
the 1980s. Chapter 5 identifies the methods and approaches used in conducting this study and 
reflects extensively upon the key issue ofpositionality. Chapter 6 is divided into two main 
sections. The first analyses changes in the quantity and composition of US development 
assistance to Nicaragua over recent years. The second concentrates on drawing out the 
specifics of Nicaragua's MCA and its core components. Chapter 7 and 8 present themain 
findings of this research, the first of which focuses on the key issue of poverty reduction and 
the second on democracy promotion. The thesis conclusion then summarises and draws 
together the main findings of this investigation and reflects upon the contribution of the study 
to the four research themes set out above. In addition to this, it suggests potential avenues for 
conducting further research. 
5 
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Chapter 2: Development discourse. the Washington Consensus and the 
Post-Washington Consensus 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical backdrop to the creation of the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA), through an analysis of what have been commonly termed the 
'Washington Consensus' (WC) and the 'Post-Washington Consensus' (PWC). In order to do 
this, the following discussion traces the contours of development theory back through time, 
reflecting upon both the continuity and discontinuity of development discourse and the 
ideologies that they portra/. It takes a famous speech made by President Truman on the 20th 
ofJanuary 1949 as a starting point with which to begin exploring development theory 
formation and places specific emphasis on the Latin American experience. Following this 
. preamble, the chapter examines the construction of the WC, which has dominated debates on 
development since the 1980s, and unravels the relationship between the WC and neo-liberal 
discourse. Attention is then given to the subsequent 'transition' towards the PWC, which is 
located as both a departure from, and reinsertion of, previous development discourse. As part 
of this analysis, the chapter identifies the key components of the PWC (many of which could 
be seen as 'new' or 'different') and discusses the importance of these elements within the 
context of contemporary development debates and practices. Consideration is also given to 
the role of the new United States' (US) security agenda in shaping development practice and 
the potential repercussions of this convergence. 
2.1 Development and underdevelopment 
" ... we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of 
. underdeveloped areas" (President Truman, cited in Rist 1997: 71). 
4 As illustrated throughout this chapter, 'development' is a highly malleable concept, and not only has its 
multiple meanings changed over time but these meanings have, as Bebbington notes, varied depending on who 
is talking about 'development' (2002: 105). In this respect, 'development' can be identified as a highly 
subjective phenomena and any discussion on 'development' must, therefore, be subject to close scrutiny and 
analysis. The discussion of development theory and discourse bears witness to this reality. 
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This essay takes the inaugural speech made by President Truman in January 1949 as a 
starting point to discuss the shifts in development discourse. Arguably, the use of the 
adjective 'underdevelopment' marked the first time in which the concept had been used as a 
synonym for 'economically backward' areas and marked a "technological innovation which 
altered the meaning of 'development', itself, by relating it in a new way to 
'underdevelopment'" (Rist 1997: 72). This is not to say, however, that development did not 
exist prior to this event, only that it had never been defined in tenns of escaping from 
underdevelopment. Its use established a new sense of ' self and 'other' as two biIlion people 
became "transmogrified into an inve~ed mirror of others' reality" (Esteva 1993: 7). To 
escape from this condition of underdevelopment, countries would need to look outside their 
own cultures and boundaries, and embrace a model of development propagated by the North. 
In this respect, the North was to become the benchmark through which progress in the South 
was to be measured and gauged. 
2.2 Modernisation theory 
Modernisation theory can be located as the theoretical expression of the dualistic 
vision of the world expressed by Truman in his 1949 speech. Indeed, the manner in which 
development was expressed reflected the tendency of early modernisation theorists to 
proliferate a sense of difference, i.e. self and other, through the labelling of the developed and 
underdeveloped. Unsurprisingly, therefore, modernisation theory was originally couched in a 
very arrogant and condescending language which is, in many ways, indicative of the 
underlying prejudice traditionally found within dominant development discourse. The 
following extract illustrates one such example: 
"There is something in the quality of the Latin American man [sic] and his culture 
which has made it difficult for him to be truly modern ... which has made this part of 
the Western world so prone to excesses of scoundrels. so politically irrational in 
seeking economic growth. and so ready to reach for gimmicks" (SilVer! cited in Moles 
1999: 2). 
The language through which the concept of the 'modem' first came to be defined was rooted 
in enlightenment discourse, in which the North was the model, prototype and gauge of social 
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progress (Slater 1993: 421)_ In this respect, one can identify the modernisation paradigm as 
being very dualistic in nature, founded through the lens of colonial infantilisation, in which 
the South was often portrayed as a child needing guidance5_ It is within this broader 
ideological context that we can begin to look more closely at the model of development 
promoted by modernisation theorists. 
2.2.1 The Rostowian 'take-off' model 
Modernisation theory strongly ties in with the notion ofpre-determination, i.e. that 
there is a fixed path all countries must take in order to become 'modern' and 'developed'. 
This perspective is illustrated most clearly by Rostow's model of development, in which each 
country is categorised as falling into one of five graduating levels within a linear trajectory of 
economic growth: 
"It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within 
one offive categories: the traditional society, the pre-conditionsfor take-off, the take-
off, the drive to maturity, and the age of mass consumption" (Rostow 1960: 4). 
This simplistic model for economic modernisation 6 gained influence within US foreign 
policy, particularly during the Kennedy and 10hnson administrations of the 1960s, where 
Rostow's elevated positions within government granted him direct influence over US policy 
towards the South. Through his capacity as a presidential advisor, Rostow was able to couch 
his 'stages' theory within the context of a political mission, aimed at putting a stop to the 
spread of communism. His most famous book 'The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto " was particularly influential and provided additional legitimacy for 
intervention in the South. As Slater comments, "the notion of modernisation - or more 
specifically modernisation theory - came to be closely associated with the nature and 
direction of US interventions in the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s" (2004: 58). In many 
ways, therefore, this link to communism provided the justification for promoting 
development policy at a time when national security interests were dominating the 
geopolitical landscape. Rostow therefore played an incisive role in launching the first 
5 As seen later, this tendency to infantilise development has not disappeared from contemporary discourse and 
one could suggest that this is a testament to modernisation theory's enduring legacy. 
, Arguably, at a time of growing complexities and ideological rivalry, it is this 'simplicity' that made Rostow's 
'take-off' theory so influential within US foreign policy. 
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'development decade', during which Kennedy substantially increased the US budget for 
foreign assistance7• 
According to Menzel, Rostow 'succumbed to the hubris of power' , in that he 
"believed he could not only define the world but also change it" (Menzel 2006: 213). This, in 
turn, made him a particularly controversial political figure and disquiet over his influence 
gained momentum in the wake of growing criticism over his theory for linear development 
and bias towards the Anglo-Saxon experience. It is within this context that we now turn our 
attention to dependency theory which, arguably, represented an antithesis to modernisation 
theory. 
2.3 Counter-discourse and dependency theory 
Dependency theory, which is most commonly associated with the Latin American 
region, can be identified as the counter-discourse to modernisation theory. As Slater 
comments, "the dependency perspectives that emanated and spread from Latin America to 
other parts of the periphery were part of a vital project of counter-representation" (2004: 
119). In contrast to modernisation theory, which tended to ignore the impact of power 
relationships on development, dependency theorists located underdevelopment as a direct 
consequence of the South's relationship with the North. This is a process termed by radical 
political economist Andre Gunder Frank as the 'development of underdevelopment' (see 
Frank 1969). In employing this phrase, Frank makes references to the suggested process by 
which the development of one area, i.e. the 'core' (or North), necessitates the 
underdevelopment of another, i.e. the 'periphery' (or South). According to this perspective, 
therefore, economic growth and development in the North is intrinsically linked to the 
extraction of key resources from the South. Within this context, power exists as a constant 
and the only thing that changes is its distribution. This understanding of dependency theory 
negates the possibility that power can be created from within and as a result it could be 
argued that, within this particular interpretation, dependency theory is a disempowering 
discourse. 
7 In this respect, one could suggest that the founding of the United States Agency for International Development, 
the Alliance for Progress, the Peace COIpS, the Development Assistance Committee, and the reorientation of the 
World Bank from post-war reconstruction aid to financing development, were rationalised and designed through 
modernisation theory (Menzel 2006: 215). 
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Although this discussion only provides a brief overview of the main tenets of 
development theory, it is important not to oversimplify dependency and ignore its important 
contribution to development discourse more broadly. For example, it critiqued and 
deconstructed the representation of the international system as being a dichotomy between 
the 'modem' and 'traditional', as portrayed within modernisation theory. For example 
Cardoso and Faletto (1979) identified the concepts of the modem and traditional as being 
insufficient in recognising specificity and the economic and cultural histories that countries 
contain (cited in Slater 2004: 122). Part of this process of critical deconstruction can be seen 
within the context of a more fundamental shift towards self-emancipation, through which 
countries of the South were able promote an identity driven from within and in doing so 
challenge northern dominance over the construction of knowledge. Ultimately, however, 
southern identity came to be dominated, throughout much of the latter part of the twentieth 
century, by the Cold War geopolitical order and this reinforced a dualistic construction of the 
world, through which the legitimacy for intervention by the North in the South was 
maintained and promoted. As a result, many Latin American countries became host to the 
ideological proxy wars of the Cold War era and development was frequently defined through 
the lens of this ideological battleground. 
2.4 Neoliberalism 
In the 1980s, something of a development impasse occurred within development 
thinking (Brown 2005: 105). This impasse was situated within the midst of escalating 
economic stagnation in Latin America. The inability of previous development paradigms to 
achieve sustainable and stable economic progress set the foundations for a coup in official 
development thinking, which took the form ofa 'neoliberal counter-revolution' (Toye 1987). 
This counter-revolution was indicative of a fundamental ideological shift, not in terms of how 
development was necessarily interpreted, i.e. its core meaning was still 'economic growth', 
but in terms of agency: 
"The neo-liberal position argued that the whole idea of bringing about development 
through directed state interventions within society was fundamentally misplaced and 
that development would only be achieved through the pursuit offree competition and 
the prioritization of market mechanisms" (Brown 2005: 107). 
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One could, therefore, argue that the neoliberal counter-revolution represented a "major 
assault on national developmentalism" (Oni~ and Senses 2005: 263), through which 
traditional identity was deconstructed and market forces strengthened, Within this context of 
shifting power relations, a 'new,8 model of development was advocated and the development 
lexicon came to be dominated by the concepts of 'market liberalism', 'outward-orientation' 
(ibid), and 'free-market democracy', 
The ideas associated with neoliberal discourse were swiftly adopted by the major 
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, 
indicative of both the influence and ideology of some governments in the North (such as 
Thatcherism and Reaganomics), Within the context of a spiralling debt crisis and 
disenchantment with traditional discourse, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) took 
the lead in providing financial assistance to the South. This was accompanied by a 
reprioritisation of goals in both the World Bank and IMF, as their agenda became orientated 
towards "protecting the integrity of the global financial system and guaranteeing interest 
payments" (Brown 2005: 109). The IFIs' elevation to the position of global financial 
regulators was accompanied by a shift in power, through which they became agencies of 
knowledge9, orientated towards the promotion of the neoliberal discourse across the South. 
Development policy in the South came to be dominated and, to a large extent, dictated by 
these institutions, which were able to exert substantial influence through the application of 
strict loan conditionalities. Of particular importance in this regard, were the highly 
controversial 'Structural Adjustment Programmes' 10 (SAPs), which stipulated structural 
changes in exchange for financial assistance. Whilst these programmes were presented as the 
panacea to the Latin American debt crisis, they were largely unsuccessful, drawing greatest 
criticism for their disregard for social programmes. Consequently, the SAPs did, in many 
cases, exacerbate existing levels of poverty and inequity, conditions that were already 
prevalent throughout many Latin American countries. 
8 One must be careful in applying 'new' to neoliberal discourse, as one could argue that it merely represents an 
extension of modernisation theory (see Kiely 1998). 
9 In chapter 7 section 7.3.1 we look at the push during the end of the 1990s towards promoting the World Bank 
as a 'knowledge bank'. 
10 These SAPs had five major components; stabilisation, privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation, and fiscal 
austerity (for further information see Brown 2005). 
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2.5 The emergence ofthe Washington Consensus 
Neoliberal ideology gained practical expression through the WC, replacing the 
previous Import-Substitution Industrialisation Strategies (ISIS)l1 that had been prevalent in 
many Latin American countries prior to the 1980s. Whilst the ISIS had dominated as the 
prevailing development paradigm in the region for many years, defects in this inward-looking 
model of economic growth became increasingly evident during the 1960s and 1970s, as many 
govemments were faced with spiralling costs and growing debts. Yet, despite the increasingly 
apparent flaws of the ISIS, some countries in Latin America, such as Brazil, proved reluctant 
to make the necessary adjustments and tumed instead to expanded foreign borrowing in an 
attempt to sustain domestic demand (Grilli 2005: 12, 13). Although this additional funding 
may have provided some temporary reprieve, the international debt crisis of the 1980S'2 
provided the real impetus for change. This situation set the foundations for a paradigmatic 
shift in development policy throughout Latin America, as the IFls began to demand market-
orientated reforms by governments in the region as a condition for granting credit (Hayami 
2003: 41). The SAPs, mentioned above, provided the mechanism for implementing these 
reforms and the WC constituted the conceptual and ideological framework through which 
they were exercised '3. 
2.5.1 Locating the Washington Consensus 
The Washington Consensus was a term first coined by the economist John 
Williamson at the end of the 1980s. It was initially used by Williamson to express "a list of 
policies that were widely held in Washington to be desirable in Latin America" (2004a: I). 
As such, the WC was not originally formulated as a policy prescription for development, but 
was nevertheless widely interpreted as being one. Over time, the consensus has been used in 
a variety of different ways to express competing ideas and agendas. In this respect the term 
'consensus' is somewhat misleading, as it suggests that there was/is conformity within 
11 Import-Substitution Industrialisation is a "development strategy by which a technologically backward [sic I 
economy tries to accelerate industrial investment primarily for the home market through heavy reliance on 
government manipUlation of market prices, barriers to entry and access to imports and finance" (Felix 1989: 
1455). 
12 According to Moreno-Brid et ai, this was "triggered by the reversal in the net financial transfers to Latin 
America, linked to a sharp increase in its foreign debt service combined with severely restricted access to 
external finance and the deterioration in its terms oftrade" (2004: 435). 
13 In this regard, the WC had a distinctly Latin American grounding although, as illustrated throughout this 
thesis, it would come to have universal applicability. 
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Washington D.C. towards development policy. In reality, however, the doctrine came to 
"obscure profound disagreements among the experts in Washington and elsewhere behind the 
facade of the consensus", disguising what, in effect, "were a multitude of very different 
reforms" (Nairn 2000: 506). In light ofthis situation, Nairn suggests that it may be more 
reasonable and realistic to talk about the Washington 'confusion'. Moreover, in the wake of 
such complexities it is hard to define exactly what the WC was/is and identify which 
interpretation of the consensus has been most significant in terms of influencing US 
development assistance. Consequently, this chapter now highlights what Williamson was 
referring to when he first coined the term 'Washington Consensus'. 
Williamson's original WC stipulated that there was a high measure of agreement in 
Washington that in, the majority of Latin American countries, ten policy actions were 
desirable. Table 2.1 below highlights what these entail. 
Table 2.1: The ten policy actions ofWilliamson's original consensus 
1. Budget deficits ... should be small enough to be financed without recourse to inflation tax. 
2. Public expenditure should be redirected from politically sensitive areas that receive more 
resources than their economic return can justify ... toward neglected fields with high 
economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary education 
and health, and infrastructure. 
3. Tax reform ... so as to broaden the tax base and cut marginal tax rates. 
4. Financial liberalization, involving an ultimate objective of market determined interest 
rates. 
5. A unified exchange rate at a level sufficiently competitive to induce a rapid growth in non-
traditional exports. 
6. Quantitative trade restrictions to be rapidly replaced by tariffs, which would be 
progressively reduced until a uniform low rate in the range of 10 to 20 percent was achieved. 
7. Abolition of barriers impeding the entry ofFDI (Foreign Direct Investment). 
8. Privatization of state enterprises. 
9. Abolition of regulations that impede the entry of new firms or restrict competition. 
10. The provision of secure property rights, especially to the informal sector. 
Source: Williamson (2004b: 196) 
From the policy actions presented above, it is possible to identify three general themes: 
macroeconomic (particularly fiscal) discipline, the deregulation and promotion of a market 
economy, and openness to the world economy (at least with respect to trade and foreign 
direct investment) (Clift 2003: 9). Whilst these policy areas are indicative ofneoliberal 
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ideology, one can contest the degree to which the original consensus, as presented above, was 
in fact neoliberal. For example, there is no reference to the idea of a minimalist state in the 
original consensus, which is a core tenet of the neoliberal agenda. Moreover, Williamson 
himself argues, as the following extract reveals, for greater differentiation between his 
consensus and neoliberalism, which is not surprising bearing in mind the bad press that 
neoliberalism and its associated SAPs have received over the years: 
"Audiences the world over seem to believe that this [the Washington Consensus} 
signifies a set of neo-liberal policies that have been imposed on hapless countries by 
the Washington-based international financial institutions and have led them to crisis 
and misery. There are people who cannot utter the term without foaming at the 
mouth ... Some of the most vociferous of today's critics of what they call the 
Washington Consensus, most prominently Joe Stiglitz (whose recent book, for 
example, specifically endorses gradual trade liberalization and carefully done 
privatization), do not object so much to the agenda laid out above as to the neo-
liberalism that they interpret the term as implying. I of course never intended my term 
to imply policies like capital account liberalization (as stated above, I quite 
consciously excluded that), monetarism, supply-side economics, or a minimal state 
(getting the state out of welfare provision and income redistribution), which I think of 
as quintessentially neo-liberal ideas ... If you mean what Joe Stiglitz means by it, then 
hardly anyone who cares about development would want to defend it" (Williamson 
2002). 
Although Williamson may debate the direct association between his original consensus and 
neoliberal orthodoxy, it is the reinterpretation of the consensus by others that has been most 
pervasive in shaping development policy and debate. In many ways, the WC acquired a 
second, broader connotation, moving beyond what may have been Williamson's initial 
intentions. It is this mutated version of the WC which arguably became the policy backbone 
of the IFIs, through which stabilisation and structural adjustment policies were pursued (Gore 
2000: 789) and the blueprint for economic growth in Latin American, and elsewhere in the 
world, established. 
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2.5.2 Critiguing the Washington Consensns 
As the failure of the SAPs to achieve positive and sustainable results became 
increasingly apparent among the development community, so too was there growing criticism 
over the WC and the policies it represents. Hayami (2003) identifies these criticisms as 
stemming from several observations: Firstly, the Latin American countries for which 
Williamson's initial intentions were focused were not able to sustain economic growth after 
their 'recovery' 14 from the debt crisis; secondly, the East Asian markets fell into crisis in the 
late 1990s following a major disruption in the financial market; and thirdly, the SAPs failed 
to deliver economic growth and reduced poverty in low-income countries. For example, Clift 
states that "around the world, 10 middle-income developing countries experienced major 
financial crises between 1994 and 1999 that damaged living standards and, in some cases, 
toppled governments and left millions worse off' (2003: 9). In the wake of such setbacks, it 
became clear that the WC was incomplete and largely incompatible with the complexities of 
Latin American cultures, politics and underlying power relations. Even its defendants came to 
recognise that the doctrine disregarded the role of institutions in economic development and 
"tended to minimise that of social policy" (Ocampo 2004: 294). As discussed below, the shift 
to the PWC aimed to rectify some of perceived misconceptions and omissions of the WC. 
2.6 The emergence ofthe Post-Washington Consensus 
The IFIs, which were seen by many to be the 'handmaidens ofthe consensus' (see 
Clift 2003), became a lightning rod for those individuals and groups unhappy with stagnant 
economic growth and growing social deprivation. In the wake of this growing discontent, the 
IFIs were faced with a crisis of confidence, as the inability of the SAPs to significantly 
reduce poverty through economic growth became more and more visible. This fuelled doubts 
over their neoliberal policy prescriptions, prompting rising criticism over the role of the IFIs 
and, in particular, the World Bank in development. By 1995 the World Bank found itselfin a 
highly compromised positionl5, with the fundamental tenets of the organisation's approach to 
'development' being called into question (Pender 2001). Faced with these difficulties, the 
14 One can question the degree to which these countries did, in fact, 'recover' from the debt crisis, as many were 
left with extremely fragile economies, an over-dependency on external assistance and, in the worse cases, civil 
war (as seen in Nicaragua). Indeed, the 1980s became widely known as the 'lost decade' in Latin America. 
15 This situation resulted from a combination of factors, such as; the 'Asian Miracle', the failure of the 
adjustments to deliver high and sustained growth in developing countries, and the Mexican crisis in 1994/95. 
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World Bank was left with little choice but to refonn, re-orientate itself and 'repackage' its 
policy outlook and practice. As a result, the emergence of the PWC can be located, in part, as 
an attempt by the IFI to replace the previous blueprint for development with a 'new and 
improved' one, whilst simultaneously looking to reinvent its image l6 in the wake of the 
SAP's failure 17• 
2.6.1 Examining the Post-Washington Consensus 
"By the first years of this millennium the Post-Washington Consensus has become 
firmly established as the principal guidepost to policies for developing economies" 
(Hayami 2003: 60). 
One could argue that a fundamental mistake of the wc was that it omitted the 
important role state institutions can play in regulating the economic sphere and implementing 
effective refonns (6ni~ and Senses 2000: 276). In contrast, the PWC rejected the state-versus 
market approach, promoting a more complimentary development process in which the state 
and market work together (Harriss 2002: 78). This dramatic shift in emphasis towards the 
state came to be reflected in the activities of international donor organisations and the way in 
which foreign aid is utilised. For example, in an interview held with the Department for 
International Deve!opmentl8 (DflD) in Nicaragua, I was told the following: 
" ... a lot of the work we do is actually less on the implementation of policies and more 
on the working structures ... to ensure that the machine works. So, things like public 
financial management and good financial management, which are mandatory no 
matter what policy you have" (research interview with Michelle WinthropI9). 
16 According to Caufield, the fact that the World Bank has "survived more than half a century of dramatic global 
and political changes is due largely to its ability to redefine itself' (1996: 2). Chapter 7, examining the 
relationship between the MCA and poverty reduction, explores this issue further, and analyses the World Bank's 
transition to an apparent 'knowledge bank' (see section 7.3.1). 
17 As demonstrated below, however, although the PWC does depart in several ways from the previous 
consensus, it nevertheless holds on to its central tenets, i.e. pursuing macroeconomic stability, opening up 
markets and the deregulating the economy. 
IS DflD, previously known as the Overseas Development Association, is the department within the British 
govermnent that is primarily responsible for promoting international development. 
19 Michelle Winthrop, Growth and Private Sector Advisor in DflD-Nicaragua - Interview held in Managua on 5th 
May 2006. 
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The 'East Asian Miracle2o, was particularly influential in promoting this re-evaluation of role 
of the state by the IFIs and their sponsors. As Pender notes, success in the Asian economies 
had little to do with World Bank policy prescription. In fact the World Bank actually 
modified its "view of the state's role in development as a consequence" (2001: 400). The East 
Asian Miracle can, therefore, be seen as playing a key part in the shift towards the PWC. 
2.6.2 The Post-Washington Consensus: Prioritising poverty reduction? 
In addition to re-evaluating the role of the state in development, the PWC located 
poverty reduction as an "immedia~e objective of development assistance, rather than as a 
consequence of the economic growth the assistance in designed to stimulate" (Hayami 2003: 
57). A fundamental flaw of the SAPs was that they left the task of poverty reduction to the 
anticipated trickle-down effect of economic growth which, as history dictates, failed to 
translate into realityl. Indeed, these programmes greatly underestimated the complex 
realities faced by many countries in the South, especially in Latin America where inequality 
is widespread and power tends to be concentrated in the hands of the economic and political 
elite. The shift towards 'pro-poor' development was very much evident in the creation of 
eight Millennium Development Goals22 (MDGs) in 2000, the first of which aims to reduce 
the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day and those who suffer from hunger 
byhalfbetween 1990 and 2015 (see the United Nations website). Furthermore, no specific 
targets were set in terms of economic growth and this is indicative of this apparent transition 
towards prioritising poverty reduction within development. 
In addition to reflecting this pro-poor shift, the creation of the MDGs bore witness to 
the elevation of concepts such as 'selectivity', 'ownership' and 'participation' within 
development policy and practice. This process was synonymous with a more fundamental 
change in awareness over the effectiveness of aid and how best to achieve results. Of 
20 From 1965 to 1990 the 23 economies of East Asia grew faster than all other regions of the world and this was 
marked by a substantial improvement in the standard of living, and advances in a host of other economic and 
social indicators. In most of the economies the government intervened systematically to 'foster growth' (see 
World Bank 1993 for further detail). 
21 Hayami states that "in the heyday of SAP, from 1987 to 1996, the number of people living below the poverty 
line of one US dollar per day in Sub-Saharan Africa increased by one third, and nearly half the total population 
continued to live below this poverty threshold" (2003: 55). 
22 The MDGs were agreed upon at the United Nations Millennium Surnmit in September 2000 and roughly 190 
UN member states signed on to them. They consist of eight key goals, which are to be met by 2015, ranging 
from halving global poverty to tackling discrimination against women. 
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particular importance in this regard, was the World Bank report produced in 1998 called 
'Assessing Aid: What works and what doesn't' which, as revealed later in this thesis, was 
highly influential in shaping the core principles underlying the MCA. This document 
encapsulated the World Bank's 'new' and 'improved' vision for development in the South, 
through which the principles of the PWC could be extended with universal applicability. In 
particular, this report recommended that donors adopt performance-based aid systems, in 
which developing countries would be rewarded for pursuing 'sound policy environments'. 
However, whilst on the one hand this transition towards greater selectivity may represent an 
innovative approach to delivering assistance, on the other it can be identified as a new phase 
in 'conditionality' which, as discussed below, was the hallmark of the WC and its associated 
SAPs. In light of this, the extent to which the PWC truly represents a departure from 
neoliberal discourse can, as emphasised by the following extract, be debated:' 
"This shift [towards the PWCj should not be seen as a reversal of the structural 
adjustment policies which characterised the Washington consensus. Rather, it can be 
argued that the PWC should be more properly viewed as an attempt to develop a 
political institutionalframework to embed the structural adjustment poliCies of the 
Washington consensus" (Jayasuriya 2001: 1). 
2.7 Promoting 'good governance' through aid 
The introduction of the concept of' good governance' to the field of international 
development is relatively recent. Indeed, it first surfaced towards the end of the 1980s in the 
World Bank's report on Sub-Saharan Africa, which talked about a 'crisis of governance' 
(World Bank 1989). Since then, it has come to dominate development lexicon and arguably 
constitutes one of the PWC's most defining features. Moreover, its emergence is illustrative 
of the recognition that the state, as discussed in section 2.6.1, has an incisive and positive role 
to play in development. Yet despite the concept's widespread use, there is still much 
ambiguity regarding what good governance actual entails: 
"A id practitioners have not yet been able to articulate an unambiguous and 
operational definition of the concept. A variety of definitions, greatly differing in 
scope, rationale and objectives, have been advanced. This multitude of definitions has 
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generated an increasing confusion regarding the boundaries of the concept" (Santiso 
2001a: 4). 
It is clear that the way in which governance, or more specifically what constitutes good 
governance, is interpreted and perceived varies significantly, with the concept meaning 
different things to different people at different times. In this respect, it is a very subjective 
term, with past attempts at defining 'good' or 'bad' governance having limited success. 
However, bearing in mind the World Bank's significant global influence, its tendency to 
preach doctrine, and the propensity of other donors to follow the bank's lead, it is useful now 
to set out how the World Bank defines governance. One of the most cited World Bank 
definitions is taken from its report on 'Governance and Development', in which it describes 
governance as "the manner in which power is exercised in management of a country's 
economic and social resources" (1992:52). Ifwe accept this definition, then one clearly 
cannot ignore the concept's political inference. However, as the following discussion reveals, 
this presents a real dilemma for the World Bank and IMF' which, according to their 
'traditional mandates', are supposed to be apolitical23. 
2.7.1 The World Bank and the good governance agenda 
An image of political neutrality is extremely important to an organisation such as the 
World Bank, which has one-hundred and eighty-five member countries, thousands of 
multinational staff and a global presence. In is not surprising, therefore, that in promoting 
'good governance' the World Bank has tended to focus on the economic dimensions ofthe 
concept, thereby embracing the 'functionalist logic' that "economic and technical questions 
can be separated from politics,,24 (B0as cited in Santiso 2001a: 6). Arguably, by targeting 
assistance at areas such as public administration, rule oflaw, and transparency and 
accountability, which are located as the "major elements to ensure economic growth and 
development", it has been able to maintain, to a degree, this apolitical image whilst pursuing 
governance reform (Nanda 2006: 274). Consequently, the World Bank has not explicitly 
questioned issues such as the 'legitimacy of government', nor the equitability of the 
23 Whilst this neutral image has been a very significant part of the World Bank's identity and perceived 
legitimacy, various scholars have, as Miller-Adams suggests, "made the case that the World Bank has never 
been as apolitical as it maintains" (1999: 23). 
24 Robinson, however, argues that "the separation of the political and the socioeconomic is an illusion, since the 
concentration of economic resources leads to the concentration of political power" (2007:34). Greater 
consideration is given to this relationship later in the following chapters. 
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economic/social system25. According to Santiso, the "quality of governance is ultimately 
attributable to its democratic content", with neither one being sustainable without the other 
(2001a: 2). One could, therefore, argue that the World Bank, restricted by its mandate, has 
tended to ignore the more fundamental issues of power, wealth and control, in formulating 
and pursuing good governance policy. Indeed, whilst defining governance in terms of the 
'exercise of power' in managing a country's resources, it gives little consideration to the way 
in which control over these resources is accumulated, maintained and concentrated by a 
country's political and economic elite. 
2.7.2 Good governance: Conditionality re-packaged? 
As stated earlier, a major flaw of the SAPs was that they greatly underestimated the 
complexities and intricacies of developing countries and, in doing so, failed to challenge the 
status quo through which power and wealth has been distributed. Whilst the 'good 
governance' agenda of the World Bank does place greater emphasis on a country's internal 
dynamics, it does not, as mentioned above, go beyond the realm ofpolicy;26 the reform of 
which continues to be defined through the lens of neoliberalism. Indeed, conditionalities, 
which as mentioned earlier were a defining feature of the WC, continue to play a key role in 
ensuring policy compliance in the South. Ultimately, 'good governance', however ambiguous 
and debated the concept may be, has become the means by which agencies, such as the World 
Bank, have been able to exert new aid conditionalities based upon the perceived performance 
and effectiveness of countries in the South. This situation is indicative of the shift towards 
greater selectivity in the delivery of aid which, despite suggestions to the contrary27, 
represents a new phase of proactive-conditionality. More specifically, pro-active 
conditionality, commonly referred to as 'pre-emptive development' (see Soederberg 2004), 
has ensured that many countries wishing to access loans or grants meet a range of criteria 
before they can become eligible for assistance. This approach is, as discussed later in the 
thesis, very much evident in the framework of the MeA, in which financial assistance is 
2l As discussed earlier, one of the key reasons for the monumental failure of the SAPs to promote development 
was that they greatly ignored the complexities of Latin American society and the underlying power relations that 
dictate society's characteristics. 
26 According to Santiso, the World Bank's approach to governance is one of 'extricating policy from politics' 
(200Ia: 6) and, as illustrated later in this thesis, the MCA appears to adopt a similar mentality. 
27 For example Chhotray and Hulme talk about the 'abandonment of conditionality' and the 'adoption of 
selectivity' (2007: 4). 
21 
Chapter 2: Development discourse, the Washington Consensus and the Post-Washington Consensus 
granted as a reward for 'good behaviour,28. Furthennore, the growing tendency of donor 
organisations to work with the 'best perfonners' in development reflects the transition 
towards a strongly results-driven agenda, in which the emphasis is increasingly placed on 
getting the greatest 'bang for buck,29. 
2.7.3 Good governance and neoliberalism 
The extent to which good governance, a central tenet of the new consensus on 
development, does in fact represent a real departure from traditional discourse is, for reasons 
outlined above, debateable. By locating the govermnents and policies of developing countries 
as being culpable for the failure ofthe WC, the IFIs have been able to reinforce their position 
within the field of development, whilst at the same time paving the way for "institutional and 
political refonns through aid conditionaIities in the borrowing countries" (Singh 2004: np). 
According to this perspective, therefore, "it was not the neoliberal model that was to blame 
for the lack of progress but rather the immature, corrupt and inefficient state administrations" 
(Demmers et a12004: 1). In this respect, governance policy provided an incisive mechanism 
with which to embed neoliberal discourse in the South, ensuring that governments pursue and 
adopt the 'right' policies. The current emphasis placed on 'fighting corruption' in the South30 
is, in many ways, complicit with this agenda and provides "a convenient explanation as to 
why the pro-market economic refonns of the past two decades in the South have not borne 
the fruit that they were supposed to" (Brown and Cloak 2004: 273). Moreover, this crusade 
against corruption has gained momentum within the post 9/11 environment, in which threats 
to national security are increasingly seen as emanating from so called 'failed states' and 
weakly governed regions. According to the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) for example, countries will only "assume responsibility for their own 
28 This notion of rewarding good behaviour was very much evident in the 2006 US National Security Strategy 
(NSS) and represents a clear example of the infantilisation referred to earlier, in which the South is basically 
treated as a child needed guidance and discipline: "Long-term development must include encouraging 
governments to make wise choices and assisting them in implementing those choices. We will encourage and 
reward good behaviour rather than reinforce negative behaviour. Ultimately it is the countries themselves that 
must decide to take the necessary steps toward development, yet we will help advance this process by creating 
external incentives for governments to reform themselves" (NSS 2006: 33). 
29 Indeed, the current Bush administration's agenda for 'transformational' policy is, as the following chapter 
reveals, illustrative of this reality 
JO The global 'crusade' against corruption in the South has been spearheaded by the World Bank, which locates 
it as a major threat to 'development': "Today one of the biggest threats to development in many countries is 
corruption. It weakens fundamental systems, it distorts markets, and it encourages people to apply their skills 
and energies in non-productive ways. In the end governments and citizens will pay a price, a price in lower 
incomes [and] lower investment" (Wolfowitz 2006: np). 
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security" through building "good policies, stable institutions and local capacity" (2004: 5) 
and this association has, as revealed below, prompted a convergence between US security 
concerns and development policy. 
2.8 The new security agenda and development policy 
Since 9/11 there has been a fundamental shift within US international development 
priorities, in which foreign assistance has become increasing allied to a broader strategy of 
combating terrorism. Indeed, 'development' is now located as one of the three pillars of the 
US NSS and this convergence has been witnessed in practice by the aligning of USA ID's 
"foreign assistance and foreign policy objectives and resources" with the State Department 
(Natsios 2004: 3). The following extract sheds further light on this situation: 
"Given many threats to national security in the post-Cold War, post-9/JJ world, u.s. 
Joreign assistance must address more than humanitarian and developmental goals. 
Conditions oJ instability and insecurity that arise Jrom terrorism, transnational crime, 
Jailing states, and global disease must be mitigated Jor sustained economic and social 
development to take root andflourish" (USAID 2004: 5) 
This joining of development and security concerns is reminiscent of the speech made by 
President Truman in 1949 in which he stated that: 
"More than half the people in the world are living in conditions approaching misery. 
Their Jood is inadequate. They are victims oJ disease. Their economic life is primitive 
and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more 
prosperous areas" (Truman, cited in Rist 1997: 71). 
Both extracts identify threat as emanating from the 'third world other', although there is a 
subtle difference. Whereas Truman relates threat as stemming from conditions associated 
with 'underdevelopment' such as food scarcity, disease and economic stagnation, USAID 
identifies threat in much more specific terms as originating from the conditions of 'instability 
and insecurity' created through the existence ofterrorism. This is important, as it ultimately 
shifts the emphasis placed on development away from a position of combating poverty, to a 
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position of combating terrorism. Whereas poverty and what it constitutes is somewhat open 
to debate, there is nonetheless a universal consensus that poverty does exist and is expressed 
through, for example, a lack of basic services, low living standards, high infant mortality and 
so on. On the other hand, the attachment or designation of the 'terrorist' label is far more 
subjective. As the saying goes, one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. 
Consequently, the persuasiveness and pervasiveness of such a label is inextricably linked to 
what is referred to Foucault as the 'powerlknowledge nexus' in discourse, which is explored 
in much greater detail in the following chapter. 
2.8.1 The dangers of convergence 
There are some obvious concerns regarding the convergence between development 
assistance and broader US security objectives. For example, there is danger that the popular 
'with us or against us' mentality found within prevailing US ideology will be applied to a 
development context. If this happens then assistance may well be biased towards those 
countries which are seen as 'friends' of the US. Indeed several examples are revealed whilst 
examining the MCA in the following chapter, where political considerations appear to have 
influenced eligibility within the initiative, reinforcing the need to examine the "intersection 
between politics and development policy" (research interview with Manuel Orozc031 ). 
Furthermore, there is a tendency, as highlighted at various times during this thesis, for 
countries in the South and policy-makers alike, to couch development issues in terms of 
'combating terrorism' in order to secure additional funding at a time when US security 
interests are dominating the political landscape. In Latin America, for example, US officials 
in charge of policy towards the region have increasingly sought attention and resources by 
"lumping a broad range of issues together in the counterterrorism - and narcoterrorist -
basket" (Youngers and Rosin 2004: 9). Whilst this might help secure additional support in the 
short-term, it helps to perpetuate a discourse in which the value of development is 
increasingly measured by its ability to combat perceived threat. Moreover, this could be 
counter-productive in the long run in terms of combating poverty, in which the distribution of 
foreign assistance may no longer be defined in terms of need, but by broader US security 
concerns. 
JI Manuel Orozco, Senior Associate and Director of Remittances and Development at the Inter-American 
Dialogue - Interview held in Washington D.C. on 4th October 2005. 
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Conclusions 
In concluding, it is important to emphasise that the purpose of this chapter was not to 
analyse the intricacies of development discourse and doctrine, but to provide the foundation 
for discussions to come, Indeed, many of the themes explored here are expanded upon and 
developed throughout this thesis, presenting additional complexities and twists to the 
discussion, 
This chapter began by looking at a famous speech made by President Truman in 1949, 
in which the meaning of development was profoundly altered by relating it to 
'underdevelopment'. This paradigmatic moment in development discourse set the staging 
ground for 'modernisation theory', a school of thought in which western experience was 
located as the panacea to underdevelopment. It gained much sway within US foreign policy, 
providing the 'legitimacy' for interventions in the South during the 1950s and 1960s. The 
prevailing geopolitical landscape was particularly important in this regard, as it established 
the precedence for implementing development policY2. Dependency theory, which emerged 
in Latin America, contested the notion that there was a positive relationship between the 
'core' and 'periphery' and, in doing so, helped to deconstruct traditional representations of 
the South. Although this did undoubtedly provide a valuable insight into Latin American 
underdevelopment, it nevertheless fell into the same trap as modernisation theory, in that they 
both tried to create universally applicable theories (Moles 1999: 7). 
By analysing the succession of development discourse in Latin America, this chapter 
set the foundation for the focus of this discussion, the WC and the PWC. The WC, which 
emerged as a response to the crippling debt crisis of the 1980s, provided the conceptual 
framework through which strict market-orientated reforms, stipulated by the IFIs, would be 
enacted. Although originally emanating as part of the so called neoliberal counter-revolution 
in Latin America, these SAPs were soon imposed on other parts of the world with little or no 
regard for social policy or country complexities. Whilst, as already stated, these programmes 
were presented as the answer to the South's underdevelopment, they had very little success, 
prompting fierce criticism over the IFIs and their policy prescriptions. In this respect, it is not 
32 Arguably, this reality bears witness to the fact that development is a highly dynamic phenomenon, with its 
meaning being moulded and shaped according broader geopolitical interests. This is very much evident today in 
the convergence between development policy and security concerns. 
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surprising that the PWC arose when it did. Indeed, it presented the World Bank with the 
opportunity to redefine itself and its policy at a time when confidence was low and it was 
facing a crisis of legitimacy. A particularly important process in this transitional phase was 
the emergence ofthe 'good governance' agenda, through which new forms of conditionality 
have been imposed on countries in the South. By locating the failure of past programmes with 
the state, the World Bank and its sponsors have been able to divert attention away from their 
own failures, whilst continuing to promulgate a model of development that is defined and 
shaped through the lens of neoliberalism. 
Finally, this chapter has illustrated that in order to understand the contemporary 
conditions shaping development policy and the distribution offoreign assistance, one must 
look beyond traditional development discourse and growth paradigms, to embrace a more 
fundamental understanding ofthe interchange between geopolitics and development policy. 
The following chapter, which explores the MCA and its various dimensions, adds weight to 
this suggestion and presents concrete examples of how the initiative has been affected by 
broader political considerations following the tragic events of9/ll. 
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Chapter 3: United States Foreign Assistance and the 
Millennium Challenge Account 
The previous chapter looked at the changes in development discourse over the last 
fifty to sixty years and, in doing so, placed a particular emphasis on the Latin American 
experience. It set the basic theoretical backdrop to contemporary United States (US) 
development assistance, within which we can locate the Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA). The MCA, broadly speaking, can be seen as a construct of the Post-Washington 
Consensus (PWC) and its associated thinking, with its creation being indicative of a shift in 
the way that foreign development assistance is delivered by the US. More specifically, the 
MCA symbolises a reaction to the perceived failures of past efforts and general 
disenchantment regarding the effectiveness of US development assistance. As argued by 
Clark, "all of the MCA innovations are designed to answer longstanding criticisms within the 
development community of assistance effectiveness" (2005: 32). However, the extent to 
which the MCA represents a clear and fundamental departure away from the core tenets of 
traditional development discourse is debateable. Chapter 2 highlighted this point more 
generally with regard to the PWC and its association with neoliberal ideology, arguing that 
although the PWC does offer a somewhat new approach to the delivery of foreign 
development assistance, it does so whilst continuing to hold on to essentially neoliberal ideas. 
In following on from that discussion, this chapter focuses more specifically on the MCA, 
what it involves and how it differs from traditional US aid programmes. Before doing this, 
however, the chapter locates US foreign assistance within a general framework of power. 
3.1 Understanding 'power' 
'Power' is a concept that is constantly being re-evaluated, repackaged and reinvented, 
and as a result is in a perpetual state of flux. This discussion does not attempt to unravel the 
myriad of ideas and interpretations of power, other than recognise that these complexities 
exist. Instead this section looks at the concept of power from a geographical perspective and, 
more specifically, through the lens of 'geopolitics'. 
It is important to recognise in starting this discussion that just as the concept of power 
is plagued by ambiguity, so too is there a profound haziness regarding both the interpretation 
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and meaning of geopolitics. As Agnew and Corbridge (1995) comment in their influential 
book 'Mastering Space', there is in fact little agreement as to geopolitics' precise meaning 
and influence. This stems from an array of potential factors, ranging from the contamination 
of 'geopolitics' through, for example, the historical 'misuse' of the German school of 
'Geopolitik' by the Nazi-regime (see Mamadouh 1998), to the necessity for geopolitical 
thought to evolve in the wake of profound changes to the global world order, as witnessed by 
the end of the Cold War: 
"At first glance the end of the Cold War, the deepening of 'globalisation ' and the de-
territorializing consequences of the new informational technologies seem to have 
driven a stake into the heart of geopolitics" (0 Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 1)33. 
Arguably, the fall of the Berlin represented the disintegration of 'traditional' geopolitical 
understanding about meaning and identity across global political space and, furthermore, 
marked the end of an era that had been dominated by the subordinating geopolitics of the 
Cold War. This global drama that had' eclipsed all others' had finally ended and the 
'geopolitical architecture' of the world was transformed (Luke 1996: 491). Fukuyama's 
pronunciation of the 'end of history' was indicative of this sense of finality, although his 
positivistic view on western liberal democracy was not without significant contestation (see 
Dodds 2000: 6, 8). Arguably, the collapse of the pervasive and persuasive geopolitical Cold 
War discourse created a sort of intellectual vacuum or, more specifically, a space of 
awakening for the construction of new alternative visions of global space, such as 
Huntington's 'clash of civilisations,34 and, as already alluded to, Fukuyama's 'end of history' 
thesis35 (0 Tuathail and Dalby 1998: I). Although these were two very different 
3J It could be argued, as illustrated later, that there has been another dramatic shift following the events of 9/1 I. 
This shift is specifically examined in section 4.4.10 of chapter 4, which looks at how 9/11 has affected US-Latin 
American relations. 
34 Huntington's approach to the 'new' geopolitics of the post-Cold War era is exemplified in the following 
extract taken from his influential essay entitled 'The Clash of Civilisations?': "It is my hypothesis that the 
ftmdamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The 
great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will 
remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between 
nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault 
lines between civilisations will be the battle lines of the future" (Huntington 1993: I). 
J5 The end of the Cold War also coincided with the highly popularised 'end of geography' thesis. As Yeung 
discusses, "this thesis argues that the juggernaut of globalisation, as a planetary force, is capable of penetrating 
all kinds of national boundaries and eroding any geographical differences therein. The convergence effects of 
globalisation are so strong that there is no place for geography in the processes of global change" (2002: np). 
Like Fukuyama's 'end of history thesis', this interpretation has been heavily critiqued, especially within human 
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interpretations of the post-Cold War order, it is argued that the theme unifying both 
approaches was their profoundly 'anti-geographical' stance, which ignored the "complex 
geographies of world politics" (see Dodds 2000: 11-15). Furthermore, in response to the 
apparent legitimacy given to Huntington's thesis following the events of9/11, Edward Said 
wrote a particularly scathing article entitled 'The Clash ofIgnorance' in which he called 'The 
Clash of Civilisations' a gimmick like 'The War of the Worlds'. Said identified Huntington 
as an 'ideologist' who wants to make 'civilisations' and 'identities' into what they are not-
"shut-down, sealed-off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and counter 
currents that animate human history ... " (2001: np). The work of critical geopolitical writers 
presents a useful entry point with which to begin deconstructing such representations of the 
world order and recognises the important interplay between power-knowledge and 
social/political relations (Dodds 2000: 33). 
3.1.1 Critical geopolitics 
Critical geopolitics can be defined as "a school of thought which explores the 
meanings, forms of representation and symbolic contestation of the geopolitical world and 
the discourses which underpin the production and reproduction ofthe meanings of 
geopolitical space" (Johnston et a12000: 311). It has been influenced to a large extent by 
postmodernism, which has sought to deconstruct the grand claims and grand theories of the 
modem era and, more specifically with regard to the discussion here, questioned the 
"epistemological limits of the ethnocentric practices underpinning Cold War geopolitics" (6 
Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 2). It is not surprising, bearing in mind the fact that 'plurality' is 
endemic to postmodemism, that the analytical framework of critical geopolitics is derived 
from many different sources including "discourse analysis, international political economy, 
feminist approaches and post-modem social theory" (Dodds 2000: 34). Arguably, however, 
the greatest influence on critical geopolitics has been the insistence by Foucault that one must 
explore the 'power-knowledge nexus' in discourse. As stated by Agnew, "knowledge is 
always situated in specific historical-intellectual contexts and power relationships that colour 
both approaches and interpretations" (2002: 7). As such, far from being viewed as a neutral 
technique or 'device for viewing the world', geopolitics is now seen within critical 
geopolitics as a discourse that may be used to represent the world in particular ways (Dodds 
geography, in which it is contested that "despite the accelerated processes of globalization, national boundaries 
still matterin the decision-making and global reach of capital" (Yeung 1998: 291). 
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2000: 34). This recognition coincides with the realisation by critical geopolitical writers that 
the notion of a detached and objective'researcher is a fallacy, with approaches to 
understanding world politics being self-consciously situated within a body of assumptions 
about the world (ibid). Therefore, a defining contribution of the geopolitical approach to our 
understanding of the world order is that it provides an insight in to how global space may be 
'constructed' and 'represented' in multiple ways to reflect and legitimise particular 
geopolitical interests. As 6 Tuathail and Dalby argue, "critical geopolitics bears witness to 
the irredeemable plurality of space and the multiplicity of possible political constructions of 
space" (1998: 3). 
3.1.2 Power and space 
John Allen's work analysing the geographies of power provides an interesting insight 
into this discussion of geopolitics by looking at the interplay between 'power' and 'space'. 
Allen states that "power is inherently spatial and, conversely, spatiality is imbued with 
power" (2003: 3). As discussed below, there are many different tyPes and modalities of 
power, and each one is uniquely constituted in both time and space. Therefore, it is important 
to keep in mind that 'power', in whatever form, is heavily influenced by the factors of 'reach, 
proximity and presence' (ibid: 190). Moreover, there has been a tendency, particularly within 
,orthodox accounts of power, to simply equate 'power' with 'domination' and use power and 
domination interchangeably, with little or no regard for the concepts' multifacetedness. 
Reducing our understanding to such a monolithic interpretation not only masks the 
complexities of power as exercised at all scales and levels of society, but it is also counter-
productive in that it reinforces a discourse that places the 'dominated' in a powerless and 
subordinated position. As Sharp et al discuss, "power should not be viewed solely as an 
attribute of the dominant, expressed as coercion or political control, since it is also present in 
the ability to resist" (2000: 3). Furthermore, Sharp et al distinguish 'dominating power' as 
that power which attempts to control or coerce others, to impose will, and/or manipulate the 
consent of others, and 'resisting power' as that power which attempts to establish situations, 
groupings and actions to 'resist' the impositions of dominating power (ibid). However, the 
idea of power existing as a duality in which a line is drawn between those doing the 
'dominating' and those 'resisting' is arguably somewhat simplistic. Consequently, the 
following section applies the concept of 'hegemony' to help us challenge some of the over-
simplifications identified in the preceding literature. 
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3.1.3 Geopolitics and hegemony 
'Hegemony' is a term derived from the prison writings of Antonio Gramsci (1971) 
and can be defined as folIows: 
"The capacity of a dominant group to exercise control, not through visible regulation 
or the deployment of force, but rather through the willing acquiescence of citizens to 
accept subordinate status by their acceptance of cultural, social and political 
practices and institutions that are unequal and unjust" (Johnston et al 2000: 332). 
As a concept it has, as indicated above, been traditionalIy associated with the state, often 
referring to the way in which power is manipulated at quite local levels. However, since these 
initial writings alternative discourses have arisen around hegemony, with its original meaning 
being expanded and extended to reflect a variety of interests and conditions. In this regard, it 
is the literature on the so called 'Great Powers', which included Great Britain in the mid 
nineteenth century and the US from 1945 to the 1970s (Agnew 1998: 10), that presents the 
most useful point of entry with which to frame our understanding of hegemony here. Agnew 
argues that the dominant representations and practices constituting the modem geopolitical 
imagination have overwhelmingly been those of the political elites of Great Powers, i.e., 
"those states and empires most capable of imposing themselves and their views on the rest of 
the world" (ibid: 9). At anyone time within this privileged grouping, a single state can be 
number one, i.e. the 'hegemon', and this state is able to play the lead role in laying down and 
enforcing the 'rules of the game'. 
Although countries have often been the 'agents' of hegemony, there is no requirement 
stating that any given 'geopolitical order' must be dominated by a single state (Agnew and 
Corbridge 1995: 17). Consequently, hegemony can exist without having a hegemonic state 
and this is arguably the case in the post-Cold War epoch. The fall of the Soviet Union 
represented the formal end point for the Cold War geopolitical order, with the US emerging 
as victor and unrivalIed world hyperpower. However, it is debateable as to whether, in this 
new world order, the US actualIy constitutes a dominant state hegemon. Instead, it could be 
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argued that 'transnational liberalism ,36 stands as the hegemonic ideology of this epoch, 
constituting the belief that "universal progress lies in the expansion and extension of 
capitalist markets across the globe" (0 Tuathail 1998: 19). William Robinson's 
conceptualisation of 'polyarchy' provides a useful mechanism for exploring this reality 
further. 
3.1.4 Polyarchy and hegemonic ideology 
In adopting the concept ofpolyarchy, Robinson draws upon 'World-Systems 
Theory,37 and a neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony in international relations (Stahler-
Sholk 2000: 134). He argues that the shift in the US to promoting 'democracy' during the 
1980s and 1990s, as seen most vividly in the case of Central and Latin America, represents a 
new ideology for the promotion and protection oftransnationaI interests. In the era of 
economic globalisation 'democracy promotion' has, according to Robinson's interpretation, 
been used to legitimise states adopting neoliberal reforms, endorsing a model of 
'development' in which "a small group actually rules, and mass participation in decision 
making is confined to choosing leaders in elections that are carefully managed by competing 
elites" (Robinson 2000: 43). Polyarchy can therefore be understood as part and parcel of 
'transnationalliberalism', a hegemonic ideology in which the US remains an undeniably 
important sponsor and actor, but not necessarily a hegemon itself. This situation reinforces 
Agnewand Corbridge's statement that "there is always hegemony, but there are not always 
hegemons" (1995: 17). This realisation calls into question the fundamental tenets of modem 
geopolitical imagination, which has tended to focus on the state, necessitating the re-
evaluation and reinterpretation of space to take into account a frequently changing and 
evolving world economy. Nevertheless, although one could and should question the extent to 
which the US is a global hegemon, the power it exerts and exercises across global space 
continues to be unsurpassed by any other state. Indeed, as AlIen comments, "the mix of awe 
36 By way of further clarification, Routledge describes 'transnationalliberalism' as follows: "Transnational 
liberalism celebrates capital mobility and 'fast capitalism', the decentralization of production away from 
developed states and the centralisation of control of the world economy in the hands oftransnational 
corporations and their allies in key government agencies (particularly those of the seven most powerful 
countries, the G-7), large international banks, and institutions like the World Bank, the IMF and the World 
Trade Organization" (1998: 252). 
37 World-Systems Theory is defmed as a "materialist approach to the study of social change developed by 
Immanuel Wallerstein" (Johnston et a12000: 901). 
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and fear that the US generates in equal measure as the world's only hyperpower tells us pretty 
quickly where power lies" (2004: 19). 
3.1.5 Examining the 'entanglements of power' 
It is important here to reinforce the fact that power is as much about resistance as it is 
about domination. As Sharp et ai's work looking at the 'entanglements of power' suggests, 
expressions of power are far from separate, but are in fact overlapped and entangled. For 
example, it is argued that power is entangled within the state, with 'resistances' existing 
between various state apparatus38 (Sharp et al 2000: 7). Furthennore, in exploring the 
interplay between the various modalities of power one cannot ignore the political processes 
occurring at a wide range of scales, from the very local to the international. Routledge's 1996 
essay on 'Critical Geopolitics and the Terrains of Resistance' looks at the role of social 
movements in challenging state-centred notions of hegemony and provides an insight into 
how critical geopolitics can promote a more radical understanding of the 'political' at a scale 
other than global. Of particular interest in this respect, is the fact that hegemony is a dynamic 
process, with the individuals involved - including both the dominant and resistant elements-
and the terrain upon which they struggle, always. shifting (Routledge 1996: 511). 
Within this context, therefore, hegemony can thus be viewed as "an active site upon 
which the contestation between forces of resistance and domination are enacted" (ibid). 
Moreover, Routledge refers to what he tenns the 'terrains of resistance' to further 
contextualise our understanding ofhegemonic and counter-hegemonic powers and 
discourses, with each 'terrain' combining a 'political praxis' that includes politics occurring 
at both a micro and macro level (1996: 17). Consequently hegemony is a dynamic 
phenomenon and is as much about resistances as it is about the various fonns of domination 
(and indeed it tends to go beyond this simple dichotomy). Therefore, it can not be truly 
understood from a purely international geopolitical perspective, as events happening at a 
range of scales, from the local to the global, are also important. Indeed, this will be illustrated 
multiple times throughout the thesis. For now, however, we return to the issue that pre-
38 This point will be exemplified further in the following chapter looking at the history of US foreign policy 
towards Central America and the frequent conflict within the US state apparatus between Congress and the 
Executive. 
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empted this discussion on power and focus on the current geopolitical order in which the 
MCA is being implemented and exercised in practice. 
3.1.6 Post 9/11: A new geopolitical order? 
As mentioned above, the end of the Cold War brought with it a crisis of identity 
within the sphere of geopolitics and catalysed the formation of new ideas regarding the 
organisation of space within a new world order. In a similar fashion, the events of9/11 also 
led to a total re-ordering and re-organisation of global politics, with the 'War Against Terror' 
replacing communism as the "catalytic motivation and ideological frame for a resurgent 
United States" (Dodds 2005: 3). The Bush Doctrine has arguably become the face of this new 
geopolitical order and put into practice a new phase of unilateral interventionism, justifying 
the use of preventative US military measures to deal with perceived 'threat', even if that 
'threat' is not yet established or imminent. Although combating 'Weapons of Mass 
Destruction' (WMDs) was the most visible expression of intent, control of the world oil 
supply by countries such as Iraq was also undeniably seen as a 'threat' to US interests 
(enhancing energy supply was mentioned explicitly in the US' NSS 2002). That being said, 
such developments have not gone unchallenged and it is important to emphasise that in this 
post 9/11 world new ideas are being formed and propagated about the organisation of 
political space, and the exercise of entangled power across this space. As a result, the MCA is 
occurring in a world of emerging identities and discourses, and it is important to recognise 
the shifting geopolitical contexts within which the initiative was formed and continues to act. 
In fact, Agnew suggests that there are three possible candidates as the basis of a 'new' 
geopolitics, one which focuses on the transnational economy and the process of globalisation, 
another which sees the prospect of 'culture wars' between civilisations, and a third which 
perceives the US exercising imperial dominance with little or no military competition (2003: 
115). At this point in time, it could be argued that there is evidence for all three and much 
could be said for incorporating each one, to varying degrees, within a holistic analysis of 
global politics. 
3.1.7 Geopolitics and power: Locating the MCA 
Although these visions for the new 'world order' are useful in framing the broader 
context for the MCA, I think that Robinson's conceptualisation of 'polyarchy', as part of the 
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project for 'transnationalliberalism', is particularly useful in facilitating a more 
geographically grounded understanding of the initiative. The US's promotion ofpolyarchy in 
Latin America had, as chapter 4 examines, two phases. The first phase involved the 
'promotion of democracy' in the 1980s and was marked by a shift in US policy away from 
bolstering authoritarianism and regional dictatorships. The second encompassed the pursuit 
of democratic consolidation during the 1990s and early twenty-first century (Robinson 2000). 
The PWC can be seen as part of this second phase, particularly in terms of promoting 'good 
governance', which was identified in chapter 2 as being one of the major outcomes of the 
transition towards the PWC. Although, 'democracy' and 'governance', as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, are two different things, it is easy to see how they may be mutually 
enforcing. However, bearing in mind the current discussion, it is perhaps more applicable, 
especially when discussing the Latin and Central American experience, to replace 
'democracy' with Robinson's concept of 'polyarchy'. The PWC can thus be seen within the 
broader ideological context of 'transnationalliberalism', reinforcing the argument made in 
chapter 2 that far from representing something fundamentally new, the PWC is in fact 
embedded within neoliberal discourse and, as such, it endorses and facilitates a model of 
'development' that is neither equitable nor genuinely 'democratic,39. 
So what does this mean in terms of understanding the MCA? As stated in the 
introduction to this chapter, the MCA can be seen as a construct of the PWC and as a result it 
has direct implications for our understanding of polyarchy and transnationalliberalism, and 
vice versa. In fact, as this chapter illustrates later in discussing the programme's selection 
criteria, the promotion of 'sound policy environments' is demonstrative of an approach that 
continues to operate upon fundamentally neoliberal assumptions. This reality is reflected to a 
large degree by the nature of the actual projects established in MCA-recipient countries, 
including Nicaragua, in which there is an overwhelming presence of large-scale 
infrastructural programmes, which could be seen as putting in place the foundations for 
transnationalliberalism. The fact that the MCA uses economic criteria from the international 
figureheads ofneoliberal reform - the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank-
in selecting recipient countries, reinforces this association. Nevertheless, as discussed below, 
the selection of certain countries, such as Jordan, appears to be less associated with the 
promotion of US-led economic development, than with maintaining US strategic interests. As 
39 See chapter 4 on US-Nicaraguan relations for greater detail on the concept of 'democracy' and its relationship 
with polyarchy. 
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such, although I would argue that the promotion oftransnationalliberalism is the underlying 
factor driving the MCA, there are moments in which other interests have taken precedence in 
determining country selectivity. Undoubtedly, in the post-9/11 world the promotion of US 
strategic interests has gained much influence in policy decisions and there has been an 
inevitable degree of politicisation in, among other things, the delivery of foreign development 
assistance. As argued by Robinson "polyarchy promotion is always only one component of 
overall US foreign policy, part of broader strategies designed on a country-specific basis that 
may include the synchronizing of 'democracy promotion' with diplomatic undertakings, 
military aggression, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) propaganda and covert operations, 
and multilateral actions" (2007: 35). 
3.2 The United States: Promoting a new development paradigm? 
Although the above discussion has been useful in setting out the underlying power 
dimensions of US foreign policy and practice, a more systematic approach is required if we 
are to understand the different aid policies and programmes that exist in the US today, and 
where the MCA fits within that framework. Fortunately, a relatively recent reform package 
being adopted in the US provides an entry point for doing this. 
3.2.1 A vision for 'transformational diplomacy' 
In January 2006 Condoleezza Rice announced the beginning of a sweeping reform 
plan that sought to ensure that foreign aid would act to advance broad US foreign policy and 
national security goals (Patrick 2006: I). This reform package was part of a broader mission 
by the US to promote what has been labelled 'transformational diplomacy' . Rice defines this 
mission as follows: "To work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain 
democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people - and conduct 
themselves responsibly in the international system" (2006: np). This vision of 'diplomacy', as 
articulated by Rice, represents a very different conceptualisation and expression of the 
phenomenon; one that focuses on internal state factors and 'supporting' changes within 
foreign states, as opposed to the more mainstream interpretation of diplomacy as constituting 
inter-state relations. As Krasner comments, "it's about the nature of domestic political 
regimes rather than the international balance of power" (2006: 3). This emphasis on internal 
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transfonnation is indicative ofthe good governance agenda discussed in chapter 2, in which 
the fundamental factors limiting development progress are identified as arising from intemal 
conditions or, more specifically, from state inadequacies. This re-conceptualisation of 
diplomacy also reflects a reality within which 'threat' towards the US is no longer seen as 
resulting primarily from other major powers (as witnessed during the Cold War), but instead 
it is seen as arising from the domestic conditions within foreign developing states. 
3.2.2 Reforming US assistance 
In recent years, there has been significant pressure to streamline US foreign assistance 
which has, as the following extract reveals, become increasingly fragmented and bogged 
down in Bureaucracy: 
"Today, foreign aid pours out of at least eighteen separate aid spigots within the 
State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) alone, 
addressing everythingfrom health interventions to military training, counter-
narcotics assistance, and economic support to allies. This is to say nothing of the 
twenty-odd other federal departments and agencies that maintain their own aid 
programmes. Rather than reflecting coherent US strategies toward particular 
countries, aid is too often driven by the desires of individual agencies or US missions, 
with the right hand not always knowing what the left hand is doing" (Patrick 2006: 1). 
As such, the refonn package promoted by Rice can be seen as the first step in bringing order 
to what is seen by many as a somewhat chaotic aid system. More specifically, this process is 
about coordinating and centralising the control and accountability of funds between USA ID 
and the State Department40. At the same time, this convergence raises the likelihood for a 
much greater level of politic is at ion in USAID's activities. Indeed, Engler states that through 
this process the Bush administration is tying aid to US strategic interests in a much more 
overt manner (2006: np). Arguably, this is part of a more fundamental shift within the US 
following 9/11, in which "the lines traditionally separating development and humanitarian aid 
40 The newly created position of 'Director of Foreign Assistance' (DFA) is to play a key role in overseeing this 
process ofrefonn, having significant authority over the actions of US AID and the State Department, whilst also 
reportedly giving 'guidance' to other agencies and entities ofthe government, including the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (State Department 2006a). However, according to a report presented to US Congress in 
2007, the MCA is outside the DFA's scope (Veillette 2007: 4); which suggests that influence on the initiative 
itselfwiII be limited. 
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from political and military action" have become blurred (Oxfam America 2006: np). As one 
USAID official is quoted as saying, "the days when aid workers could set their own agenda, 
without concern for national security priorities, are over ... that's a peacetime luxury ... we're 
a country at war" (Stockman et al. 2006: np). 
Ironically, USAID was created in the 1960s in an attempt to separate development 
assistance from political and security-based aid. As stated on USAID's webpage, "Freed from 
the political and military functions that plagued its predecessor organisations, USAID was 
able to offer direct support to the developing nations of the world" (USAID 2005). It would, 
of course, be very naive and incorrect to suggest that this separation from politics and 
military agendas has until now been maintained - one look at the Cold War suggests 
otherwise - but there is nevertheless a clear danger that the organisation's practice will 
become determined by the wider political agenda post 9/11, i.e. the 'War on Terror'. 
However, it should be mentioned that the nature of the convergence between USAID and the 
State Department is less than clear. For example Krasner, who was appointed Director of 
Policy Planninl1 by Condoleezza Rice in 2005, states that USAID will remain an 
'independent' agency, with its legal status remaining the same (2006: 8). That being said, the 
concept of 'independence' can be very ambiguous and whilst USAID will, according to 
Krasner, remain an 'independent' structure in the formal sense, there will inevitably be 
compromises made in terms ofless tangible assets such as the 'ideas' shaping US 
development discourse within USAID. 
3.2.3 'Transformation' and US foreign assistance 
Whilst Condoleezza Rice applies the concept of transformation to her vision for US 
diplomacy it has also, as demonstrated above, become a defining feature of contemporary US 
foreign assistance. Broadly speaking 'transformational development' is a central goal that 
seeks to achieve the 'transformation' of recipient countries' economic development paths 
through the use of US development assistance (Nowels and Veillette 2006: I). Consequently, 
it aims to do more than, for example, raise living standards or address the immediate issues of 
poverty, but it seeks to transform countries "through far-reaching, fundamental changes in 
41 According to the State Department website, this position involves focussing "on a wide range of strategic 
issues, including the development of American capacity to address problems posed by weak and failing states 
and to support institutions that support freedom, democracy and good governance" (State Department 2005). 
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institutions of governance, human capacity, and economic structure" (USAID 2004: 14). In 
this respect, the shift to transformational development reflects the view expressed by many 
development experts that for aid to be used effectively it must invested in sound policy 
environments. Once again, this' sound policy' perspective is indicative of the mentality 
expressed through the PWC in which the state is now understood to be a key player in the 
development process (as opposed to what was seen under the framework of the Washington 
Consensus (WC), where the emphasis was placed on 'rolling back the state'). Through this 
re-conceptualisation of the state, the onus within the field of development has now shifted to 
state effectiveness and efficiency. 
Although I do not doubt that that improving internal state dynamics can be 
advantageous in promoting 'sound policy environments', it is possible that a broader critical 
questioning of the actual model of development being pushed by governments and 
institutions in the North is being diverted by an overemphasis on the 'state'. Arguably, there 
is a danger that by locating development as a predominantly national issue, one may fail to 
take into account the potentially negative impact of external relations on development, both 
past and present. This gives credence to the interpretation of the PWC expressed by 
Jayasuriya, in which contrary to being something new, the PWC is simply seen as "an 
attempt to develop a political institutional framework to embed the structural adjustment 
policies of the Washington consensus" (2001: I). Furthermore, designating blame for past 
development failures to the governments of aid-recipient countries provides greater 
legitimacy and leverage for external actors to intervene in the South. In terms of the MCA, 
therefore, which as indicated earlier is the flagship development programme for achieving 
this 'transformational' process, we must consider the degree to which the underlying 
assumptions driving the programme do in fact represent something new and innovative, or 
whether it is simply another case of 'old wine in new bottles'. 
3.3 The MeA: An introduction 
In 2002 President Bush announced the beginning of a new kind of foreign assistance 
programme by the US that would in theory lead to a fifty percent increase in US core 
41 
Chapter 3: US Foreign Assistance and the Millennium Challenge Account 
assistance to so called 'developing' countries42 (2002b). This statement was confinned in 
2003 when the 'Millennium Challenge Act' was passed, which founded a new development 
entity, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), to oversee and manage the initiative 
(Clark 2005: 31). According to Radelet, the biggest advantage of establishing this new 
organisation is that it was able to "avoid the political pressures, bureaucratic procedures, and 
multiple congressional mandates that weaken current aid programmes" (2003a: to). In this 
way it would be able to avoid some of the perceived problems of traditional US development 
programmes, which had prompted the process of foreign aid refonn highlighted earlier in 
section 3.2.2. However, whilst it is true that the MCC has managed to avoid many of these 
issues, one could also suggest that it has not done anything to improve the situation. In fact, 
in the 2006 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review, it states that the· 
creation of the MCC had 'further fragmented' the US aid system (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 2006: 20). What is more, one cannot ignore the implications 
of the creation of the MCC on USAID, which appears to have been increasingly sidelined in 
the delivery of US Official Development Assistance (ODA)43. Within this context, the 
creation ofthe MCC is seen by some as a 'sign of distrust' towards USAID (see Steinhilber 
2004: 5), prompting fears over the agency's future44. 
It is important to recognise that foreign aid can be used to pursue several goals, only 
one of which is 'development'. Lancaster identifies six uses of US foreign aid including 
'promoting security', 'promoting development', 'providing humanitarian relief, 'supporting 
political and economic transitions', 'building democracies', and 'addressing transnational 
problems' such as HIV and AIDS (2000: 33). According to Radelet, however, problems may 
arise when "one programme attempts to simultaneously meet multiple, sometimes 
conflicting, objectives, leading to a lack of coherence in everything from broad strategic 
planning to specific programmes on the ground" (2003a: 4). This is particularly true when we 
consider the Cold War period, during which foreign aid allocated on the basis of 'strategic' 
not developmental considerations, often failed to deliver positive results. In this regard, the 
42 In reality this pledge of 50% has not been met, with the MCC in 2006 receiving less than half of what was 
originally stipulated by President Bush. The reasons for and impact of this are looked at later in this chapter. 
43 According to the DAC review, between 2002 and 2005 the amount of ODA administered by USAID fell by 
around 50% (OECD 2006: 12). This coincides with growing global security interests following the events of 
9/11; a process referred to earlier in this chapter. 
44 Further consideration is given to this important issue in chapter 6, which examines the relationship between 
USAID and the MCC, and considers whether or not MCA funding has occurred to the expense of other USAID 
progranunes. 
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MCA can therefore be seen as an attempt to bring order to an environment where the delivery 
of aid is, as suggested in section 3.2.2, somewhat fragmented and uncoordinated. Indeed, the 
MCC's stated mission is to "reduce global poverty through the promotion of sustainable 
economic growth" (MCC web site a). In order to do this, the MCA adopts a somewhat unique 
selection process in which a country's prior 'performance' determines their eligibility within 
the initiative. However, before looking more closely at the MCA and the processes involved 
in becoming a compact-country, it is first useful to locate the fund within the broader 
framework of US foreign assistance. The new strategic framework for foreign assistance 
offers an effective entry point in which to do this. 
3.3.1 Locating the MCA 
In May 2006 a new strategic framework for foreign assistance was implemented and this 
set out how the US would pursue the goal of 'rationalising' foreign aid allocated to both the 
State Department and USAID (Patrick 2006: 3). The overarching goal of this 'Foreign 
Assistance Framework' is to promote 'transformational diplomacy' (as defined by 
Condoleezza Rice in section 3.2.1). Five key objectives are found within this new assistance 
framework and these are shown in table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: US foreign assistance objectives 
1. Advancing peace and security: Preventing, mitigating, and recovering from internal 
or external conflict. 
2. Promoting just and democratic governance: Making governments accountable to 
their people by controlling corruption, protecting civil rights, and strengthening rule 
oflaw. 
3. Encouraging investments in people: Including appropriate expenditure on health, 
education, and environment. 
4. Promoting economic growth: Including reduction in barriers to entry for business, 
suitable trade policy, and fiscal accountability. 
S. Providing humanitarian assistance: Emergency relief and rehabilitation. 
Source: Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance 2007 
The MCA, as illustrated later, can be seen as fulfilling (in theory) goals two, three, 
and four directly, although more broadly speaking it could be suggested that it also 
contributes to goal number one, as reducing poverty is seen by many as being conducive to 
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the advancement of 'peace and security,45. The administration has also, as part of this overall 
reform process, categorised all US development aid recipient countries according to an 
assessment of their current conditions. These divisions, defined within the new strategic 
framework, are shown in table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2: US foreign assistance framework 
Category Dermition Countries46 Goal of US foreign Graduation 
assistance Trajectory 
States in, or Including: Stable environment for Advance to 
emerging from, Afghanistan, good governance, the developing 
and rebuilding Colombia, Haiti, increased availability of or 
Rebuilding after, internal or Sudan, Liberia, essential social services, transforming 
external conflict. Kosovo, Iraq, and initial progress to category. Countries Democratic Republic create policies and 
of Congo, Nepal, Cote institutions upon which 
D'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, future progress will rest. 
and Somalia. 
States with low Includes a wide range Continued progress in Advance to 
or lower-middle of countries at various expanding and the 
income, not yet states of development, deepening democracy, transforming 
Developing meetingMCC such as Cambodia, strengthening public and category. performance Pakistan, Egypt and private institutions, and Countries 
criteria, and the Ecuador. supporting policies that 
criterion related promote economic 
to political rights. growth and poverty 
reduction. 
States with low Includes all MCA Government, civil Advance to 
or lower-middle recipient and threshold society and private the 'sustaining 
income, meeting countries (these are sector institutions partnership' 
Transforming MCC listed in detail below). capable of sustaining category or 
Countries performance development progress. graduate from 
criteria and the foreign 
criterion related assistance. 
to political rights. 
States with Includes a diverse Continued partnership as Continue 
upper-middle group of countries strategically appropriate partnership or 
income or greater such as Israel, Mexico, where US support is graduate from 
Sustaining for which US Russia and Kuwait. necessary to maintain foreign 
support is progress and peace. assistance. Partnership provided to Countries 
sustain 
partnerships, 
progress, and 
peace. 
Restrictive States of concern Includes countries Civil society empowered Advance to 
Countries where there are such as Belarus, to demand more other relevant 
significant Burma, China, Cuba, effective democracies foreign 
45 This is readily apparent in the fact that development now forms one of the three pillars of the US security 
strategy. This accords with the discussion on power presented earlier in which it is argued that a new 
geopolitical world order has emerged following the events of 9/11 and that this has been accompanied by the re-
organisation of political space . 
... This category was established from work undertaken by Patrick (2006: 3, 4) 
44 
Chapter 3: US Foreign Assistance and the Millennium Challenge Account 
governance Iran, Libya, North and states respectful of assistance 
issues. Korea, Syria, human dignity, category. 
Uzbekistan, accountable to their 
Venezuela, and citizens, and responsible 
Zimbabwe. towards their 
neighbours. 
Source: Adapted from the 'Foreign Assistance Framework' (2007) 
As we can see from table 3.2, the MCA is the central initiative adopted by the US to 
assist 'transforming' countries. US assistance within this context has the broad goal of 
establishing conditions in which a country's development can be sustained through 'capable' 
government, civil society and private sector institutions. Once again, this is indicative of the 
good governance agenda discussed earlier. The actual MCC performance 'criteria' mentioned 
in the definitional section is discussed in detai1later in this chapter, as is the selection process 
in general. For now; however, it is useful to note that the five categories established within 
this new strategic framework are not independent, but actually represent a system of 
progression in which countries can 'graduate' from one position to another (for example, 
graduating from a 'developing' country to a 'transforming' country). A country would, in 
theory, reach the pinnacle of this graduating process once it reaches the enviable position of 
no longer requiring foreign assistance to sustain development. Both 'Transforming Countries' 
and 'Sustaining Partnership Countries' have this ambitious goal as the next possible phase in 
their 'graduation trajectory,47. The following section takes a closer look at who these 
'Transforming Countries' are and where they are positioned within the MCA process. 
3.3.2 Identifying the countries 
As illustrated in table 3.3 below, there are a total of thirty-nine countries involved 
with a Threshold or MCA Compact programme in one form or another. The Threshold 
Programme aims to improve the performance of a given country on specific MCC indicators. 
Through this process, therefore, a country may by improving a low indicator score become 
eligible for greater assistance through a compact agreement. That being said, however, 
countries are not, according to the MCC, "required to participate in the Threshold Programme 
to improve their indicator scores and to qualify for compact funding" (MCC website b). 
Consequently, whilst Threshold assistance may be used as a stepping stone for securing 
47 As demonstrated later in this chapter, this notion of 'graduating' for development assistance is very much a 
defining aspect of the MCA. 
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significantly more funding through the MCA, this is not always the case. Table 3.3 below 
provides an overview ofthose countries involved with the MCC and their status in the 
initiative. 
Table 3.3: MCC-engaged countries and funding 
MCAcompact Threshold amount 
Country Status amount (rounded to (rounded to the 
the nearest US$ 
million) nearest US$ million) 
Albania Threshold 16 
Annenia Compact 236 
Benin Compact 307 
Bolivia Compact Eligible 
Burkina Faso Compact 481 I3 & Threshold 
Cape Verde* Compact 110 
El Salvador Compact 461 
Georgia Compact 296 
Ghana Compact 547 
Guyana Threshold 7 
Honduras Compact 215 
Indonesia Threshold 55 
Jordan Compact Eligible 25 &Threshold 
Kenya Threshold I3 
Kyrgyz Republic Threshold Eligible 
Lesotho Compact 363 
Madagascar Compact 110 
Malawi Compact Eligible 21 & Threshold 
Mali Compact 461 
Moldova Compact Eligible 25 & Threshold . 
Mongolia Compact 285 
Morocco Compact 698 
Mozambique Compact 507 
Namibia Compact 305 
Nicaragua Compact 175 
Niger Threshold 23 
Paraguay Threshold 35 
Peru Threshold 36 
Philippines Compact Eligible and 21 Threshold 
Rwanda Threshold 25 
Sao Tome and Threshold 9 Principe 
Senegal Compact Eligible 
Tanzania Compact & Threshold 698 11 
Timor-Leste Compact Eligible and Threshold Eligible 
Uganda Threshold 10 
Ukraine Compact Eligible & 45 Threshold 
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Vanuatu Compact 66 
Yemen*· Threshold 21 
Zambia Threshold 23 
"According to 2008 MCC eligible country report Cape Verde was not re-selected after it failed to meet the test 
criteria for the third year in a row. However, this is unlikely to affect compact participation as the MCC does not 
believe that there has been a 'serious policy reversal or a pattern of actions inconsistent with the selection 
criteria' (MCC 2007a). 
""Yemen was suspended in 2005 following deterioration in the country's performance on the selection criteria. 
However, the country was reinstated in 2007 by the MCC after undertaking a series of refonns. In addition The 
Gambia was also suspended from the MCA following a 'disturbing pattern of deteriorating conditions in eight 
of the sixteen policy categories' (MCC 2006a). The country was removed from the programme completely at 
the end of 2007. It is interesting to note that Sri Lanka, with whom the MCC had predicted it would sign an 
MCC agreement with by the end of2007 (see MCC 2007a: 9), was also removed from the programme following 
escalating violence within the country. Interestingly however, the MCC did this very quietly, and there has been 
little, if any, mention of this action or reasons for the decision (see Herrling 2007a). 
Source: Compiled using multiple country reports (MCC 200Th) 48 
Within the specific context of the MCC, a 'compact' is an agreement made between 
the US, acting through the MCC, and the government of a given country. The document itself 
constitutes a detailed agreement between the parties involved, stating the compact goals and 
objectives, the development projects, the programme implementation process, the compact 
terms and clauses, funding details and so on. As such, these agreements essentially dictate the 
rules by which both parties must act and cooperate, thereby clarifying the nature of their 
relationship within the framework of the MCA. There are currently eighteen compact 
agreements, representing a commitment of over US$6 billion by the US to these recipient 
countries. As discussed in more detail below, however, the size of these compacts varies 
considerably, ranging from US$66 million in Vanuatu, to close to US$700 million in 
Morocco. 
3.3.3 Examining the 'threshold' countries 
Threshold Programme Agreements are defined by the MCC as being a 'contract 
between the United States and a country' that provides financial assistance in order to help 
that country improve its performance in one or more of the MCCts seventeen policy 
indicators49 (MCC website b). Once selected, countries are encouraged to construct a plan 
identifying the measures that could be adopted to improve a specific indicator score and to 
48 The information in table 3.3 was last updated 22/10/08 from data held on the MCC website. 
49 These are shown in table 3.5 on page 59. 
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submit this plan to the MCC for review and approval. However, it is USAID that is primarily 
responsible for administering and overseeing the effective implementation of the Threshold 
Programmes in recipient countries. Arguably, this 'partnership' 50 is necessary bearing in 
mind that the MCC has very little direct presence in the recipient countries themselves, as 
alluded to later in the chapter. In contrast, USAID has, through years of activity, attained a 
significant field presence within much of the South and this, combined with the agency's 
substantial development expertise and infrastructure, makes it an ideal candidate for the task. 
According to MCC, the board of directors selects threshold countries based upon three 
broad criteria: 
1. The country's overall performance on all seventeen policy indicators. 
2. The opportunity to reduce poverty and generate economic growth within a country. 
3. The availability of funds. 
(MCC web site c) 
Despite these established criteria, however, there appears to be some confusion regarding the 
inclusion of certain countries, such as Jordan, within the initiative. Indeed, Jordan already 
receives substantial assistance from the US, assistance which totalled over US$l.3 billion in 
2003 and 2004 - with only Iraq and Afghanistan receiving more (Radelet 2005). As 
illustrated later, significant restrictions have, since the MCA was first created, been placed on 
the MCC in terms of its budget and, therefore, the decision to provide further assistance to 
Jordan through this specific programme was somewhat confusing. In addition to this funding 
issue, concerns were also voiced over the inclusion of 'non-democracies' in the programme 
(see Radelet 2005) and this, in turn, mirrors an ongoing broader set of debates over exactly 
which types of countries the MCC should be working withs1 • Regardless of such controversy, 
however, Jordan has since been elevated to the position of being 'compact-eligible', 
prompting further objections from parts of the development community (see Freedom 
50 Despite the use of words such as 'partnership' there has been significant debate, as highlighted already in 
section 3.3, over what the creation of the MCC means for USAID as a development entity. 
SI Chapter 8, which specifically explores the issue of democracy in the MCA, sheds further light on this issue. 
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Houses2 2006). The following section, which looks closer at the MCC's decision-making 
process, explores this issue in greater detail. 
3.4 Understanding the selection process: The MCC board of directors 
The MCC's board of directors consists of the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
who acts as the board's Chairperson, the Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson as Vice 
Chairperson, the US Trade Representative Susan Schwab, USAID Administrator Henrietta H. 
Fore, and MCC CEO John Danilovich, who took over the reigns of the MCC in 2005 
following the previous CEO's departures3• There are also four public individuals on the board 
who were appointed by President Bush including President of the International Republican 
Institute Lome Craner, Senator William Frist, who served as majority leader in the US Senate 
from 2002 to 2007, President of the Catholic Relief Service Ken Hackett, and Alan Patricof, 
who is the founder and managing director of a venture capital firm (MCC website d). 
In terms of the selection process, the board is supposedly' guided', as discussed 
below, by a country's performance on seventeen indicators. In addition to this, the board can 
also take into account "data gaps, lags, trends, or other material information, including 
leadership, related to economic growth and poverty reduction" (White House website), as 
well as the funds available to the MCC at a given times4• Whilst giving the board this latitude 
in choosing potential recipient countries is necessary, it also brings into the decision making 
process a level of subjectivity. As Radelet suggests, "this discretion must be used carefully 
and only in a limited set of circumstances to guard against too much political influence on 
selection" (2003a: 7). However, with more than half of the MCA compact-countries now 
failing the indicator testSS, the degree to which the board can restrict this discretion to a 
52 Freedom House is a US-based international non-governmental organisation that conducts research and 
advocacy on issues such as democracy. It also provides two of the MCC's seventeen indicators for selection, 
including one on 'Civil Liberties' and another on 'Political Rights', both of which fall within the 'Ruling Justly' 
category. 
53 Paul Applegarth, who was the founding CEO of the MCC, resigned in June 2005 following reported 
complaints over the pace at which new compacts were being signed (see The New York Times 2005). In 
addition to this, it has been suggested that Applegarth 'wasn't qualified for the job' in the first place, as the 
Republican campaign contributor had "limited experience in international aid" (Kurlantzick 2006). Similar 
concerns have also been raised over his successor John Danilovich (ibid). 
54 As demonstrated later, this is important in light of the severe budget constraints placed on the MCC since its 
inception. 
" According to the 2008 MCC scorecards available on the MCC website, the following MCA compact-
countries are now failing the indicator test: Armenia, Henin, Cape Verde, El Salvador, Honduras, Madagascar, 
Mali, Morocco and Mozambique. Consideration is given to why this may be the case later in the chapter. 
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'limited set of circumstances' is debateable. Furthermore, there are signs that political 
considerations may have influenced the decision-making process. For example, the decision 
to select Jordan as a compact eligible country for 2007 was perceived by many to be based 
upon political factors: 
"This is not a question about whether or not the US should provide support to Jordan. 
But [that] the MCC is not the appropriate funding source. US foreign policy goals 
should be met through State Department and USAID funding mechanisms, not the 
MCA ... " (Herrling et al 2006: 2). 
As illustrated later in section 8.3.4 of chapter 8, there are other examples in which the US' 
broader agenda for pursuing the 'War on Terror' has been seen to influence eligibility within 
the MCA. This is indicative of the new geopolitical world order referred to earlier, in which 
security interests are increasingly affecting overall US foreign policy objectives and practice. 
As a result, it is clear, despite assurances to the contrary, that politics do matter in the MCA 
and this theme is examined in greater detail later in this thesis. For now, however, we turn out 
attention to understanding the process by which countries come to be involved in the MCA. 
3.4.1 Phase 1: Identifying candidate countries 
There are two main stages in the selection of eligible countries, the first of which 
focuses upon identifying the candidate countries. In order to do this, the MCC uses an income 
threshold level to determine eligibility. For example in the first year of selection, it was 
decided that the MCA candidates should be those 'low-income countries' (LICs) that are 
eligible to borrow from the International Development AssociationS6 (lOA) and have a per 
capita income equal to or less than US$I,435 (which at that time was the historical cut-off for 
lOA assistance). This level was subsequently raised over a three year period, so that from 
2006 onwards both the 'low income' and 'low-middle income countries' (LMICs) form part 
of the candidate pool. Consequently there are now two income tests for eligibility, one for the 
LICs and another for the LMICss7• As a result, the number of candidate countries has 
increased, with a total of ninety-five countries being (re)selected for 2008, compared to sixty-
56 The International Development Association, which is part of the World Bank, provides interest free loans and 
~rants to the South and is largely funded by governments in the North (World Bank website a). 
7 For further information see MCC (2007c). 
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three in 2004. Out of that ninety-five, sixty-seven candidates were identified as being LICs 
and a further twenty-eight as LMICs (MCC 2007d). Whilst there is a 'cap' limiting the 
amount of programme funds that can be channelled to the LMICs, concerns have been raised 
over the inclusion of this categoryS8. Further consideration is given to this important issue 
later in the chapter whilst looking at the MCC and how it is funded. 
3.4.2 Phase 2: Applying the selection criteria 
The second stage in the selection process involves applying a set of indicators to the 
candidate countries in order to determine country eligibility. In all there are now seventeen 
indicators, which fall into the three broad categories of 'Ruling Justly', 'Investing in People' 
and 'Economic Freedom;s9. 
Table 3.4: The MCA selection indicators and their sources 
Indicator Cate~ory . Source 
Civil Liberties Ruling Justly Freedom House 
Political Rights Ruling Justly Freedom House 
Voice and Accountability Ruling Justly World Bank Institute (WBI) 
Government Effectiveness Ruling Justly WBI 
Rule of Law Ruling Justly WBI 
Control of Corruption Ruling Justly WBI 
Immunisation Rates Investing in People World Health Organisation (WHO) 
Public Expenditure on Health Investing in People WHO 
Girl's Primary Education Investing in People United Nations Educational, Scientific and Completion Rate Cultural Organisation (UNSESCO) 
Public Expenditure on Investing in People UNESCO and national sources Primary Education 
Natural Resource Center for International Earth Science 
Management Investing in People Information Network (CIESIN) and the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. 
Business Start Up Economic Freedom International Finance Corporation 
Inflation Economic Freedom International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook 
Trade Policy Economic Freedom Heritage Foundation 
Regulatory Quality Economic Freedom WBI 
National sources, cross checked with 
Fiscal Policy Economic Freedom International Monetary Fund World Economic 
Outlook 
ss The Center for Global Development (CGD), a Washington-based think tank, has been particularly vocal with 
regard to this issue. 
s, In the 2008 selection process, two new measurements were adopted by the MCC board of directors, including 
a 'Natural Resource Management index' (NRMI) and a 'Land Rights and Access index' (LRAI) (see MCC 
2007e). In addition to this, two of the previous Economic Freedom indicators (Cost of Starting a Business and 
Days to Start a Business) were combined to form the 'Business Start Up' indicator. As a result of these changes, 
the total number of indicators now stands at seventeen. 
51 
Chapter 3: US Foreign Assistance and the MiIlermium Challenge Account 
International Fund for Agricultnral 
Land Rights and Access Economic Freedom Development (IF AD) and International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). 
Source: MCC website e 
Each country has a scorecard in which their 'progress' at meeting the indicators is 
shown over a five to six year period. This information should then be utilised by the MCC 
board of directors to help determine which countries to include in the programme. Candidates 
wishing to be eligible for the MCA must, in theory at least60, score above the country median 
for its group (LIC or LMIC) on at least half of the indicators in each category61, including the 
Control of Corruption test62. However, as emphasised earlier in section 3.5, passing this test 
does not ensure inclusion within the MCA, as the board of directors can take into account a 
range of other factors, including the resources available to the MCC, in making their final 
decision. Consequently, whilst country selection should be based primarily upon a 
candidate's performance in the three categories highlighted in table 3.4, this is not necessarily 
always the case. The following section, which looks at the inclusion of countries currently 
failing the indicator test, throws further light on this situation. 
3.4.3 Programme inclusivity: Beyond the indicators 
As highlighted in section 3.5, more than half of the compact-countries re-selected by 
the MCC board of directors for 2008 are currently failing the indicator test. At first glance, 
this is a somewhat worrying state of affairs, especially when we consider that the majority of 
these countries were not failing in these areas when first selected to receive programme 
funding. However, a closer examination of events reveals that much of this apparent 
deterioration in performance has been driven by factors out of the countries' control. For 
example, some countries such as Armenia have, since becoming eligible for MCA compact 
assistance, moved from the LIC to LMIC category. Consequently, whilst the performance of 
these countries may not have necessary diminished, their position relative to other candidates 
60 The MCC board of directors selected seven countries in the 2007 selection round that did not pass the 
indicator test. 
61 On the inflation indicator, however, a country must have an inflation rate of less than 15% rather than the 
median. 
62 As Tarnoff notes, "should a country fall below the median on the corruption indicator, it will be disqualified 
from consideration unless other, more recent trends suggest otherwise" (2008: 2). It is interesting to note that 
three of the fifteen countries that have a compact signed with the MCC are, according to the 2008 scorecards, 
failing the corruption test. This situation is explored in greater detail below. 
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within their new grouping has essentially worsened. In the past, the MCC has, according to 
Herrling and Radelet, "given new LMICs certain leeway regarding the new standards to 
which they are compared" (2007: 10). Whilst one can appreciate the logic for doing this, it 
does not change the fact that there is a fundamental flaw in the way that candidate selection is 
designed. Ultimately, a country's relative performance in the MCA can deteriorate, or indeed 
improve, for no other reason than the World Bank has changed its definition of what 
constitutes an LIC or LMIC. Arguably, this situation is illustrative of what was referred to 
earlier as the. 'power-knowledge' nexus in discourse63 . 
A second reason for why certain compact-countries are now failing the indicator test 
is rooted in the recent decision of the MCC board of directors to include the new NRMI. In 
previous years, both Mali and Mozambique would have qualified by passing just two of the 
Investing in People indicators; however, the inclusion of this new index means that countries 
wishing to pass the indicator test must now perform above the median on at least three ofthe 
five measurements. As a result, whilst the performance of these countries may be just as good 
as, if not better than, previous years64, they now technically fail this test for eligibility. 
Consequently, the MCC board of directors has, since this is the first time that the new index 
has been fonnally included as a programme indicator65, recognised the heightened difficulties 
faced by countries in passing the Investing in People hurdle, and taken this factor into 
account whilst reselecting the compact-countries for 2008 (see MCC 2007a). Moreover, in 
order to help address the imbalance created through having an odd number of indicators 
within the Investing in People basket, strong arguments have been made in favour of 
introducing an additional 'education quality' index to the category66. According to Radelet et 
a1 this would "give education the attention it deserves", helping to ease concerns that the 
addition of the new NRMI and LRAI would "dilute attention that countries give to the 
education indicators' (2007: 4). The MCC has already devoted a significant amount oftime 
and effort to locating an acceptable educational quality index (reportedly exploring no fewer 
63 Chapter 7, which looks at the specific issue of the MCA and poverty reduction in Nicaragua, sheds further 
light on this relationship by examining the way in which 'poverty', as defined by organisations such as the 
World Bank, has been resisted and redefmed by citizens on the ground. 
64 For example, Mozambique has, despite failing the indicator test, performed significantly we1l, passing all of 
the Ruling Justly indexes and a1l but one of the indicators for Economic Freedom. 
65 In the previous year, both the NRMI and the LRAI were used as 'supplemental information' in the selection 
process, in order to give countries "notice ofthe new measures" (MCC 2007e). 
66 Reportedly, when the initial MCA eligibility process was first created there was a desire to have six Investing 
in People indicators, but a "shortage of appropriate indicators ... made it difficult to do so" (Radelet et al. 2007: 
4). 
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than twenty-three possible indicators - see Rose et al 2007) and has, furthennore, stated its 
intention to continue this search in the years to come (MCC 2007t). 
A third and final reason for the apparent 'underperformance' of compact-countries 
explored here is to do with the reliability of the all important 'control of corruption index' 
(COCl). The corruption indicator is the only indicator that countries must score above the 
median in order to qualify, in theory, for MCA assistance. This year, however, two compact-
countries that failed to pass the 'hard-hurdle' for corruption, Benin and Honduras, were 
reselected for assistance in 2008 by the MCC board of directors. In understanding why this 
was the case, it is essential to recogoise that, in contrast to other MCA criteria, there are 
'explicit margins of error' in measuring the control of corruption. As the designers of the 
index themselves emphasise, "a simple 'in-or-out' rule runs the risk of misclassifying some 
countries precisely because margins of error are not trivial" (Kaufmann and Kraay 2002). The 
MCC has clearly taken note of such limitations in making its selections this year. For 
example Honduras, which failed the 'decisive' COCI by a very narrow margin, was 
reselected because the margin of error for this indicator means that one cannot definitively 
say that the country did in fact score below the 50th percentile, i.e. the required median 
(Herrling and Radelet 2007: 5). In addition, the MCC has utilised supplemental infonnation, 
such as Transparency International's 'Corruption Perception Index' (CPI), to help reach 
decisions on country perfonnance on this indicator, according to which Honduras' score had 
remained unchanged from the previous year. It is interesting to note that Benin, which out of 
all the MCA compact-countries was marked the lowest on the COCI (scoring in the 45th 
percentile), did actually score better than Honduras, Mali and Nicaragoa67 in the CPI. In 
addition to this, Benin's score on this indicator had improved significantly from the previous 
year, in which it was placed in the 38th percentile, and this was arguably a key factor for the 
MCC board of directors in reselecting the country68. 
Bearing in mind the importance of 'combating corruption' in the MCA, further 
consideration is given to this issue below. Before doing that, however, it is important to note 
67 In 2008 Nicaragua only just passed the COCI, which could raise concerns about the country's future in the 
MCA. 
68 In addition to this, it is interesting to note that in 2006 Benin scored in the 86th percentile according to the 
corruption index and this fell to 38 the following year. According to Herrling and Radelet this was due to the 
WBI, the source of the COCI, "changing the underlying data for Benin's indicator" (2007: 5). One again, this 
illustrates the fragility of this crucial index, as well as the importance of utilising supplemental data in 
determining inclusion within the MCA. 
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that although issues such as changing income categories, additional indexes and existing 
margins of error have clearly been significant in influencing apparent country performance, 
one should not become complacent in dismissing all perceived 'underperformance' as being 
caused by such factors. For example, Armenia was identified above as a country that had 
suffered in terms of its relative performance as a result of moving from the LIC category to 
the LMIC category. Whilst Armenia would have passed three of the Ruling Justly indicators 
had it stayed in the LIC category (as opposed to passing just one), it still would have failed all 
three of the so-called 'democracy indicators' (which includes 'Political Rights', 'Civil 
Liberties' and 'Voice and Accountability'). According to Herrling and Radelet, this should be 
. a point of concern for the MCC "since it has only rarely selected countries that fail these 
indicators" (2007: 10). In addition, Cape Verde has also, as alluded to previously, witnessed a 
declining performance on several key indicators, only passing one index from each of the 
Investing in People and Economic Freedom categories. Consequently, the MCC board of 
directors took the decision in the 2008 selection process not to re-select Cape Verde69• Whilst 
one cannot draw too much from this situation, the MCC does, as discussed later, operate 
according to an incentive system approach and, therefore, any sustained decline in 
performance among compact-countries may start to raise questions over the initiative's 
ability to propagate the 'transformational' change it aspires to. 
3.5 Examining the corruption indicator: A closer look 
There is not time here to discuss and analyse every one of the seventeen indicators 
outlined in table 3.47°. Instead, this chapter focuses primarily upon what is considered the 
most important measurement in determining country eligibility, the COCI. As mentioned 
above, the corruption indicator is the only pass or fail test within the MCA selection process 
and this is indicative of the emphasis placed on tackling the issue of corruption by the current 
Bush Administration and Washington-based institutions. Despite the growing importance of 
this concept, especially within the field of development, corruption is still a very difficult 
issue to measure and this stems in part from its definitional ambiguity. For example, Brown 
and Cloke (2004) perceive serious deficiencies in the conceptualisation of corruption adopted 
69 Whilst Cape Verde was not deemed eligible for 2008 compact funding by the MCC board of directors, this 
will reportedly have "no impact on compact participation ... since compact continuation is based more on 
performance on implementing the compact itself' (Herrling and Radelet 2007: 11). Instead, this represents a 
warning to Cape Verde that it must do more to meet the required criteria (see Kraham 2007). 
70 For more detail on each of the indicators see MCC (2007g). 
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by the World Bank and by Transparency International7l (TI), in which corruption is defined 
as the "abuse of public power for private gain ... " (World Bank 1997: 102). One of the major 
limitations of this definition is that corruption is reduced to a purely public phenomenon and, 
as a result, there is a failure to take into account the "rising possibilities for private sector 
corruption caused by market-led economic reforms" and, furthermore, to recognise the inter-
linkages that exist between corruption in public and private spheres (Brown and Cloke 2004: 
283). 
As discussed above, the MCC draws its corruption indicator from the WBI or, more 
specifically, from a governance database compiled by Kaufinann, Kraay and Mastruzzi72. To 
construct this database, Kaufinann et al rely on thirty-three data sources provided by thirty 
different organisations around the world (Kaufinann et al 2007a: I). Consequently, it is 
reported that the information used in creating this database reflects the "views on governance 
of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm 
survey respondents worldwide" (ibid). Due to the fact that the database is compiled from 
multiple sources, it also has the advantage of covering a much larger number of countries 
than any individual data set, thereby facilitating cross-country comparisons. Furthermore, 
measures of precision are provided for users of the database, in which the margins of error for 
each country are identified. According to Radelet, many other survey sources fail to do this, 
which can create a false sense of precision (2003a: 33). Arguably, as Kaufinann et al 
themselves recognise, the fact that they must provide these margins of error, reflects the 
'inherent difficulties' of measuring governance using "any kind of data" (2007a: I). 
As with most databases on corruption and associated governance concepts, the 
Kaufinann et al approach is primarily based upon subjective measures of governance (Radelet 
2003a: 33). As a result, country scores are measured relative to one another and, therefore, it 
is not always easy to determine if a given country has improved or whether others got worse 
(ibid.)73. Indeed, due to the very nature of corruption, any estimates of its extent are as much 
"a matter of perception and feeling" as they are a "mathematical measurement of the 
phenomenon" (Meny cited in Brown and Cloke 2004: 278). In reality, there is a significant 
71 TI is a leading 'non-governmental' organisation that 'measures' conuption (see www.transparency.org for 
further information). 
72 In fact the MCC takes five of its seventeen indicators from this database; four 'ruling justly' measurements 
and one index in 'economic freedom' category (see World Bank website b for further information). 
73 Radelet does, however, mention that Kaufmann and Kraay have constructed an adjustment factor to take into 
account changes in world averages over time (2003a: 33). 
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level of subjectivity involved in "codifying all but the most basic and obvious features of 
countries' constitutional, legal and regulatory environments" (Kaufmann and Kraay 2007: 8) 
and, therefore, it is easy to overstate the objectivity of such measurements. This is 
particularly relevant when considering TI's use of the 'Perception Index' in measuring 
corruption, which ranks countries according to the degree in which corruption is 'perceived' 
to exist among public officials and politicians (TI 2004a: I). However, due to the nature of 
corruption itself, responses based on individuals' actual experiences are, according to 
Kaufinann et ai, "sometimes the best available, and the only, information" available (2006: 
1)74. Nevertheless, it is essential to bear in mind the limitations and dangers of using such 
information, especially when applying it to a highly selective initiative such as the MCA. 
3.6 The MCC and funding levels 
One of the factors the board of directors takes into account in selecting eligible 
countries is the actual resources available to them. In this sense, the MCC is no different from 
any other development entity. However, the MCC's 'transformational' agenda lends greater 
precedence to securing large levels of funding, as the following extract exemplifies: 
"MCC must focus its available resources to fulfil its mission of supporting 
transformative development programs. MCA is intended to provide a significant 
policy incentive to candidate countries by commanding the attention needed to 
galvanize the political will essential for successful economic growth and sustainable 
poverty reduction, and needs substantial resources to have that incentive effect" 
(MCC 2005a: 8). 
This agenda for bold investment was set by President Bush in a speech in 2002, when he 
declared an ambitious vision for development in which the US would lead by example, and 
dramatically increase US development assistance to the South (see Bush 2002a). He 
designated the MeA the flagship development programme for this process, through which 
the US would channel an extra US$5 billion in assistance a year by 2006. Unfortunately this 
intent has not, as table 3.5 below illustrates, been reflected in practice. 
74 See Kaufinann et al (2007b) for an account of the major criticisms people have of this approach to 
establishing world wide governance indicators. . 
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Table 3.5: Funding the MCC 
Fiscal Year Presidential Pledl(e Presidential Request Actual Amount 
2004 nla US$1.3 billion US$I.O billion 
2005 nla US$2.5 billion US$ I.5 billion 
2006 US$5.0 billion US$3.0 billion US$ 1.75 billion 
2007 US$5.0 billion US$3.0 billion US$1.75 billion 
2008 US$5.0 billion US$3.0 billion US$I.54 billion 
Source: Center for Global Development web site a. 
President Bush's pledge to designate an extra US$5 billion in foreign development 
assistance by 2006 seems rather moot in light of the reality presented in table 3.5. Whilst no 
one would call the US$I. 75 billion allocated to the MCC in both 2006 and 2007 a small 
amount, it is clearly nowhere near the level of funding initially envisioned. What is more, this 
figure actually dropped to US$I.54 billion in 2008 and events in recent months suggest that 
the problem of under-funding is only going to get worse: 
"Trading in its shears for a guillotine, the Senate Appropriations Committee 
essentially decapitated the MCC, providing $254 million (a cut of$1.97 billion from 
the Administration's request), covering one year of basic life support services for the 
corporation during which time it must prove its worth. Meanwhile, the Committee 
recommends redirecting the freed-up MCC money to top up other development 
accounts, USA1D operating expenditures75, and then a host of short-term 
humanitarian, peacekeeping and non-proliferation accounts" (Herding 2008a: np). 
Arguably, with a growing congressional deficit, the fallout from Hurricane Katrina, the War 
on Terror and the crippling effects of the global credit crunch, accessibility to funds has 
become increasingly limited. As Herrling comments, short-term security interests are 
dominating the 'political landscape ' and this is putting foreign assistance for' long-term 
development programmes' at risk (2007b: 4). That being said, however, one cannot shift all 
75 The recommendation that MCC money be used to top up other development accounts and USAID's operating 
expenditure is very interesting in light of some of the debates surrounding the relationship between the MCC 
and USAID (see section 3.3). As discussed in greater detail within chapter 6, the money channelled through the 
MCC is supposed to go 'above and beyond existing aid requests' (Bush 2002a). The recommendation that MCC 
funds be used to prop up other areas in the US foreign aid system therefore raises serious question marks over 
the extent to which this assistance is in fact 'additional'. Furthermore, one could suggest that reallocation of 
MCC funds would undermine the initiative's position and propagate doubts over the programme's future. 
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the blame for the programme's under-funding to these broader political issues, as the MCC's 
slow disbursement of funds has also been complicit in this process. 
According to an MCC-country report produced in November 2007, a total of 
US$125.48 million has been disbursed to the compact-countries since the MCA was first 
established back in 2004. This figure is, as table 3.6 below demonstrates, significantly below 
what would have been expected for many of the countries involved. 
Table 3.6: The disbursement figures for the eight compact-countries that had completed their 
first year of programme implementation by November 2007 
Country Estimated (US$ millions) Actual (US$ millions) Difference (US$ millions) 
Annenia 12.6 7.93 -4.67 
Benin 32.4 13.43 -18.97 
. Cape Verde 7.53 7.53 0 
Georgia 51.7 25.54 -26.16 
Honduras 27.7 3.02 -24.68 
Madagascar 9.65 9.65 0 
Nicaragua 20.4 6.28 -14.12 
Vanuatu 1.7 1.7 0 
Total 163.68 75.08 -88.6 
Source: MCC (2007b) 
Whilst the MCC did meet its disbursement projections for year one in three of the countries, 
it performed much worse in the other five countries where initial projections for funding 
disbursements were higher. If anything, year two of programme implementation looks to fare 
even worse, as the amount of projected disbursements is set to increase dramatically. If, for 
example, we take Honduras, which is one of the countries to have completed its second year, 
. 
the country received only US$7.96 million of the US$62.2 million projected by the MCC. 
Moreover, the prospects do not appear to be any better for many of the other compact-
countries coming close to finishing their second year ofimplementation76• There could be a 
number of different reasons for this slower than expected progress in disbursing funds, from 
over-rigorous procedures and processes within the MCC, to complexities within the recipient 
76 For example, Georgia had only received US$1O.12 million at the time of the November 2007 report, despite 
the fact that the MCC projected a total disbursement of close to US$I 05 million by March 2008. According to 
the quarterly MCC Status Report for July 2008 to September 2008, this figure now stands at approximately 
US$50 million (MCC 2008a), less than half that projected to be disbursed by the close of the second year of 
implementation in March 2008. Additionally, it is likely that recent volatilities in Georgia may further impede 
compact progress this year. 
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countries themselves 77. Whatever the precise reasons, it is clear that Congress has used this 
situation to justifY lower than anticipated funding to the MCC, prompting fears over the 
agency's future (see Danilovich 2007a). 
3.6.1 Is under-funding undermining the MCA? 
One may question why, if the MCC has currently disbursed only a small amount of 
the funds already available to it, should the lack of additional funding be a concern. Surely 
the MCC could use existing resources to begin financing other compacts? Actually, the MCC 
cannot, by law, do this. As Herrling and Rose explain, "funds are committed to countries 
when a compact or threshold programme is signed, at which point the MCC is legally 
required to have the funds for all five years of each compact in their entirety in hand ... " 
(2007: 2). In light ofthese restrictions, attempts were made by Senator Lugar in November 
2007 to introduce an amendment that would change this, requiring that no more than fifty 
percent of the entire compact amount be obligated upfront. However, whilst proponents of 
the 'Lugar amendment' reportedly saw this change as necessary in order to "protect both the 
future MCA funding levels and the reputation of the MCC" (see Herrling2007b), others were 
much less optimistic about its inclusion stating that, among other things, the MCC would 
become "like the World Bank and all the other countries using overseas development aid in a 
stop and go fashion" (President Kufor of Ghana, cited in Dugger 2007: np). Nevertheless, 
although the amendment was approved unanimously by the Senate, it was eventually dropped 
from the 2008 FY budget, with the final figure of US$ 1.54 billion likely to be enough to fund 
the anticipated compacts for 2008. That being said, one cannot ignore the broader 
implications of this financial straight jacket on the MCC's future operations. 
For the MCC to succeed in inciting 'transformational' change, it clearly must be one 
of the largest donors in a given country and also the most effective in terms of delivering 
results. With this in mind, it is useful now to look at the specific country contexts in which 
MCA programmes are being implemented and, furthermore, examine MCA funds relative to 
those of other donor sources. Consequently, table 3.7 below examines compact size relative 
77 For example, Dugger states that ''putting stringent accountability systems in place has consumed more time 
that expected" (2007: np). Chapter 6 considers this issue of 'accountability' in greater detail whilst looking at 
the specific experience of Nicaragua. 
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to 'Gross Domestic Product' (GDP), 'Official Development Assistance' (ODA) and other 
donor organisations, within the MCA compact-countries. 
Table 3.7: MCA programme size comparison for signed compacts78 
I LICs I LMICs 
MCC Total Compact MCCdonor Compact, Compact, Compact per 
Compact compact annual rank by size %2005 %2005 capita (cnrrent 
size average (2005 GDP* ODAJOA(net US$,2005 
($US (US$ commitments) disbursements) popnlation) 
millions) millions) ** 
Armenia 236 47.2 3'" 0.96% 24.39% 78.24 
Benin 307 61.4 4'" 1.43% 17.61% 36.38 
Cape Verde 110 22.0 4m 2.24% 13.70% 217.05 
El Salvador 461 92.2 I" 0.54% 46.24% 67.00 
Georgia 295 59.0 3'" 0.92% 19.07% 65.93 
Ghana 547 109.4 7m 1.02% 9.77% 24.74 
Honduras 215 43.0 6'" 0.52% 6.32% 29.84 
Lesotho 363 72.6 I" 5.01% 105.49% 202.25 
Madagascar 110 27.5 IOm 0.55% 2.96% 5.91 
Mali 461 92.2 2no 1.74% 13.33% 34.10 
Mongolia 285 57 I" 3.03% 26.91% 111.59 
Morocco 698 139.6 3'" 0.27% 21.42% 23.14 
Mozambique 507 101.4 4'" 1.53% 7.89% 25.62 
Nicaragua 175 35.0 9'" 0.71% 4.73% 33.99 
Tanzania 698 139.6 4'0 1.15% 9.28% 18.21 
Vanuatu 65.7 13.1 2no 3.86% 33.28% 310.83 
'GDP populatIOn data/ram World Development IndIcators 2007 
"ODA data/ram DAC database, retrieved July 26, 2007 
Source: Adapted from the Center for Global Development website 
As illustrated above, the MCC is the leading donor in only three of the sixteen compact-
countries shown in table 3.7 (El Salvador, Lesotho and Mongolia) and this may raise doubts 
over the initiative's ability to incite 'transformational' development. Indeed, Herrling and 
Radelet argue, with regard to the early programmes, that the compacts are "simply not large 
enough to bring about the kind of transformational change originally envisioned for the 
MCC" (2005: 2). In the wake of the current funding issues facing the MCC, the corporation is 
presented with two options: they can either have a larger number of smaller compacts or a 
smaller number oflarger compacts. To date, the trend has been towards the latter, as 
78 At the time of compiling this information, Namibia and Burkina Faso had not yet become MCA compact-
countries and, as a result, are not included in the above table. Details regarding the size of Namibia and Burkina 
Faso's MCA compacts are provided in table 3.3. More information can be found on the MCC's website 
(www.mcc.gov). 
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witnessed by the fact that the total funds for the first five MCA programmes totalled US$90S 
million, compared to over US$2.S billion for the last five79• This reality is indicative of the 
position expressed by MCC CEO Danilovich soon after taking over from Applegarth, in 
which he stressed the following: 
"MCC is meant to create transformative programmes. To have a truly transformative 
impact in the countries MCC partners with, I believe that future Compacts will 
generally need to be larger than those signed thus far. This means that faced with 
finite resources, MCC will have to allocate reduced resources to fewer countries if it 
is to achieve this transformative impact" (200S: 2). 
As one would expect, this increase in the allocation of country assistance, witnessed in table 
3.7 above, has been accompanied by an improvement in the MCC's position relative to other 
donors in compact-countries. At the same time, however, this has occurred to the detriment of 
programme numbers, prompting concerns over the MCA's level ofinclusivity at the global 
level. 
3.6.2 Weighing up the LICs and the LMICs 
Within the context of the continuing funding constraints already outlined in this 
discussion, a strong argument has been made for focussing entirely upon the LICs as opposed 
to including the LMICs, which became eligible for MCC assistance in 2006. Although a 
'funding cap' was actually included in the law that established the MCC to help "ensure that 
the majority of the funding would be reserved for the world's poorest countries 80" (see MCC 
website f), this was done under the understanding that by 2006 there would be an additional 
US$S billion available in resources (or close to that amount). However, as illustrated in table 
3.S above, the amount actually granted to the MCC in practice has fallen well short of the 
amount originally pledged by the Bush administration. This has clear implications for the 
79 The first five countries to sign agreements with the MCC are; Madagascar, Honduras, Cape Verde, Nicaragua 
and Georgia. The last five countries, excluding Namibia and Burkina Faso, which are not included in table 3.7, 
are Mozambique, Lesotho, Morocco, Tanzania and Mongolia. 
80 The extent to which the MCA does in fact work with the world's 'poorest' countries has been open to 
considerable debate. Ultimately, the initiative is about providing assistance to the 'top·perfonning' countries 
within given income categories and logic suggests that, more often than not, these countries will not be the 
poorest or have the greatest need for assistance. Further consideration is given to the MCA's pro-poor 
credentials later in the thesis. 
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MCC's agenda for creating transfonnational results in compact-countries, prompting calls for 
the MCC to exclude the LMICs, which on average tend to be two or three times richer than 
the LICS81 : 
"We have long argued that the MCC should not include LM/Cs as long as the overall 
programme funding remains well below the originally envisioned $5 billion per year. 
While LM/Cs do have very many poor citizens. MCA resources should not be diverted 
from the poorest countries to those with greater tax bases. better access to private 
capital and higher domestic savings" (Herrling and Radelet 2007: 9). 
Despite these strong arguments, there are now four LMICs with signed compact agreements82 
(as shown in table 3.7), with Morocco and Tanzania having the largest compacts to date. 
However, in the most recent round of selection, the MCC board of directors did make the 
decision not to include any new LMICs, which is a reflection of the fact that there are 
significant budget constraints and also that several countries that had been selected as eligible 
in previous years have moved from the LIC category to the LMIC category. Nevertheless, 
whilst these steps have clearly been made to help mitigate against a "leaner-than-expected 
financial diet" (Starks 2007), one cannot ignore, as the following section explores, the 
obvious dangers that under-funding may bring. 
3.6.3 Under-funding and the MCA's future prospects 
In 2007, aid officials reportedly warned that the MCC was likely to run out of money 
in the 2007 fiscal year (FY), meaning that several countries that had "laboured to meet its 
strict eligibility criteria" might have to be turned away (Phillips 2007: 1). Whilst the MCC 
still managed to sign/approve five substantial compacts towards the end of2007, voicing 
these concerns did little, if anything, to improve the programme's prospects this year. As 
shown in table 3.5 above, the MCC was allocated just US$1.54 billion for FY2008, halfthe 
amount requested by President Bush and less than a third of the US$5 billion figure originally 
pledged in setting up the MCA83• As alluded to in section 3.6, this situation is set to worsen in 
81 See Radelet et al (2005) for further information. . 
82 These countries include; Cape Verde and El Salvador in 2006, Morocco in 2007 and Armenia in 2008 
(Herrling and Radelet 2007). 
8J Although this years congressional allocation ofUS$1.54 billion does reportedly allow the US to 'save face' 
(see Herrling 2007c), it does little in terms of facilitating the MCC's agenda for 'transformational development'. 
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2009. Such persistent under-funding is undoubtedly going to impact on the ability of the 
MCA to operate as an incentive system for reform in development; a phenomenon commonly 
referred to as the 'MCC-Effect'. Indeed, Danilovich states that countries take it upon 
themselves to "enact economic, social and political reforms that they previously would not 
have considered doing" in order to be deemed eligible for MCC funding (2006: np). 
According to this logic, therefore, the transformative power of the MCA is irrevocably linked 
to the size of its resources, i.e. the bigger the 'carrot' the greater the incentive for change and 
vice versa84. 
3.7 The MeA: An innovative approach to delivering aid? 
With all the budget constraints, criticisms over the MCC's efficiency and question 
marks over the initiative's future capabilities, it is more important than ever to reflect upon 
the programme's defining characteristics. According to Chassy, the MCA is intended to 
represent the 'antithesis of the traditional aid programme', which has long been criticised for 
its 'redundancy, ineffectiveness and worse' (2005: 37). As a result, one could suggest that the 
'innovations' found within the MCA are designed to answer 'longstanding criticisms within 
the development community,85 over the effectiveness of aid (Clark 2005), with the 
programme acting as a model to 'reform existing development assistance' (see Pasicolan 
2003). The World Bank was undoubtedly the lead actor in promoting this general process of 
reform in the US and in other donor countries in which, among other things, it called for aid 
agencies to be more' selective' in the delivery of assistance. This shift in the delivery of 
foreign aid was indicative of the recommendation by David Dollar and Lant Pritchett that aid 
is most effective when invested in 'sound policy environments,86 (Dollar and Pritchett 1998). 
Consequently, one could suggest that the MCC was established to test the idea that past aid 
efforts had often failed because the assistance went to 'corrupt' and 'ineffective 
84 This situation reinforces Allen's suggestion that "there are no pre-formed blocs of power out there waiting to 
constrain or limit the choices of others. There are only resources and abilities of many different kinds ... which 
may be mobilised and deployed to produce what we would recognise as power" (2003: 96). 
85 Whilst the MCA may have been designed to answer the criticisms of some parts of the 'development 
community', one should not forget that the programme is essentially a Republican-led initiative and, therefore, 
the initiative is likely to be biased towards a particular set of concerns. 
86 This shift in emphasis was part and parcel of the PWC, a phenomenon that has already been discussed in 
chapter two. 
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govemments,87 (see Dugger 2005). This is, as the following section explores, readily visible 
in the MCC's pre-emptive approach to delivering aid. 
3.7.1 A pre-emptive approach to delivering aid 
A key aspect of the MCA and its selection process is that countries wanting to be part 
of this new aid programme must strive to meet the criteria set before they can actually access 
the funding. Many previous aid programmes, though not all, have given aid on the 
understanding that certain reforms seen as necessary for development will be adhered to after 
aid flows have begun. In this respect, the MCA is different as it demands that countries 
wanting to be involved in the initiative must have already put into effect the changes and 
reforms seen as necessary for healthy and productive economic growth. As such, it works as 
a sort of incentive system, rewarding 'sound policy' with greater development assistance. In 
this sense, it is not all that dissimilar to the approach adopted within the Highly Indebted Poor 
Country (HIPC) Initiative of the World Bank and IMF, in which countries must meet a range 
of conditions before they may receive debt relief!8. Arguably, both employ a method of 
delivering assistance through pro-active conditionality in which funds are withheld until 
demands, made by the donor, are met (Soederberg 2004: 281). Clearly, for this carrot-and-
stick approach to work well there must be an effective incentive system in place. In the case 
of the MCA, however, this system is, as discussed earlier, potentially being undermined by 
reduced funding and this is already limiting the MCC's ability to propagate transformational 
change at the global level. 
3.7.2 Country ownership 
The MCA differs from many traditional US aid programmes in that grants are 
awarded based on a foundation model as opposed to the traditional country programme 
approach adopted by USAID (Clark 2005: 31). What this means is that each compact-country 
87 Whilst the argument that aid is only effective in 'sound policy environments' has received widespread 
support, it has not gone without contestation (for example see Hansan and Tarp 2000, and Santiso 2001). 
Greater consideration is given to these debates in later chapters. 
88 In order to begin receiving relief on a 'provisional' basis, countries must have a ''track record in 
macroeconomic stability, have prepared a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and cleared any outstanding 
arrears ... For a country to reach completion point it must maintain macroeconomic stability under a PGRF-
supported programme, carry out key structural and social reforms as agreed upon at the decision point, and 
implement a PRSP satisfactorily for one year" (World Bank website c). 
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takes responsibility for developing, implementing and monitoring their MCA programme89• 
As one interview respondent commented, "The MCA is the country's programme ... they 
design and implement it" (research interview with Jim Vermillion90). According to Radelet, 
this approach puts "the responsibility for programme design and implementation where it 
belongs - with the recipient countries" (2003a: 8). However, whilst the emphasis on country 
ownership has clearly led to greater compact-country control over their MCA projects, it 
would be a mistake to assume that this represents a shift to complete autonomy. In the end, 
the MCC retains ultimate control over the programmes, maintaining the right to veto certain 
decisions or stop funds altogether if they deem it necessary. Although this is not unexpected, 
after all the MCC is accountable to US taxpayers for those funds, it does highlight the need 
for a closer examination of what the concept of' country ownership' means in practice91 • 
Whilst the MCC does have mechanisms with which to exert a degree of control over 
the MCA programmes, one could suggest that, through its highly selective approach to 
country eligibility, the need for intervention is rather limited. Hence, those deemed eligible 
for compact assistance are in fact countries that are already committed to a model of 
development that is shaped by the North. What the MCC does is give countries that have 
already demonstrated an active commitment towards towing the official development line, 
greater 'control' over a development process which has, in may ways, already been defined 
through the lens of 'transnationalliberalism' . Perhaps, this is one of the reasons why there are 
such striking similarities between many of the compact programmes, in which the dominant 
focus is nearly always placed on improving transport and agricultural infrastructure (see the 
MCC 2007b). Alternatively, one could hypothesise, in light of the MCC's stated focus on 
results92, that countries may have opted for projects that are seen to be easily monitored, 
accounted for and measured, over what may be seen as vaguer, but nevertheless important, 
programmes. Whatever the precise reasons, this tendency to prioritise large-scale 
infrastructural projects within the framework of the MCA has prompted criticism from parts 
89 This is one of the potential reasons why MCA projects have taken longer than expected to implement. Indeed, 
in a recent article it was suggested that 'poor countries' are not used to planning such 'complex developments' 
and have, therefore, needed additional time to get the progranunes up and running (Dugger 2007). 
90 Jim Vermillion, Managing Director for Latin America in the MCC - Interview held in Washington D.C. on 5th 
October 2005. 
91 Chapter 8 explores this key issue in greater detail, with a specific focus placed on Nicaragua's MCA 
experience. 
92 According to the MCC "assistance goes to those countries that have developed well-designed progranunes 
with clear objectives, benchmarks to measure progress, procedures to ensure fiscal accountability for the use of 
our grants, and a plan for effective monitoring and objective evaluation of results" (MCC website a). 
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of the development community who argue that the MCC does not fund projects of direct 
benefit to the poor, but rather relies on a 'trickle-down' approach (see Kurlantzick 2007) 
which as history demonstrates has often been a hollow promise. 
3.7.3 Consultation and the MCA 
In examining this issue of 'ownership', it is essential to look at the processes through 
which individuals within the compact-countries are able to engage with the MCA. Within this 
context, the concept of 'consultation' is particularly significant as, to a large extent this 
defines the formal mechanisms through which public participation, a process which is 
increasingly seen as being a determinant of programme success, is enabled. It should come as 
no surprise that the MCC places a strong emphasis on the consultative process in the 
development of the MCA programmes. In fact, this focus was hardwired into the MCC's 
approach through its founding legislation, which requires the following: 
"In entering into a Compact, the United States shall seek to ensure that the 
government of an eligible country (1) takes into account the local-level perspectives 
of the rural and urban poor, including women, in the eligible country; and (2) 
consults with private and voluntary organizations, the business community, and other 
donors in the eligible country" (MCC 2006b: 3). 
Clearly, if the principle of ownership is to have meaning, then recipient countries should 
move beyond the sphere of government and engage with society as a whole, i.e. it must 
represent more than a tokenistic attempt to build a foundation oflegitimacy. As Clark 
suggests, it is essential "to build in a channel of influence in the MCA for civil society groups 
that is real and not just window dressing" (2005: 34). Whilst the MCC is required to ensure 
that genuine consultation does take place in recipient countries, the degree to which this has 
happened in practice is, as illustrated later in this thesis, debateable. This has implications for 
how we understand and value 'democracy', which becomes increasingly important in a 
country such as Nicaragua, where democracy is a particularly fragile phenomenon. 
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Conclusions 
The MCA should not be seen as a single initiative, but as part of a global package 
through which US interests are being pursued. Its inception at the start of the twenty-first 
century was symbolic of the emergence of 'transformational' policy in the US, through which 
the hegemonic ideology of 'transnationalliberalism' has been extended. Whilst recognising 
this reality, however, one cannot ignore the impact of 9/11 on US foreign policy, through 
which security interests have come to dominate the geopolitical landscape. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the MCA has not been immune to the effects of this. Despite such 
complexities however, the MCC has a clear focus in its approach to promoting international 
development and focuses specifically on reducing global poverty through the "promotion of 
sustainable economic growth" (MCC website a). According to this approach, therefore, 
economic growth is directly conducive to the reduction of poverty and with this is mind it is 
not surprising that the MCC is highly selective in working with those countries that have the 
greatest economic potential. 
Although economic growth is undoubtedly an important component of development, 
it is important to recognise that inequality can greatly affect its impact on poverty (Lustig et 
al 2002: 4). This can be seen most clearly with regard to the neoliberal Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) of the eighties and nineties in Latin America, which in many cases 
greatly exacerbated existing social and economic inequity. The consequences of these 
programmes were, in several cases, disastrous, with critics likening their impact to that of a 
tropical storm (see Nithipan-Envio team 1992). Although the MCC does grant countries 
greater control and flexibility in composing and implementing their compact projects, this is 
being done within a pre-defined model of development that continues to give primacy to 
economic growth. The historical legacy of these SAPs, which were highly econocentric in 
nature, cannot be ignored. It is vital that donors move away from a 'one model fits all' 
mentality in development and acknowledge the conditions and underlying power relations 
that are particular to each country. In recognition of this need for specificity, the following 
chapter examines the historical backdrop to Nicaragua's unique and at times volatile 
relationship with the US, through which the country's MCA can be contextualised and an 
explicit analysis of the MCA undertaken. 
68 
Chapter 4: United States - Nicaraguan Relations; A Volatile History 
Chapter 4: United States - Nicaraguan Relations; A Volatile History 
The second chapter in this thesis focussed on providing the theoretical backdrop to the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), beginning with a famous speech made by President 
Truman in 1949. From there, the chapter examined two very influential bodies of thought, 
modernisation theory and dependency theory, which preceded the neoliberal counter-
revolution of the 1980s and the subsequent transition to the Washington Consensus (WC). 
This was followed by a discussion of the apparent transition to the Post-Washington 
Consensus (PWC), which coincided with an emerging 'good governance' agenda that would 
come to dominate the actions of key development organisations and thinkers from the 1990s 
onwards. The chapter concluded by recognising the fundamental shift within the United 
States' (US) international development priorities towards realigning foreign assistance with 
the post 9/11 US security agenda and emphasised the need to re-evaluate the concept of 
'development'. The third chapter examined the MCA and its defining aspects, locating the 
initiative within the broader context of US foreign policy. It identified some ofthe fund's 
perceived strengths and weaknesses, whilst simultaneously considering the emergence of 
'transformational' policy in the US and the associated reform of US foreign assistance. The 
chapter concluded by stressing the need for greater historical and spatial specificity in 
understanding ofthe MCA and, in this respect, the following discussion exploring US-
Nicaraguan relations is particularly important as it provides the historical and geographical 
context to the study. In doing this, however, the chapter does, at times, refer to Latin America 
and Central America more broadly, in order to distinguish between moments in which the 
wider geopolitical context has shaped the nature of these relations. 
4.1 Introduction 
It is easy when writing about the history of US-Nicaraguan relations to fall into the 
trap of simply listing events in a chronological fashion - indeed this does have a certain 
appeal. Such an approach would undoubtedly simplity this daunting task and provide an 
intriguing overview of events within the discourse of US-Nicaraguan relations. However, 
without recognising the interrelated issues and complexities that criss-cross historical 
relations, it would offer little more than a glorified timeline. Of much greater significance 
here is the identification of historical themes, of the continuities and discontinuities that shape 
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this unique relationship. Arguably, historical events have repercussions that transcend both 
spatial and temporal boundaries, and it is this interconnectedness which must be explored and 
unravelled here if we are to understand the past, present and future of US-Nicaraguan 
relations. That being said, however, for the purpose of clarity this chapter is divided up into 
three broad historical periods. Although structuring the discussion in this way may appear to 
contradict the previous suggestion regarding the adoption of a timeline approach, it does help 
bring coherence to what is an incredibly complex topic. Furthermore, in order to avoid the 
dangers oflumping events into detached historical groupings, frequent connections are drawn 
between these 'historical periods', reflecting the transcendental qualities of US-Nicaraguan 
relations referred to above. 
The first section entitled 'pre-crisis US-Nicaraguan relations' considers a number of 
important historical events and themes, such as the commencement of the Cold War 
geopolitical order and the creation of the Alliance for Progress. The second section labelled 
'Central America in crisis' focuses on US-Nicaraguan relations during the 1980s. The use of 
the label 'crisis' in distinguishing this period was decided upon for two key reasons: Firstly, it 
reflects the fact that the 1980s was a hugely volatile period in Central American history, 
referred to by some as the "bloodiest, most violent, and most destructive era in Central 
America's post-I 820 history" (Lafeber 1993: 362). Secondly, its use here is indicative of the 
plethora of books and articles that emerged, both from within the isthmus itself and from 
outside the region, during this period, which talked about a region in crisis93• Whilst applying 
this label here, however, it would be a mistake to assume that crisis in Central America only 
began in the late seventies and concluded with the end of civil war in the region94• The final 
part of this chapter looks at US-Nicaraguan relations from the early 1990s to present day, 
focussing on a range of issues illustrative of the post-Cold War era and reflecting on the 
increasing submersion of the Central American region into international obscurity. As Nairn 
discusses more generally, Latin America once thought to be the 'backyard' of the US is now 
more like Atlantis - the lost continent (2004: np). 
93 See, for example, Leiken and Rubin (1987) The Central American Crisis Reader: The essential guide to the 
most controversial foreign policy issue today, Feinberg (1982) International dimensions of the Crisis, Gallado y 
Lopez (1986) Centroamerica La Crisis en Cifras, Camancho y Rojas (1984) Las Crisis Centroamerican, Lundahl 
y Pelupessy eds (1989) Crisis Economica en Centroamerica y el Caribe, ICADlS 3 (1986) Para entender Centro 
America; Los Hechos que formaron la crisis, ICADlS 4 (1986) Para entender Centro America; Raices y 
Perspectivas de la Crisis Economica. 
94 Within the context of this specific chapter, 'crisis' should be seen in a broad relational sense, marking 
paradigmatic moments in the discourse ofU8-Nicaraguan relations, which act as waypoints in giving direction 
to a topic that is both highly complex and multidimensional. 
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It is useful to begin this chapter by considering how the historical relationship 
between the US and Central America has generally been interpreted by individuals with an 
interest in the region and, in turn, how this has shaped the identity of the isthmus. A brief dip 
within the academic literature provides an interesting indication as to the region's modem 
history which, although very telling, tends to mask over some important historical realities. 
Taking several examples, the region is described as an 'obscure backwater' held hostage to 
the demands of American imagination (Black 1988), a 'workshop of empire' (Grandin 2006), 
and an area 'by-passed by history' (see Prevost and Vanden 1999). Much of the literature 
presents an image of Central America as being powerless, unable to shape its own history - a 
history that has been defined through the desires and whims of external forces. As this 
chapter demonstrates, the role of the US and other external actors in the region cannot be 
ignored, as these forces have been paramount in shaping the region's development. But 
whilst their importance in the isthmus is undeniable, one cannot and must not discount the 
determining role internal dynamics have played in defining regional history. Far from being 
'passive' non-actors in a history imposed and defined from without, regional stakeholders 
have acted as decisive agents of change. Countries within the isthmus have been active 
participants in shaping their own histories and have not been shy in exercising their power of 
'resistance' in the face of unwanted foreign impositions and moulding their own outcomes; a 
reality exemplified throughout this chapter. 
4.2 'Pre-crisis' US-Nicaraguan relations 
This part of the chapter seeks to explore the historical antecedents to the Central 
American crisis of the 1980s and discusses what are arguably some of the most important 
episodes in 'pre-crisis' US-Nicaraguan relations, beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
Good Neighbour Policy in 1933. 
4.2.1 The 'Good Neighbour Policy' and the Central American dictatorships 
The Banana Wars formally ended with the announcement of the Good Neighbour 
Policy in 1933 by US President Franklin D. Rooseveit. This declaration represented a radical 
reversal of US policy towards Latin America, which had previously entailed - as already 
demonstrated within a Nicaraguan context - successive military interventions. Grandin argues 
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that if such a shift were to happen today it would be the equivalent of "George W. Bush 
withdrawing troops from Iraq, repudiating his doctrine of pre-emptive strikes, signing the 
international Criminal Court Treaty, normalising relations with Syria and Iran, and permitting 
third-world nations to have greater control over international capital flows" (2006: 28). What 
the Good Neighbour Policy promised for the Latin American region was threefold: that the 
US would desist from unilateral military interventions, it would relinquish its administrative 
and financial control over the Central American countries, and it would respect the political 
traditions and sovereignty of the 'sister republics' (Niess 1990: 100). The instigation of this 
policy, however, was far more than a purely peace-driven agenda or PR campaign. If 
anything, this dramatic shift in stance reflected the recognition of many within Washington 
that US interests could be better served through diplomatic and commercial means, as 
opposed to 'gunboat diplomacy,95. This, however, is not to say that the Good Neighbour 
Policy actually represented the end of interventionism, only that it would take place through 
more subtle and subversive means, i.e. through ambassadors, foreign 'advisors' and the 
strategic use of economic assistance96• In fact, one could argue that this led to a situation that 
was actually more interventionist than before, institutionalising US authority over the 
Americas and bringing the countries further into the political, economic and cultural orbit of 
the US (Grandin 2006: 3-4). As Lafeber argues, following the introduction of the Good 
Neighbour Policy, the US "carried out interventionism in Central America and tightened the 
system far beyond anything Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson probably imagined" 
(1993: 83). 
4.2.2 An unholy alliance: The US and regional dictatorships 
Beyond increasing US interventionism throughout the Americas, the Good Neighbour 
Policy also helped sustain dictatorships within the isthmus (Maira 1986: 21). Successive US 
administrations lent their support to authoritarian regimes in Nicaragua, El Salvador and 
95 Within the context of Central America, 'gunboat diplomacy' can be understood as a manifestation of the 
Roosevelt Corollary in 1904, in which military (and more often naval force) was used as an instrument of US 
foreign policy within the isthmus. Furthermore, '1he use of gunboat diplomacy, including the deployment of 
marines, in support of direct U.S. control over government finances was ... central to Washington's involvement 
in Nicaragua between 1916 and 1933" (US History Encyclopaedia). 
% It is interesting here to draw parallels between this event and Condoleezza Rice's conceptualization of 
'transformational diplomacy' referred to previously, part of which seeks to make US foreign diplomacy more 
efficient as a tool of US foreign policy. 
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Guatemala97• To a large degree, these regional dictatorships were seen as a source of stability 
in the region and, therefore, conducive to US interests. In Nicaragua, for example, dictator 
Anastasio Somoza was the "trusted interlocutor of the United States in Central America", 
constituting an "authentic power axis which was stable, permanent, lasting and which had all 
the political flexibility required to carry out its role in the region" (Cerdas 1986: 181). As 
such, these dictatorships were not a paradox, but were in fact necessary for the 'system' to 
work (Lafeber 1993: 83) and, therefore, the US tended to avoid any interventions that could 
have caused 'discomfort' to the regimes. The US' support for despotism throughout Central 
America meant that dictators had little pressure or incentives to meet the demands of both the 
middle and lower classes for reforms or even 'nominal political participation' (Weeks 1986: 
114). This created social, economic and political conditions that were conducive to the 
formation of oligarchic groupings, supported by two pillars: the US on the one hand and the 
domestic military elites on the other. Ironically, these systems of repression would, as 
Martinez argues in discussing Nicaragua, become the source of much instability at a later 
date, as "domestic developments gradually turned the strongest regional system for 
domination and the most secure for US foreign policy in the isthmus into the exact opposite" 
(1986: 183). 
4.2.3 A new geopolitical order 
This discussion engages with the debates and issues that helped shape the 
development of the isthmus during the 1950s and 1960s. Once again, US activities within 
Nicaragua and the Central American region during this period were heavily motivated by the 
pursuit of economic and strategic interests and less visibly, although no less importantly, by 
the continuation ofthe US' 'civilising' mission. The end of the 1940s marked the onset ofan 
ideological tug of war between US-led capitalism and Soviet-led communism, in which much 
of the South, and Central America in particular, would faH victim to this global struggle for 
hegemonic dominance. As previously discussed in chapter 3, which analysed the concept of 
power from a geopolitical perspective, the end of World War 11 coincided with the inception 
ofa new 'pervasive' and 'persuasive' world order, which would come to dominate the 
geopolitical imagination until its formal coHapse in 1989. Hence, the commencement of the 
Cold War came to redefine US relations with its southern neighbours, but also with much of 
97 For example, Roosevelt made a famous remark commenting that "Somoza [the Nicaraguan dictator] may be a 
son ofa bitch, but he's our son ofa bitch" (cited Zepezauer 1994). 
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the rest of the world, as the promotion of strategic interests took centre stage within US 
policy. However, it is the US' unique relationship with Central America and Nicaragua in 
particular, that is of greatest relevance here and the following discussion focuses on these 
areas. 
4.2.4 The 1954 Guatemalan coup 
Much of the Cold War geopolitical order was dominated by the US agenda for 
combating alleged communist inspired revolutions in Central America. However, the 1954 
US-assisted coup in Guatemala was of particular significance as it represented a paradigmatic 
moment in the commencement of Cold War relations with the isthmus. The coup saw the 
installation of a US friendly puppet regime headed by President Col. Carlos Castillo Annas, 
who was in no way disillusioned as to the role the US expected him to play. In a visit to 
Washington D.C., following his successful takeover of power, he was painfully forthright in 
saying to then Vice President Nixon "Tell me what to do and I will do it" (Kinzer 2003: np). 
The coup, which was one of the earliest interventions by the US legitimised through Cold 
War ideology, is recognised as being one of the most important events in the history of US 
relations with Latin America (see Grandin 2004) and, with regard to Central America more 
specifically, set the precedent for later interventions. Moreover, it was the Central 
Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) first major covert action within the isthmus and it marked the 
beginning of an era of US backed military regimes, not only in Central America but across 
the Latin American region as a whole. In the specific case of Guatemala, the coup 
dramatically changed the country's historical course, ending democracy and inaugurating 
forty years of dictatorships; regimes under which one hundred thousand civilians would be 
murdered (Stokes 2003: np). 
4.2.5 Containing communism 
The Guatemalan coup marked the commencement of a policy of contaimnent that 
went way beyond the Monroe Doctrine, in which in the face of agressive European 
colonialism the US laid claim to the Americas. Although the policies were similar, in that 
they were both concerned with keeping unwanted powers or systems out of the US' 'sphere 
of influence', they had one fundamental difference. As Niess clarifies, "while Monroe's aim 
had been to contain the power-political ambitions of the European states, the Truman 
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administration's Latin American policy sought to block or reverse any undesirable social 
changes" (1990: 134). Consequently, the Cold War containment doctrine was much more 
intrusive than the Monroe Doctrine, having direct implications for the internal dynamics of 
the Central American countries. Any social change or mobilisation seen as undesirable by the 
country elites was met by cries of communist subversion, a call which rallied much support in 
the US. Indeed, whilst helping to bolster the positions oflocal elites, it also provided 
politicians in the US with the perfect excuse for deploying 'countenneasures,98. As Booth et 
al suggest, "US policy in the region perhaps responded more to domestic political fears, 
misperceptions, and rhetoric in the United States and the fears oflocal elites, than to the 
reality ofthe situation in the isthmus" (2006: 178) 99. The subordination of Central American 
relations under the auspices of the containment doctrine was synonymous with the emergence 
of the new geopolitical world order, in which both national and international politics were 
seen as a zero-sum game between communism and the 'free world' (Booth et a12006: 179). 
Although no longer defined today in terms ofan East-West conflict, US political rhetoric is 
still very much confined to this 'zero-sum' mindset, witnessed most visibly in President 
Bush's frequent assertion that in the new fight against terror countries are either 'with' the 
US or 'against' it, denying the possibility of a neutral standpointIOo• 
4.2.6 A self-fulfilling prophecy 
It could be argued that the inflexibility oflocal elites and US politicians to accept 
social change placed many Central American governments and social movements in a 
98 These countenneasures included a wide range of both subtle and more direct actions by the US involving: 
informationldisinfonnation campaigns, counterinsurgency programmes, covert actions by secret police, political 
destabilisation, economic blackmail through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 'subliminal warfare' 
through the help of research and social organisations, military aid of all types, intimidating naval manoeuvres, 
support for armed insurgency and direct military intervention (Niess 1990: 133-134). 
99 Some parallels could be drawn here to the post-9/11 world, in which many countries have embraced anti-
terrorist rhetoric in the hope ofiegitimising action or indeed inaction against various groups or countries, and 
often in order to secure additional support, financial or otherwise, for their alleged anti-terrorist activities. For 
example, in Latin America it is far more common post-9/11 for coca-producing countries to identify small coca 
farmers as being somehow related to global terrorist networks. Moreover, as attention has shifted away from 
Latin America, officials in charge of US foreign policy towards the region have increasingly sought attention 
and resources by "lumping a broad range of issues together in the counterterrorism - and narcoterrorist - basket" 
(Youngers and Rosin 2004: 9). 
100 In a speech made in November 2001 President Bush stated the fOllowing: "Over time it's going to be 
important for nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity ... You're either with us or against us in 
the fight against terror" (cited in CNN November 6th 2001). He also asserted this dualistic global vision in his 
use of the phrase 'axis of evil' for the first time in January 2002 during the State of Union Address, to describe 
those govemments accused of sponsoring terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction - WMDs 
(mentioning Iraq, Iran and North Korea) (Bush 2002b). 
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position where any attempt to pursue alternative models of development, that would help 
address 'underdevelopment', were construed as un-American and, hence, essentially 
communistlO1 . Ironically, this brought about a self-fulfilling prophecy, a point expressed in 
the following extract from Niess: 
"The foolish attempt to put revolutions or reforms under quarantine like infected 
cattle, to prevent the communist 'bacillus 'from spreadingfrom one region to another, 
left beleaguered reformers no option but to lookfor economic aid and political 
support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, countries which they initially would 
probably not have seen as allies" (1990: 134). 
Bearing in mind the above quote, it is important to ask ourselves whether the communist 
'threat' was, in fact, a legitimate concern for the US and determinant to hemispheric Cold 
War interventions, or whether this rhetoric acted as a smokescreen for an alternative agenda. 
For example, whilst Booth et al suggest that "the containment of Soviet-inspired communism 
was the major force driving US foreign policy" (2006: 178), Stokes states that Soviet 
expansion was rather a peripheral, concern for the US. Indeed, Stokes argues that the two 
states that have traditionally been used to illustrate US containment efforts most clearly, Cuba 
and Nicaragua, both initially sought good relations with the US and US hostility towards 
these states occurred prior to any Soviet alignment (2003: np). This lends support to the idea 
. that US hostility towards many Central American and Caribbean countries during the Cold 
War era may have been triggered by the domestic policies of such countries (policies that 
were seen as non-conducive to US interests), as opposed to any real Soviet threat. For 
example, in the case of Guatemala, the CIA led coup discussed earlier was driven more by 
the need to protect certain US corporate interests, in the shape of the United Fruit 
CompanylO2 (UFCo), than combating any real sort of communist threat. In a country of more 
than three million people, the communist party had a membership of only four thousand and 
in the governing coalition only four out of fifty-one deputies were communists, with none 
being cabinet members (Oliver 2004: np). So perhaps one could argue that US 'concern', 
which was often couched in terms of Soviet expansionism and used to legitimise 
101 This can be seen most visibly in tenos of 'dependency theory' (discussed in chapter 2), which evoked "fears 
of Marxism, communism, radicalism, [and] general disrespect for established academic procedures" (Bath and 
James 1976, cited'in Hyman 1994: 37). 
102 At the time of the coup, US Secretary of State John Dulles was a major UFCo shareholder, his bother Allen 
Dulles - Director of the CICA - had been the company's president, and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs John Cabot was a major shareholder (Niess 1990: 149), 
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interventions in Central America during the Cold War period, was driven in part by corporate 
and economic interests. The following section looking at the Alliance for Progress sheds 
further light on this possibility. 
4.2.7 The Alliance for Progress 
The Alliance for Progress was initiated by US President Kennedy in 1961 and 
represented a ten year plan for 'development' in Latin America, to be administered by the 
newly created United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The alliance 
provided economic and military assistance to its allies in Latin America and played an 
incisive role in promoting modernisation throughout the Americas (MacDonald 1997: 31). In 
light of this discussion, it is useful here to refer back to chapter 2 which analysed 
modernisation theory and its evolution, whilst simultaneously establishing a clear link 
between development theory and the geopolitical Cold War era (see section 2.2.1). The 
influential work undertaken by Rostow in the 1950s and 1960s establishing the 'stages of 
economic growth' not only exemplified the extremely paternalistic, as well as ethnocentric 
ideas enshrined in the modernisation discourse, but also, as indicated by the title of Rostow' s 
famous book 'The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto', 
demonstrated the theory's entrenchment within Cold War geopolitics. Consequently, 
modernisation theory, through being embedded within prevailing ideological discourse, 
helped to legitimise US interventions in the South, particularly in the US' 'backyard' -
Central America. 
In a speech given in March 1961, President Kennedy set out his vision for the 
alliance: 
..... we propose to complete the revolution of the Americas, to build a hemisphere 
where all men [sic] can hope for a suitable standard of living and all can live out 
their lives in dignity and in freedom. To achieve this goal political freedom must 
accompany material progress ... Let us once again transform the American continent 
into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts, a tribute to the power of the 
creative energies offree men and women, an example to all the world that liberty and 
progress walk hand in hand. Let us once again awaken our American revolution until 
it guides the struggles of people everywhere - not with an imperialism of force or fear 
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but the rule of courage and freedom and hope for the future of man [sic 1 " (Kennedy 
1961: np). 
It is interesting to note that as Kennedy was setting out this vision for the Americas and 
pledging to dramatically increase US economic assistance to the region lO3, he had full 
knowledge of the preparations being made to invade Cuba, giving his go ahead for the' Bay 
of Pigs' operation only three weeks later (Niess 1990: 173). Moreover, despite his reference 
to 'freedom' and 'liberty', the regional dictators and military elite, many of whom were 
installed through US support, continued to rule in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua. As McGrew states, "US policy towards Central America appeared increasingly 
paradoxical; in the fight against communist totalitarianism it was engaged in alliances with 
highly undemocratic regimes" (1992: 66). With regard to Nicaragua more specifically, the 
US maintained strong and visible support to the Somoza dictatorship, giving millions of 
dollars in aid for 'social and economic projects' under the auspices of the Alliance for 
Progress, despite ample evidence showing that Somoza and his accomplices stole much of 
this assistance (Booth et al. 2006: 72). Additionally, during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Nicaraguan dictatorship received US military support far out of proportion to that of other 
Central American countries, with Somoza's National Guard subsequently becoming the most 
"heavily US-trained military establishment in Latin America" (ibid). 
Despite Kennedy's passionate speech on completing a revolution for 'freedom' and 
'dignity' in Latin America, the Alliance for Progress was essentially an instrument of US 
foreign policy, aimed at supporting and furthering US interests in the region. As a result, far 
from representing the beginning of something fundamentally new, the creation of the 
Alliance demonstrated the continued efforts of the US to maintain 'stability' in the region, 
driven by the pursuit of US economic and strategic interests. Ironically, Kennedy's vision of 
awakening an 'American revolution' signified the accelerated attempts by the US to pre-empt 
growing political instability, instability that had resulted, to a large degree, from the US' 
unbridled support for oligarchical and dictatorial patterns of rule in the region (McGrew 
1992). In this respect, one could suggest that the Alliance was utilised by the US and local 
elites to fight 'genuine' revolution in Latin America, signifying a determined effort by both 
103 The Alliance for Progress aimed to inject the huge sum of$100 billion into Latin America over a ten year 
period, of which the US would contribute one fifth (becoming the US' largest single foreign-aid programme at 
the time). 
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parties to engineer a revolution from above in order to prevent a revolution from below 
(Niess 1990: 176). Consequently, whilst the Alliance may be identified as an effort to combat 
'underdevelopment' in the region through the use of economic aid and the promotion of a US 
led model of development, it was nevertheless a project opposed to fundamental intemal 
change, aimed at keeping the lid on problems as opposed to confronting them. 
Although the Alliance for Progress witnessed some limited economic advances, it 
failed to achieve any meaningful results and, in some cases, exacerbated regional problems. 
According to Niess, there was an inherent contradiction within the Alliance in that "the 
planned reforms were neither in the interest of the Latin American elites, because they 
undermined their very basis of existence, nor of the Americans, because they undermined 
their economic and political interests" (1990: 178). More specifically, it is argued that 
whereas the business sector wanted 'political stability' in order to maximise their profits, the 
US sought to keep out communism by ensuring social 'peace', and both of these could be 
provided by the armed forces in Latin America104 (ibid). Within this context, the emergence 
of a number of new dictatorships and military regimes during the 1960s in Latin America 
(including in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador), can be seen as being directly related to 
the Alliance for Progress. Furthermore, despite a modest increase in regional Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) over the period spanning the Alliance's existence, very little of the 
accumulated wealth trickled down to the general population, with many of the benefits being 
reaped by fly-by-night US investors105 (Black 1988: 113). President Kennedy clearly had a 
point when he said that 'political freedom must accompany material progress' and the 
Alliance proved him right, iffor all the wrong reasons. Central America, which had been 
intended as a showcase for the Alliance, became the very symbol of its collapse (ibid). 
4.2.8 The seventies and growing obscurity 
The seventies began with the failure of the Alliance for Progress and the collapse of 
the Central American Common Market106 (CACM) (Lafeber 1993: 267). The region also slid 
104 As illustrated later in this chapter, whilst this strategy may have been successful in ensuring short-tenn peace 
and stability, it was counter-productive in the long-run, with these very systems of 'control' becoming the 
source of much instability. 
105 It should also be mentioned that US loans and grants had several conditions - such as the imperative to buy 
only US products (Niess 1990). 
106 The CACM was created in 1960 to "spur regional economic integration, foreign investment, intraregional 
trade, and industrialisation", with the intention of undercutting the potential appeal of socialism. Its objectives 
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from US attention as politicians within the US became preoccupied with other issues, such as 
the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. Consequently, Central America was, under 
both the Ford and Nixon administrations, demoted in tenns of US foreign policy priorities. 
Although there was an increase in economic and military aid to the Americas, the emphasis 
was placed upon maintaining existing regimes in power, not about facilitating any 
meaningful social change (McGrew 1992: 66). Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume 
passivity in Central America during this period. In particular, there was increased 
mobilisation within civil society, driven by members of the Catholic Church and catalysed 
through the onset of clerical activism. Liberation theology, which arose out of this movement, 
was hugely significant in that it "combined the fonnation and consolidation of grassroots 
organisations with ideas oflocal democracy" (Bebbington and Thiele 1993: 37) and it is 
through this relationship to 'democracy' that notions of empowerment became infused, to a 
large degree, within Central American societies. The impact ofthis social revolution was 
enonnous, with extensive grassroots activity being facilitated through Christian Base 
Communities (CEBs) set up by nuns and priests in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua (Booth and Walker 1999: 151). Needless to say, this activation of society was 
largely met by condemnation from elite groupings within the isthmus, which saw this 
'awakening' as being highly subversive and it was quickly labelled as 'communist'. 
Nevertheless, despite repressive countenneasures instigated by the Central American ruling 
elite, the movements grew stronger and would come to be an incisive factor in shaping the 
region's future. 
4.2.9 President Carter and US regional policy 
Central America found its way back onto the US radar once political instability within 
the region threatened social revolution (Amson 1993: 2). In contrast to previous US 
administrations, however, the inauguration of President Carter in 1977 presented the 
possibility of a more humanistic, if not moralistic, US policy outlook towards the region. 
According to Niess, the US elections "heralded a turnabout in US Latin American policy 
similar to that effected by President Kennedy 16 years earlier" (1990: 189). Of particular 
significance, was the promise of the new administration to abandon the 'East-West 
straight jacket' and adopt a differentiated approach that would recognise the specificity of 
converged with those of the Alliance for Progress, which sought to "bolster the capitalist development model" 
(Booth et al 2006: 50). 
80 
Chapter 4: United States - Nicaraguan Relations; A Volatile History 
individual nation states (ibid). Additionally, the new administration elevated the promotion of 
'democracy' and the advancement of human rights as the core tenets of US foreign policy, 
inciting domestic and political reform in what was arguably an attempt to gain some measure 
of control over the region's revolutionary movements (McGrew 1992: 66). Although this 
transition to a more humanistic regional approach, if taken at face value, was a potentially 
positive step, it should not be mistaken as being indicative of a crisis of conscience among 
politicians within the US, as it arguably represented the continued efforts ofleading figures 
within the US to maintain control and stability in the region. However, in considering the 
volatile events that were to follow in the 1980s, it becomes clear that this attempt to engineer 
a US managed revolution from within the isthmus was unsuccessful and, as explored below, 
there are several important reasons for this failure. 
Firstly, the US' containment policy was, as alluded to earlier, a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, in that it gave countries in Central America little choice but to look for support 
elsewhere, i.e. from the Soviet Union or Cuba. Consequently, whilst there was, initially at 
least, a shift away from viewing US relations with the region through the lens of the East-
West conflict, Cold War geopolitics had, in many ways, already become entrenched in 
regional relations. For example, the 1970s had witnessed the emergence of Cuban-aided 
leftist revolutionary movements in both Nicaragua and El Salvador, whilst in the US the 
'right-wingers' remained diametrically opposed to aiding 'communist' groupings in any way 
or form. Secondly, linking to the above discussion, Carter's 'transformation' of US foreign 
policy was essentially too little, too late. The US had through its unbridled support of 
regional dictatorships and oligarchies, its Cold War policy and imperialistic activities in the 
Americas, already helped put into motion a course of events that would inevitably lead to 
disaster for the region. Instead of focussing on the underlying causes of instability and 
impoverishment in Central America, the US had been happy to put a lid on the growing 
discontent and ignore the social oppression and deprivation, so long as its short-term 
economic and strategic interests were being served. It was only once the regional troubles 
started to boil over and threaten US interests that they decided to act, by which point it was 
too late. As Black argues, "each President in his own way fell into the trap of believing that 
US power and technological skill could mould Central America like putty, even at a time 
when its social systems were breaking apart" (1988: 136). 
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In addition to the above discussion, there are some more specific, although not 
unrelated, factors to consider. For example, one key reason for the downfall of Carter's 
regional policy was 'Vietnam syndrome'. The fallout from the Vietnam War continued to 
dominate US political debates, having substantial repercussions for US foreign policy. 
Indeed, Arnson argues that Vietnam was the most important context to shape US policy 
debate over Central America and this stemmed, to a significant degree, from a lack of 
consensus over the purpose of American power in a post-Vietnam world (1993: 3). Whereas, 
for many people in the US, Vietnam tended to revive old isolationist tendencies, the majority 
of conservatives argued that the US only lost in Vietnam because of a lack of will and they. 
therefore pushed for a more aggressive confrontation with the Soviet Union and its allies 
(Felton 1993: VII-VIII). Of particular importance, however, was the impact ofthe Vietnam 
War on Congressional-Executive relations in the US, which ended decades of co-operation 
over foreign policy and saw the reactivation of powers that Congress would now choose to 
exercise (Arnson 1993: 3). As discussed below, recognising the interaction between the 
different structures of government is essential in understanding US policy towards the 
isthmus, especially during the 1980S107• Furthermore, the legacy of defeat in Vietnam would 
continue to shape the American psyche and Central America was to become the arena in 
which the US would seek to erase the trauma it caused. 
Another reason for the breakdown of Carter's policy emanated from internal 
dynamics within the region or, more specifically, from those very structures of power that the 
US had fought so hard to maintain, the dictatorships and military regimes. Many of these 
regimes became concerned about Carter's new 'moralistic' policy and began to adopt a more 
aggressive stance towards the US. Moreover, a number of high profile events led to 
widespread public revulsion in the US over the administration's alliance with the Central 
American dictators and military elites108• Ironically, in light ofthe historical role the US 
played in maintaining such systems of rule, a number of these regimes argued that they would 
no longer tolerate US interference in their internal affairs, with some going so far as to 
107 The complex relationship between Congress and the Executive in US government, illustrates the importance 
of not being too monolithic in discussing the US and its foreign policy. It also reasserts the discussion presented 
in section 3.1.5 of chapter 3 exploring the entanglements of power, i.e. that resistances often exist between 
aJiparatus within the state structure (Sharp et al 2000: 7). 
I 8 For example in one incident in 1979 an ABC news correspondent was shot in the head by the National Guard 
in Nicaragua - a moment captured on video camera and later aired on US television. In another incident in 1980, 
the bodies of several US nuns who had been raped and subsequently killed by the El Salvadoran National Guard 
were found (Black 1988: 138-139). 
82 
Chapter 4: United States - Nicaraguan Relations; A Volatile History 
decline further US military aid 109 (Niess 1990: 191). Therefore, despite all the 'good 
intentions', "inter-American relations reached an almost unprecedented low in the course of 
1977" (ibid). A combination of events in 1979, such as the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua 
and the overthrow of El Salvador's military, not only re-awoke US interest in Central 
America, but also marked a transition in the US to viewing regional relations through the lens 
of the East-West conflict. This shift was marked by the return to 'traditional' policy (led by 
military logic) and resulted in generous US military aid being disbursed to 'counter-
revolutionary' forces within the isthmus. As Black highlights, "just as the CIA-backed coups 
in Iran and Guatemala had embodied the power of the United States in the 1950s, the fall of 
the Shah and Somoza within five months of each other in 1979 symbolised, for US 
conservatives, the collapse of American prestige and national will" (1988: 135). Central 
America was to become, for many of those in the US who had been shaken by failure in 
Vietnam, the test case of US power and will. Accordingly, the 1980s would spell out disaster 
for the region, constituting the bloodiest, most violent and destructive era in Central 
America's post-1820 history (Lafeber 1993: 362). 
4.3 Central America in crisis 
The inauguration of Ronald Reagan as US President in 1981 marked the formal return 
of Cold War discourse within US foreign policy, with the hard right arguably having little 
difficulty in "imposing its extremist line,,110 (Niess 1990: 192). A specific and fundamental 
change, witnessed in the shift from the Carter to Reagan administration, was the positioning 
of 'terrorism' as the central concern of US foreign policy, replacing that of 'human rights' . 
The new terrorist agenda would continue to emphasise the Soviet 'link', abandoning Carter's 
human rights policy on grounds that it impeded the "realisation of US objectives in the 
Western hemisphere" (Niess 1990: 193). Reagan's political philosophy re-invoked notions of 
'Manifest Destiny' and 'divine providence', reminiscent of nineteenth century idealism lll • 
Moreover, Reagan interpreted his landslide victory into office as vindication of his tough 
109 This included regimes in Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil. 
110 This is witnessed by the proliferation of right-wing think tanks within the US. These think tanks, which 
would prove extremely influential throughout the eighties, included organisations such as the Centre for 
Strategic and International Stndies (CSIS), the Hoover Institute, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the 
Heritage Foundation (Niess 1990: 192). 
III The following extract from President Reagan's 'Announcement for Presidency' demonstrates this invocation 
of 'Manifest Destiny': "A troubled and amicted mankind looks to us, pleading for us to keep our rendezvous 
with destiny; that we will uphold the principles of self-reliance, self-discipline, morality, and -- above all --
responsible liberty for every individual that we will become that shining city on a hill" (Reagan 1979: np). 
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campaign rhetoric and public support for reinstating US global primacy (Arnson 1993: 54, 
55). To a degree, this was a fair interpretation of domestic sentiment at the time, with many 
Americans longing for simple truths at a time of complexities. Within this context, Central 
America became the test case of US resolve and took centre stage in Reagan's foreign policy 
agenda. As McGrew states, "Central America was elevated into a fundamental test of US 
power in the world" (1992: 61). 
4.3.1 The Executive, Congress and the debate on human rights 
As suggested previously, no analysis or discussion of US Central American foreign 
policy would be adequate without recognising and examining the relationship between the 
Executive and Congress during this period of 'crisis'. Although both the Reagan 
administration and Congress viewed the US as a positive force in the world, there was an 
ideological divide in terms of how 'power' should be exercised. For example, Reagan argued 
that Congress, controlled by the Democrats, was overstepping its role in foreign policy and 
was allowing the Soviet Union to gain a 'beachhead' on the American mainland, whilst 
Congress asserted that the administration was ignoring the lessons from Vietnam (F elton 
1993: IX). A key point of debate and contestation was Reagan's rejection and apparent 
disregard for human rights abuses, illustrated by the administration's continued support for 
those Central American 'allies' committing them. In contrast to Reagan's suggestion that 
pursuing the protection of human rights in the region was counterproductive to the US' 
hegemonic project, Congress saw their very rejection as contrary to US interests .. 
The fundamental issue of human rights would come back to haunt President Reagan 
on many occasions, but one specific event would act as a galvanising force for congressional 
and public opposition. In the 1980s, it came to light that the US supported National Guard in 
El Salvador had raped and killed four US nuns. This event became a powerful symbol, for 
many in the US, of the raw brutality in El Salvador and this reality was forced home by the 
death offellow Americans. As a Senate Republican staffer reflecting on this event later 
discussed, "these were Americans, not nameless campesinos and urban dwellers. It was very 
hard not to be deeply affected by that, and a lot of Senators were ... " (cited in Amson 1993: 
62). The murder of these nuns by supposed US allies acted as a catalyst for the domestic 
mobilisation of public opinion, specifically within the church community, in opposition to 
such alliances. Nevertheless, Reagan not only continued to support the Salvadoran 
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government through the supply of human and monetary resources, but increased US 
assistance to it. 
4.3.2 The Nicaraguan revolution 
One could argue that until the mid-eighties, El Salvador was the primary concern of 
the Reagan administration in Central America. However, with the 'election' of US supported 
Jose Napole6n Duarte in 1984 in El Salvador, the US turned the focus ofits attention to 
Nicaragua, which subsequently took centre stage in US foreign policy formation. Before 
looking more specifically at US-Nicaraguan relations during this period, however, it is 
useful, and indeed necessary, to re-cap on the events leading up to the Nicaraguan revolution. 
As mentioned previously, the corrupt Nicaraguan National Guard was the most heavily US-
trained military establishment in the whole of Latin America and was employed in a 
campaign of terror by Somoza 112 to quell public protest and mobilisation, during which time 
thousands of innocent people were murdered. It was during this time of social mobilisation 
and government oppression in the 1970s that the Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional 
(FSLN) (the Sandinista National Liberation FrontI13), a rebel group of guerrillas and Marxist 
students inspired by the Cuban revolution and Sandino, expanded its links, gaining 
substantial support from university student groups (Prevost 1997: 150). FSLN membership 
(especially of young people) rocketed following 1977, as thousands were driven, in the wake 
of intensified National Guard efforts, to join the movement. Furthermore, the 'axis of 
regional power' enshrined within the Somoza dynasty, assimilated by the US as the chosen 
instrument of regional foreign policy, shifted over time from being the strongest link in the 
US chain of control, to the weakest (Cerdas 1986: 175). In response to this situation, the US 
and Catholic Church hierarchy supported the unsuccessful efforts114 of bourgeois elements 
within Nicaraguan society to negotiate an end to the Somoza regime (in what was arguably 
an attempt to subvert a revolution from 'below'). In addition, the Carter administration 
announced its opposition to Somoza's continued rule, removing Nicaraguan aid from the 
1979 US budget and blocking arms deliveries from certain suppliers (ibid). Yet, at the same 
112 The Bomoza dynasty ran from when Anastasio Somoza Garcia, commander of the Nicaraguan National 
Guard, seized political power in 1936, until the revolution in 1979. In this time his two sons also ruled 
Nicaragua; Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Their power was maintained during this 
~eriod by two pillars; the US and control of the National Guard. 
Il For detailed information on the FSLN and its history see Prevost (1997). 
114 These efforts were redoubled following the assassination ofPedro Joaquin ChamoTTo, editor of the 
opposition paper La Prensa in 1978 (Booth et a12006: 75). 
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time as wanting the dictator gone, there was an effort by the US government to stop the 
Sandinistas from seizing power1l5. Despite such efforts, the FSLN, which was divided for a 
time over tactical disagreements, reunited in 1979 and, furthermore, joined with other 
opposition movements to lead a coalition against a weakening Somoza. In July 1979, after 
looting the national treasury, Somoza fled from Nicaragua to Miami and two days later the 
Sandinista led coalition took power (Booth et al 2006: 76). 
4.3.3 The FSLN in power 
The FSLN inherited a country decimated by years of volatility and abuse, in which 
time about fifty thousand people had been killed and government had to contend with billions 
of dollars in property damage and international debtl16• In addition to these constraints, 
differences and conflicts arose within the anti-Somocista coalition about the FSLN's 
revolutionary programme, culminating in the alliance's subsequent collapse. Despite this 
situation, the FSLN was optimistic, initially at least, about the future, adopting various 
reforms and policies with the intention of aiding the historically ignored, whilst 
simultaneously laying down the "foundations for democratic government and rule of law" 
(Booth and Walker 1999: 38). However, as Prevost states, during their ten years in state 
power there would be a transformation of both the 'character and ideology' of the FSLN, 
with party rhetoric being considerably different by the middle of the 1980s from that of 
1979117 (1997: 152). In order to understand the reasons for this shift, it is necessary to 
recognise the extremely influential role that the US played in Nicaragua during the 1980s. 
4.3.4 The transition from Carter to Reagan and US-Nicaraguan relations 
Although the Carter administration had previously stated its opposition to the Somoza 
regime, it was also, as mentioned above, against the Sandinistas taking control. Despite this 
oppositional standpoint, however, the new Nicaraguan government was initially offered a 
rather tentative friendship by Carter in the form of "diplomatic recognition, emergency relief 
aid, the release of suspended loans and in 1980 a new $75 million loan commitment" (Booth 
liS The origins of the Sandinistas dates back to the infamous rebel Augusto Sandino, who successfully 
challenged US occupation at the start of the twentieth century, only to be assassinated by the Somoza controlled 
Nicaraguan National Guard in 1934. 
116 In order to remain credit worthy in international credit circles, the revolutionary government was essentially 
obliged to pay offSomoza's debts (Booth and Walker 2006: 77). 
117 For further details on the nature of this transformation see Vanden and Prevost (1992). 
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et al 2006: 78). In the beginning, therefore, the FSLN had fairly good working relations with 
the US, but this period of relative calm was not to last as the Cold War ideological 
straighijacket came to define US foreign policy towards the region once more. With Reagan's 
inauguration to office in 1981, there was a dramatic intensification of hostilities towards 
Nicaragua, as the new administration made the destabilisation ofthe Sandinista government a 
key concern of US regional foreign policy. The revolutionary government's new socialist-
style agenda became construed by the Reagan administration as part of a Soviet-based 
strategy implemented through Cuba and, as a result, the FSLN was raised to the position of 
the US' political and ideological enemy (Martinez 1986: 156)lJ8. 
4.3.5 President Reagan and Nicaragua 
Reagan devoted more speeches to Nicaragua than any other issue and this was an 
indication ofthe country's prominence within US foreign policy. Indeed, Nicaragua was to 
become the "single most divisive and bitterly fought foreign policy issue since the war in 
Vietnam" (Felton 1993: IX). The US' assault on Nicaragua throughout much of the 1980s 
was a multifaceted process, involving the use of a variety of tools to undermine the 
revolutionary government's plans: 
"Among other activities, it involved training, equipping, and directing a Nicaraguan 
exile counterrevolutionary (Contra) army to fight against its own government; using 
U.S. influence in the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to cut off 
all normal lending to the upstart republic; and orchestrating a massive anti-
Sandinista propaganda campaign typified by frequent distortion and outright 
fabrication" (Walker 2000: 75). 
An interesting and powerful insight into the US' propaganda machine is provided by looking 
at Nicaragua's 1984 elections which, although judged as valid by the international 
community, were discounted by the US (DeRaymond 2005). As the following extract 
illustrates, the US actively sought to undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process: 
118 This representation of Nicaragua as an ideological and political enemy by the US once again demonstrates 
the subordinating nature of the Cold War geopolitical order. 
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"A highly paid CIA asset with connections to the Contras ... was employed to show 
apparent interest in running a campaign without formally registering, and then 
withdraw with a great fanfare claiming that the conditions for a free election did not 
exist. Later, one of the six opposition candidates was persuaded by the US embassy to 
withdraw at the last moment - once again with great drama" (Walker 2000: 75). 
As discussed later in this chapter, US interference in electoral processes, particularly in 
Nicaragua, was a recurring theme throughout the 1990s and was also evidenced in the most 
recent 2006 national electionsl19• Reagan also orchestrated a campaign to shape the US 
public's perception of Central America, using modem tools to great effect (Black 1988: 137), 
and conveniently leaving out from many statements on the isthmus, any mention of the mass 
civilian killings or murders of US citizens. Where reference was given to humanitarian 
issues, the Sandinista revolutionary government was identified as being culpable, with the US 
being the beacon of 'hope' and 'freedom' for the Nicaraguan people: 
"The truth is there are atrocities going on in Nicaragua. But they are largely the work 
of the institutionalised cruelty of the Sandinista government - cruelty that is the 
natural expression of a communist government, a cruelty that flows naturally from the 
heart of totalitarianism. The truth is Somoza was bad, but so many of the people of 
Nicaragua know the Sandinistas are infinitely worse" (Reagan 1985 cited in 
Ruchwarger 1987: 3). 
4.3.6 President Bush and Nicaragua 
Towards the latter half of the 1980s, conditions in Nicaragua had reached a massive 
low, with a free falling economy, declining grassroots participatory democracy and failing 
social programmes. At the same time, the Reagan administration had become virtually 
isolated in its policies on Central America (Lafeber 1993: 39), especially in the wake of the 
Iran-Contra affair12o• The election of George H. W. Bush in 1989 was therefore an important 
119 The 2006 Nicaraguan elections constituted a definiug moment in Nicaraguan history, as it saw the re-election 
of Daniel Ortega, the 1980s revolutionary leader. 
120 In 1986 key members of the Reagan administration helped illegally sell arms to Iran to ensure the release of 
US hostages and used the subsequent profits to purchase weapons for the Contras. Despite attempts at a cover 
up, the scandal was arguably the biggest catastrophe of the Reagan administration (Arnson 1993: 1) 
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moment in US-Nicaraguan relations and marked a shift in hemispheric relationsl21 • President 
Bush's political philosophy was rooted more in pragmatism than his predecessor, who was 
instead guided by a rigid set of ideological principles (Pearce 1998: 588). In this sense, Bush 
was fortunate to be taking office just as the Cold War was ending, as this dramatically shifted 
the global context for Central America policy discussion and allowed the US to step out of 
the self-perpetuated ideological straight jacket. No doubt this was a breath of fresh air for 
many politicians in the US, who must have been eager to remove Nicaragua from 
Washington's political agenda, or more explicitly, "to drain the Central American poison 
from the US political system" (Amson 1993: 279). Bush was also driven by the desire to 
mend relations with Congress following the volatiIities of the 1980s, especially over 
Nicaragua. 
Indicative of Bush's 'moderated' approach was the signing of the Bipartisan Accords 
in the US, which ceased all aid to the Contras. At the same time, however, dramatic 
developments were being pursued within the isthmus itself, as the five Presidents of Central 
America met in El Salvador to sign the Peace Accords (Arnson 1993: 232). Following this 
historic event, the US became deeply involved in the 1990 multiparty Nicaraguan elections, 
despite the fact that Bush had pledged to "leave the ordering of Nicaraguan politics to 
Nicaraguans" (ibid: 234). As Booth et al discuss, US election strategy followed two tracks: 
The first one was to potentially denounce, in case ofFSLN victory, the electoral process on 
grounds of fraud, and the second was to invest millions of dollars122 to effectively ensure an 
opposition win: (2006: 85). With regard to the latter, the US pushed for a 'unified 
opposition' 123 to be led by the UNO and headed by the US approved Violeta Chamorro. 
Despite early polls to the contrary, the UNO won the elections comfortably in 1990, marking 
a paradigmatic moment in Nicaraguan history. 
121 It should be mentioned that Bush was vice-President under the Reagan administration and, as a result, the 
degree to which his inauguration to office represented the commencement of something fundamentally new, in 
terms of the underlying ideas driving policy formation, is debateable. 
122 In 1989 congress authorized $9 million in overt funding for the UNO (National Opposition Union), to be 
dispensed by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (Vanden 1999: 51) 
123 Creating a unified 'right' appears to be a frequent aspect of US efforts to influence the electoral outcomes in 
Nicaragua, evidenced most recently in the actions of US ambassador to Nicaragua Paul Trivelli in the 2006 
elections (see section 4.4.6). 
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4.4 Post-Cold War US-Nicaraguan relations 
Close states that "accepting the loss of the 1990 elections may have been the most 
important thing the Sandinistas did in their years in power" (1999: 29). At first glance that 
may appear to be a slightly odd thing to say, but if we locate this apparent defeat within the 
context of the revolutionary democratising project, we can see that it represents one of the 
FSLN's greatest achievements. Undoubtedly, one of the major overall objectives of the 
revolution, indeed it could be argued its primary purpose, was to give power back to the 
general population through popular democratic participation. Consequently, the 1990 
elections, which were recognised internationally, could be identified as a key moment in the 
consolidation of 'democracy' in Nicaragua (Luciak 1995: 183). However, this suggestion is 
not without contestation and this derives, to a large extent, from the ambiguity plaguing 
'democracy' as a concept. If, for example, we consider Nicaragua during the 1980s, it is 
possible to identify two very different, if not contradictory, interpretations of the term. The 
formal reading of democracy tends to reduce the concept to the electoral process and one 
could argue that this understanding was symbolic of the US approach to Central America 
during the 1980s. Indeed, during this period the US proclaimed the birth of 'democracy' in 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, but condemned its absence in Sandinista Nicaragua. 
This was despite the fact that the elections in both Guatemala and El Salvador were held 
within the context of 'state sponsored terror' , with citizen participation confined by 
widespread repression (Booth et a12006: 171). Hence, although the implementation of 
elections in Nicaragua, and in much of the rest of the isthmus, was an important step in the 
process of democratisation, analysis based solely on regional elections greatly undervalues 
the real nature of democracy in Central America. 
Close argues that "of all the political systems that have embraced constitutional 
government in the last quarter of the twentieth century, Sandinista Nicaragua had the best 
claim to be called democratic itself,124 (1999: 4). Not only did the 1980s mark the first time 
in which Nicaragua had seen the beginnings of genuine and legitimate oppositional politics 
124 There are many different interpretations of 'democracy'. For the purpose of clarity, there are two key trends 
of thought on democracy that warrant attention here. The first approach tends to limit democracy to the electoral 
process and this, generally speaking, could be referred to as 'representational democracy'. A second approach, 
which I will refer to as 'participatory democracy', is more concerned with the processes and mechanisms in 
place that allow for meaningful participation in 'governance'. Although explored in some detail within this 
chapter, much greater consideration is given to understanding the concept of democracy in chapter 8. 
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but, moreover, the FSLN pushed for the conversion of the historically excluded into political 
actors, and through agrarian reform dramatically changed the rural balance of power (ibid: 
31). This 'popular participation' is, if anything, a more genuine reflection of democracy's 
literal meaning - 'rule by the people'. To emphasise this point, it is useful to refer to a speech 
made by the revolutionary leader Daniel Ortega in 1980, at the start of the Sandinistas' 
national literacy campaign: 
"For the Sandinista Front, democracy is not defined in purely political 
tenns, and is not reducible to popular participation in elections. It is 
something more, much more ... It must be said once and for all: democracy 
neither begins nor ends with elections. It is a myth to try and reduce 
democracy to that kind of condition" (cited in Ruchwarger 1987: 3/4). 
Bearing in mind the above discussion, it is clear that 'democracy' is a very malleable and 
flexible concept. Its meaning can be bent and shaped by those in power and constructed as 
'knowledge'. Recognising this is important when looking at 'democracy' in Nicaragua during 
the 1990s and beyond, and in understanding its relationship with neoliberalism. 
During the 1980s when 'democracy' was applied by the US to conditions in Central 
America, it was done so within the context of the Cold War and was applied in a way that 
was conducive to US interests. Furthermore, a critical historical analysis would suggest, and 
rightly so in light of discussion so far, that the Cold War was not simply a bipolar global 
contest being played out through proxy wars in the South, but it actually acted as a very 
useful legitimising tool for the pursuit of US hegemony in the post World War II period 
(Stahler-Sholk 2000: 134). Within this context, the label of 'democracy' came to facilitate a 
hegemonic project and operated as an instrument of US foreign policy. Bearing in mind the 
US' status in the world and its enormous influence over the Americas, it has more of an 
incentive and, broadly speaking, more power to shape and define the meaning of democracy 
than other countries. It is, therefore, not unexpected that towards the end of the Cold War the 
concept was once again remoulded to reflect the changing national interests and priorities of 
the US. The following sections look at this conceptual 'transition' in further detail, focussing 
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specifically on William Robinson's work on 'polyarchy,125, which offers an interesting 
insight into the nature of 'democracy' and its application to the Central American region. 
4.4.1 Democracy or polyarchy? 
William Robinson adopted the concept ofpolyarchy in an attempt to understand why, 
after years of suppressing, often brutally, democracy in Latin America (as demonstrated 
previously in discussing US support for the Central American dictatorships) the US shifted its 
policy in the 1980s to promoting and supporting regional 'democracy'. The rise in mass 
social movements for democratisation within the Americas, challenging the status quo of elite 
rule at both a local and global level, provoked fear within the US, with the 1979 Sandinista 
revolution in Nicaragua constituting one of several key 'turning-points' in the shift towards 
US 'democracy promotion' (Robinson 2007: 32). This historic moment not only symbolised, 
for many conservatives in the US, the collapse of American prestige and will, but according 
to Robinson it also demonstrated to policy-makers and strategists in the US that the old forms 
of control were no longer a viable option. I would argue, however, that this 'realisation' 
within the US actually preceded the historic events of 1979, as demonstrated in the 
unsuccessful prior efforts of the Carter administration to engineer a US-controlled revolution 
in Nicaragua (see Niess 1990). In this respect, although the decision by the US to follow a 
strategy of managing 'political change' in Nicaragua was undoubtedly taken too late (the 
revolution had gained too much momentum by that point), it was perhaps less reactionary 
than indicated by Robinson. Nevertheless, in the wake of the Nicaraguan revolution, policy-
makers in the US established a new coherent package of' strategies, modalities and 
instruments' for political intervention, under the barmer of 'promoting democracy' (Robinson 
2007: 32, 33). A key component of this strategic 'turnabout' was the use of intervention to 
bolster those forces within civil society allied to the US and identified with' global 
capitalism', i.e. the elites of Latin and Central American society. Furtherrnore, this transition 
from supporting dictatorships to 'promoting democracy' in Central America can be seen, in 
Gramscian terms, as constituting a transition from 'transnational coercive domination' to 
'transnational consensual domination' - or at least "consensus seeking forms of domination" 
(Robinson 2007: 33). 
125 Please refer back to section 3.1.4 of chapter 3 for a more holistic interpretation ofpolyarchy and its 
relationship to the new hegemonic ideology of 'transnationalliberalism'. 
92 
Chapter 4: United States - Nicaraguan Relations; A Volatile History 
Within this context, the 1990 Nicaraguan elections not only represented the apparent 
transition to 'electoral democracy' but they also signified the establishment of a polyarchic 
political system of rule, consolidated through this new US strategy of political intervention. It 
is, therefore, somewhat ironic that throughout much of Latin and Central America what is 
commonly referred to as 'democratisation' has in fact been accompanied by growing 
inequality, social polarisation and the proliferation of poverty, presenting a reality that is at 
odds with the very essence of 'democracy'. To a large extent, this reality is a reflection of the 
insistence, of many US policy-makers and intellectuals, that polyarchy must go hand in hand 
with 'neoliberal global capitalism', establishing what is commonly referred to today as 'free-
market democracies'. However, as Robinson suggests, the gap between the world's wealthy 
minority and the poor has increased exponentiaIIy under the last thirty years of capitalist 
globalisation, resulting in "unprecedented worldwide concentrations of wealth and power that 
have brought about a global socioeconomic dictatorship that is the antithesis of democracy" 
(2007: 34). Hence, it could be argued that polyarchy does in fact generate and recreate the 
"socioeconomic conditions that make genuine democracy impossible" (Robinson 2000: 47). 
This apparent contradiction is not without recognition or challenge, as witnessed by the 
"ongoing struggle between the neoIiberal lean and 'modern' state organised to facilitate 
integration into global markets and an alternative vision of mass participatory democracy in 
which the state must respond to organised demands from below" (Stahler-Sholk 2000: 135). 
Moreover, it enforces the need to qualify what we mean when we talk about the 
'consolidation of democracy' and reflect on just whom this 'democracy' is serving. 
Despite the flaws endemic within the project of 'polyarchy' there is a danger, 
according to Coppedge for example, of historical amnesia, in which many "Latin Americans 
and Latin American scholars have forgotten how much worse it was to live, and how much 
harder it was to work for social justice, under regimes that came to power by military force, 
that disbanded political parties, trade unions and human rights groups, and that murdered, 
disappeared, imprisoned or exiled opposition leaders" (2007: 36). Coppedge, in drawing 
directly upon Dahls' conceptualisation ofpolyarchy, takes a much more positive view on 
polyarchy, defining it as: 
" ... a set of institutions and procedures ensuring that effective political decision-
makers are selected in free and fair elections, under conditions in which citizens have 
access to diverse sources of independent information, can express their political 
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expressions freely and can organise and join parties and other organisations without 
fear of government retaliation" (2007: 36). 
Far from constituting some sort of elitist project of manipulation, as Robinson would argue, 
Coppedge identifies 'polyarchy' as a 'precious achievement', and one worthy of emulation. 
The main reason for these divergent opinions rests in the fact that whereas Robinson critically 
analyses the connections between polyarchy and neoliberalism (a connection which, bearing 
in mind the complementary fashion in which they are expressed and promoted by the US, 
cannot be ignored), Coppedge makes little mention of this relationship (see Coppedge 2007: 
36,38) and, in doing so, limits polyarchy to a purely political phenomenon. As Robinson 
states, "the separation ofthe political and the socioeconomic is an illusion, since the 
concentration of economic resources leads to the concentration of political power" (2007:34). 
The following section, therefore, focuses specifically on the 'consolidation' of democracy in 
Nicaragua and its relationship to neoliberal discourse. 
4.4.2 Democracy and neoliberalism in Nicaragua 
Chapter 2 has already provided an overview of the concept of 'neoliberalism' and its 
evolution. What this section aims to do is locate neoliberalism within a specifically 
Nicaraguan context and relate it to the concept of 'democracy'. Ironically, neoliberal 
ideology actually came to be infused within Nicaraguan society during the latter part of the 
1980s, under the Sandinista government. If anything, rather than being a sign of acceptance 
for externally driven capitalist reform, it was an indication of desperation. A combination of 
internal and external pressures had by the end of 1980s placed the Sandinistas in an economic 
straight jacket. This situation forced the revolutionary government to impose harsh structural 
reforms on an already economically and socially impoverished society. The inauguration of 
the UNO government of Violet a ChamoITo ushered in a deepening of commitment to the 
principles of neoliberal ideology, with the new administration embracing the associated 
structural reforms with enthusiasm (Booth and Walker 1999: 94). Furthermore, the ChamoITo 
administration's somewhat naive faith in market forces injected a bias favouring large 
businesses, strengthening the positions of monopolies, oligopolies and the business elite close 
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to the governmentl26 (Arana 1997: 84). One could argue, therefore, that the shift within 
Nicaragua to 'embracing' neoliberalism at the start of the 1990s, actually worked to 
undennine the hard fought gains made in political and social equality within Nicaragua 
during the 1980s, accentuating the very socio-economic conditions that contributed to the 
violence and unrest of the preceding decades (Booth and Walker 1999: 19). 
Although the transition towards a market-orientated economy helped curb inflation 
and resulted in some modest economic growth, these limited successes were overshadowed 
by neoIiberalism' s highly detrimental socio-economic side effects. As Robinson elucidates, 
neoliberalism threw "most Nicaraguans into a desperate social and economic situation and 
excluded and atomised the grassroots by driving people to extreme poverty and despair" 
(1997: 40). Unemployment, crime and homelessness became the human face ofneoliberal 
discourse, with its destructive impact on the Central American isthmus being likened to that 
of a 'tropical stonn' (Nithipan-Envio team 1992: 36). The exacerbation of inequality within 
this context is illustrative ofpolyarchy's embeddedness within neoliberal discourse and vice 
versa, as it is through this complimentary relationship that such conditions are created and 
power becomes concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. With this connection in mind, the 
following section looks at the 'tiers' through which polyarchy may be operationalised by the 
US and establishes clear links to what could be considered the organisations at the forefront 
of neoliberal discourse and its promotion. 
4.4.3 Ope rationalising polyarchy and promoting neoliberalism 
Robinson states that there are several tiers through which polyarchy may be 
operationalised by the US. The first tier involves the highest levels of state apparatus (such as 
the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA) and, within this setting, 
'political intervention' is one component in a broader package of policies towards a given 
country or region. With regard to Nicaragua, there are many different examples of how these 
various components have been involved in the promotion of 'polyarchy' , from the CIA's 
attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the 1984 Nicaraguan elections, to the recent efforts 
of US ambassador Paul TrivelIi to influence the 2006 electoral outcome. The second tier 
involves USAID, in addition to other branches of the State Department, which dole out 
126 As discussed later in chapter 7 examining poverty reduction in Nicaragua, this bias had deep implications for 
the banking sector and the ability offarmers to access credit (see section 7.8.4). 
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millions of dollars to 'ostensibly US organisations', as well as to the NED127 and its core 
groups (such as the International Republican Institute128 and the National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs). The third tier includes those organisations within the 
'intervened' countries themselves that receive funding, guidance and political sponsorship 
from US agencies. This group may encompass a range of different actors, such as local 
political parties, coalitions, business councils, women's groups and human rights groups 
which, according to Robinson become, through their incorporation into 'democracy 
promotion' programmes, "integral agents of the transnational agenda" (2007: 35). As a result, 
Robinson argues that the US is able, through such relations, to create 'agents of influence' 
who can create ideological conformity, 'promote a neoliberal outlook' and advocate for 
policies of integration into global capitalism (ibid)129. 
Although all three tiers for operationalising 'polyarchy' are applicable to the 
Nicaraguan context (with direct relevance to various historical events already mentioned), it 
is the second tier involving USAID and the NED that will be examined now. The reason for 
this is that exploring the role of entities such as USAID and the NED in Central America 
during the 1980s and 1990s, draws attention for the interwoven and mutually enforcing 
qualities of polyarchy and neoliberalism. During this period the US provided assistance, often 
through USAID, as a transitional mechanism for Nicaragua's insertion into international 
financial structures and, as ViIas notes, "played a central role in the decision of some Central 
American govenunents to implement Structural Adjustment Programs" (2000: 218). During 
the 1980s, the distribution and quantity of the assistance given to govenunents in the region 
was significantly influenced by the geopolitical considerations of the Cold War. The US also 
exerted significant pressure over the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and was able 
to ensure Nicaragua's exclusion from multilateral assistance following 1982. A key factor 
behind the integration of neoliberalism within the region was the economic crisis experienced 
127 The NED is a US non-profit organisation that was created under the Reagan administration in 1983 and, 
although set up as a 'private' entity, receives all its funding from the US government. The NED, although 
forbidden by law to fund any political party, made a $4 million contribution to the FSLN-opposition campaign 
of Viol eta Chamorro, who as already mentioned won the 1990 Nicaraguan elections. 
12SIt is interesting to note again here that the International Republican Institute's President, Lorne Craner, is on 
the MCC's governing board of directors. 
129 Although I do agree that the US can, through certain relations, promote its own ideological and neoliberal 
agenda, it is important not to be too monolithic in scooping all such 'internal' actors into the same basket. 
Furthermore, there is a danger of over-stating US power to the point of actually underestimating and 
undervaluing the ability of individual groups and organisations, who may receive some US funding, to follow 
their own agenda, or indeed resist such impositions (please refer back to chapter 3 which discusses the plurality 
of 'power'). 
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throughout the isthmus during the 1980s. Faced by economic stagnation and, in some 
countries, also war, many of the governments in the region became increasingly dependent on 
foreign assistance, especially from the IFIs. This dependency acted as valuable leverage for 
these external forces to pressure aid-dependent countries into adopting SAPSl30 (Kendrick 
2006). Consequently, USAID, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB), were incisive actors in promoting neoliberalism within the isthmus. 
It would, however, be a mistake to assume that this neoliberal agenda was simply 
imposed from above, as USAID actually adopted a strategy of cultivating neoliberal ideas 
from within the isthmus itself. One can easily draw parallels here between this 'cultivation' 
ofneoliberal ideas within the isthmus and Robinson's third tier for polyarchy's 
operationalisation, in which internal national and local actors constitute integral agents of a 
'transnational' agenda. As Vilas discusses, USAID devoted "considerable effort and 
resources to developing a new breed of Central American entrepreneur, politician and 
intellectual to promote economic adjustment within the isthmus" (2000: 219). For example, 
in El Salvador, where neoliberalism was implemented most religiously, USAID helped 
launch the 'Salvadoran Foundation for Development' (FUSADES) which was to become a 
committed sponsor ofneoliberal reform (ibid). USAID was also a key player in the 
establishment ofneoliberalism in post-Sandinista Nicaragua, returning to the country 
following the 1990 elections (after being absent for much of the 1980s) and setting out a 
comprehensive programme of restructuring, which would act as a blueprint for the 
construction of a neoliberal republic (Robinson 1997: 31). In fact, the US approved a two 
year $541 million package to the country, to be administered through USAID and the NED, 
but most of this money never actually entered the country as it was used instead to re-
establish Nicaragua's credit standing, opening the "spigot for new lending from the World 
Bank and IMF" (ibid). This trend continued following 1992 as the US began to phase out 
bilateral aid and there was a shift to funding from the IFIs. US assistance, therefore, acted as 
a transitional mechanism for Nicaragua's insertion into the international financial structures. 
Nicaragua's transformation into polyarchy was well underway. 
130 The creation of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC) in 1996, initiated by the IMF and 
World Bank, represents a continuation of this trend, in which countries, such as Nicaragua, have been able to 
access debt relief conditioned upon meeting strict economic management and performance targets. As 
previously stated in chapter 3, the MCA adopts a similar approach to the HIPC, in that countries must meet a 
range of criteria before being eligible for assistance under the progranune. 
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4.4.4 Shifting priorities? The Clinton administration and regional policy 
The inauguration of President Clinton to office in 1993 brought to an end ten years of 
Republican rule in the US and yet, at the same time, signified little in the way of fundamental 
change. As Brown states, "Clinton ... generally deviated little from his predecessor's twin 
preoccupations with economic liberalisation and formal limited democratisation" (2000: 
551). This was reflected in USAID's activities towards Nicaragua, where 'encouraging 
broad-based economic growth' and 'building democracy' formed the central tenets of their 
approach (USAID 1998 and 1999 Congressional Presentations). Furthermore, the Clinton 
administration made the pursuit and promotion of US economic interests a number one 
priority in policy towards the Latin American region as a whole (Y oungers 1999: np), a 
reality illustrated in 1994 by the implementation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)131 and the hosting of the first Summit ofthe Americas on the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)132. Yet despite this focus on the 'economic', US 
economic aid to Latin American and the Caribbean actually continued to fall during the 
Clinton administration, dropping in 1998 to less that half the amount allocated to the region 
in 1988 (USAID Congressional Presentation FY 1998 cited in Youngers 1999: np). With 
regard to Nicaragua more specifically, the decline in bilateral assistance during the Clinton 
administration was even more pronounced. Indeed, by 1998 it had fallen to about one-sixth 
of what it had been in 1993. This should not, however, be construed as some sort of 
fundamental change in the attitudes of those within the Clinton administration towards their 
southern neighbours, but instead it was a reflection of the "continued decline in the priority 
attached to dealings with Latin America", combined with concerns regarding the real benefits 
of free-trade (Brown 2000: 552)133. 
Irrespective of the continued focus of the Clinton administration on economic 
liberalisation and the promotion of 'formal democracy', there were some important shifts in 
131 "NAFTA is an agreement between Canada, the US, and Mexico that took effect on January I, 1994, designed 
to increase the scope for the free flow trade and investment among these three countries. It includes measures 
for the elimination of tariffs and non·tariffbarriers to trade, as well as many more specific provisions 
concerning the conduct of trade and investment that reduce the scope for government intervention in managing 
trade" (CPE Globalisation Briefs website). 
132 The FfAAgoes far beyond NAFfA in terms of both scope and power, and aims to incorporate thirty-four of 
the western hemispheric countries in an agreement which would see the elimination of the barriers to trade. 
133 In light of Latin America's continued freefall into international obscurity, becoming what Moises Nairn 
refers to as 'the lost continent' (2004), it is clear this trend of regional de-prioritisation is very much still evident 
today, especially following the events of9/11 (see section 3.10 on US-Latin American relations post 9/11). 
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policy associated with the transition from the first Bush administration. Of particular 
relevance here, in following on from the previous section exploring polyarchy and 
neoliberalism, were the changes made to the way in which USAID conducted its work. At 
the start of the I 990s, USAID's activities in Nicaragua were highly politicised and 
specifically focussed on the implementation of harsh economic structural adjustments. In 
fact, Robinson states that the "development of a polyarchic political culture among the elite 
and the legitimisation of neoliberal social order among the population were crucial 
counterparts in eroding the revolution's value system,,134 (2004: 17). This situation is 
reflected in the following interview extract: 
" ... what they [USAID J were doing under Bush I was promoting structural 
adjustment ... we got hold of the USAID documents for Central America ... and they 
were like World Bank structural adjustment loans. They literally said, in the 
Nicaraguan one in particular, 'in order to get thisjirst ... of$50 million, you have to 
layoff 1 0,000 public sector workers '. Now whether they were the exact amounts or 
whatever I can't remember, but that is basically what it was. So they gave cash in 
exchange for laying off public sector workers, which was disastrous ... They also gave 
assistance to organisations that were anti-Sandinista and they cut out some of the 
better organisations like UNA G the small farmers union ... if you wanted to do good 
small rural development in Nicaragua in 1990, you couldn't cut off UNA G, it didn't 
make sense and so they were trying to ... it was what we thought of as a very 
politicised aid programme" (research interview with Lisa Haugaard 135 2005). 
USAID underwent something of a transfonnation with the inauguration of President 
Clinton in 1993, becoming far more open, objective and participatory in its activities. For 
example, organisations such as UNAG (the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers in 
Nicaragua) who were, as Brown states, "destabilised by USAID earlier on in the decade", 
began to receive assistance from USAID for some of their programmes (2000: 552). There 
was also a positive shift in the relationship between USAID and US non-governmental 
134 For example, USAlD allocated significant funds to replacing public school textbooks developed under the 
Sandinista govermnent. In the new text books it was asserted, among other things, that US interventions were 
carried out to bring peace and stability (Robinson 2004: 18). 
'" Lisa Haugaard, Director of the Latin American Working Group - Interview held in Washington D.e. on 21" 
September 2005. 
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organisations (NGOs) operating in the region - a theme that was further discussed in the 
interview: 
" ... one of the things that was very positive was that the Clinton administration,jrom 
the top down, told the State Department and particularly uSAID ... I think they told 
both but it was uSAID that really pushed it ... that they needed to consuit with civil 
society, that they needed to consult with US civil society and civil society in the 
countries involved ... So we had some odd moments when people from the US State 
Department, who had never entered a small NGO like ours, had been told that they 
were supposed to go and talk to us ... and we had some awkward moments where they 
actually sought us out, which is very rare, and then didn't even know what to say to 
us ... It didn't work all that well in the State Department but it worked in uSAID and 
there we had a tremendous amount of access that wasn't easy to begin with but it 
expanded and got better" (research interview with Lisa Haugaard 2005)136. 
In conjunction with this more participatory approach, USAID shifted its emphasis away from 
'economy-wide adjustment' and 'policy conditionality' (illustrative of the neoliberal SAPs), 
towards more project-based lending (Brown 2000: 552). The promotion of 'good 
governance' would come to be a key aspect of this new agenda, promoting the strengthening 
of state institutions and justice systems. Although this can and should be seen (in light of the 
way USAID operated under Reagan and Bush) as a positive step, we must be careful not to 
make too much of this 'transition' As stated in chapter 2 and reiterated in chapter 3, 'good 
governance' far from constituting something fundamentally new, is deeply embedded within 
neoliberal ideology and does not represent a fundamental departure from that discourse. It is 
also directly implicated in the promotion and strengthening of polyarchy, as discussed earlier. 
116 With the inauguration of the new Bush administration this relationship appears to have changed once again; a 
reality conveyed to me in an interview with Programme Director Geoff Thale from the Washington Office on 
Latin America: "The Bush administration has not backed away from dialogue with NGOs ... I just think the 
disagreements have been broader and therefore the dialogue has tended to be more formal and less substance ... 
We talked a lot with Clinton Administration staff about Cuba ... it is a waste to time to talk to people in this Bush 
Administration. There is no point. I mean they would have a meeting if! asked for it but there is no point. .. We 
don't talk much about Nicaragua because Our disagreements are really fundamental and nothing is going to 
make them change ... On the other hand, in Guatemala, whilst we haven't seen eye to eye, there has been a lot of 
genuine dialogue, not only with us but also with the human rights community more broadly ... So it is more 
issue-by-issue" (research interview held in Washington D.e. on 18th November 2005). Greater thought is given 
to understanding the changes associated with the current US administration later in this chapter. 
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An important event to mention in concluding this section on the Clinton presidency is 
'Hurricane Mitch', which devastated much of Central America in November 1998, leaving 
thousands dead and millions homeless. Moreover, it impeded what modest economic growth 
Nicaragua had achieved in the aftermath of the turmoil present in the country for large parts 
of the 1970s and 1980s. In discussing this catastrophic event, there are several key issues that 
should be raised: Firstly, although the hurricane was one of the deadliest and most powerful 
to ever occur in the Atlantic basin (on record at least), its impact was made far worse by the 
short-sighted agricultural policies adopted in the region. Both the national governments and 
the IFIs had "failed to formulate and fund policies that support sustainable rural 
development", with the destructive practices of 'clear-cut logging', 'hillside farming' and 
'over-cultivation' "exacerbating the mudslides and flooding caused by the torrential rain" 
(Y oungers 1999: np). Secondly, in the wake of this disaster the Clinton administration 
allocated almost US$I billion in debt relief and long-term reconstruction to those countries 
most affected (such as Nicaragua and Honduras) and this aid package represented the "first 
significant infusion of economic assistance to the region" in over a decade (ibid). However, 
contrary to representing the commencement of something fundamentally new in Nicaragua, 
the US' response to the disaster did, in fact, symbolise the continuation of the views and 
ideas that had dominated the formulation of policies towards Nicaragua in the years prior to 
Mitch, i.e. that Nicaragua was already successfully pursuing the path of 'free-market 
democracy'. Within this context, Mitch simply constituted a blip in the "process of 
modernisation and progressive transformation that were occurring in the country" (Brown 
2000: 564) and, contrary to the opinion of many individuals within Nicaragua and the 
region 137, did not demonstrate to policy makers in the US the need for a change in direction. 
Nonetheless, Hurricane Mitch did act as a catalyst for the 'organisation of civil society' 
within the region, necessitating the development of plans to transform the region though the 
reconstruction process l38 (Bradshaw et al 2002: np). 
137 As Bradshaw et al state, there were "hopes that the destruction would create links between civil society, 
national and local governments and the international community to construct strategies for sustainable human 
development which focus on people, and in particular, the poor and marginalised sectors of society" (2002: np). 
138 For example, the Civil Coordinator for Emergency and Reconstruction (CCER) emerged in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua; bringing together 21 networks, involving more than 350 national NGOs, social 
movements, sectoral networks, producer associations, unions, collectives and federations. The CCER was not 
only heavily involved in the post-Mitch reconstruction efforts, but it was also promoting a vision for 
transformation; not only of the material conditions under which the majority of the population had been living, 
but also of the fundamental context in which those conditions were being produced and reproduced (Bradshaw 
and Linoeker 2003: 148). 
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4.4.5 Free trade and DR-CAFTA 
As stated in the previous section, the promotion of economic interests became the 
core priority of the Clinton administration, as illustrated by the implementation ofNAFTA 
and pursuit of the FTAA. With regard to Central America more specifically, the creation of 
the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), which was 
rolled out under the following Bush administration, was an important step in the promotion 
of 'transnationalliberalism,139 and is symbolic of the region's transition into polyarchy. DR-
CAFT A is a trade agreement negotiated between the US, the five Central American 
countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua and, as of2004, also 
the Dominican Republic, which promises to codify and accelerate the process of trade 
liberalisation throughout the region (InterAction 2003: 3). Through its Trace Capacity 
Building (TCB) assistance, USAID has played an incisive role in the development and 
implementation of the agreement within the region. In Nicaragua, the amount of USA ID 
funds targeted at TCB has increased massively, from a mere US$20,000 in 1999 to roughly 
US$14 million in 2004 (USAID website) and this situation demonstrates the influential role 
USAID has played in institutionalising transnationalliberalism in the country. Undoubtedly, 
DR-CAFT A has significant strategic importance for the US and is recognised as being a key 
stepping-stone to the FT AA. 
DR-CAFTA has been a highly controversial issue, creating divisions both within the 
countries involved and between them. The agreement has been praised by proponents as 
being an important step towards 'freedom', 'democracy' and economic reform in the 
countries of the isthmus. Indeed, President Bush states that by "transforming our hemisphere 
into a powerful free trade area, we will promote democratic governance and human rights 
and economic liberty for everyone", and calls for the US to "complete the work of 
democracy and peace" that it 'began' two decades ago in Central America (Bush 2005a). In 
addition to this, the World Bank, a long time supporter and instigator of neoliberal reform, 
states that DR-CAFTA promises to boost economic growth and poverty reduction in the 
isthmus (see World Bank 2005). This positive view, however, is not shared by everyone. DR-
CAFTA has, in fact, been criticised for its potential to do the exact opposite, with counter-
arguments stating that DR-CAFTA is likely to increase inequality and exacerbate poverty in 
139 According to Routledge, 'transnationalliberalism' has been "institutionalised through ... international free 
trade agreements', such as NAFTA (1998: 252). 
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the region (Weinberg 2005: 8). Mexico's apparent meltdown a year after joining NAFTA in 
1994, the agreement upon which DR-CAFTA is based, clearly emphasises that such concerns 
are not merely hearsay and the countries of the isthmus are in many ways even more 
vulnerable than Mexico was when it joined NAFTA (being poorer, having lower education 
levels and lacking vital infrastructure). Latin Americans are clearly not alone in their doubts 
over free trade, with an increasing number of individuals in the US voicing concerns and this 
was reflected at the political level. As Nairn discusses in response to the 2004 Summit on the 
Americas, "all of the Democratic candidates, the individuals aspiring to be candidates, are 
questioning and criticising free trade" (2004: np). 
4.4.6 The US and electoral interference 
US ambassadors not only intervened in the 2002 Nicaraguan election, but also in 
Bolivia the same year and in El Salvador in 2004 (Dominguez 2007: 27). US interference in 
Latin American elections has frequently been done in the name of 'promoting democracy', as 
witnessed in the case of Venezuela, where the US continues to employ "institutionalised 
public polyarchy-promotion programs", utilising entities such as the NED to strengthen the 
oppositional anti-Cbavez political movements, as well as more short-term diplomatic and 
often covert measures to influence the course of events in real time (Coppedge 2007: 38). 
Whilst the US' involvement in the 2002 failed coup attempt to replace CMvez is still not 
entirely clearl40, the subsequent endorsement of this action by the US (action which would 
have replaced a democratically elected government with a militarily installed one), spoke 
volumes about the US' real agenda. As Robinson clarifies, "the criterion for regime change 
through 'democracy promotion' is not whether democracy exists ... but Washington's broader 
strategic concern with suppressing states that challenge the global capitalist order" (2007: 
34). The fact that all this happened within the broader context ofa 'left turn' 141 in Latin 
America is, in this respect, extremely telling. 
140 Chavez has repeatedly accused the Bush administration, which has tried to distance itself from the coup, and 
the CIA, of orchestrating the coup against him. [n 'The Observer' it was stated that the failed coup in Venezuela 
was "closely tied to senior officials in the US government ... " (Vulliamy 2002: np). 
141 The 'left turn', or what is commonly referred to in the literature as the rise of 'radical populi srn', is discussed 
in section 4.4.8. 
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The US agenda for interfering in democratic process in Latin and Central America is 
nothing new, and although it is now taking place through more subtle fonus of intervention, it 
is still, as demonstrated below in the case of Nicaragua, very much apparent: 
"Washington's intervention in Nicaragua has been quite blatant and has included 
economic assistance for selected candidates and/or political parties, assisting in 
writing constitutions and drafting legislation, arrangingfor the publication of articles 
about local politicians and candidates in U.S-subsidised Nicaraguan media, 
pressuring local leaders and groups to mould their policies to reflect U.S, interests 
and threatening anti-U.S. political leaders, including pushing them from power" 
(Kendrick 2006: np). 
In every Nicaraguan election since the heavily influenced 1984 election, the US has 
attempted to influence democratic processes in the country and has not been shy in its use of 
threats to shape the electoral outcomes. To an outsider, this somewhat unhealthy obsession 
with Nicaragua, a seemingly inconsequential country with a total landmass less than that of 
New York State, is confusing. There are, as discussed later in this chapter, several possible 
explanations for this situation, but more holistically, with regard to the themes already 
analysed, Nicaragua can be located within US foreign policy as part of a broader package for 
promoting and propagating 'free-market democracies' (constitutive of the coupling between 
polyarchy and neoliberalism). In tenus ofDR-CAFTA, therefore, Nicaragua's importance 
must be understood as part ofthe wider regional context through which the ideology of 
transnationalliberalism, for which the US is a key sponsor, is being pursued. Looking at the 
most recent 2006 national elections in Nicaragua gives a further insight into some of the 
potential motivations behind US interference in the country. 
The 2006 Nicaraguan elections were important for several reasons: Firstly, Daniel 
Ortega, the 1980s Sandinista and FSLN leader, was elected as President for the first time 
since the 1984 elections. His inauguration into office, therefore, represented an historic 
moment for the country, which would potentially redefine US-Nicaraguan relations. 
Secondly, the Nicaraguan elections occurred against the backdrop of a Latin American 'left 
turn' , headed by Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez and Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The rise of 
'radical populism' has subsequently been identified by the US as constituting a national 
security threat and one that must be countered. Therefore, the election of the Cold War left-
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wing leader Ortega in Nicaragua, who also happens to be close friends with both the 
Venezuelan and Cuban leaders, could be identified as part of this left turn and, in this respect, 
part of the growing threat to US security. 
The 2006 Nicaraguan election, like that of 1996 and 200 I, was marked by barely 
masked US threats and denunciations of the FSLN leader Daniel Ortega. One of the most 
vocal in voicing disapproval was US ambassador to Nicaragua Paul Trivelli, who was not 
only reported to have threatened to cut off the MCA if the FSLN won (Nicaragua Network 
2006), but also to have sent letters to the Nicaraguan liberal leaders and presidential 
candidates offering both financial and technical assistance (Kendrick 2006). When 
questioned by the Nicaraguan journalist Carlos Chamorro about his 'belligerent' activities, 
Trivelli responded by saying: "I am not going to stop defending democracy - that is part of 
our policy and it will continue to be part of our policy" (ibid). Clearly, as already 
demonstrated, 'democracy' is a very malleable concept and, for reasons already established, 
one could potentially replace 'defending democracy' with 'defending polyarchy'. 
Nevertheless, in a warning to the Bush administration, Trivelli was singled out and cautioned 
by the Organisation of the American States l42 (OAS) for his interference within the 
Nicaraguan electionsl43 (Democracy Now 2006). However, Trivelli was not alone in his 
efforts, with former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs Roger 
Noriega, and Otto Reich, who was the former senior official in the administrations ofRonald 
Reagan and George H. W. Bush, also speaking outl44• 
4.4.7 A fragile democracy 
Although the attempts by the US to influence the elections in Nicaragua have 
potentially been harmful to the process of democratisation in the country, this is not to say 
that the concern behind such interventions is unwarranted. A brief glance at the last ten years 
142 The OAS is made up of thirty· five member states from North and South America and has played an 
important role in organising missions to observe and monitor elections (OAS website). 
143 In a further development, a leading Nicaraguan human rights activist - Vilma Nuiiez - testified before the 
Inter-American Human Rights Commission in Washington D.C. about the US' interference within the elections 
(see Democracy Now 2006). 
144 For example, Noriega said that "the Nicaraguan people probably value their relationship with the United 
States, but also value their own wellbeing and I believe that they recognise that with the Sandinista president, 
the country would sink like a stone and reach depths such as that of Cuba; and that the economy would probably 
be affected" (Kendrick 2006). Otto Reich on the other hand stated that "A man accused of raping his 
stepdaughter is capable of raping his country" (Tayler 2006). 
105 
Chapter 4: United States - Nicaraguan Relations; A Volatile History 
of Nicaragua's political system does in fact present a fragile state of affairs (as demonstrated 
in the creation of the 'pact' between the corrupt ex-President Arnoldo Aleman and self-
maintained 145 FSLN leader Daniel Ortega in 1998). The 'pact' effectively ensured a two party 
political monopoly, intentionally depriving the Nicaraguan people of any kind of third party 
option (Bendafia 2002). In this way, Nicaragua was carved up between Aleman and Ortega, 
representing a tightening of space, which left little (if any) room for political alternatives. In 
essence, the nation's political system came to be dominated by these two caudillos (political 
overlords), with the direct impact of undermining democratic process. As Close discusses, "it 
seems that diametrically opposed ideologies are not enough to keep parties from 
collaborating to cement their dominance over national politics" (2003: 3). Furthermore, 
Daniel Ortega's recent election as Nicaraguan President was a direct result ofthis 
undemocratic pact, which pushed through a series of electoral reforms allowing for easier 
victory. Of particular importance in this respect, was a change in the required threshold level 
of votes required to win, without which Daniel Ortega could not have succeeded in the 2006 
national elections. Under the 'pact' Ortega and Alem{m have twisted and manhandled the 
Nicaraguan political system to ensure and preserve their self-interests (Nithipan-Envio team 
2000a: 3). Whereas for Ortega this meant becoming Nicaraguan President, for Aleman it 
meant ensuring his freedom and absolution from all but one of the charges made against him 
for widespread corruption and embezzlement whilst in power. Although this less than ideal 
situation does not legitimise US intervention in the Nicaraguan elections, it does highlight 
that concerns regarding the democratic credentials ofthe ruling Nicaraguan parties are not 
unfounded. 
4.4.8 The left turn in Latin America and the rise of radical populism 
It is important in understanding US interest in the Nicaraguan elections to look at the 
broader context in which the elections took place. As already mentioned, the rise of radical 
145 By this I am referring to the continued and successful efforts of Daniel Ortega to maintain his control over 
the FSLN and undermine any efforts from within the party itself to elect a different leader (as witnessed by 
Herty Lewites' expulsion from the FSLN in 2005 after challenging for leadership). More generally, it should be 
noted that there has been something of a crisis of identity among the Sandinistas in recent years expressed most 
visibly in the fragmentation of the FSLN and the formation ofa break away party in 1995 on Sandino's lOO" 
anniversary, called the Movimiento de Renovaci6n Sandinista (the Sandinista Renovation Movement - MRS). 
Many of the FSLN's most charismatic founders and leaders defected to the MRS, unhappy with the direction of 
the FSLN and the leadership of the party by Daniel Ortega. As Zibechi comments, there are now effectively two 
Sandinismos (2006: np). However, Ortega's recent election as President demonstrates that his party continues to 
have substantial power in Nicaragua. 
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populi srn has played an important role in reshaping US-Latin American relations. Whilst, 
following the end of the Cold War, many academics rightly foretold the return of the left, 
they were partly wrong about the type of 'left' that would eventually emerge (Castaneda 
2006: np). The rise of radical populism within the hemisphere (otherwise known as the 'pink 
tide') owes its growing success to its political appeal to impoverished and working-class 
Latin Americans, i.e. to individuals whose lives have failed to improve under 
'democratisation' and the adoption ofneoliberal policies (LeoGrande 2006: I). The 
persistence of inequality and poverty in the region has fostered regional discontentment 
which, in turn, has triggered significant grassroots mobilisation and the formation of an ever 
strengthening anti-globalisation movement, highly critical of the World Bank and the IMF. 
This movement has gained significant political influence, constituting a powerful force in the 
election of centre-left presidents, such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in 
Bolivia, who are highly critical of the free market orthodoxy (Grandin 2006: 209). The 
election ofthese individuals and growth in anti-US rhetoric has been met with some alarm in 
the US, where these regimes have been labelled as 'antidemocratic' and as an emerging threat 
to US national security146. To put this within the Central American context, President Bush 
met with all five Presidents from the isthmus in 2005 and identified' leftist groups' - not 
poverty, violence or even corruption - as the chief danger facing Central America (ibid: 213). 
Clearly, for the majority of ordinary Latin Americans, the real threat to their lives is poverty 
and social exclusion. Moreover, although the democratic credentials of individuals such as 
Chavez can be called to question, he and every other left populist leader who has come to 
power in Latin America over the last decade did so through democratic elections (LeoGrande 
2006: 10). One could, therefore, argue that tolerating such governments in Latin America is 
the price of 'democracy' (ibid). However, as history shows us, the US has never been shy in 
by-passing its democratic 'ethics' when national interests are threatened. 
The attempted coup in Venezuela to overthrow Hugo Chavez in 2002 was a key 
moment in shaping US-Latin American relations. Whereas many of the countries in the 
region were concerned that the coup had 'forsaken democratic principles', Washington was 
slow to condemn the illegal seizure of power and even briefly endorsed it during the 
immediate aftermath (Riemer 2004: np). The situation was made worse when, upon hearing 
146 In a testimony before the House Anned Services Committee on March 24th 2004, US Anny General James, 
T. Hill identified 'radical populism' as an 'emerging threat': "Traditional threats are now complemented by an 
emerging threat best described as radical populism, in which the democratic process is undermined to decrease 
rather than protect individual rights" (Williams 2004: np). 
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ofChavez's return to power, Condoleezza Rice gave the following 'advice': "We do hope 
that Chavez recognises that the whole world is watching and that he takes advantage of this 
opportunity to right his own ship, which has been moving, frankly, in the wrong direction for 
quite a long time" (cited in Bellos 2002: np). Not only did this act as provocation for an 
already outraged Chavez to pursue a strongly anti-US agenda, but it also propagated regional 
anti-US sentiment. Grandin argues that just as the "disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion 
increased Fidel Castro's prestige and radicalised hemispheric politics, this 2002 failed coup 
attempt in Venezuela galvanised popular hostility toward the Bush administration and 
catapulted Chavez into the role of champion of the underdog, one of the most admired 
politicians in all of Latin America" (2006: 211). Consequently, the US' response to the coup 
inadvertently helped to split the hemisphere into two distinct ideological camps and, 
furthermore, legitimised Chavez's rule in the eyes of other Latin Americans. He is now seen 
by many as a kind of crusader for the Latin American poor, fighting against the spread of US 
imperialism and promoting equality, instead of the man who is, according to Castaneda, 
"driving his country into the ground,,]47 (2006: np). 
4.4.9 Nicaragua, the US and the new 'left' 
Bearing in mind the discussion thus far, the 2006 election of Daniel Ortega in 
Nicaragua was clearly something the US would have liked to avoid. However, now that he is 
elected, to what extent does he really represent a threat to the US? Since Ortega took office in 
Nicaragua in early 2007, it has been clear that he has been trying to sit on both sides of the 
fence, remaining on amicable terms with the US, whilst extending relations with the new 
'left'. This juggling act is evidenced most readily by Ortega's stated intention to remain in 
DR-CAFTA, whilst simultaneously joining the 'Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas' 
(ALBA), which was set up by the Venezuelan and Cuban governments in 2005 as an 
alternative to the FTAA promoted by the US (Nicaragua Network 2007a). Bearing in mind 
the fact that the US is Nicaragua's largest trading partner, Ortega's decision to remain in DR-
CAFT A is not unexpected. And yet, whilst stating his commitment to the free-trade 
agreement, Ortega has been highly critical of the neoliberal policies imposed on Nicaragua 
over the last sixteen years, blaming them for greater indices of poverty, illiteracy and 
147 Castaneda 2006 argues that since Chavez took office in 1999 poverty figures and human rights indices in 
Venezuela have deteriorated, with the leader more interested in 'supporting' other countries than helping his 
own country's poor. 
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corruption (Nicaragua Network 2007b). It appears that such contradictions are running riot 
within the new government, as it remains 'committed' to its anti-neoliberal discourse, whilst 
still cooperating with the IMF's policies, and confrontational with the US, whilst 
simultaneously seeking its 'benevolence' (Nithipan-Envio team 2007a: np). 
So, what can this confusing picture tell us about the future of US-Nicaraguan 
relations? At this point arguably very little. However, history dictates that the US has little 
tolerance for the 'middle ground' position when it comes to matters of national security and 
with radical populism increasingly being viewed as an 'emerging threat', Ortega's ambiguous 
standpoint may not be sustainable in the long run. This is a particularly important point when 
we consider the increasingly politicised environment within which US policy is being 
formulated in the post 9/11 world. Greater consideration is given to this reality below, as we 
reflect upon the impact of the War on Terror on the US' relations with the Latin American 
region. 
4.4.10 The impact of the War on Terror on regional relations 
On August 25th 2000 in Florida, George W. Bush made a speech on Latin America in 
which he promised, should he become President, to 'look South' as a 'fundamental 
commitment' of his Presidency (Bush 2000). Furthermore, he stated that "those who ignore 
Latin America do not actually understand America itself' (ibid). Unfortunately, following the 
events of 9/11 his pledge to pursue positive relations with Latin America failed to transpire. 
As Castaneda argues "the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington sounded the death 
knell for what could have become the new Bush administration's more forward-looking, 
engaged and enlightened policy toward the rest of the hemisphere" (2003: np). The 
administration arguably lost interest in Latin America, as regional concerns became 
"displaced by other emergencies and distractions that Washington [had] as its priority" (Nairn 
2004: np). In the wake of this apparent neglect, Latin American support for the US' policies 
further diminished and, as already discussed, this disquiet was expressed in the pink tide, 
which saw the resurgence of the popular left, spearheaded by Hugo Chavez. The 'visionary' 
approach to US-Latin American relations proposed by Bush in his pre-election speech has all 
but vanished and has been replaced, instead, by a situation where relations are increasingly 
being defined through the lens of a new 'emerging threat' that must be maintained. 
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Nicaragua stands out as an obvious target for, what the US sees as, CMvez's 
'destabilising' influence148, and this is one of the possible motivations behind Washington's 
efforts to influence the 2006 elections. As stated by Hakim, "administration officials are 
convinced that he [Chavez] is provoking instability in some of the most volatile states in the 
hemisphere, including Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua" (2006: np). The events of 9/11 
provided the impetus for the prevailing 'terrorism' discourse, which has framed many 
discussions on Latin America and resulted in the region being represented in a more negative 
manner. As alluded to previously in the chapter, not only have officials in charge of US 
foreign policy towards Latin America increasingly used terrorist discourse to secure 
resources, but governments from within the region itself have done much the same. As a 
result, not only is Latin America slipping into greater obscurity within US foreign policy, as 
the US continues to focus its attentions on problems in the Middle-East, but what little 
attention it does receive is being couched in increasingly negative terms. 
Conclusions 
This chapter looked at the evolution of US-Nicaraguan relations over the course of 
almost two hundred years, covering a range of interconnected issues and themes. An 
extremely important topic throughout this entire discussion has been the concept of 
'democracy' and its application throughout the isthmus at different times. Democracy is a 
highly malleable concept and one that has taken on many different meanings and 
connotations throughout Nicaragua's history, at times legitimising the worst acts against 
humanity whilst, at other moments, inspiring social revolution. In fact Robinson argues that 
concepts such as 'democracy' and 'freedom' are meaningless in and ofthemselves as they are 
always ideologically charged. As such, "whoever controls the definition controls the terms of 
the discourse and is able to set the framework in which people speak and even think,,149 
(Robinson 2007: 32). For example, Condoleezza Rice's agenda of 'transformational 
diplomacy', developed in response to President Bush's vision of promoting 'democracy' 
148 The 2006 US National Security Strategy described Venezuela as a "demagogue awash in oil money that is 
undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region" (2006: 15). 
149 This reality it demonstrated in the following extract, which reinforces the 'power-knowledge' nexus in 
discourse referred to in the previous section: "I don't believe there are different kinds of democracy ... we [the 
US] know it when we see it" (Condoleezza Rice cited in Grandin 2007: 22). 
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throughout the worldl50, has the potential to legitimise US intervention within foreign 
political affairs, under the auspices of carrying out 'diplomacy'. As HoIt discusses, "the State 
Department says ... outpost officers will move 'from reporting outcomes to shaping them'. 
That is the point at which the US moves from diplomacy to intervention" (2006: np). This 
new vision for US diplomacy seeks, according to Rice, to 'change the world itself (Rice 
2006), utilising the State Department to "restructure the internal institutions of nations" 
(Grandin 2007: 22), and employing US foreign diplomats to manipulate country politics. 
According to Dominguez, the Bush administration has actually "tainted democracy 
promotion efforts, making them appear little more than a fig leaf to hide its exercise of 
power" (2007: 29). 
This chapter has also set the broader context for understanding contemporary US-
Latin America relations, which Hakim suggests are at their lowest point since the end of the 
Cold War (2006: np). Without a doubt, Nicaragua's MCA is occurring at an extremely 
interesting moment in US-Nicaraguan history and its future under Ortega is anything but 
certain. At the same time, Grandin adds an interesting perspective to the discussion so far, by 
situating Latin America as the 'workshop of empire' and staging ground for current US 
policy. Grandin locates Reagan' s Central American wars as a dress rehearsal for what is 
happening in the Middle-East today and also as the point of inception for a coalition of 
neoconservatives, Christian evangelicals, free marketers and nationalists, that would stand 
behind President Bush's expansive policy (2006: 6). In addition to the region's determinant 
role in the shaping of contemporary policy, is the growing frequency with which US 
conservatives, such as Dick Cheney, cite El Salvador as the 'model' for building 'democracy' 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. As stated by Engler, this signifies a warped interpretation by 
individuals within the US over their country's role in El Salvador and suggests a "wilful 
blindness to even the most murderous consequences of the United States Cold War foreign 
policy" (2004: np). 
Finally, this chapter set the historical context for the focus of the study, Nicaragua's 
MCA. It is important to recognise that the MCA is not happening in some kind of historical 
ISO "Almost a year ago today in his second Inaugural Address, President Bush laid out a vision that now leads 
America into the world. 'It is the policy of the United States,' the President said, 'to seek and support the growth 
of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in 
our world.' To achieve this bold mission, America needs equally bold diplomacy, a diplomacy that not only 
reports about the world as it is, but seeks to change the world itself. I and others have called this mission 
"transformational diplomacy" (Rice 2006: np). 
111 
Chapter 4: United States - Nicaraguan Relations; A Volatile History 
vacuum but is, instead, intimately caught up in events happening at a range of scales, from 
the local to the global, both past and present. The discussion on polyarchy, both in this 
chapter and in the previous one, has been ex~emely useful in establishing a precedent for the 
MCA. Furthermore, it has taken on particular specificity within the Nicaraguan context, 
within which the theme of 'democracy', and what it represents, has overtime been heavily 
debated and actively contested, both from within Nicaragua and without. In concluding, 
therefore, this thesis has, thus far, situated Nicaragua's MCA within three fundamental and 
interrelated areas ofinterest: Chapter 2 set the broader context of the MCA through analysing 
the evolution of development discourse over time, from President Trurnan's famous speech in 
1949, to the transition to the Post-Washington Consensus in the 1990s. Chapter 3 explored 
the MCA as part of the shifting strategies within US foreign policy, placing a specific 
emphasis on the issue of development assistance. This chapter explored how Nicaragua's 
MCA can be understood within the context ofthe unique historical relationship between 
Nicaragua, both as an individual country and as part of the regional whole, and the US. 
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Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
This chapter looks at the research methods employed in carrying out this investigation 
into Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the issues associated with its implementation 
in Nicaragua. It begins by iterating the study'S core themes/objectives first identified in 
chapter 1 and then provides a summary of the research process, indicating what was done, 
when and why. Following this, the chapter focuses on the methods employed to collect 
information for the thesis, identifying their strengths and potential weaknesses. The process 
of reflexivity is then utilised to discuss the process of data production, the interpretation of 
data and the writing-up ofthe thesis, thus assessing positionality and the interplay of power 
during the research. 
5.1 Research aims and objectives 
The core aim of this study is to answer the following research question: Does the 
MeA live up to its 'transformational' rhetoric or is it yet another case of 'old wine in new 
bottles '? Under this broad agenda there are several key themes that this research seeks to 
elucidate and explore, and these are listed below in the form of objectives for greater clarity: 
~ Objective 1: To understand the specific experience of Nicaragua in the MCA. 
~ Objective 2: To engage with, and contribute to, the core debates surrounding the 
MCA as a United States (US) development initiative. 
~ Objective 3: To locate the MCA within the context of dominant development 
discourse, looking specifically at the Washington Consensus (WC), Post-Washington 
Consensus (PWC), and neoliberalism. 
~ Objective 4: To utilise this study of the MCA as a platform for examining the 
relationship between development discourse and US democracy promotion. 
In purs~ing these objectives, primary research was predominantly conducted during the 
second year of study, which focussed on two very different locations. The first stage of 
research was conducted from September to November 2005 in Washington D.C. and 
involved a series of interviews with individuals from the US government, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and think tanks, as well as the use of onsite secondary sources of 
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infonnation. This preliminary phase was targeted at acquiring general infonnation on the 
MCA and its position within US development assistance, as well as making some initial steps 
towards collecting background infonnation on Nicaragua and its position within US foreign 
policy. Washington D.C. presented a particularly interesting and useful context in which to 
do this, as it is the headquarters for some of the most influential development agencies within 
the US, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), as well as home to a large number of influential 
international development actors. Table 5.1 below gives an overview of the thirteen 
interviews carried out in this preliminary phase of research in Washington D.C. 
Table 5.1: Interviews conducted in Washington D.C. between September and November 
2005 
IndividuaJ(s)l>l Organisation 
Lisa Haugaard Latin American Working Group (LAWG) 
EIsa Chang Center for International Policv (CIP) 
Chuck Kaufman and Kathv Hoyt Nicara)!;lla Network 
Sameer Dossani 50 Years is Enough 
Gretchen Alther Center for Development and Population 
Activities(CEDPA) 
Betsy McCallon White Ribbon Alliance 
Stephanie Weinberg Oxfam 
Manuel Orozco Inter-American Dialo)!;lle 
Jim Vennillion, Kenny Miller Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
and Amalia Sobalvarro 
Christina del Castillo United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
GeoffThale Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) 
JeffVogt WOLA 
Seth Nickinson InterAction 
The second and arguably most significant stage of investigation was carried out in 
Nicaragua between the months of February and August 2006. During this six month period, 
interviews were conducted with a diverse range of people from the city of Managua and the 
departments of Leon and Chinandega, which are located in the west of Nicaragua (see figure 
5.1 below). 
151 These are the interviewees' actual names and respondents gave permission to be recorded during the 
interviews for the purposes of this research. Information on their respective orgartisations was correct at the time 
of the interviews. 
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Table 5.2 below provides an overview of the interviews conducted during the six 
months in Nicaragua, categorised accord ing to the locations in which they were undertaken. 
In total , seventeen interviews were conducted in Managua, ten in north Leon, five in the city 
of Leon, three in north Chinandega and five interviews in the city of Chinandega. 
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Table 5.2: Lnterviews carried out in Nicaragua between February and August 2006 
Individual (s)l>l Organisation Location 
Sarah Smith-Pearce Catholic Agency for International Managua 
Development (CAFOD) 
Steve Olive United States Agency for Lnternational Managua 
Development (USA ID) 
Ciri 10 Otero Center of Initiatives for Environmental Managua 
Policies (C LP A) 
Nelda Sanchez Promotion of Equity through Pro-Poor Managua 
Growth (PEMCE) 
Edgar Sotomayor Project of Support for the Monitoring Managua 
and Evaluation of Nicaragua 's Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PASE) 
Irving Larios Institute for Research and Social Managua 
Action (fNGES) 
Ivan Garcia Civil Coordinator and National Managua 
Counci l on Economic and Social 
Planning (CONPES) 
Alejandro Aleman Centro Humboldt Managua 
Mario Quintana Civil Coordinator Managua 
Eva Rasmussen Journali st Managua 
Violeta Granera CONPES Managua 
Julio Montealegre Millennium Challenge Account - Managua 
Nicaragua (MCAN) 
Denis Melendez Center for HealIh In formation and Managua 
Consulting Services (Cl SAS) 
M ichelle Winthrop and Department for International Managua 
Maria Jarquin Development (DflD) 
Matt Bohn Millennium Challenge Corporation - Managua 
Nicaragua 
Juan Sebastian Chamorro MCAN Managua 
Nubia Luna INGES and ex-Mayoress of El Sauce North Leon 
Reyna Casti llo Network of Actors for Loca l NOlth Leon 
Development (RADEL) 
Evert Delgadi llo Mayor of El Sauce and Association of North Leon 
Municipalities from North Leon 
(AMULEON) 
Juan Jose Rayo AM ULEON North Leon 
Aura Estela Corrales RADEL North Leon 
Esmerita Zamora Local Government (Achuapa) North Leon 
Manuel Rostran Teacher and Co-operati ve President North Leon 
Juan Delgadillo and Local Government (J icaral) North Leon 
Nicolasa Laguna 
J ustino F onseca Local Government (Malpaisi llo) North Leon 
152 These are the interviewees' actua l names and respondents gave permission to be recorded during the 
il1lcrviews for the purposes of this research. Information on their respective organisations was correct at the time 
of the interviews. 
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Rigoberto Sampson National Autonomous University of Le6n city 
Nicaragua (UNAN) 
Jilma Balladares FUNDAP ADELE Le6n city 
Harold Baldiz6n Vega Ministry of Governance (MIGOB) Le6n city 
Emesto Medina Ex-Rector ofUNAN Le6n city 
Petrona Sandoval Association of Women with Le6n city 
Disabilities from Le6n 
Paulino Zufiiga and Association of Municipalities from North Chinandega 
Trinidad Garcia North Chinandega (AMUNORCHI) 
Moises Moreno Robles Mayor of Santo Tomas del Norte North Chinandega 
Agresio Osejo AMUNORCHI and Mayor of North Chinandega 
SomotiIlo 
Alberto Aviles Business Man and ex-Minister of Chinandega City 
Governance 
Maria Castillo Movement for Women in Chinandega Chinandega City 
Pablo Medina Association for Survival and Local Chinandega City 
Development (ASODEL) 
Santos Mendez Farmer, Journalist and Radio Presenter Chinande)!;a City 
Yader Aguilera and Wendy MIGOB Chinandega City 
Hernandez 
In addition to these interviews, onsite secondary sources were also utilised, many of 
which provided important insights into the country's MCA programme, as well as broader 
information regarding an array of key development issues (such as Nicaragua's Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper - PRSP). 
5.2 Qualitative research 
'Qualitative research' was the primary method employed in collecting information for 
this study. More specificaIly, in light of the diverse and multiple practices located under the 
broad banner of qualitative research, this investigation utilised 'semi-structured interviews'. 
In deciding upon this approach, I considered a range of factors such as the time I would be 
spending in the 'field', the finances available to me, the context in which the fieldwork was 
being undertaken, and most importantly what I was looking to get out of the process. Before 
looking in greater detail at the use of interviews and their application within this specific 
study, however, this chapter focuses on exploring and contextualising qualitative research. 
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5.2.1 Qualitative methods versus quantitative methods 
Qualitative research is often defined through its position relative to quantitative 
research and vice versa. Consequently, the two approaches, both of which are employed 
throughout the human geography discipline, are frequently characterised as constituting 
oppositional and conflicting methodologies. Table 5.3 below identifies this 'dualistic' 
relationship. 
Table 5.3: Dualisms between qualitative and quantitative methods 
Qualitative Quantitative 
Qualitative data Quantitative data 
Natural settings Experimental settings 
Search for meaning Identification of behaviour 
Rejection of natural science Adoption of natural science 
Inductive approaches Deductive approaches 
Identification of cultural patterns Pursuance of scientific laws 
Idealist perspective Realist perspective 
Source: Winchester (2005) 
However, accepting such an interpretation is inevitably problematic. Hammersley, for 
example, challenges the 'widely held notion' that there are two methodological paradigms in 
social research, the qualitative and quantitative, and instead argues that "diversity cannot be 
encapsulated within two (or, for that matter, three, four or more) paradigms" (1995: 39, 40). 
As such, there has been growing realisation of the need to depart from a perceived dichotomy 
between quantitative and qualitative research methodologies, in which it is argued that they 
can be better seen as being part of a continuum (see Madge et al 1997: 93). Whilst 
recognising the importance of doing this, it is nevertheless useful here to draw some 
comparisons between qualitative and quantitative methods, as doing so clarifies the defining 
attributes of the methodological approaches. 
Whilst quantitative approaches to research tend to reflect a general belief that there is 
a pre-existing world which can be known and measured, a qualitative interpretation tends to 
see the world as something that is "dynamic and changing, always being constructed through 
the intersection of cultural, economic, social and political processes" (Dwyer and Limb 2001: 
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6). As Smith elucidates, "the world is not real in a fixed, stable or predictable way; .. .it is not 
entirely accessible; and ... it does not appear empirically the same to everyone, no matter how 
carefully we look. Rather, qualitative methods presume the world to be an assemblage of 
competing social constructions, representations and performances" (2001: 25). This assertion 
reflects the recognition of 'situated knowledge' m, in which neither the researcher, nor indeed 
the researched, can ever be fully detached from the construction and recycling of 
knowledge/power. Bearing this in mind, it is easy to recognise the significance of qualitative 
methodologies in the emergence of a variety of postrnodem and poststructuralist geographies 
(see Kitchin and Tate 2000: 16, 17), with the so called 'cultural turn' in geography 
representing a key moment in the diffusion and adoption of the approach throughout many 
areas of the geography discipline (such as 'economic geography', 'population geography', 
'health geography' and so on - see Dwyer and Limb 2001). 
5.2.2 Qualitative methods 
In terms of the actual methods employed, it has already been stated that qualitative 
research involves many different practices and this reflects the approach's use within 
geography in addressing a diverse range of issues and processes. However, for the purpose of 
clarity, the practices employed within qualitative research can be seen as faIling into three 
broad categories: oral (e.g. interviewing), textual (e.g. documentary), and observational 
(Winchester 2005: 7). Out of these three, the most commonly employed approach is 'oral' 
and this can take a variety offorms (the selection of which should ultimately be defined by 
what a given researcher aims to know or do). In terms of this specific study, interviews were 
chosen as the most suitable method for pursuing the thesis' aims (set out previously) and the 
following section focuses on exploring the use of interviews within research. 
5.3 Interview approaches 
Of all the qualitative methods, interviews are the most commonly used (Kitchin and 
Tate 2000) and are identified as effective tools in the production of rich and varied data sets. 
As discussed by Valentine (2005), interviews are not utilised with the intention of producing 
15' Situated knowledge "replaces the traditional conception of scientific practice as the pursuit of a disembodied, 
inviolable and neutral objectivity, with an alternative formulation that stresses embodied physicality, social 
construction, and cultural politics" (Johnston et al 2000: 742). 
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representative facts and figures, but instead they are used to give an in-depth insight into the 
lives, experiences and opinions of individuals. Eyles (1988) denotes interviews as a 
'conversation with a purpose' - a social encounter, which involves a complex personal 
interaction between two or more individuals. The degree of depth required inevitably varies 
according to the specific requirements ofthe researcher, the intended purpose of the study 
and the need for comparability between data sets. Consequently, several different types of 
interview can be identified and these can be placed along a continuum, with 'structured 
interviews' at one end and 'unstructured interviews' at the other. In the middle of this 
continuum, one can locate the 'semi-structured interview': an interview which has "some 
degree of predetermined order but still ensures flexibility in the way issues are addressed by 
the informant" (Dunn 2005: 80). Semi-structured interviews were the dominant research 
method employed within this study and, as a result, the following section explores this type 
of interview in greater detail. 
5.3.1 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews employ a guided approach in which the content of the 
interview and the issues discussed are, to a degree, predetermined by the researcher. At the 
same time, however, it is an interactive process which allows for a level of flexibility. For 
example, with regard to the interviews I conducted during this study, there were always set 
themes and issues around which I would frame the discussion. However, I allowed for some 
divergence away from the set agenda, as this often resulted in the introduction of new themes 
and issues that were of direct or indirect interest. Therefore, as opposed to structured 
interviews which allow for very little departure from a strict set of questions, semi-structured 
interviews are much more responsive and organic, reacting to a specific exchange occurring 
at a given point oftime. Through this process one can accumulate new ideas and thoughts, 
which may well come to define and shape the course of the research. As argued previously in 
discussing qualitative methods more broadly, semi-structured interviews are malleable, 
responding to situations and embracing alternative knowledge as part and parcel of a dynamic 
and constantly changing world. However, at the same time it does have an agenda and, in 
contrast to. unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews are content focussed. 
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5.3.2 The advantages of using interviews in research 
Although there are key differences between the three interview approaches 
highlighted above, there are tendencies true to all of them and these distinguish interviews 
from other forms of data collection. In particular, the level of depth obtained through 
conducting interviews tends to be much higher than what might be achieved through the use 
of alternative techniques (such as questionnaires I54). In contrast to questionnaires, which are 
typically standardised and untailored to individual circumstance, interviews tend to be much 
more explanatory, taking a 'conversational' and 'fluid form', which varies according to the 
"interests, experiences, and views of the interviewees" (Valentine 2005: 111). As a result, 
interviews aim to capture the complexities of the individual's experiences and ideas. 
Interviews are, therefore, far more people-orientated than many other approaches. 
Nevertheless, 'positivists' have frequently criticised in-depth interviews for their apparent 
lack of 'objectivity' and 'detachment'. Conversely, an argument has been made, especially by 
those individuals adopting humanist or post-structuralist perspectives, that there is, in reality, 
'no such thing as objectivity in social science research': "Rather they argue that all research 
work is explicitly or implicitly informed by the experiences, aims and interpretation of the 
researcher ... " (Valentine 2005: 112). Far from representing a technique that is impeded and 
lessened by its direct and close engagement with the individual, in-depth interviews draw 
their strength and usefulness from this precise relationship. As explored below with regard to 
reflexivity, subjectivity is not only endemic to the research, but constitutes its very essence as 
a method for exploring subjective values and beliefs. 
5.3.3 Utilising interviews 
The reasons for using in-depth semi-structured interviews within this specific study 
have already been alluded to. It was decided from an early point in the research process that 
interviews would be the most appropriate approach for exploring a topic such as this, as they 
allow for a much more in-depth insight into the experience, feelings and/or opinions of 
certain individuals, rather than other approaches which may incorporate' closed' questions 
IS' It needs to be noted that these approaches do not have to be mutually exclusive. Often questionnaires and 
interviews are used in conjunction, forming a symbiotic relationship that may well strengthen the overall 
structure of an investigation. 
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(Kitchin and Tate 2000: 213). More generally, Dunn states that there are four main reasons 
for using interviews: 
1. To fill a gap in knowledge that other methods are unable to bridge 
2. To investigate complex behaviours and motivations 
3. To collect diversity of meaning, opinion and experiences 
4. When a method is required that shows respect for and empowers those people who 
provide the data. 
(Dunn 2005: 80) 
In terms of this specific research, each of the reasons identified by Dunn influenced the 
decision to adopt an interview-based approach. However, a key point of consideration in 
deciding to utilise interviews was the hugely diverse backgrounds and beliefs of the 
respondents, as this necessitated a style of research that would take into account the many 
complexities found therein. In this respect, it is important to note that every interview 
conducted during the study was done so 'face to face' and this allowed for a much more 
engaged dialogue and interaction than might have been achieved through, for example, a 
telephone interview. Furthermore, employing the semi-structured interview approach helped 
me to address the power differential in this research. Although explored in greater detail 
below, it is important to recognise here that research is, as Dowling comments, "interleaved 
with relations of power" (2005: 23) and these relations can, according to England (2004), 
take different forms, whether they be reciprocal, asymmetrical, or potentially exploitative. 
With this in mind, one could suggest that adopting a less structured approach to interviewing 
can be an empowering process, as it enables the respondent(s) to ask questions and examine 
the researcher about hislher project, its aims and their motivation. This, in turn, facilitates the 
important process of critical reflexivity, through which an individual may modify or adapt 
hislher research in response to their social engagement with participants. 
5.4 The selection process 
In contrast to questionnaires, the aim of recruiting respondents for interviews is not 
necessarily to choose a representative sample, but rather to select an illustrative one 
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(Valentine 2005: 112). Therefore, the decision of who to recruit is frequently motivated by 
theoretical considerations. For example, with regard to this particular thesis and the cultural, 
and social, context within which it was enacted in Nicaragua, I could perceive that gender 
was going to be a key factor in determining involvement in, and the perception of, the MCA, 
and this was indeed the case. In recognition of such factors, this research engaged with 
individuals with highly diverse and mixed backgrounds and demo graphics, from a variety of 
urban and rural settings. In fact, awareness about the urban/rural dimension in this research 
was necessitated as much by the need to capture the complexities of Nicaraguan society in 
looking at the MCA, as by the nature of the initiative itseI£ Although the MCA is, at first 
glance, a strategy for national development, Nicaragua's MCA is in reality a regional 
initiative (although being headed at a central level from its capital Managua), involving the 
two departments of Le6n and Chinandega, which are located to the northwest of the country. 
It is important to remember that although gender is important in this study, it does not, 
in itself, define identity. 'Men' and 'women' are not 'homogenous social groups', as their 
identities, as one or the other, are intersected by other identities such as 'age', 'class', 
'ethnicity', 'race' and so on (Valentine 2005). Moreover, these categories are, as Herod notes 
in discussing the issue of 'race', "socially constructed in different ways in different places 
and at different times" (1999: 320). Consequently, a person's identity can change 
significantly according to the broader context in which they operate. As a result, what is 
means to be a 'man' or 'woman', 'white' or 'black', 'young' or 'old' (to name just a few) can 
vary from place to place and from one year to the next. This reality emphasises the 
importance of positionality and critical reflexivity within research. One must be constantly 
aware of, and respond to, the social and cultural environments in which research is being 
conducted. 
5.4.1 Sampling approach 
This thesis adopted a 'purposive' sampling approach, which is argued by Patton to 
consist of fifteen different forms. However, as Patton himself recognises, these fifteen modes 
of selection are not mutually exclusive, with each one fulfilling a different purpose within 
research. In this study, five of these were particularly prevalent in defining the sampling 
structure and these are defined in table 5.4 below. 
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Table 5.4: Purposive sampling approaches 
1. Snowball and chain sampling: This is an approach for locating infonnation-rich key 
infonnants or critical cases. 
2. Criterion sampling: This approach is driven by the logic of reviewing and studying all 
cases that meet some predetennined criterion of importance. 
3. Confirming and disconfirming cases: The researcher gathers data and watches for 
patterns to emerge. Over time this gives way to confinnatory fieldwork, which involves 
testing ideas, confinning the importance and meaning of patterns, and checking out the 
viability of emergent findings with new data and additional cases. This can involve looking 
for and sampling confinning and disconfinning cases. 
4. Opportunistic or emergent sampling: Fieldwork often involves on-the-spot decisions 
about sampling to take advantage of new opportunities during actual data collection. 
5. Convenience sampling: Doing what is fast and convenient. 
Source: Patton (2002: 234-241) 
'Snowballing' (a process in which one contact may be used to help the researcher 
recruit another, who may in turn do the same) was particularly useful in establishing contacts 
during the study. This was especially true when talking to elites l55 and individuals within 
networking organisations, many of whom had knowledge of, and/or access to, other persons 
of interest. For example, in Nicaragua I interviewed an individual within Chinandega's 
Departmental Development Council (CODECHI), who then put me in contact with the 
Mayor of a nearby municipality who, during the actual interview, arranged an interview for 
me with an influential figure in central government. 'Criterion sampling' fonned the 
backbone ofthe general sampling structure, in which only individuals who, for example, 
were involved in the MCA initiative or had knowledge of the MCA and/or a related topic of 
interest, were selected to take part in the study. This component really goes without saying, as 
selection must be based on relevance to the actual research. The third sampling approach 
mentioned in table 5.4 above (labelled as 'confinning and disconfinning cases'), constituted 
another important aspect of the study'S sampling framework. Part and parcel of this 
investigation involved evaluating the viability of certain statements/ideas against other 
sources and exploring the extent to which these may have been commonly held or indicative 
ofa certain pattern or trend. 'Opportunistic' or 'emergent' sampling is similar in this respect, 
in that it follows the same kind of organic process, i.e. the researcher is responsive to new 
findings and ideas. As with all research, the infonnation collected during this study was 
155 Greater consideration is given to interviewing elites in section 5.6.2 below. 
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composed of multiple and interrelated threads, with new knowledge and ideas leading the 
research in different directions and, in some cases, to different locations. 
The final approach mentioned in table 5.4 is labelled 'convenience sampling'. 
Depending on the nature of their project many researchers would cherish the opportunity to 
talk to the most 'important' and influential actors within their chosen field of study, but this is 
not always possible. Research is inevitably constrained by time, costs and issues of 
accessibility. Consequently, it is ultimately defined by the reality within which the researcher 
is operating. However, this should not be construed as suggesting that one should only seek 
to engage with those individuals who are the easiest or most 'convenient' to interview 
(indeed as I found during my research, it was often individuals that were the hardest to meet 
that had the most 'valuable' information), but that any decision should involve weighing up 
the benefits and drawbacks of the resulting action or inaction. Furthermore, as illustrated 
previously, interviewing an individual who may be considered 'accessible' or 'convenient' 
can, in certain cases, grant the researcher access to more prominent figures, facilitating the 
process previously described as 'snowballing'. 
In conclusion, the sampling framework adopted in this study was illustrative of the 
research method employed. As stated above, semi-structured interviews are essentially a 
hybrid of unstructured and structured interviews, and draw upon the strengths of both 
approaches to facilitate a predetermined and yet flexible engagement with the research 
respondents. In a similar fashion, the sampling process used in exploring the MCA was 
initially focussed on certain individuals and organisations seen, at that time, to be relevant to 
the topic under investigation. However, as new information and knowledge was accumulated 
during the study, new opportunities inevitably arose and alternative investigative paths were 
presented. Consequently, the methodological approach utilised and the sampling framework 
adopted within this particular study were mutually enforcing, acting in harmony to facilitate a 
rich and responsive research process. 
5.5 Positionality and reflexivity 
There has been a growing realisation in geography of the important role the 'personal' 
plays in research. As Madge et al comment, "it influences the questions we ask, the ways in 
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which we interpret answers to those questions, and what we do with our research results" 
(1997: 88). One must therefore continually assess positionality and the power relations at 
play through the process of reflexivity (Skelton 2009: np). Reflexivity rejects neopositivist 
empiricism which specifies a strict dichotomy between object and subject, and seeks to bring 
to the surface the explicit power relations present during the research process, thus revealing 
"what knowledge is contingent upon, how the researcher is socially situated and how the 
research agenda/process has been constituted" (Ramazanoglu and Holland 200 I: 118). In this 
respect, it operates as a strategy for 'situating knowledges', in which the "sort of knowledge 
made depends on who the makers are" (Rose 1997: 306, 307). Thus, knowledge is deeply 
bound up in the relations of power between the researcher and the researched. 
As an approach, reflexivity has been most thoroughly analysed and discussed by 
feminist geographers and whilst clearly advocating the importance of being reflexive in 
conducting research, there is a general recognition of the difficulty of actually doing it (see 
Rose 1997). Indeed, it could be argued that the use of reflexivity has often brought about its 
own form of concealment, in which there is an assumption that the 'reflexive researcher' can 
be "fully aware of their own self-conscious and simultaneously survey the entire landscape of 
power" (Maxey 1999: 201, 202). Whilst recognising the validity of such concerns, the 
process of reflexivity is crucial to the research process, as it enables the researcher to be more 
open to any challenges to their theoretical position and the knowledge claims made, and 
receptive to the potential consequences of their interactions with those being investigated 
(England 1994: 82). As a result, the following sections engage with the issue of reflexivity in 
exploring the research process, and for the sake of clarity the discussion is framed around the 
three themes of 'producing data', 'interpreting data' and 'writing-up'. In doing this, however, 
recognition needs to be given to the fact that these crude divisions to the research process do 
not necessarily exist in practice and, as Maxey states, one must question the validity of 
accepting prescriptive and formulaic boundaries to research (1999: 203). 
5.6 Data Production 
The term 'data production' is used here instead of 'data collection' because the latter 
tends to ignore the social process of production and instead suggests that there are pre-
existing 'facts' lying around that the researcher can collect. The information produced by the 
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researcher is subject to complex social, cultural and political processes that shape its meaning 
and translation into 'knowledge'. In this respect, it is important to acknowledge that we are, 
whether we like it or not, human beings complete with feelings, failings and moods, and all 
of these things affect how we feel and understand the reality around us. As Stanley and Wise 
discuss, "our consciousness is always the medium through which the research occurs; there is 
no method or technique of doing research other than through the medium of the researcher" 
(1993: 157). Consequently, it can be argued that it is our identity positions, i.e. our age, 
religion, gender, ethnicity, cultural background and so forth, that ultimately detennines what 
we discover from research and what we perceive as-important, where we choose to research, 
and what 'knowledge' we decide is valid (Madge et al 1997: 101). Just as our identities are 
partial and situated, so too are the fields in which we operate, and these are interpreted in 
different ways by different people, coloured through lived experience. The texts I chose to 
read or didn't, the relationships I built or lost, the ideas I listened to or ignored, all of these 
and more influenced my findings, and whilst recognising that there is no such thing as an all-
seeing, all-knowing researcher, being reflexive is a means of giving greater openness to the 
research process and the 'knowledge' that is produced. 
The use of semi-structured interviews as the primary method of producing data for 
this research was decided at an early stage in my PhD studies and the reasoning for this was 
discussed above. In reflecting upon the implications of adopting this methodological 
approach, it is important to recognise that in contrast to quantitative methods that generally 
offer the researcher limited access to the experiences of respondents, social relationships, and 
nuances of meaning, interviews offer an in-depth insight into the lives of individuals, thus 
opening the door to a complex engagement between researcher and researched. Thus, this 
study can be better understood as a dialogic process jointly shaped by myself as the 
researcher and the interview respondents (Madge et al 1997: 92). In establishing relationships 
with respondents in the US and Nicaragua, I often highlighted that fact that I was not aligned 
with any connected political or development organisations, and I believe that this improved 
my ability to engage with individuals from the political spectrum of society. For example, it 
is possible that by doing this I may have been seen as less of a 'threat' by interviewees and as 
a result they could have been more open to dialogue around potentially sensitive issues. 
Furthermore, in acknowledging my supplicant position in the interview process and making it 
clear to the respondents that I respected them as the experts from whom I wished to learn, I 
felt that I was able to disassociate myself, to varying degrees of success, from a potential 
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relationship with respondents in which I would be seen as the one holding all the 'power'. As 
England discusses, this approach to fieldwork is "predicated upon the unequivocal acceptance 
that the knowledge of the person being researched ... is greater than that of the researcher's" 
(1994: 82). In some cases, feigning ignorance about certain debates and issues during the 
interview process, whether at the international, national or local level, helped to enforce this 
relationship whilst granting a useful insight into individuals' opinions and feelings. The fact 
that I was a relatively young and inexperienced researcher is likely to have strengthened the 
validity of adopting such an approach, as individuals may have been willing to divulge more 
information during the interviews in order to 'help the process along'. 
In terms of formulating the research questions, I had a fairly broad agenda for the 
preliminary field work stage in Washington D.e., in which the intention was to acquire 
general information and opinions on the MCA, as well as on Nicaragua and its placement 
within US foreign policy. This influenced my approach of which organisations and 
individuals to include during this preliminary research phase, in which there was a tendency 
towards some of the larger NGOs such as Oxfam and InterAction that have a considerable 
global presence, as well as to relatively well-known think-tanks such as Washington Office 
on Latin America and the Latin American Working Group that have detailed knowledge of 
Latin America. This focus on the 'bigger picture' intentionally led to fairly wide-ranging 
discussions on the MCA, from which I was able to pull out and explore the key thesis themes 
of 'poverty reduction' and 'democracy promotion'. As discussed below, these early 
discussions were to inform later fieldwork in Nicaragua and frame much ofthe content of 
discussion. 
The nature of my engagement with the respondents in Washington D.e. was affected 
by what I perceived to be a sort of 'outsider' status in the development community. I had a 
sense of constantly trying to gain access to a select group of individuals who appeared to 
have their own dynamic and established social groupings, and whilst through the research 
process I was able to gain a glimpse of this world, this would usually end once the interview 
was over. This is by no means to suggest that I was deliberately 'excluded' from this group or 
that those I met were not friendly or open to discussion, only that I felt unable establish a real 
presence in Washington D.e., and at times felt more like an academic tourist than an engaged 
researcher. This resulted in a somewhat sterile and 'un-messy' research experience, in which 
relationships were never entirely formed or broken. Nevertheless, the data produced from this 
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fieldwork was no less valid in my opinion, and fulfilled my expectations of what this 
preliminary research stage was supposed to deliver. 
In exploring the MCA in Nicaragua, questions were framed around the two core and 
interrelated themes of poverty reduction and democracy promotion, and initial exploration of 
these issues drew upon the findings of the preliminary fieldwork in Washington D.C. In this 
respect, the research conducted in the US acted as a mechanism with which to 'structure' 
discussions in Nicaragua, in the early stages at least, although a degree of flexibility in terms 
of content was ensured through the adoption of semi-structured interviews. Under this 
general thematic umbrella, a number of sub-themes arose through discussions with 
respondents and these led to new avenues of enquiry. Decisions therefore had to be made 
during the fieldwork as to which avenues of enquiry I wanted to pursue and research further. 
This subsequently informed the later choices I would make regarding the selection and de-
selection of interviewees. Whilst these decisions were a conscious reflection of what I felt 
were the most important and relevant issues to understanding the MeA, I recognise that the 
choices I made were affected by my personal identity and my interaction with the interview 
respondents. Reflecting upon ideas around being an 'insider/outsider' in this research offers a 
means of thinking through this process further. 
5.6.1 The 'insider/outsider' dichotomy in research 
As Madge et al discuss, "power relations will take different forms in different places, 
at different times, and between different people" (1997: 103). Thinking about the researcher 
as an 'insider' or 'outsider' provides a mechanism for understanding how positionality can 
affect power in the research process. To do this, however, it is necessary to depart from 
framing this relationship as a simple dualism and recognise that a researcher can fall 
somewhere in between. In fact, Herod suggests that it is perhaps more fitting to talk about 
'degrees of outsiderness', in which there is a 'sliding scale of intimacy' (1999: 325, 326). Far 
from representing two distinct and fixed groupings, one's positionality can, in this respect, 
shift and potentially "translocate through categories and identities" (ibid: 321). To a large 
extent, this dynamism is endemic to human nature, with individuals often presenting 
themselves in different ways within different contexts. In terms of the actual research 
process, one may, whether consciously or subconsciously, gain advantages through the 
manipulation of identity and through this process transcend, to varying degrees, the supposed 
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insider/outsider divide. In terms of my own research, for example, I modified the way I 
dressed and presented myself according to my perception of what would be most appropriate 
for any given occasion, I sought use local languages where possible, and I was aware of need 
to follow appropriate cultural practices of greeting. In this way, one is able, in some respects, 
to bridge the gap between being an 'outsider' and 'fitting-in', although the extent to which 
this bridging occurs in reality is inevitably dependent upon a range of other factors such as 
one's social, physical and/or cultural characteristics. Moreover, it is impossible to ignore the 
fact that how an individual may view him or herself will, in all likelihood, be different to how 
someone else sees them. This situation is indicative of the fluidity of 'identity', in which 
categories such as race, gender, class and age, are socially constructed, varying across time, 
space and place. 
As Skelton discusses, "cross-cultural researchers often record the ways in which their 
insider/outsider status helped them gather 'different' kinds and levels of information" (2009: 
np). Whilst it is true that having an insider status may grant the researcher certain 
opportunities (such as access to certain forms of information and 'knowledge'), being 
perceived as an outsider can, as suggested by the following extract, also have its rewards: 
"Whereas being perceived as an 'outsider' has often been thought of as undesirable 
in the research process, I have felt that, in fact, my position precisely as an 'outsider' 
has sometimes positively helped in the research process because it has allowed me, 
then, to appear as a 'neutral' or 'impartial' observer of events" (Herod 1999: 322). 
In terms of my own research, there were several moments when I sensed that my 'position' as 
an outsider (whether real or imaginary), enabled me to distance myself from issues and 
events that could have alienated me from those I was interviewing. For example, in 
Washington D.e. strong sentiment was expressed during the course of the interviews over the 
nature of US-Nicaraguan relations from both sides of the political spectrum. Within this 
context, I felt that my position as a British 'outsider' allowed me to retain a level of 
impartiality, through which I was able in some respects to become an observer of such 
discussions. Being able to do this became especially important in conducting the second 
phase of this research in Nicaragua, where I was undertaking interviews with individuals 
belonging to different political groupings. Bearing in mind the strong history of political 
volatility in the country, and the fact that I was carrying out this fieldwork in the run-up to the 
130 
Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
highly contested 2006 elections, maintaining an image of neutrality, whether at the national, 
departmental or local level, was vital. 
Whilst presenting oneself or being perceived as an 'outsider' can be beneficial in 
terms of enforcing an image of impartiality, it can also encourage a respondent to be more 
open and honest about certain issues. For example, as a visiting foreign academic I may have 
presented less of a 'threat' to respondents than if I had come from their own town, city, 
region or country. This could have resulted in a greater openness by respondents than may 
otherwise have been possible, thus aiding in the production of rich and varied data. In 
addition to this, a respondent may give far more detailed answers to questions in order to help 
fill a perceived culturallknowledge gap between themselves and the 'outsider'. In recognition 
of these potential benefits, it is not unforeseeable that a researcher might consciously 
accentuate their status as an 'outsider' in order to obtain these potential benefits. As discussed 
above, for example, I was happy to take a supplicant position during the interviews, as I felt 
that this would facilitate in the sharing of information. Furthermore, as England notes, "the 
appeal of supplication lies in its potential for dealing with asymmetrical and potentially 
exploitative power relations by shifting a lot of power over to the researched" (1994: 82). The 
following section develops this discussion on power further within the specific context of 
conducting research with elites and non-elites. 
5.6.2 Interviewing 'elites' and 'non-elites' 
The theme of interviewing 'elites,IS6 and 'non-elites' in research was applicable to 
both the fieldwork in Washington D.C. and in Nicaragua, having important implications for 
the power dynamics involved and thus the data produced. As stated by Cormode and Hughes, 
the "characteristics of those studied, the power relations between them and the researcher, 
and the politics of the research process differ considerably between elite and non-elite 
research" (1999: 299). In light of this fact, attention is now given to examining the 
differences between conducting research with elites and non-elites during this particular 
study, beginning with the key issue of accessibility. 
'56 Whilst Herod refers to foreign elites as "foreign nationals who hold positions of power within organisations", 
he also recognises that this is a problematic label, with notions of what constitutes 'foreign' being highly 
subjective (1999: 313). I would also suggest that perceptions of 'elitism' are also highly subjective, as they are 
largely dependent upon one's own perceived 'status'. 
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In conducting the fieldwork for this study, I found that it was relatively 
straightforward to make initial contact with some individuals that could be considered as 
'elites', due to their involvement within clearly identifiable structures. In Washington D.e., 
for example, many of those interviewed belonged to well-established organisations which had 
their own web sites, through which contact details for individuals could be readily obtained. 
In contrast, accessing 'non-elites' did present a greater challenge at times, as these formal 
channels of accessibility were not always visible. Such complexities were inevitably enforced 
by the challenges associated with conducting research in the South, where infrastructure, 
particularly in rural areas, can be lacking. Within this context, making contact and 
establishing relationships with individuals and groups (particularly social networks) with 
local knowledge and access was a crucial part of the research process. This was especially 
true in Nicaragua, where I found that engaging respondents was perhaps more dependent on 
who you know and developing informal relationships than in Washington D.e. 
At the start of my fieldwork in Nicaragua, I sought to identify organisations and 
individuals who I perceived would both offer a valuable insight into my research topic and 
also facilitate access to other respondents - especially those operating at the local level. This 
process, referred to previously in the chapter as 'snowballing', gave momentum to the 
research process and acted as a bridge between research at the national, regional and local 
level. In contrast to my experience in Washington D.e. where contacts were primarily made 
through 'formal' charmels of communication, I found that in Nicaragua I depended far more 
on establishing informal contacts and relationships with individuals in the 'field'. Whilst this 
felt like a very natural and fluid process, I was nevertheless aware of the potential dangers 
that relying too heavily on 'contacts' could have on the data produced. For example, 
respondents may well have directed me towards 'friends', political allies and/or those 
individuals and organisations seen as 'important', and this would have had an impact on the 
data this research produced. In order to try and mitigate against the possibility of this 
happening, I was constantly questioning and reflecting upon the snowballing process, and I 
sought to open up multiple avenues for selecting research respondents, thus spreading 
potential 'risk'. 
In addition to these issues of accessibility, one could also suggest that, due to their 
privileged position, elites may have greater resources at their disposal and, consequently, can 
often provide supplemental information and documents to support their ideas and statements. 
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This is not to say, however, that the knowledge provided by elites is any more valuable than 
that provided by non-elites, only that elites are perhaps better equipped to exercise their 
beliefs and opinions. During several of the interviews, for example, respondents produced 
supportive and informative material which was subsequently used in the production of the 
research findings. Whilst this process was incredibly useful, I was very much aware of the 
need to critically engage with ideas around 'knowledge' and 'power', in which the ability of 
individuals to be 'heard' is intimately bound up in a complex of social, cultural, political and 
economic relations. Questions such as 'whose voice is being heard' and 'is this information 
representative' provided a means of reflecting upon these epistemological issues, as well as 
upon my own position within the research. Indeed, such questions enforced an ethical and 
moral responsibility for ensuring that marginalised voices can be heard within the research. 
Thus, whilst secondary sources of information provided during the interviews were useful, 
the onus during the fieldwork was very much placed on producing data through engaged 
dialogue with respondents. 
5.6.3 The use of secondary sources 
Although interviews were the main approach adopted during this field work, 
secondary data was also collected and utilised and this was done in two main ways: through 
visiting libraries in Washington D.C. and in Managua, and through the accumulation of 
material obtained whilst conducting interviews. This data provided extremely useful 
background information on both the MCA and on related peripheral issues. In addition, it 
should be noted that much of the information collected has, due to the relative newness of the 
MCA, received little, if any, academic attention. For example, the detailed results of an 
important regional diagnostic on Nicaragua's MCA carried out by another international donor 
organisation within the country was made available to me following an interview, despite the 
fact that the information collected was still under analysis at the time. Other forms of onsite 
secondary information also proved invaluable with local documents proving extremely useful 
and insightful on a range of issues. In Leon, for example, I was given a document prepared by 
the 'Regional Council of the Women ofthe Occident' during an interview, which made a 
strong case for the inclusion of women in the MCA programme and highlighted the important 
role of women in Nicaragua's economy. During another encounter, I was provided with local 
development plans for the departments of Leon and Chinandega, and these greatly 
strengthened my understanding of the issues affecting the municipalities in the region. 
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Consequently, whilst semi-structured interviews did form the backbone of the fieldwork, the 
collection of secondary data was also important in informing the research process and 
findings of this study. 
5.6.4 Conducting research in Nicaragua and the issue of positionality 
Although issues relating to positionality were pertinent to the fieldwork undertaken in 
both Washington D.C. and Nicaragua, it was the latter location as the primary research site 
that is focussed on here. As Scheyvens et al discuss, "field work in the Third World can give 
rise to a plethora of ethical dilemmas, many of which relate to power gradients between the 
researcher and the researched" (2003: 139). A 'northern' researcher operating within such a 
context must, therefore, spend a significant amount of time reflecting on issues of 
positionality: 
"If you are embarking on research in the developing world it is particularly 
important to be aware of your privileged position in terms of wealth, education and so 
on, in relation to those you will be working with and to recognise that your research 
is embedded within the context of colonialism" (Valentine 2005: 114). 
The research conducted in Nicaragua for this study was more intimate than that experienced 
iu Washington D.C., and involved building relationships within the field of research. This 
had important implications in terms of positionality, and by acknowledging and integrating 
difference during the research process I was able to adopt approaches that I felt would be of 
greatest benefit to the research. For example, by working with an interpreter in Nicaragua, I 
believe that I was able to bridge some of the differences I perceived existing between myself 
and respondents, thus bringing a degree of 'sameness'. On the other hand there were 
moments, as highlighted above, in which-it was possible to play on 'difference' or even 
accentuate difference during interviews in order to elicit a more detailed and explanatory 
response from informants. Consequently, it is important to recognise that positionality is not 
always fixed, with aspects of our identity playing different roles, at different times and in 
different places. 
In undertaking my fieldwork in Nicaragua, I was conscious of my 'identity' as a 
relatively young, white, educated man, from a wealthy northern country, carrying out 
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interviews in a relatively impoverished and less developed post-colonial country. As 
discussed below, I was constantly reminded of my privileged position and recognised the 
potential power that being a white male in the country gave me over the research process. 
Before reflecting upon my experiences, however, it is important to acknowledge that, as 
Skelton comments in discussing her own research, "each interview was a negotiation, and 
complex facets of positionality and power (both mine and those of the person who might or 
might not be interviewed) came to play at different points" (2001: 93). Thus, whilst exploring 
aspects such as 'race' and 'gender' below, consideration is also given to the different role 
'identity' may have played at different times. Furthermore, although the characteristics of 
'race' and 'gender' are crudely separated from other aspects of identity (such as age, 
sexuality and nationality) to facilitate clarity within the following discussion, reference is also 
made to these other characteristics, which, far from constituting detached representations of 
who we are, are intimately bound up in the personalities that we embody. 
During my time in Nicaragua, not a day went by without someone calling me a 
'Gringo' or Chele (meaning white person) and as a result I came to recognise that being white 
in that country had significant meaning. Indeed, I would argue that my 'whiteness' came to 
dominate my identity in Nicaragua and this became even more pronounced as my research 
took me to remote rural areas in the country, where I was frequently the only white foreigner 
there. During my frequent visits to the country's capital, Managua, I was frequently surprised 
by the huge billboards I saw advertising all kinds of products, properties, health care services 
and so on, on which almost every single person shown had light-coloured skin, despite the 
fact that only 17% of the country's population is white. It was almost as if, in advertising 
these relatively luxurious products and lifestyles, being 'white' was something that people 
should aspire to. I therefore learnt at an early point in my fieldwork that being white would be 
an important factor during my time in Nicaragua and the following discussion reflects upon 
situations where I felt my whiteness had had an impact on the research process. 
It is clear that my identity as a 'white' male foreigner placed me in a privileged 
position and this may have presented greater opportunities for engagement with certain actors 
from Nicaraguan society than otherwise possible. For example, it is feasible that this may 
have facilitated greater personal rapport with some ofthe more educated elites (who are also 
predominantly 'white' males), many of whom constitute 'gatekeepers', i.e. those individuals 
with the 'power to grant or withhold access to people or situations for the purposes of 
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research' (Burgess 1984: 48). Along a similar vein, it is possible that the fact that a white 
foreigner had travelled to Nicaragua to listen to, among other things, the opinions and ideas 
of 'ordinary' individuals and groups in Nicaragua, may well have provided the motivation 
and impetus for greater engagement and openness in the research process. Herod expresses a 
similar sentiment in discussing his research in Eastern Europe: "I felt that interviewees would 
be more receptive to spending time with me ifthey felt that I had travelled such a long 
distance with the sole purpose of interviewing them ... i.e., that they were somehow 'special' 
people from whom an interested 'outsider' wished to learn" (1999: 323). Recognition of this 
possibility enforces an ethical and moral responsibility for ensuring that these marginalised 
voices are indeed heard within the research and greater consideration is given to this issue 
during the following sections on 'interpretation' and 'writing-up'. 
Whilst recognising the advantages I may have received as a privileged researcher in 
Nicaragua, it is not improbable in some of the more impoverished rural settings that being 
perceived as a 'white' outsider may have enforced the cultural barriers between myself and 
respondents. Within this context, the use of a Nicaraguan interpreter could have had a 
positive or negative affect on the situation. For example, it enabled me to communicate and 
share my thoughts with clarity in Spanish with the individual respondents, which may have 
helped breakdown certain cultural barriers. On the other hand, the use of an interpreter may 
have reinforced a perception of white superiority, in which I, as the 'boss', was employing a 
darker skinned Nicaraguan. In this respect it is important to recognise that just as my 
positionaIityas a white male researcher from the United Kingdom would have affected the 
nature of my engagement with respondents, so too would have the interpreter's presence. 
According to Skelton, the use of an interpreter ushers in an additional layer of cross-cultural 
relations, in which there are "at least three actors working across cultures and spaces: 
researcher, research participant, and interpreter/translator" (2009: np). This has implications 
for the power dynamics involved in the research process and results in what Smith terms 
'inbetween' forms of understanding (Smith 1996: 165)lS7. 
In addition to reflecting upon the issue of race, it is also important to consider the 
implications of gender on the research process. Within Nicaragua, as in many countries in the 
South, the balance of power between men and women is highly unequal. Nicaraguan society 
157 See Twyman et al (1999) who talk in detail about the use of interpreters during fieldwork and its implications 
for positionality. ' 
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tends to be dominated by men and this situation is illustrative of a culture of a 'machismo' 
present throughout many countries in Latin America, where the characteristics culturally 
associated with the 'masculine' tend to be valued above and beyond those associated with 
being 'feminine'. Not only would this have had implications for the power relations between 
myself and the researched, but it also had ethical implications in terms of ensuring that 
marginalised voices are heard. For example, one could hypothesise that, in light of women's 
subordinated position withi.n Nicaraguan society, certain groups of women may have been 
eager to take part in this study, as doing so would help make them heard within an 
environment that has traditionally been dominated by men. On the other hand, some of the 
women interviewed for this research used anti-male rhetoric during discussions and it was 
hard not to feel affected by this sense of hostility and almost culpable for the actions of my 
'fellow' man. Whilst I recognised that the use of such rhetoric was a reaction to the way 
many women have been, and continue to be, treated as subordinate to men in Nicaraguan 
society, I could not ignore the potential impact of my own position as a privileged male 
researcher on this process. Had I in some way invoked these feelings? And if so, what impact 
would this have had on the data produced? Reflecting on such questions forced me to 
continually re-evaluate and analyse the impact of my presence in the field. 
5.7 Interpreting Data 
According to Ramazanoglu and Holland, "language has powerful effects in producing 
meanings, so interpretation is like translation in constructing rather than just conveying 
meaning" (2001: 118). The researcher must decide what information/ideas to incorporate or 
exclude in producing 'knowledge'. In this respect, the process of interpretation must be 
understood as an exercise in power and, whilst recognising that I cannot fully present the 
voices of respondents, it is nonetheless important to reflect upon interpretation in this thesis. 
In particular, feminist geographers argue that "we should evaluate our research critically and 
attempt to interpret it in its full cultural, social, political, and economic context", thus 
allowing "multiple interpretations that come through the research to be acknowledged and 
presented" (Madge et al 1997: 106). This can be difficult however, as the process of 
interpretation and writing-up often occurs back 'home' and the return to 'normality' can 
create a sense of detachment from the field. Once again, reflexivity presents a mechanism 
with which to try and bridge the gap. 
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In detennining how best to interpret the research data, I decided that a useful starting 
point would be to upload all of the interview transcripts from the fieldwork in Washington 
D.C. and Nicaragua into qualitative data analysis software. This proved extremely useful in 
identifying and coding the research themes and sub-themes, which were focussed around the 
central topics of poverty reduction and democracy promotion. Text from the interview 
transcripts was thematically coded to facilitate analysis and management of the research data, 
and through this approach I could readily access interview material relating to specific topics, 
whilst keeping respondents' comments situated within the broader context of discussion. Part 
and parcel of this process therefore involved envisaging patterns, making sense of, and 
bringing order to, the vast wealth of data produced through my fieldwork. Whilst the 
framework of ideas behind this study and the questions asked during the interviews did 
provide a useful entry point with which to do this, decisions regarding the identification of 
themes were also shaped by what I had learnt through engagement with the respondents. As 
such, it could be argued that my research findings are a direct result of the interaction 
between interpretative capacity, the constraining framework of my beliefs, and the apparent 
newness of the data produced (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2001: 160). As Reay discusses in 
reflecting upon her own doctoral research, "there are many possible readings of interview 
transcripts [and] from where I am socially positioned certain aspects of the data are much 
more prominent that others" (1996: 70). In presenting the findings of this thesis, therefore, I 
cannot claim that the data' speaks for itself, as these research findings are a product of 
personal interpretation and of the connections that I have decided to draw. 
Whilst openly recognising that it is, as Mullings discusses, "the situatedness of my 
knowledge, and the knowledge that I derived from an extensive reading of the work of others, 
[that] shaped my interpretation and presentation of the research" (1999: 347), it is nonetheless 
important to reflect upon the specific process through which interview material was selected 
and de-selected in this study. As England comments, it is ultimately the researcher who 
decides which quotes and whose voice to include in the final text (1994: 86). Consequently, it 
is the author that has authority over the interpretation of data and the choice of quotations 
used to support their claims. In tenns of my own research, there were conscious decisions 
involved in the selection and de-selection of interview quotes including their perceived 
relevance to the research topic, identified similarities and differences between transcript data, 
the clarity of the produced text, the desire to produce interesting and insightful research 
findings, and the need to incorporate the views of a cross-section of respondents. With regard 
138 
Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
to the latter, I felt that it was professionally and ethically important to ensure that multiple 
voices would be heard through this research, albeit mediated through the process of 
interpretation. This approach resonates with the statement by Ramazanoglu and Holland that 
"making knowledge claims across differences means taking responsibility for interpreting the 
social existence of others (2001: lOS, 106). The process of writing-up is therefore especially 
important, as it is through this process that a space for hearing the voices of the respondents 
should be created (Madge et a11997: 107). 
5.8 Writing-up 
As Skelton highlights, "in our writing we need to examine how we write, what and 
who we represent and how [and] we must be constantly vigilant about stereotypes and 
assumptions that we as the writer may perpetuate and that our readers may interpret" (2001: 
95). In terms of my own research, for example, I felt that it was incredibly important in 
discussing Nicaragua's MCA and US-Nicaraguan relations more broadly, not to contribute to 
an image of the South as being powerless vis-it-vis the North. As discussed in the 
introduction to chapter 4 discussing the Central American region more broadly, people from 
the isthmus are not passive non-actors in a history imposed and defined from without, but are 
decisive agents of change. In writing about the MeA therefore, I wanted to bring to the 
surface and reveal the way in which actors and groups operating at a range of scales have 
been able to engage with and exercise power over the initiative and the processes involved. 
The use of certain 'labels' within the text was particularly important in this regard, as their 
use can construct misleading images and representations of the South. For example, 
following discussion with respondents in Nicaragua I was extremely wary about using the 
term 'poor' when referring to the country and its people, as this runs the danger of ignoring 
the process through which conditions of poverty have been created and can infer that 
somehow being 'poor' is the natural state of play. Instead, I frequently use the word 
'impoverished' within the written text as a substitute for 'poor', as this gives 
acknowledgement to the fact that there are processes through which poverty is produced and 
maintained in the South. This is incredibly important from the view of empowerment, as it 
shifts the emphasis away from dealing solely with the conditions associated with poverty, to 
considering the actual processes and relationships of power through which such conditions 
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have been created. Thus rather than focussing only on the symptoms of impoverishment, one 
can begin to address its causes. 
In writing-up this thesis, I was also conscious of the need to avoid some of the traps 
associated with a northern research talking about the South, in which there is a danger of 
misrepresenting the 'other'. The use of language is particularly important in this regard, as 
certain words can have connotations beyond their defined meaning. For example, I initially 
used the word 'native' in the text when referring to the use of the interpreter in Nicaragua 
which bearing in mind its formal definition as a person who was born in a particular place 
seemed appropriate. However, upon re-reading the text and following discussions with my 
supervisors it was agreed that the word 'native' should be removed as it conjures up powerful 
images of the colonial era, in which the tenn 'native' was often used in a derogatory way 
when referring to individuals who lived in a country prior to European colonisation. Bearing 
in mind my own position as a British researcher in the South, I felt that it was important to 
refrain from using this term, not only because of its implications for representing the 'other', 
but also because of a personal desire to distance myself from being seen as an 'academic 
tourist' conducting parachute research. As Richardson (1994) highlights, through the process 
of writing researchers are creating a particular view of the topics they discuss and also of 
themselves. 
According to Mansvelt and Berg, "the process of writing constructs what we know 
about our research but it also speaks powerfully about who we are and where we speak from" 
(2005: 256, 257). One way in which academics have sought to highlight the partial nature of 
their research has been to incorporate personal pronouns such as'!', 'my', 'our' and so on. 
By doing this, it is argued that the researcher will not appear as an invisible, anonymous 
voice of authority, but as a 'real, historical individual with concrete, specific desires and 
interests' (Harding 1987: 9, cited in Madge et a11997: 107). Whilst in writing-up this 
research I have incorporated pronouns in places that I felt were warranted, I considered it 
unnecessary to caveat every other sentence with the phrase 'I think' or 'in my opinion'. For 
me, adopting such an approach would have compromised the integrity and flow of the written 
text, and offered little more than a tokenistic attempt to incorporate 'self'. Instead, I have 
sought to openly recognise, acknowledge and make clear in this chapter the production of 
knowledge in this thesis, and emphasised the fact that the research findings are both partial 
and situated. As discussed above, knowledge is produced through the research process and 
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much of the 'knowledge' reported in this thesis is a result of the information shared by the 
research respondents. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed in detail the research conducted for this thesis in both 
Washington D.e. and Nicaragua, and reflected upon a number of important methodological 
issues. Greatest attention has been paid to the research process in Nicaragua and there are two 
main reasons for this. Firstly, Washington D.e. represented the preliminary phase of the 
investigation, with Nicaragua being the primary site of analysis. This is not to say, that the 
information collected in Washington D.e. was unimportant, far from it, but that this 
preliminary stage was essentially about setting the broader context for understanding 
Nicaragua's MeA. Secondly, Nicaragua represents an extremely complex and challenging 
environment in which to conduct research. Whilst there were problems and difficulties to be 
overcome, there were also many opportunities and this reality is reflected in the rich and 
varied data produced by the fieldwork, as presented in results chapters 8 and 9. Furthermore, 
this chapter utilised the process of reflexivity to thoroughly explore the processes of data 
production, data interpretation and writing-up, which operated as an incisive mechanism for 
assessing the role the 'personal' plays in research and the power relations at play. As revealed 
through the course of this chapter, the researcher is intimately bound up in the knowledge 
they produce and thus this thesis represents a particular and partial story of the MeA and US-
Nicaraguan relations. 
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Chapter 6: Contextualising Nicaragua's Millennium Challenge Account 
This chapter outlines the development of Nicaragua's Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA) and its components, whilst simultaneously locating the fund within the broader 
context of United States (US) - Nicaraguan relations, emphasising shifts in US priorities 
towards Nicaragua and the Central American region as a whole. This discussion, therefore, 
sets the foundation for the following two results chapters, which focus on exploring the two 
interrelated issues of 'poverty reduction' and 'democracy'. In doing this, these chapters 
engage with the core thesis objectives outlined in the previous chapter (see section 5.1). A 
summary of these findings and their contribution to addressing the underlyingresearch 
question stated in chapter 5 is provided in the concluding chapter. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section explores shifts in the 
quantity and composition of US development assistance, and other sources of funding, to 
Nicaragua. This discussion therefore represents an extension of chapter 4, which analysed the 
historical relationship between the US and Nicaragua. However, whilst chapter 4 was 
concerned with examining the multifaceted elements of this unique relationship across many 
decades, attention here is focussed on locating the MCA within the specific context of 
shifting US development priorities. In particular, consideration is given to examining the 
trends in US foreign assistance towards Nicaragua and, where applicable, the region as a 
whole, in the period leading up to the MCA's creation and following its inception. The 
second part of this chapter is primarily concerned with identifying the defining characteristics 
of Nicaragua's MCA and exploring how the programme has evolved. This detailed 
discussion is crucial in facilitating the more detailed analyses of its operations in chapters 7 
and 8. 
6.1 Upheaval within the US' foreign assistance structures 
Chapter 3 situated the creation ofthe Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
within the broader context of shifting trends in US foreign assistance, giving specific 
attention to the changing role of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), which has for a long time been primarily responsible for administering US 
assistance abroad. However, there have been growing concerns that USA ID is being 
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weakened with, for example, the creation of the MCC being seen as a symbol of growing 
discontentment over the agency's inability to address the fundamental causes of poverty. The 
announcement of a sweeping reform plan by Condoleezza Rice in 2006 to streamline foreign 
assistance (which included aligning USAID with the State Department), has also been met 
with some alarm, especially with respect to the potential politicisation of USA ID's activities 
(see Engler 2006). In the wake of such criticism, the US government has frequently 
emphasised USAID's importance as an autonomous development body, stating that it 
"remains an independent agency, and continues its role as the United States Government's 
premier international development institution" (State Department 2006b). However, concerns 
have been voiced over the potential fragmentation of US foreign assistance policies and 
activities, both at home and abroad (see Herrling and Radelet 2003). There has, therefore, 
been careful scrutiny by the development community of any subsequent shifts in funding 
away from USAID with the 'President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
headed by the US State Department, and the MCA, headed by the MCC, identified as 
possible substitutes to USAID's activities. As a result, it is not surprising that "how USAID 
would participate in the MCA initiative has been a continuing concern of Congress and 
various policy analysts" (Tamoff2008:19). 
Although it is useful to initially reflect upon these important issues here, the purpose 
of this first section is to place these issues discussed in chapter 3 within a specifically 
Nicaraguan context. Hence, attention is now turned towards exploring the extent to which 
these changes to the structures shaping and defining US foreign development policy may 
have affected the volume and nature of assistance to Nicaragua during the period 
immediately prior to, and after, the creation of the MCA. However, it is important to 
recognise that these important shifts within the US have not happened in some sort of 
development vacuum, sealed off from other areas of US foreign policy. Without a doubt, the 
new security agenda following the events of 9/11 has had a subordinating impact on many 
different areas of US domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, it is essential to bear in mind, in 
talking about such issues, that there are interwoven complexities that influence the discourses 
of development and although not discussed in detail again during this particular chapter, these 
should not be forgotten or ignored 158. 
158 For example, in the coming months it will be interesting to see how the deepening global economic crisis and 
recent election of Ba rack Obama will affect US international development practice. The following extract from 
an interview with Obama sheds further light on both these issues: "I think it is important for us to increase 
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6.2 Understanding the shifts in the composition of development aid 
This section develops and expands upon some of the general ideas presented 
previously in chapter 3 section 3.3, where the possibility of funds being diverted away from 
USAID as a result of the MCC's formation was first presented as a key concern surrounding 
the MCA. This theme is explored in greater detail now, with specific emphasis placed on 
Nicaragua's experience: a country in which the US was the largest bilateral donor for Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) between 2005 and 2006159• In analysing the shifts in both the 
volume and composition of foreign assistance to Nicaragua, this chapter helps to set the 
broader context for Nicaragua's MCA, which is essential if we are to truly understand the 
impact ofthe initiative on the country's development. Before doing this, however, it is 
important to clarify exactly what it is we are referring to when we talk about 'aid' and, 
furthermore, specify those aspects of foreign aid that are pertinent to the research at hand. 
6.2.1 Defining development aid 
Although there is a huge array of literature and news articles discussing 'development 
aid', there is not a universally accepted definition of what it is and this makes quantifying and 
qualifying aid flows especially problematic. As Brown et al comment, whilst some have 
opted to include the "full spectrum of aid to developing countries, including aid for 
humanitarian purposes", others have taken a narrower interpretation of what it means (2006: 
3). Government officials have a tendency of using the term 'development aid' in a very loose 
manner, which can create a distorted view of reality. For example, in 2005 President Bush 
stated that the US had "tripled overseas development aid to Africa" during his Presidency 
(2005b: np) and many within the development community took issue with this: 
"The Bush Administration has significantly increased aid to Africa, but that increase 
falls far short of what the President has claimed. U.S. aid to Africafrom FY 2000 (the 
last full budget year of the Clinton Administration) to FY2004 (the last completed 
foreign aid. Now I have to say that my plans were structured prior to this recent financial crisis. So we are going 
to have to see what is possible in next year's budget. I can make an assurance that we will not cut foreign aid, 
that we will increase it. We may not be able to increase it as quickly or by as much that I wanted to do when I 
p,ut my plans together last year" (2008: np). 
'9 According to statistics provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
the US was Nicaragua's 3rd largest donor for ODA between 2005 and 2006 (after the International 
Development Association and Inter-American Development Bank - OECD website). 
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fiscal year of the Bush Administration} has not "tripled" or even doubled. Rather, in 
real dollars, it has increased 56% (or 67% in nominal dollar terms). The majority of 
that increase consists of emergency food aid, rather than assistance for sustainable 
development of the sort Africa needs to achieve lasting poverty reduction" (Rice 
2005: I). 
It is, therefore, extremely important when discussing aid flows to be specific about just what 
the figures represent and what aspects of 'aid' are being referred to. Consequently, this 
chapter clearly states what facts and figures are being discussed in analysing shifting patterns 
of aid to Nicaragua, and Latin America more generally, as well as justifying their use within 
the specific context of this study. 
6.2.2 Trends and shifts in US development assistance 
In 2005 the US boasted by far the highest annual expenditure ever provided by a 
donor country, in terms of net ODA amount, a reality reflected in figure 6.1 below. 
Figure 6.1: Net ODA in 2005 
use billion 
30r--------------------------------------------------------27.62 
106.78 
25 
20 
15 13.15 
1C.n lO,OB10.03 
10 
e.11 5.09 
3.70 3." 3.02 :2 7~ 
. 2.11 '-'16 1.77 1.08 1 57 
. O.Q-J 0.72 0.38 0.38 0.27 0.20 
Source: OECD (2005) 
146 
Chapter 6: Contextualising Nicaragua's Millennium Challenge Account 
That being said, however, there are some important points to bear in mind. Firstly, as a 
percentage of 'Gross National Income' (GNI) the US was, in reality, one of the smallest 
donor countries in terms of ODA (see figure 6.2). 
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In addition, although the US' 2005 ODA annual expenditure ofUS$27.6 billion was the 
highest amount ever provided by a single donor country, this figure on its own is potentially 
misleading and requires further qualification. First and foremost, it should be recognised that 
(out of the US$27.6 billion) a massive US$lO billion was directed to Iraq, with both 
Afghanistan and Iraq receiving a massive 48% of total US ODA in 2004/2005 (OEeD 2006: 
26)160. At the same time, however, the percentage of official assistance to the Americas 
plummeted between 2001 and 2005, falling from 26% in 2001 to 7% in 2005 (ibid)161. In 
light of this situation, it is increasingly important to analyse the types of US development aid 
being channelled towards the region and how they relate to one another, and also to 
investigate exactly what impact these specific flows are having on the development of Latin 
American countries. Within this context, exploring and analysing the impact of the MeA in 
Nicaragua is especially important. 
160 Once again, this reality demonstrates the dominance of the US security agenda post 9/11 within US foreign 
policy. 
161 These statistics reinforce Moises Nairn's statement, highlighted in the introduction to chapter 4, that Latin 
America once thought to be the 'backyard' of the US is now more like AtIantis - the lost continent (2004: np). 
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It should also be noted that since 2001 the US has been channelling a smaller 
proportion of its ODA through multilateral agencies. This constituted only 17% of total US 
ODA in 2004 (compared to the 'Development Assistant Committee [DAC)I62 - average of 
28%) and this figure fell even further in 2005 to 8% (OECD 2006: 12). Once again, one 
could suggest that the reasons for this shift away from multilateral spending is, to a large 
degree, rooted in the War on Terror, in which bilateral aid has certain advantages over 
multilateral aid in pursuing key US security interests. For example, the US can use bilateral 
aid as a financial incentive to encourage sometimes reluctant regimes to cooperate (as 
witnessed with regard to PakistanI63). Furthermore, it could be argued that, whereas 
multilateral aid can appear to be fairly anonymous and therefore 'neutral', direct bilateral aid 
can actually help improve the US' image in countries where there may be mixed or negative 
views of the US and its actions. Moreover, in the age of growing US budgetary pressures, 
bilateral aid has the advantage of being easier to justify as directly serving "specific national 
interests" (Minch 2005). Whatever the precise reasons for this change, it is crucial, in the 
wake of this shift to greater bilateral assistance, that we take a closer look at the machinery 
through which US funds are now being channelled. 
6.2.3 Trends and shifts in the management of US ODA 
This section takes a closer look at the changes in the use of bilateral aid, focussing 
specifically on the institutions through which it is channelled. In particular, I am interested, in 
light of some key areas of concern regarding the relationship and coordination between the 
MCC and the USAID, in exploring the changing role of USA ID in the delivery of US foreign 
aid. Although the official stance continues to be that USAID remains the primary body 
responsible for carrying out international developmentl64, one cannot ignore the fact that the 
162 The DAC acts as a forum for major bilateral donors and acts as the principal body through which the OECD 
study issues related to cooperation within international development. Its members include: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Derunark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and 
the European Commission (see the OECD website). 
163 Following the events of9/11, Pakistan's place on the world stage shifted considerably as it became a key ally 
for the US in its fight against 'terror' and, more specifically, against the Taleban. However, in the wake of the 
highly contested, and controversial, national elections held in February 2008, Pakistan's future role in the War 
on Terror is anything but clear. As such, one could question the sustainability of utilising direct US bilateral aid 
in this manner. 
164 See the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) fact sheet available on the State Department website 
(http://www.state.gov/flreleases/factsheets2006/67947.htm). 
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agency's share of the ODA pie has fallen considerably over recent years. Table 6.1 below 
illustrates this reality. 
Table 6.1: Management of OD A by institution (%) 
Institutions 1998 2002 2005 
USAID 64.3 50.2 38.8 
Department of State 12.9 18.6 13.4 
Department of Defence 3.5 5.6 21.7 
Department of Treasury 12.6 10.7 4.3 
Department of Agriculture 2.3 5.8 13.9 
Department of HeaIth and Human 3.7 Services .. .. 
Other 4.4 8.9 3.2 
Peace Corps .. .. 1.1 
Source: OECD (2006) 
As demonstrated by table 6.1, the proportion of ODA channelled through USAID has 
decreased significantly, from 64.3% of US ODA in 1998 to 38.8% in 2005. This decline 
coincided with a substantial and rapid increase in the volume of assistance administered by 
the Department of Defence, which grew to 21.7% of the US' ODA in 2005. As one might 
expect, the War on Terror appears to have catalysed this shift, with a large proportion of 
foreign assistance being allocated to US security priorities. Indeed, not only was this reflected 
in USAID's declining role in the management of OD A, but it was also evident in the 
geographical allocation of agency funds. More specifically, whilst the actual volume of 
assistance being managed USAID did increase from roughly US$9.8 billion in 2002 to about 
US$10.6 billion in 2005, this growth was largely due to the agency's expanded role in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. In fact, if we exclude these two countries from both the 2002 and 2005 
figures, it becomes apparent that USAID's assistance to the rest of the world did actually fall 
by close to US$1.2 billion between these two dates165• In the wake of such reductions, the 
importance of examining 'global' initiatives such as the MCA becomes even more apparent. 
Indeed, its creation raises important questions over the future role of USA ID in development 
and, more generally, how US foreign aid may be administered in the future. The following 
sections, therefore, look at the relationship between USAID and the MCA in further detail, 
165 These data is taken from USAID's 'Greenbook' available via the USAID website and all figures are in 
constant 2006 $US. 
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drawing upon other sources of data to provide a much more in-depth account of what has 
been happening. In doing this, a particular emphasis is placed on Nicaragua's experience and 
how USAID's assistance to the country has changed over recent years. 
6.3 USAID and the MCC: Exploring the relationship in Nicaragua 
In starting this analysis, it is interesting to note that whereas USAID is the primary US 
body charged with fighting poverty and promoting economic growth overseas (see Moss et al 
2005: 4), the MCC's stated mission is to "reduce poverty through the promotion of 
sustainable economic growth" (MCC website a). In a very real sense, therefore, they are 
pursuing the same broad objective, although clearly through very different approaches. In 
order to explore the relationship between these two development bodies, this chapter now 
focuses on those USAID programmes that can be seen as contributing most directly to the 
MCA's fundamental objectives of 'economic growth' and 'poverty reduction'. From now on, 
this chapter will refer to these USAID programmes as constituting 'core development aid' 
and this includes: Child Survival and Health (CS H), Development Assistance (DA) and the 
Economic Support Fund (ESF)166. As table 6.2 below demonstrates, there have been 
significant reductions in all of USA ID's programme areas between 2002 (when President 
Bush first announced his intention to dramatically increase US development assistance-
primarily through the MCA167) and 2007. 
Table 6.2: USAID-Nicaragua budget by account (in thousands ofUS$) 
Programme Percentage Percentage 
Budget (acconnt 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Change Change 
allocation) 2002-2007 2004-2007 
Child Survival and 8470 9830 7805 7703 7699 6661 -21% -14.7% 
Health Programmes 
Fund (CSH) 
Development 16602 23460 26856 26058 20843 12996 -22% -52% 
Assistance (DA) 
Economic Support 2800 0 0 4467 3366 3000 7% nla Fund (ESF) 
Total 27872 33290 . 34661 38228 31908 22657 -19% -35% 
Source: Adapted using data available on the USAID website (www.usaid.gov) 
166 It does not therefore include USAlD's PL 480 Title 2 (or public law 480) which constitutes 'food aid'. 
167 Please refer back to chapter 3 section 3.6 for further detail. 
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The most significant decrease has been in DA account, especially between 2004 and 2007 
when it fell by about 52%, which coincides with the signing of Nicaragua's MCA compact in 
mid-2005 and it is this relationship that is focussed on here. 
Interestingly, Nicaragua's MCA is primarily focussed on sectors that have 
traditionally been fimded through two out of the four programmes located within USAID's 
DA account: the 'Agriculture and the Environment' programme and the 'Economic Growth' 
programme, and these are the areas that have seen the greatest reductions, as illustrated in 
table 6.3 below. 
Table 6.3: USAID-Nicaraglia budget by sector (in thousands ofUS$) 
Programme Budget by Sector and 2004 200S 2006 2007 Percentage 
Account Change 
2004-2007 
Basic Education DA 5295 6754 5940 4734 -11% 
Agriculture and Environment DA 9359 6654 5301 2530 -73% 
Economic Growth DA 5809 7420 2454 1500 -74% 
Democracy and Governance DA 6393 5230 7148 4232 -39% 
ESF 0 4467 3366 3000 nla 
Family Planning! Reproductive 3870 3534 3499 2661 .-31% health CSH 
HIV/AIDS CSH 500 496 990 1000 100% 
Child Survival and Maternal 3000 3242 3210 3000 0% Health CSH 
Other Infectious Diseases CSH 435 431 0 0 N/A 
PL 480 Title IT 7046 9710 11726 12500 77% 
Total (including PL 480) 41707 47938 43634 35157 -16% 
Total (core development aid) 34661 38228 31908 22657 -35% 
Source: Adapted using data available on the USAID website 
This relationship suggests that, in the case of Nicaragua, USAID funds are potentially being 
moved away from those areas where the MCA is focussed. In the compact agreement signed 
between the US and Nicaragua, it clearly sets out how the MCAwill 'coordinate' its efforts 
with USAID's rural office and identifies the objectives of the MCC and USAID's 
agribusiness development activities as being similar. In light of this situation and the 73 % 
drop in USAID's 'Agriculture and Environment' account (not to mention the 74% decrease 
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in its 'Economic Growth' accolint) between 2004 and 2007, it is necessary to extend this 
analysis further by looking at the broader context within which these reductions have taken 
place. 
6.4 The broader context 
President Bush himself stated in 2002 in a speech promoting the US' commitment to 
international development, that the new funds, channelled through the MCA, would go 
"above and beyond existing aid requests" (Bush 2002a). However, there are some clear 
questions surrounding the extent to which this has been the case. An interview held in 
October 2005 with the then MCC director for Latin America sheds further light on this issue: 
"Well philosophically our argument has been that MCAfunding should be a reward 
to a country, which means there should be no reduction in other US fonding. Now the 
reality of that is hard to know. Congress has used language that has said reduce 
funding where there is MCAfunding, which we think would be a very negative thing. 
And we are arguing against that. But the reality is ... our friends up in Congress are 
sitting down trying to figure out how they are going to absorb cuts in this year's 
budget for the US government, when there is a mandate to cut $50 billion out of the 
budget. And so that is going on right now and we don't know how that is going to 
come out. I do know that the White House has told the committee that is working on 
this that their top priority for foreign assistance is the MCA. So that is the White 
House instruction to the committee" (research interview with Jim Vermillion168). 
From this perspective, therefore, it is clear that the merits of having the MCC as additional 
funding, especially in light of the fact that the MCA operates on a 'reward' approach, are 
evidently recognised. At the same time, however, one cannot ignore the broader context 
within which the relationship between the MCC and USAID is being played out. As 
demonstrated above in discussing the allocation of US ODA, the War on Terror has had a 
subordinating impact on other areas of US foreign policy - not just in terms of the resources 
assigned to specific programmes but also in how these programmes are executed spatially (as 
witnessed by the increased marginalisation of Latin American issues). Moreover, as 
168 Jim Vermillion, Managing Director for Latin America in the MCC - Interview held in Washington D.C. on 
5th October 2005. 
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discussed in chapter 3, the MCC, which was established to administer the 'innovative' flag-
ship development programme, has itself been subject to substantial budget cuts, receiving 
much less funding than requested, with the potential to undermine its effectiveness as a 
development entity. 
At the same time as appreciating the impact of the War on Terror on US foreign 
assistance spending, one cannot ignore the fact that the creation of the MCC was, in part, 
symbolic of disenchantment within the US over the effectiveness of past efforts at combating 
poverty and promoting economic growth. In this context, the 'innovations' of the MCA were, 
to a large extent, established to answer the "longstanding criticisms within the development 
community of assistance effectiveness" - assistance which has for a long time been headed 
by USAID (Clark 2005: 32). This situation is reflected in the following interview extract: 
"Since World War 2, the United States has spent probably about $250 billion in 
economic assistance and we have had six countries graduate from that assistance. 
This programme (the MCA) will be a success ifin the next decade, for $10 billion, we 
come up with jive new graduates as a result of this economic assistance. I mean those 
are my numbers and my views; I am a political appointee so I am giving you the 
political take on it" (research interview with Jim Vermillion). 
As a result, the extent to which the shifts in the DA account of USA ID in Nicaragua can be 
attributed directly to the impacts of the War on Terror on levels of development assistance or, 
more generally, to this discontentment over the ineffectiveness of past efforts, is difficult to 
gauge. Nevertheless, whilst the precise reasons for this situation are not entirely clear, it is 
evident that USAID has been experiencing budget reductions in Nicaragua and this reality 
readily acknowledged by staff operating within the country itself: 
" ... we have had budget reductions. That is true. But that has been across Latin 
America. You know it wasn't like Nicaragua was necessarily singled out. And the 
reasons for that are varied and multiple, and this {the MCA} could be one of those 
reasons. But we are dejinitely not seeing anything that would suggest we are getting 
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this much less because the MCC is getting this much more" (research interview with 
Steve OliveI69). 
Although, I would agree with the above comment that one cannot, in light of the hugely 
complex policy environment within which the US international development aid is being 
conducted, state categorically that an increase in 'a' has led to a decrease in 'b', the available 
data suggests that there is a relationship between the two and this is not, as discussed below, 
restricted to Nicaragua alone. 
6.4.1 Establishing broader funding trends: MeA recipient countries 
In a study undertaken by Brown et al in 2006 it was discovered that whereas the funds 
allocated through the DA account of USA ID to non-MeA countries l70 had remained more or 
less the same between 2002 and 2006, MeA recipient countries had witnessed a marked 
decrease in this period (most visibly between 2004, one year before the first MeA compact 
was signed, and 2006, when their study was conducted). If we take this analysis forward to 
present day levels we can see this trend continuing, as illustrated in table 6.4 below, which 
shows the existing MeA compacts and the associated change in USAID DA between 2004 
and 2007. 
Table 6.4: MeA funding and USAID's DA account 
Total Average Percentage 
Compact Number compact change in Compact focus by Country Date signed (US$ of years money per USAIDDA sector year (US$ 
millions) 
millions) 2004-2007 
Rural road 
rehabilitation, 
irrigation/agricultural 
Annenia 27/03/2006 236 5 47.2 ufa projects, teclullcal 
assistaoce and credit 
support for 
agribusiness. 
169 Steve Olive, USAlD-Nicaragua Office Head for Trade and Agriculture - Interview held in Managua on 11th 
Arri12006. 
17 The six largest recipients of US aid including; Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Pakistao, were not 
included in the figures because, according to the authors, they "represent outliers in terms of their massive aid 
levels" and, therefore, including them would have "skewed the data for average funding going to developing 
countries" (Brown et al 2006: 5). 
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Land legalisation 
project, financial 
services, judicial 
Benin 22/02/2006 307 5 61.4 -95% improvements, 
market access 
involving port 
rehabilitation. 
Watershed 
management and 
agricultural support 
Cape Verde 04/07/2005 110 5 22 nla project, infrastructure 
project, private 
sector development 
project. 
Human development 
project 
( educationltraining 
and community 
El Salvador 29/1112006 461 5 92.2 -72% development), 
development 
assistance proj eet, 
transportation 
project. 
Regional 
infrastructure 
Georgia 12/09/2005 295 5 59 nla rehabilitation, 
enterprise 
development project. 
Agriculture support, 
Ghana 0110812006 547 5 109.4 -17% transportation infrastnucture,rural 
development project. 
Rural development 
Honduras 13/0612005 215 5 43 -42% project, 
transportation 
project. 
Water sector project, 
Lesotho 23/0712007 363 5 72.6 nla health sector project, private sector 
development project. 
Land titling project, 
Madagascar 18/0412005 110 4 27.5 -22% banking project, 
enterprise project. 
Irrigation project, 
infrastructure project 
Mali 13/1112006 461 5 92.2 -33% (airport), agricultural 
processing project, 
support project. 
Rail project, property 
rights project, 
Mongolia 22/10/2007 285 5 57 nla vocational education 
project, health 
project. 
Agribusiness 
projects, tourism 
Morocco 31107/2007 698 5 139.6 0% project, financial 
services project, 
enterprise support 
project. 
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Water and sanitation 
project, 
Mozambique 13/07/2007 507 5 101.4 -45% transportation project, land tenure 
project, agricultural 
productivity project. 
Land legalisation 
project, road 
Nicaragua 14/0712005 175 5 35 -52% infrastructure 
project, agribusiness 
project. 
Transport sector 
Tanzania 15102/2008 698 5 139.6 +23% project, energy 
sector project, water 
sector project. 
Infrastructure 
Vanuatu 02/03/2006 66 5 13.2 nla project, public works 
project. 
Source: Adapted using data from the MCC and USAID (updated April 2008) 
The sixteen MeAs shown in table 6.4 have primarily focussed upon private sector 
development (especially in agricultural areas). In eight out of the ten countries where USAID 
is both present and administers DA, there have been substantial decreases in the funds 
allocated through this account and this is consistent with the focus of the MeA. For example, 
if we look in more detail at Nicaragua's experience, we can see that the country's MCA, 
which is focussed on spurring economic growth through a large scale transport infrastructure 
project, a land legalisation project and an agribusiness project, has coincided with reductions 
of more than 70% in USAID's 'Agriculture and Environment' and 'Economic Growth' 
programmes. A similar trend has occurred in Honduras, which has seen funds to these two 
USAID DA components fall by 70-75% between 2004 and 2007, or over US$8 million in 
real terms (USAID website). Much like Nicaragua's MCA, Honduras' programme is 
focussed on increasing agricultural productivity and promoting economic growth through a 
large scale transportation project. In El Salvador, the decline in USAID funding to these 
programmes has been even more pronounced, falling by about 71 % in the' Agriculture and 
Environment' component and a massive 88% in 'Economic Growth' component. One can, 
therefore, suggest that in these countries there is a correlation between USAID sector cuts 
and the focus of the MeA project components. 
Although I am not going to explore the relationship between aspects of USA ID 
funding and the MeA in each of the compact-countries here, it is clear from table 6.4 above 
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that similar trends to those highlighted in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador, can be seen 
in many of the other countries. The reasons for these cuts in USAID funding in MCA-
recipient countries could be many, ranging from budgetary constraints coinciding with the 
War on Terror, to the potential phasing out of certain USAID activities. Moreover, reductions 
in the 'Agriculture and Environment' and 'Economic Growth' components of USA ID's DA 
account (which correspond closely to the focus of the majority ofthe MCAs) have been most 
pronounced in the three Central American countries (Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador) 
where, since 2004, there have been reductions totalling well over US$35 million (in 
percentage terms this constitutes an average loss of about 75%). This is a much greater 
reduction than that witnessed in the African MCA-recipient countries, both as a percentage 
change and in terms of the actual money involved. This regional difference may well reflect 
Latin America's general demotion within US foreign policy, especially following the events 
of9111. In fact, if we extend this regional analysis and look at Guatemala, a non-MCA 
recipient country, we can see that USAID's DA to Guatemala fell by almost 40% between 
2004 and 2007, with the greatest loss in the' Agriculture and Environment' account. This 
suggests that decreases in US assistance to the Central American region through this account 
cannot be attributed solely to the MCA 171, but rather are also related to a number of other 
issues such as Latin American marginalisation in US foreign policy and USAID's shrinking 
role in the delivery of OD A (as illustrated above in table 6.1). 
Whatever the precise reasons for the situation outlined above, it is clear that whilst the 
MCA does represent a significant injection of money into these Central American countries, 
this has been accompanied by a critical reduction in USAID's role, especially in the area of 
Development Assistance. This association is extremely important in Nicaragua, where the 
country's MCA is not actually a national programme but a regional one, focussed in the 
north-west of the country. As a result, although the US$175 million injection of money 
through the MCA is considerable, the funds are orientated towards developing a specific 
region of Nicaragua, which essentially only includes two out of the seventeen departments 
within the country. So, whilst USAID has traditionally operated at a national level within 
Nicaragua, Nicaragua's MCA is far more focussed. Therefore, reductions in USAID's core 
171 That being said, it is important to highlight that the countries of Central America are very often seen within a 
'regional' context, i.e. as part of a group (indeed, DR-CAFTA is a testament to this fact). Consequently, one 
could hypothesise that, in light of the concentration of MCA programmes in Central America, the assistance 
granted to Guatemala, the only other Central American country to receive USAID funding through the DA 
account (the USAID mission in Costa Rica closed in 1996 after the country 'graduated' from most forms of US 
assistance), fell as a result of its shared regional identity, i.e. it was a regional budget cutback. 
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funding, especially in the area of Development Assistance, will have broader ramifications in 
terms of US development efforts in the country as a whole. 
6.S The MCA process in Nicaragua 
The first part of this chapter helped locate Nicaragua's MCA within the context of 
shifting patterns in core US development assistance, with much attention given to the role of 
USAID. Attention now turns to looking in detail at Nicaragua's MCA, beginning with a brief 
overview ofthe country's programme. Following this introduction, the chapter explores the 
reasons behind the decision to focus the MCA in the northwest ofthe country in the 
departments of Leon and Chinandega. Then the chapter identifies the initiative's central 
components, providing a factual overview of each one and touching upon some ofthe issues 
raised during the course of the research. It concludes with a discussion of the structures 
through which the MCA is being administered in Nicaragua and a brief analysis of the 
execution of MC A funds to date. Before beginning, however, it should be iterated here that 
this chapter is essentially about providing the foundation for the following two chapters, 
which build upon the discussion presented here and give a much more critical and analytical 
perspective on Nicaragua's MCA. Therefore, this section should be seen as a sort of 
informative guide, providing background knowledge on the country's programme and 
facilitating later in-depth discussion. 
6.6 An overview: Nicaragua's MCA 
On July 14th 2005, then President Enrique Bolaiios signed a five year MCA agreement 
with the MCC, amounting to US$175 million to be distributed over a five year period 
(although it wasn't until the 26th of May 2006 that the compact actually came into force). 
Prior to the signing of the compact, a proposal was put forward by the Nicaraguan 
government to the MCC and this outlined a "strategy to achieve economic growth and 
poverty reduction by building the productive capacity of the departments of Leon and 
Chinandega ... " (MCC 2005b: 1). This followed a process of 'consultation' in which 
Nicaragua identified what it saw as the greatest barriers to growth in the country. These 
barriers included: insecurity in property rights, a lack of infrastructure, high energy costs due 
to an excessive dependency on oil, low levels of value added to products, a high vulnerability 
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to natural disasters and problems associated with the country's judicial system. The proposal 
put fOlward by the Nicaraguan government outlined these issues and argued that, with the 
exception of the last one, all of the problems identified could be mitigated against or solved 
through the sensible application ofMCC funds 172• However, as seen in the final agreement 
signed between Nicaragua and the US, Nicaragua's MCA programme is focus sed on 
addressing just three of these identified barriers to development and these themes constitute 
the initiative's core objectives: 
~ Objective I: Increase investment through the strengthening of property rights 
through the 'Property Regularisation Project'. 
~ Objective 2: Reduce transportation costs between Leon-Chinandega and domestic, 
regional and global markets through the 'Transportation Project'. 
~ Objective 3: Increase the value-added of farms and businesses in Leon-
Chinandega through the 'Rural Business Development Project'. 
Source: MCC-Nicaragua Compact (2005) 
Although, there was a wide consensus between the government and actors within the region 
over the inclusion of these three components, there was one issue that, although included in 
the initial proposal, was not incorporated in the final programme. This was an energy project, 
which according to Emesto Medina was something that "Leon and Chinandega really 
wanted, but the government didn't" (research interview with Emesto Medina173). The reason 
behind the decision not to include this component was discussed in a later conversation with 
a leading figure in Nicaragua's MCA programme, who told me the following: 
"They {those from the region] had pushed another project which was the electricity 
project - to invest in renewable energy project. But after due diligence with the MCC 
172 For further information see Nicaragua's 2004 proposal to the Millennium Challenge Corporation (available at 
http://www.cuentadelmilenio.org.ni). 
173 Ernesto Medina, Ex-Rector of the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN) - Interview held 
in the city of Le6n on 50h July 2006. 
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it was decided that it was notfeasible ... but we had put it on based upon the insistence 
of the development councils" (research interview with Julio Montealegre174). 
This response does raise some important questions over the decision-making process in the 
MCA and necessitates a deeper examination of the individuals and structures involved. 
Consequently, section 6.9 of this chapter briefly outlines how the initiative is being managed 
in Nicaragua. Before doing this, however, the chapter turns its attention to understanding the 
geography of Nicaragua's MCA, discussing the reasons behind the decision to focus the 
funds in the occident175 of the country. 
6.7 Nicaragua's MeA: A regional focus 
As already stated in this chapter, Nicaragua's MCA is not a national programme, but 
is instead focussed in two departments to the northwest ofthe country. The reasoning behind 
this decision is reflected in the general logic of Nicaragua's original proposal to the MCC, 
which was founded upon the following five principles: 
I. Rapid implementation 
2. Direct impact on the major problems that affect development in Nicaragua 
3. Mutual participation of the public and private sectors 
4. Start a tenable process with lasting effects on economic and commercial growth 
5. Generate a fundamental change in the country 
Source: Nicaragua's MCA proposal (2004) 
Furthermore, it is argued in the document that in order to successfully implement a 
programme based on these five principles, it must be applied to a specific geographical area. 
This will subsequently generate sustainable economic growth within a particular region, the 
benefits of which can, in theory, be replicated in other parts of Nicaragua. Moreover, the 
proposal draws upon examples from all over the world, such as the Guangdong province in 
174 Julio Montealegre, Programme Co-ordinator for the MCA-Nicaragua/Civil Sociely Director for Chinandega 
in MCA-Nicaragua - Interview held in Managua on 30'" March 2006. 
I7S From this point forth, 'occident' will be used to refer to the area in the northwest of Nicaragua where the 
MCA is being implemented. 
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China and the southeast of Brazil, to strengthen its case for this selective geographical focus. 
The use ofthese examples as symbols of success is extremely interesting, and also worrying, 
bearing in mind Nicaragua's position as one of the most unequal countries in the western 
hemisphere when it comes to the distribution of wealth (an issue already discussed in chapter 
4). Indeed, concerns have surfaced in recent years over the growing disparities in economic 
growth and income levels in the Guangdong province, especially between the rural and urban 
areas where this divide is most visible176• If anything, the situation in Brazil is even worse, 
with the country having one of the world's most unequal distributions of income (Skidmore 
2004). The very fact that Nicaragua's MCA is attempting to imitate this sort of selective 
development model, however broadly, is a point of concern. Additionally, Nicaragua's 
geography as a relatively small country, in comparison to the economic giants of Brazil and 
China, cannot be ignored, as it raises question marks over the degree to which this regional 
approach to development177 is replicable in a country such as Nicaragua. 
Finally, one could argue that Nicaragua's decision to draw upon the experiences of 
countries such as China and Brazil in developing its model of growth, is rooted in the MCC's 
agenda for achieving 'transformational' results in recipient countries. This suggestion is 
illustrated by the following interview extract: 
" ... we saw that Nicaragua had great potential all over the country, but at the same 
time, we recognised that if you were to spread that money over the entire country the 
impact would be diluted and it wouldn't demonstrate a transformative impact. So the 
decision was tofocus it in a specific region ... because there are examples of other 
countries such as the United States where you have Silicon Valley, and you have the 
provinces in China, where they focus on one region ... So there were these examples of 
where focussing on a region has had a transformative impact" (research interview 
with Julio Montealegre in 2006). 
176 "The governor of China's richest province, Guangdong, has become increasingly alarmed about growing 
regional disparities in economic growth and the growing gap between income levels in urban and rural areas ... 
In the work report he delivered on Monday to the opening session of the Guangdong People's Congress, 
Governor Lu Ruihua listed uneven development and low rural incomes as among the major problems that 
Guangdong now faces" (China News Digest 2002). 
177 It should be noted that this type of 'regional' thinking does have some validity; at least in theory. For 
example, 'growth pole theory', which first emerged in the 1960's, represents an approach to development in 
which investments are focussed in a limited number of locations, in order to encourage economic activity and 
help address welfare issues. These growth pole strategies were, however, largely unsuccessful in practice (see 
Parr 1999 for further detail). 
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During an interview with the MCC in Washington D.C. it was clarified that the MCA is about 
the transformation of countries not states, and that the programme would have a nationwide 
impact. It is, therefore, expected by many involved in Nicaragua's MCA that, as already 
alluded to above, the initiative's benefits will not only be felt within the region where it is 
focussed, but throughout the country as a whole. Hence, the recipient area will, in theory, 
become an economic hub for the national economy. However, adopting an approach such as 
this is not without dangers, as discussed in the following chapter exploring the issue of 
poverty reduction within Nicaragua. 
6.7.1 The departments of Le6n and Chinandega 
According to individuals I spoke with in Nicaragua, there was at a broad level a 
process of national consultation during which time the different territories across the country 
put forward proposals to the Nicaraguan government. Following a review of these proposals, 
the government identified the region of Leon and Chinandega as fulfilling the requirements 
for 'rapid economic take-off 178 and it was at this point that a new process of consultation 
began at the departmental level. Several reasons were suggested to me during the course of 
this investigation as to why this specific area of Nicaragua was chosen to take part in the 
MCA and these are discussed below. 
6.7.2 Regional history and economic potential 
History was a key factor in determining Leon and Chinimdega's selection for these 
MCA funds. Between 1958 and 1978 this area of Nicaragua experienced rapid economic 
growth and operated as a motor for the national economy, achieving much success in the 
production of cotton. However, a combination of factors following this boom period resulted 
in the collapse of the region'S economy and the region's freefall into inactivity. The 
following interview extract sheds further light on the situation: 
178 According to the proposal put forward by Nicaragua to the MCC, there are several attributes that a region 
must have in order to achieve the same sort of rapid economic take-off experienced in other places in the world. 
These include; a minimal level of transport and communication infrastructure, high levels of human capital with 
competitive salaries, fertile land and abundant natural resources, and the potential for growth (Nicaragua's MCA 
Proposal 2004). 
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"There was a time when cotton production would make you rich, but because of this 
the region became a mono-cultivated area. We were only producing cotton because 
the price ofit was good. However, the government of Nicaragua made some bad 
negotiations and also the international price of the cotion dropped. Added to this 
situation was a political problem. As such, these combined factors led to the 
emigration of capital and people ... human and economic capital. The machines for 
producing cotton were sold ... sold for 4 cents anywhere. They sent the tractors to 
Cuba ... basically there was the destruction of the whole productive system in 
Nicaragua and this had a huge impact on Leon and Chinandega ... especially in Leon 
because that is where the spinning machines were. We had the industry, and then 
there was nothing, and the spinning machines were set onjire and the rest sold. They 
disassembled all the crop dusters ... we had a lot of agricultural machinery, which 
was of the same quality level as the best producers from the United States. At the 
same time we had the splitting of families, as well as everything else that caused the 
destruction of the country. We had a culture of working and getting paid ... but this 
was changed to a culture of begging and not being paid" (research interview with 
Jilma BalladaresI79). 
Despite the dramatic downturn of the region's agricultural economy following the events 
described above, the area continues to be one of the most fertile in Nicaragua, with an 
abundance of human potential, capacity and agricultural experience. Consequently, a key 
goal of the MCA is to unlock the region's capabilities and use the initiative's funds to kick 
start its economy, so that the occident can once more take the lead in the country's 
development. Furthermore, the government anticipates that the injection of money through 
the MCA programme will help the area engage with DR-CAFT A, granting the region greater 
accessibility to markets, especially in Honduras, which is also an MCA recipient country. In 
fact, as I was told in several interviews, the occident's geographical proximity to Honduras 
was a contributing factor in the region's selection: 
179 Jilma Balladares, MCA-Nicaragua Civil Society Director in representation ofFUNDAP ADELE - Interview 
held in the city of Le6n on 21" June 2006. 
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"Since the MCA already has funds in Honduras it was easier to do a connection 
between the south of Honduras with the north of Nicaragua. That is why they chose 
Lean and Chinandega at first" (research interview with Edgar SotomayorI80). 
6.7.3 Regional organisation and government relations 
Beyond the economic and historical factors discussed above, there are some other key 
interrelated reasons for the region's selection in this fund, which although not referred to 
explicitly in Nicaragua's proposal to the MCC were, as many interviewees discussed, 
determining factors in the selection process. Firstly, each country must meet the requirements 
set by the MCC for citizen participation within the programmel81 and, in this respect, the 
territory of Le6n-Chinandega is said to be one of the "best organised in the country" 
(research interview with Irving LariosI82). Once again, the region's strength is rooted in its 
history, in which there had been a significant process of mobilisation, through which the local 
communities organised to make demands on the local and central government. The signing of 
the Achuapa Agreements in 2002 between actors in north Loon and the central government 
was a testament to this fact in which, following a sustained process of advocacy, the region 
secured important investment aimed at "strengthening local production and overcoming 
social and political marginalisation" (Cupples et al 2007: 793). In fact, as I was told during 
the course of one interview, there is a direct relationship between these agreements and the 
MCA: 
"/ was part of the government when those accords [Achuapa Agreements] were 
signed - well when some of those accords were signed. And one of the responsibilities 
from the central government was to find resources to finance projects. And we now 
have the Millennium Challenge Account right there in that region so ... / am not 
saying that the Millennium Challenge Account decided to focus on Lean and 
180 Ed&ar Sotomayor, National Co-ordinator for PASE in Nicaragua's government - Interview held in Managua 
on 12 May 2006. 
181 The legislation establishing the MCC requires that "in entering into a Compact, the United States shall seek 
to ensure that the government ofan eligible country (1) takes into account the local-level perspectives of the 
rural and urban poor, including women, in the eligible country; and (2) consults with private and voluntary 
organizations, the business community, and other donors in the eligible country" (Millennium Challenge Act 
2003: 6) 
182 Irving Larios, Executive Director of the Institute for Research and Social Action (INGES) - Interview held in 
Managua on 25 th April 2006. 
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Chinandega just as a result of those accords but it did make it so much easier" 
(research interview with Juan Sebastian ChamorroI83). 
Since the signing of the Achuapa Agreements, the spaces for political engagement 
and participation in the territory have grown, as witnessed with the formation of the 
Association of Municipalities from north Leon (AMULEON) and the Network of Actors for 
Local Development (RADEL) in the department of Leon, and the Association of 
Municipalities from north Chinandega (AMUNORCHI)184. Furthermore, the Departmental 
Development Councils (DDCs) in Leon and Chinandega have been playing an increasingly 
important role in their capacity as an official space for consultation at a departmental level. 
At the end of 2004 the DDC in Leon (CONDELEON) and the DDC in Chinandega 
(CODECHI) were officially recognised and formalised through the passing ofthe 'Citizen· 
Participation Law' by the central government. These entities are now playing an important 
role in Nicaragua's MCA, where they function as an intermediary space for participation and 
consultation 18S. 
As I discovered during an interview in Nicaragua, the selection of Le on and 
Chinandega for the MCA was not only indicative of the area's level of organisation, as 
discussed above, but it also reflected the central government's relationship with that territory: 
" ... overall there is good communication [with Le6n-Chinandega), which is not 
necessarily the case for all the regions ... especially in the north where the relationship 
with the central government has not been as good as with this one ... you want to have 
a look at what is happening in Matagalpa and Jinotega ... the development councils of 
the region are taking an approach that is not necessarily the most mature one, like 
blocking roads and conducting violent protests and although the people in Lean and 
183 Juan Sebastian Chamorro, Director of MCA-Nicaragua - Interview held in Managua on 30th July 2006. 
184 AMULE6N and AMUNORCHI are associations of Mayors from the municipalities in the north of Le6n and 
Chinandega that are focussed on political advocacy and they work in close alliance. RADEL, on the other hand, 
is a network of actors for local development, comprising many different civil society organisations throughout 
the municipalities in north Le6n. 
ISl These DDCs are incredibly important actors in Nicaragua's MCA programme, having a direct input within 
the decision-making process and theoretically representing the interests of all the municipalities in the 
departments. As a result, a lot of research time was devoted in Nicaragua to examining these relatively new 
entities in Le6n and Chinandega, and the findings for this part of the research are presented in greater detail in 
section 7.8.2 of chapter 7 and section 8.8 of chapter 8. 
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Chinandega are not friends with the government of cours/86, they were taking a more 
mature approach to communicating with the government. And you know how it is 
right? If you have someone that you basically don't know start screaming at you, you 
already start to develop an attitude against them" (research interview with Juan 
Sebastian Chamorro). 
In summary, therefore, there are a variety of possible reasons for why the specific 
departments of Le6n and Chinandega were chosen to participate in the initiative (from the 
area's economic potential, to the nature of its relationship with the central government). The 
chapter now develops this discussion by examining the MCA projects being implemented in 
this region. 
6.8 The MeA components 
This section offers a detailed overview of Nicaragua's three MCA components: the 
'Property Regularisation Project' (PRP), the 'Transportation Project' and the 'Rural Business 
Development Project' (RBDP). Once again, however, it should be clarified that a more 
critical in:depth analysis ofthese projects is given in the later chapters and the aim here is 
primarily to provide some general factual information about them. 
6.S.1 The Property Regularisation Project (PRP) 
This first programme is the smallest in Nicaragua's MCA in terms of the funds 
allocated to it, of which there are US$26.5 million. Uncertainty over land ownership, 
combined with conflict, unclear delineation among family members and an inefficient 
registration process, has created conditions that are seen as non-conducive to stability and, 
therefore, investment. Consequently, this project is concerned with addressing the issue of 
land titling and ownership. Table 6.5 below provides an overview of the project's main 
components and its expected results. 
186 Here he is referring to the fact that, when I was conducting my research in Nicaragua in 2006, a large 
majority of the twenty-three municipalities in the region were headed by Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN), which was in opposition to the ruling Bolaiios administration. 
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rable 6.5: The PRP and its expected outcomes 
Project components Expected outcomes 
Institutional Capacity Building: Provide 70 percent of rural and 50 percent of 
technical support to government institutions urban properties in Leon will have more 
to implement and sustain tenure regularization secure and registered titles. 
reforms in Leon. 
Cadastral Mapping: Conduct area-wide Costs in both time and money of 
cadastral mapping in Leon to obtain current conducting property-related transactions 
property descriptions to be recorded in a are projected to be reduced by 50 
geographic information system. percent. 
Land Tenure Regularization: Clarify land 
tenure, resolve disputes, and improve formal A favourable investment climate and 
documentation of property rights. improved registry system will encourage 
Database InstaUation: Link municipal and investment and environmental protection. 
national registry and cadastral databases. 
Protected Area Demarcation: Demarcate Farmers who have their land titles 
and legally validate the boundaries of four regularized by the Project are expected to 
environmentally-sensitive protected areas, increase investment in land improvement 
regularize land rights within the perimeter of by 32 percent over five years. 
each, and facilitate the adoption ofland use All four protected areas in Leon will be 
management plans by occupants therein. formally demarcated and occupant tenure 
Analysis and Communications: Fund short- will be regularized, allowing effective 
term technical assistance, policy analysis and development and enforcement of Land-
outreach to promote participation in, use and use management plans. 
sustainability of the improved property 
registration system . 
. 
Source: MCC-Nicaragua Compact (2005) 
Uncertainty over land ownership has become a major problem throughout Nicaragua, 
where there may be three or four people possessing titles to the same piece of property and 
"others who don't even have a property title and might be the legitimate owners ... " (research 
interview with Manuel Orozco187). The reason for this situation appears to be two-fold. 
Firstly, once the Nicaraguan revolutionary party seized power in 1979 they adopted a policy 
of agrarian reform aimed at redistributing land previously owned by powerful families 
amongst the general population. It was not until the FSLN lost the 1990 elections, however, 
that the Sandinista government passed laws aimed at guaranteeing the future of its agrarian 
187 Manuel Orozco, Senior Associate and Director of Remittances and Development at the Inter-American 
Dialogue - Interview held in Washington D.C. on 4th October 2005. 
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refonns188. These highly controversial laws converted 'all agrarian refonn use titles' into 'full 
ownership titles' and transferred properties and lots seized by the state to the families 
occupying them (Larson 1993). More critically, these so-called 'piiiata' laws enabled the 
defeated Sandinista party to carve up a large number of public and private businesses, 
properties and lands, among government officials and supporters. This issue subsequently 
became the political battleground for the elected Chamorro administration and, furthennore, 
set the precedent for thousands oflater land/property disputes and rival claims. 
The second reason for the problems in ownership and titling is to do with the cultural 
model that people have become accustomed to in Nicaragua, where property and land has 
increasingly been passed down by word of mouth: 
"There are many properties and pieces of land that have been inherited from 
grandfathers, but those lands are not legal... this is not to do with the Sandinista 
revolution, but due to the inheritance process. So a father gives this land to his son, 
who gives it to his sons and so on, and nothing is signed ... nothing is legal... So the 
prior-generations had real titles but when they died their sons inherited the land by 
word of mouth. And that is how things have continued" (research interview with Juan 
Delgadillo189). 
Consequently, there are now many generations involved in a process of trying to legalise 
their titles over land and property, which is neither cheap nor easy190. In terms of the MCA, 
the PRP is primarily concerned with solving problems resulting from this cultural tradition of 
inheritance. It is not intended to deal with the much more controversial political issue ofland 
disputes resulting from the agrarian reform process of the 1980s: 
"We are not supporting the acijudication of political cases of property. So probably 
70% of the property up there [in Le6n-ChinandegaJ will end up with good titles and 
30% won't be touched because of political problems. At some point later when there 
is the political will to solve that they can" (research interview with Jim Vennillion). 
188 This is commonly referred to the 'lame duck period', which runs from when Charnorro won the Nicaraguan 
elections in February of 1990, to the 25 th of April, when she was actually inaugurated to office (Larson 1993). 
189 Juan Delgadillo, Coordinator for Municipal Operations - Interview held in the town of Jicaral in north Le6n 
on 14th June 2006. 
190 Section 7.9.3 looks specifically at the issue ofland-ownership. 
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Despite this position, however, I did get the sense in conducting this research that, initially at 
least, people in the region were under the impression that the funds in this component would 
be used to solve these political issues, as illustrated in the following interview extract: 
"Every time we have those big meetings with one hundred and twenty people they 
think those funds are going to be ... The Sandinistas stole from my family a big 
propertyJ9J ... about 1500 manzanasJ92, and people think that the money from the 
account is to help those people legalise their property and it is not. And I have been 
involved in this from the beginning and I didn't know until maybe four months ago ... 
that the funds are not to solve the type of problem in which people stole landfrom us" 
(research interview with Alberto Aviles I93). 
Clearly, there are still very strong feelings and emotions over the issue ofland redistributed 
as a result of the Sandinista agrarian reform strategy. What is more, it was evident in 
undertaking research in the region that many individuals were still under the impression that 
the funds of this component would be used to solve the sort of dispute outlined above. Once 
again, bearing in mind the fact that the vast majority of the municipalities in Lean and 
Chinandega are headed by the FSLN, there are clear political motivations for its inclusion 
within the programme. Nevertheless, the fact that there was misconception over this issue 
raises some important questions over the dissemination of information on the initiative, 
especially at the local level, and this is explored in greater detail in later chapters. 
6.8.2 The Transportation Project 
The Transportation Project was allocated the largest amount of money out of all three 
components, receiving roughly US$93 million. The roads in the northwest of Nicaragua, as in 
much of the rest of the country, are notoriously bad and this has serious social and economic 
repercussions. In terms of the MCA, however, it is the latter economic dimension that is the 
primary point of concern, as illustrated in the following interview extract: 
191 By this, the respondent may be referring to the 'lame duck period' discussed above, in which much of the 
land and property seized by the revolutionary party was carved up among supporters and government officials. 
192 A 'manzana' is a measurement ofland equivalent to about 1.7 acres. 
193 Alberto Aviles, businessman/Treasurer of CODECHl/ex·Minister of Governance for Chinandega . Interview 
held in the city of Chinandega on 27th July 2006. 
169 
Chapter 6: Contextualising Nicaragua's Millennium Challenge Account 
"They can't really farm tomatoes, which have a higher export value than beans do, 
because when you try to put your tomatoes on a truck to bring them down into 
Chinandega it turns into tomato juice, without the pasteurising and all that good stuff 
to make any value ... There is a lot of cattle production in'the area, which is one of the 
sectors that will do well under DR-CAFTA, but it is so hard for them to get their stuff 
out by truck that they pay El Salvadorans. El Salvadorans come in and they buy the 
cattle from the Nicaraguan farmers. They bring their trucks in but because the roads 
are so bad, the Nicaraguanfarmers have to take the liability for anything that 
happens to those trucks. So that increases their costs, increases their overall risk and 
it is just troublesome" (research interview with Kenny MillerI94). 
Within this context, high transportation costs are perceived to be a direct impediment to the 
economic growth of the region. Indeed, expanding and improving the effectiveness of trade 
both internally, and externally through the DR-CAFTA framework, is the dominant theme 
running throughout Nicaragua's MCA. Table 6.6 below outlines the project's main 
components and expected results. 
Table 6.6: The Transportation Project and its expected outcomes 
Project components Expected outcomes 
N-I Road (segment of Pacific Road upgrades will reduce transportation costs 
Corridor): Improve a 58-kilometer between the region and domestic, regional and 
segment of the Pacific Corridor between international markets for an estimated 3,300 
Nejapa and Izapa. current road users per day. 
Secondary Roads: Pave and upgrade key 
secondary routes to link rural producers Upgrading up to 100 kilometers of secondary 
to the primary road network. roads is anticipated to reduce travel times and 
Technical Assistance: Provide technical transport costs to markets and education and 
assistance to the Ministry of health services for rural communities. 
Transportation and Infrastructure (MTI) 
and the Nicaraguan Road Maintenance Improvements to the N-I road and the secondary 
Fund (Fondo de Mantenimiento Vial or roads are important for realizing the economic 
FOMAV). benefits outlined in the Rural Business 
Development Project as well as for stimulating 
new investments in Nicaragua as trade north from 
Managua to Honduras and El Salvador becomes 
more efficient and cost-effective. 
Source: MCC-Nicaragua Compact (2005) 
194 Kenny Miller, Program Officer in the MCC - Interview held in Washington D.C. on 5th October 2005. 
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As the following passage from Nicaragua's compact agreement clarifies, there is a 
direct relationship between the Transportation Project and the building of the Plan Puebla 
Panama (PPP), a controversial neoliberal project to create a Mesoamerican network of 
highways: 
"The 3,150 kilometer Pacific Corridor links Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. In Nicaragua, the Pacific Corridor 
connects the Honduran border at Guasaule to the Costa Rican border and major 
production and consumption centers in and around the cities of Managua, Lean and 
Chinandega. The World Bank, the Central American Bankfor Economic Integration, 
and the Nordic Development Fund have financed the construction of a modern 
transportation route from the Honduran border to the town ofIzapa approximately 58 
kilometers from the capital of Managua. This remaining 58 kilometer stretch of road 
between Izapa and Nejapa (the "N-I Road") on the outskirts of Managua is the final 
section needed to create an effective trade corridor linking producers and consumers 
in Managua to markets north in neighbouring Honduras and El Salvador and linking 
producers in Lean and Chinandega to Managua and markets south" (MCC: 
Nicaragua Compact 2005: 64). 
This decision to build this important N-l road using MCA funds was not, as later chapters 
discuss, a popular decision for many ofthose in Leon and Chinandega, because its 
construction was a central government priority, not a regional one. The following interview 
extract demonstrates the discontentment over the road's inclusion, as well as raising some 
interesting questions over the important issue of' ownership' in the M CA: 
"We were always against that road because the government took advantage of the 
MCA to accomplish what should have been done with other resources. There were 
some resources with other institutions for the construction of that road. We do not 
deny the importance that it has. It is vital to join the whole country. Instead, it uses 
money that was ours: Lean's and Chinandega 's" (research interview with Irving 
Larios). 
One way in which this initiative is said to differ from past US assistance is that there 
are reportedly no earmarks or legislation on how the money must be used. Consequently the 
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management of the Transportation Project is decided upon through an international process of 
competitive bidding. Additionally, the MCC stipulated that Nicaragua must have a plan for 
ensuring the sustainable upkeep of the roads once they are built, which it now does: 
"Nicaragua used to be, prior to December of this last year, the only country in 
Central America that didn't have a road maintenance programme. The MCC said 'we 
are not going to invest in roads if you can't maintain them '. So what we had to do, in 
consultation with the local people and with their support, was lobby the national 
assembly to approve a law that guarantees road maintenance. So that is one of the 
biggest successes that certainly Nicaragua has had so far with MCC ... without having 
actually disbursed any funding they've got the country to adopt a good policy - which 
is a road maintenance policy" (research interview with Julio Montealegre). 
Another important condition placed upon the project by the MCC is that the roads to be built 
or improved in the region must meet a threshold level in terms of the 'economic rate of 
return' (ERR). The idea behind this approach is that the roads included in the programme 
must have a good economic viability in terms oflinking markets and products together. As 
one respondent discussed, "at the end of the day they (the MCC) don't want their money to 
be used on roads that are going to nowhere" (research interview with Juan Sebastian 
Chamorro). However, for reasons discussed in chapter 7 looking at poverty reduction, this 
approach is potentially problematic. 
6.8.3 The Rural Business Development Project (RBDP) 
The RBDP was allocated around US$34 million. This part of the programme is essentially 
in place to provide 'support and assistance' to the agricultural sector within the region and 
improve efficiency and profitability (not just for producers but also for associated 
businesses). As a result, it is primarily focussed upon developing 'higher-profit' agriculture 
and agribusiness enterprises, which is indicative of the fact that the MCC is required, through 
its legislation, to have positive economic rates of return on its investments. In particular, the 
intention is to create value-adding processes, as indicated in the interview extract below: 
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" ... we want to see more value added post harvest ... and we would like to see that they 
don't just take live cattle and ship them to El Salvador but that there is processing in 
the country ... we'd like to see that if mangos are produced that they aren 'f just 
shipped out whole to then get chopped and pealed and frozen somewhere else ... " 
(research interview with Jim Vermillion). 
However, it should be noted that the actual focus of this project is not on supplying credit to 
farmers and business men/women to harvest and produce their crops, but instead it is about 
'intelligent marketing'. This involves collecting and sharing information about the market, 
facilitating the creation of commercial links between producers and consumers, 
recommending and promoting political reforms, research and development and promoting 
rural investment. Effectively it is about assisting individuals that already have a product or 
means to produce and providing them with information and opportunities to market their 
goods, whether internally or externally. Consequently, one could suggest that it works under 
the 'recognition' that there are already existing channels to get finance that producers can be 
steered towards. Table 6.7 below sets out the RBDP's main components and its expected 
outcomes. 
Table 6.7: The RBDP and its expected outcomes 
Project components Expected outcomes 
Rural Business Development Services: Thousands of farmers will directly benefit 
Expand higher-profit agriculture and from the Rural Business Development 
agribusiness by providing business Project by receiving help with the transition 
development services, disseminating market into higher-value agriculture. 
information, developing improved 
production techniques, and managing the An estimated 7,000 jobs will be created. 
two Project Activities described below. 
Technical and Financial Assistance: To The additional profits and wages of farms 
help small and medium-sized farms and generated as a result ofthe Rural Business 
agribusiness transition to higher-profit Development Project are projected to total 
activities, provide technical and financial $30 million annually, beginning six years 
assistance to these enterprises, including after the project's initiation. 
support that will directly offset certain costs 
of small farms To ensure that the benefits from the project 
Grants to Improve Water Supply for are long-term, the project will facilitate 
Farming and Forestry Production: Based linkages among different actors involved in 
on a watershed management action plan, rural business, such as distributors and 
provide grants to improve the water supply processors, and build local capacity to link 
for irrigation and facilitate higher value. producers to market opportunities. 
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Thousands of hectares of currently arid land 
will have improved water supply and be 
under sustainable farm or forest production 
Source: MCC-Nicaragua Compact (2005)195 
6.8.4 Summary 
The above discussion has provided background infonnation on the three core 
components of Nicaragua's MCA (the 'Property Regularisation Project', the 'Transportation 
Project' and the 'Rural Business Development Project'), as well as indicating some of the 
areas in which a more critical analysis ofthese components is required. To a large extent, this 
will be the task of the next two chapters. For now, however, attention turns to exploring the 
management of Nicaragua's MCA. 
6.9 Managing the fund 
In beginning this discussion it is important to clarify that none of the programme's 
funds are channelled through the government of Nicaragua but are managed by an 
independent fiscal agent. According to MCC staff, this approach to managing MCA funds 
was proposed by the Nicaraguan government. The decision to do this, however, is likely to 
have been influenced by the MCC and possible concerns over the strength of existing 
financial systems within the country. In the highly politicised pre-electoral environment in 
which the .compact agreement came into force, heightened concerns over the delivery and 
management of such funds were to be expected. Nevertheless, the use ofthese 'accountable 
entities' has prompted criticism amongst parts of the development community (see Herding 
and Radelet 2006), reinvigorating debates over the contested issue of donors providing direct 
budget support. According to a comprehensive report produced in 2006 by the International 
Development Department (IDD)196, budget support can, in situations where the government 
has the political will to reduce poverty, be an effective mechanism for delivering aid. Not 
19' According to the compact agreement, the RBDP is likely to involve the greatest level of coordination 
between the MCC and USAID. 
196 The report, entitled' An Evaluation of General Budget Support (I 994-2004}' , was carried out by the 
International Development Department (IDD) at University of Binningham on behalf of more than thirty donor 
organisations and partner countries. It was initiated and supported by the DECD's Development Assistance 
Committee's Evaluation Network. 
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only can it help strengthen the relationship between donor bodies and the governments in the 
South, but it can also improve the transparency and accountability of budgetary and 
accounting mechanisms197. However, despite these potential advantages, some donor bodies, 
such as USAID, continue to circumvent govemment structures in a bid to reduce risk and 
maximise control198. Whilst the MCC is more flexible than this with, for example, the 
Honduran Ministry of Finance (SEFIN) acting as the fiscal agent for the Honduran MCA (see 
Lucas 2007a), the majority of the countries involved rely on external bodies to manage 
programme funds. As a result, it has been suggested that for an initiative that prides itself on 
being 'different' the MCC is, in this respect, "decidedly un-innovative" (Herding and Radelet 
. 2006: I). Reportedly, the MCC is yet to make public its rationale for supporting one approach 
over another, beyond reliance on the 'ownership' principle that is, and Lucas warns that, in 
the wake of the slow disbursement of MC A funds, the MCC may be tempted to "circumvent 
any government systems that slow its progress" (Lucas 2007b: 7). 
In addition to using an external fiscal agent, the decision to establish an independent 
legal-entity, MCA-Nicaragua, to implement the programme within the country and be 
accountable for its success, can be identified as one way in which efforts were made to 
distance the initiative from the political sphere. This process does, according to Lucas, reflect 
the MCC's "practice of establishing separate program implementation units outside of 
existing government structures,,199 (2007c: 5). Whilst these independent entities can help 
ensure greater levels of accountability and protection, there are criticisms over their potential 
impacts, from 'weakening government capacity' by attracting officials with higher salaries, to 
adding further complexities to the government's "burden of managing a lot of different 
197 With regard to Nicaragua more specifically, however, the report highlights a number of difficulties to 
delivering direct 1J.udget support to the Nicaraguan government, including macroeconomic uncertainties and 
institutional fragmentation within the central government (particularly between the Executive and legislative 
branches). Consequently, concerns over fmancing the programme through government ntinistries are not 
unfounded. This is especially true when reflecting upon the growing fragmentation within the Nicaraguan 
government highlighted during the fieldwork, which is analysed in chapter 8. 
198 According to Michelle Winthrop, who is the Growth and Private Sector Advisor in DlID-Nicaragua, USAID 
will "never, ever, give budget support anywhere". As she goes on to explain, "they have been very clear about 
that... unequivocal - astonishingly unequivocal. I don't know why; I'd love to know why ... I think it is an 
ideological issue; there is a legislative block on USAID giving budget support, no matter who it is to" (research 
interview conducted in Managua on 5th May 2006). 
199 The practice of providing project finance through 'accountable entities' is nothing new in development. The 
World Bank and other multilateral banks have long adopted this approach through their use of 'project 
implementation units'. Interestingly, however, there has been something ofa shift in official rhetoric over recent 
years, away from using these independent units. For example, in the 2005 'Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness' (of which the US, World Bank and International Monetary Fund were among the many 
signatories), the commitment was made by donors to significantly reduce, by two-thirds, the "stock of parallel 
project implementation units" (2005: 9). 
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donors" (ibid). Such concerns have propagated the view that their use should be minimised in 
development. For example, in the Paris Declaration of 2005 on aid effectiveness, it was stated 
that donors should, where possible, "use country systems and procedures to the maximum 
extent possible" and, where this is not feasible, ensure that "additional safeguards and 
measures" are taken to "strengthen rather than undennine country systems and procedures" 
(2005: 4). Moreover, it goes on to specify that donors should avoid creating "dedicated 
structures for day-to-day management and implementation of aid-financed projects and 
programmes" where possible (ibid: 5). Consequently, the frequent use of external entities 
within the MCA does appear to be somewhat at odds with the commitments laid out in the 
declaration. Bearing in mind the programme's highly stringent country selection process, in 
which countries are essentially rewarded for their perfonnance in, among other things, 
'government effectiveness', and the MCC's stated commitment to 'country-ownership' .. one 
could suggest that the MCC could do more so help strengthen institutions and improve 
capacity in practice. 
6.9.1 MeA-Nicaragua: Structure and composition 
In tenns of actual structure and composition, MCA-Nicaragua consists of a board of 
directors, composed of individuals from the central government, local government and civil 
society, who oversee the implementation ofthe initiative, as well as a management team (or 
Technical Secretariat) that is responsible for the "daily management of the implementation of 
the program" (MCC-Nicaragua Compact 2005). With respect to the first of these, the board 
of directors is composed of seven voting members20o: two civil society directors, one from 
Leon and the other from Chinandega, one Mayor director from the region and four central 
government directors. The central government, therefore, holds the voting majority and, as 
will be discussed in chapter 8, this situation has been contentious. In addition to these voting 
members, there are seven 'observers' and these include the following individuals: The MCC 
representative in Nicaragua, three representatives from government ministries2ol , two civil 
society observers from Chinandega and Leon, and one Mayor. Although these individuals 
may attend all the meetings of the board of directors, participate within discussions and 
receive any information or documentation available to the board, they cannot vote. 
200 The process by which these individuals are selected, and where they come from, is discussed below. 
201 One from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAGFOR), one from the Ministry of Transportation and 
Infrastructure (MIl), and one from the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources in Nicaragna 
(MARENA) (MCC-Nicaragua Compact 2005). 
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Despite not having a vote, the MCC representative does retain "approval rights at a 
number of key decision points during implementation, including key steps in procurements, 
budgets for project activities, major re-disbursements and key personnel decisions" (MCC 
2005b: 4). The situation was clarified in an interview held with the MCC representative in 
Nicaragua: 
"From a corporate governance stand point I am an observer and so I don't have a 
vote. But in the compact there is a governance agreement and I have certain rights 
that I can exercise - like veto power for example" 202 (research interview with Matt 
Bohn20l). 
Consequently, it is clear that whilst the MCC is keen on promoting 'country ownership' in 
this fund, it has maintained oversight of the implementation process. In many ways, this is 
not unexpected as the MCC is accountable for these funds after al1 and will not use US 
taxpayers' dollars without ensuring some measure of control over how they are used 
(especially in the increasingly hostile post-9ll budget environment as referred to previously 
in chapter 3). At the same time, however, it is possible that in its bid to reduce risk, the MCC 
has potentially impeded the pace at which the MCA programme is being implemented in the 
recipient countries. 
6.9.2 Appointing the MCA board of directors 
The board of directors' positions outlined above were appointed in different ways and 
it is useful now to spend a bit of time looking at these. The President of the board of directors 
and the government directors (including the observers), were appointed by mutual agreement 
between the Nicaraguan Executive, i.e. the President of Nicaragua, and the MCC. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that following the inauguration of Daniel Ortega as Nicaraguan 
202 In light of this extract, it is useful here to briefly refer back to the conceptual and theoretical work on power 
presented earlier in the thesis. More specifically, the situation presented above bears witness to the plurality of 
power discussed in chapter 3, in which the phenomenon can be exercised and expressed in different ways across 
both time and space. In terms of 'veto' rights, it is important to clarity that in many cases the actual 'threat' of 
veto can be just as powerful a form of control as its exercise in practice. Indeed, just knowing that an individual 
can prohibit or reject a decision or course of action, can heavily influence and shape the decision-making 
r,rocess and its subsequent outcomes. 
03 Matt Bohn, MCC representative in Nicaragua - Interview held in Managua on 14th August 2006. 
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President in 2007 these individuals changed as new party officials were ushered in204. With 
respect to the two Mayors that are present in MCA-Nicaragua, one was elected by the Mayors 
from the municipalities of Leon and the other by the Mayors from the municipalities of 
Chinandega. The two elected Mayors take it in turn to be voting members on the board, the 
order of which was decided upon by the board of directors' President. As such, when one 
Mayor is serving as a voting member the other serves as an observer and they act in these 
capacities for two non-consecutive terms of fifteen months. In terms of the four civil society 
representatives, the two DD Cs from the region - CONDELEON and CODECHI - were each 
given one seat, the appointment of which was decided upon by the councils' board of 
directors. Each DDC also proposed representatives from two other civil society organisations 
operating in their departments205. In a similar fashion to the process outlined above, the civil 
society representatives take it in turn to be voting members and the order of this was decided 
upon by the board of directors' President. As a result, when two of the representatives are on 
the MCA-board operating in a voting role, the other two individuals act as observers and, 
once again, this changes every fifteen months. 
6.10 Disbursement of MC A funds 
This final section aims to provide a very brief overview of the pace at which 
Nicaraguan-MCA funds have been disbursed in practice. Figure 6.3 below shows the 
disbursement schedule of the MCA funds as of November 2007. 
204 Although this transition occurred after I had conducted my primary research in Nicaragua, it would be 
interesting to see what affect, if any, this change in staff may have had on the decision-making process within 
MCA-Nicaragua. 
205 Whilst it is clear that the DDCs are playing a fundamental role in Nicaragua's MCA, the actual democratic 
credentials of these entities are less known. During the course of research, several important issues were raised 
with respect to their representativeness and although not touched on in detail here, these themes are explored in 
greater depth in chapter 8. 
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Figure 6.3: Disbursement schedule for Nicaragua (in millions of U8$) 
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As demonstrated by figure 6.3, the actual disbursement of programme funds for the first year, 
completed in May 2007, fell considerably short ofthe projected estimates, constituting only 
31 % of the amount forecast. Nicaragua has since completed its second year of 
implementation and according to the July-August 2008 status report from the MCC on 
Nicaragua, the total disbursement figure now stands at approximately U8$22.5 million (MCC 
2008b). This amount still falls well short of the amount projected in figure 6.3, which 
predicted a total disbursement of over U8$60 million by the end of year 2. 
A briefIook at the other MCA countries shows that this disparity between predicted 
and real disbursement is not restricted to Nicaragua alone. For example, in Honduras only 
U8$3.02 million of the predicted U8$27.7 million was used in their first completed year (see 
MCC 2007i). A major reason for this situation in Honduras was that the MCA programme 
was premature in its entry into force, beginning before the programme's 'foundations' had 
been put in place (see Lucas 2007a). According to 2008 July-August status report for 
Honduras, which has now completed its third year of MC A implementation, only U8$21.5 
million has been disbursed in total and this is well below the U8$170 million disbursement 
projected to have taken place by completion of year three (MCC 2008c). As the following 
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extract reveals, this situation is due, in part, to the excessive oversight and risk management 
by the MCC in Washington D.C., which has been true across the board of MC A-recipient 
countries, including Nicaragua: 
" ... the MCC is pursuing meticulous oversight of country programs. Every step of 
procurement, hiring, program design, and even translation of standard operating 
documents must be approved by Washington. This has caused delays, undermined 
ownership among MCA country programs, and reduced the authority of country-
based MCC officials. It has also led country-based MCC staff and MCA country 
officials to argue that the MCC is losing sight of the forest for the trees-focusing too 
much on small operational steps and not on big-picture program goals or a broader 
debate about the acceptable level of risk in its investments" (Lucas 2007 c: 4). 
More generally, however, one could argue that what is happening in these countries, with 
regard to funding disbursements and project process, is a by-product of the US' agenda for 
achieving 'transformational' development results over a relatively short period of time. 
Perhaps the MCC is trying to do too much in too little time, placing itself in a situation where 
there may be unrealistic timescales and goals206• Whatever the precise reasons may be, it is 
clear that slow MCA disbursements and programme implementation are contributing to the 
cuts in the MCC's budget (see Tarnoff2008) and these reductions will undoubtedly have 
severe implications when it comes to inciting transformational change at the global level. 
Conclusions 
This purpose of this chapter has been two-fold. The first part of the chapter focussed 
on understanding Nicaragua's MCA within the context of shifting patterns in US foreign 
assistance and particularly that channelled through USAID. Whilst it is clear that this five 
year programme ofUS$175 million represents a substantial injection of US assistance to the 
country, this has coincided with a significant reduction in USAID's activities, not only in 
Nicaragua but across Central America. This reduction has been most visible in USAID's 
Development Assistance, or more specifically within the 'Economic Growth' and the 
'Agriculture and Environment' accounts of this programme. As discussed above, the 
206 The MCC's 'transformational' approach to development is revisited in the following chapter, which looks at 
Nicaragua's MCA in relation to achieving poverty reduction. 
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reduction of USA ID's budget in these accounts coincides with the type of projects being 
implemented through the MCA207• However, these decreases have been most pronounced in 
Central America, where three out of the five countries currently have MCA agreements with 
the US (Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador). In addition to these three, Guatemala, a non-
. MCA country, has also experienced significant reductions in these areas, which suggests that 
these associated cutbacks have taken place at a regional level. It also points to the ongoing 
marginalisation of the Latin American region as a whole within US foreign policy, which was 
discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
The second part of this chapter provided some general factual background on the 
MCA process in Nicaragua. It began by outlining its regional focus and gave several reasons 
as to why the specific departments of Le6n and Chinandega were selected for this initiative. It 
then explored the programme's three project components, including the PRP, the 
Transportation Project and the RBDP, and touched on some of the issues that were raised 
regarding these components during the course of the research. This discussion was followed 
by an examination of how the MCA is being managed in Nicaragua, with specific attention 
given to the board of directors responsible for making decisions on the MCA. The final part 
of the chapter examined the progress made in implementing the initiative in Nicaragua and 
drew upon the experience of the country's neighbour, Honduras, to further contextualise the 
discussion. All of this has been necessary in setting the foundation for the following two 
chapters, the first of which focuses on the important issue of poverty reduction and questions 
the extent to which the initiative is likely to reduce poverty in Nicaragua. 
207 As alluded earlier, there is some coordination in Nicaragua between the MCC and USAID and, therefore, it 
would be wrong to assume, from the cutbacks to USAlD's budget, that there is necessarily an antagonistic 
relationship between these two development entities. According to Matt Bohn, the MCC's official representative 
in the country, the MCC has a "very close working relationship with USAID", A similarly positive response 
was given by Steve Olive, who works in USAID's Nicaraguan office on trade and agribusiness: "We keep to our 
own areas and projects; however we share information a lot. And they have been very good about letting us 
lmow about what their plans are; how they are deciding that; when they have people come down from 
Washington to design the project they have always met with us. So their communication, from my viewpoint, is 
very good - excellent", 
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Chapter 7: The Millennium Challenge Account and Poverty Reduction 
This is the first of two chapters focussed on analysing the results of this thesis, which 
are framed around the two interrelated themes of 'poverty reduction' and 'democracy'. For 
now, attention is turned towards the issue of poverty reduction which, as already mentioned, 
is the stated mission of the MCC208 • More specifically, this chapter questions the extent to 
which Nicaragua's MCA will have a fundamental impact on poverty levels within the 
departments of Le6n and Chinandega. To do this, it begins by locating this analysis of the 
MeA within the context of development discourse (as explored in chapter 2), identifying the 
initiative's defining characteristics and providing an assessment on how these attributes may 
contribute to, or detract from, its ability to address poverty issues at a global level. 
After setting out these broad themes and issues, attention is turned towards the 
particulars of Nicaragua's experience in the MCA. This starts with a discussion on defining 
'poverty', drawing directly upon material and perspectives from Nicaragua in which the 
construction of knowledge around the issue of 'poverty' has been contested. After this 
preamble, the chapter focuses on exploring the three core project components of Nicaragua's 
MCA, identifying the key issues surrounding these different programmes and drawing 
tentative conclusions as to the impact the individual components may have on poverty levels 
in the region. This is followed by a more holistic discussion on the model of development 
being promoted through the MCA, which concentrates primarily upon examining the 
relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction. The chapter concludes by 
making connections to the following chapter which analyses the fundamental issue of 
'democracy' in relation to the MeA and, in doing so, recognises the interconnectedness of 
these themes. 
7.1 A reflection upon the MCA and development discourse 
Chapter 2 represented the first step in contextualising the MCA within this thesis and 
it did so by looking at the introduction, decay and reformulation of development discourses 
over time, with particular emphasis placed on Latin America and its experience. The 
208 "MCC's mission is to reduce global poverty through the promotion of sustainable economic growth" (MCC 
website a). 
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intention here, however, is not to repeat or summarise that discussion, but to use it to 
construct a theoretical framework that will aid the following analysis on the MCA and 
poverty reduction. To do this, the chapter builds upon the analysis of neoliberalism and the 
Washington Consensus (WC) presented in chapter 2 (see sections 2.4 and 2.5), focussing 
specifically on the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) which, as suggested below, was 
highly influential in shaping the MCA and its guiding principles. 
7.1.1 Revisiting the Post-Washington Consensus 
The appointment of J ames Wolfensohn as President of the World Bank in June 1995 
marked the beginning of a reform process through which the International Financial 
Institution (IFI) would try to rebuild its damaged image and reputation following the failed 
neoliberal policy prescriptions of the 1980s and early 1990s. Wolfensohn was responsible for 
redefining the organisation's role, rebuilding legitimacy for its interventions abroad and 
renewing a general sense of purpose (Pender 2001). However, it was the selection of Joseph 
Stiglitz as 'Chief Economist' of the World Bank in 1997 that really catalysed this process. 
His appointment signified an apparent shift away from the much hated WC and the 
emergence of the PWC. Although chapter 2 has already discussed what this transition 
involved, it is useful here, in focussing on the important issue of 'poverty reduction', to 
reflect briefly upon the PWC's defining characteristics. 
Generally speaking, the PWC represented a broadening of objectives whereby 
economic growth was no longer located as the sole goal of development: 
"We seek increases in living standards - including improved health and education. 
Not just increases in measured GDP. We seek sustainable development, which 
includes preserving natural resources and maintaining a healthy environment. We 
seek equitable development, which ensures that all groups in society, not just those at 
the top, enjoy the fruits of development. And we seek democratic development, in 
which citizens participate in a variety of ways in making the decisions that affect their 
lives" (Stiglitz 1998a: 31). 
This is not to say that economic growth was no longer essential, only that its importance was 
now qualified in terms of its contribution to these broader objectives. More fundamentally, 
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poverty reduction came to be located as an immediate objective of development assistance, 
rather than simply a consequence of economic growth209• Additionally, the PWC bore witness 
to the realisation among development thinkers and practitioners that state institutions can, and 
must, play a role in development. As highlighted previously in chapter 2, WC-based policies 
rejected this role and promoted a minimal, non-interventionist state. The 'new' consensus 
discarded this 'state-versus-market' approach and promoted a much more collaborative 
development model. Furthermore, and not unrelated to the previous point, the PWC placed 
much greater emphasis on the idea of 'country ownership'. As Stiglitz states, "if policies are 
to be sustainable then developing countries must take ownership of them" (ibid: 34). This has 
been synonymous with the drive towards what the World Bank sees as 'sound policy 
environments', in which the financial assistance countries receive is conditioned upon their 
adherence and commitment to this prescribed development model. 
As alluded to above, 'conditionality' - the hallmark of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) and neoliberal ideology- has remained, despite this apparent transition 
from the WC to the PWC. However, as Pender clarifies, this conditionality has been 
"renegotiated in line with the changing emphasis of the World Bank's definition on 
development" (200 I: 408), moving away from a narrow conceptualisation of development, 
towards a more holistic interpretation. As argued in chapter 2, the degree to which this re-
conceptualisation of 'development', enshrined within the PWC discourse, truly represents a 
departure from neoliberal ideology is highly debateable. For example, as stated by 
Jayasuriya, this 'transition' towards the PWC should "not be seen as a reversal of the 
structural adjustment policies which characterised the Washington consensus. Rather, it can 
be argued that the PWC should be more properly viewed as an attempt to develop a political 
institutional framework to embed the structural adjustment policies of the Washington 
consensus" (200 I: I). Indeed, good govemance, which is argUably the cornerstone of the 
PWC, has enabled international donor agencies to exert these new conditionalities on aid-
recipient countries. 
209 In contrast, the MCC's mission is to reduce poverty through economic growth. This raises some question 
marks, as discussed later, over the extent to which the MCC constitutes a real departure from traditional 
development discourse. 
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7.2 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
If, as stated earlier, the SAPs truly were the practical expression of the WC, then the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), initiated by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1999, were their equivalent for the PWC. These national 
programmes for poverty reduction were built upon five core principles2lo, which were 
synonymous with PWC thinkinlll. However, as revealed in chapter 2, the PRSPs have 
received much criticism for their continued association to neoliberal policy. Moreover, many 
concerns have been raised over participation in the PRSPs which, according to Calaguas and 
O'Connell, had "not lived up to the optimistic rhetoric" (2003: 3). A World Bank document 
produced in 2002 reviewed this issue and set out the main points that many of the major 
development agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), external to the World 
Bank, had to make about the participative process in the PRSPs. The issues raised included 
concerns over the breadth and depth of participation, as well as suggestions that the 'real 
poor' had not been involved as much as they should have (World Bank 2002a). 
Whilst it is evident that 'country ownership' and 'participation' were central to the 
PRSP model envisaged by the World Bank, the extent to which this rhetoric was reflected in 
practice is less clear. For example, Bertelsen and Jensen identify serious deficiencies in the 
participatory process for Honduras and Nicaragua, especially in terms of the macroeconomic 
part of the PRSPs, in which they argue that both the government and IFI representations 
contributed in excluding civil society from participating in this specific area (2002: 85). 
Furthermore, as Bradshaw and Linneker argue in discussing Nicaragua more specifically, the 
degree to which the traditional bias granted to economic growth in development policy has 
shifted is debateable: "Despite the best efforts of civil actors to influence the PRSP process, 
and growing evidence to the contrary, the official discourse in Nicaragua continues to view 
economic growth as the key to poverty reduction" (2003: 156). Bearing in mind the MCC's 
mission of reducing global poverty through the promotion of economic growth, one could 
210 According to the IMF, the core principles of the PRSP approach are that poverty reduction should; be 
'country-driven', 'results-oriented', 'comprehensive' (in recognising the multidimensional nature of poverty), 
'partner-oriented', and have a 'long-term perspective' (see http://www.imf.orglextemallnp/exr/facts/prsp.htm 
for further information). 
211 Whilst one could suggest that the MCA draws upon four of these principles, one can debate the extent to 
which it is, in fact, 'comprehensive'. As discussed later, the MCA adopts a somewhat narrow understanding of 
poverty, in which 'progress' towards poverty reduction is measured in terms of promoting economic growth. As 
history dictates, however, the relationship between levels of poverty and economic growth is far from simple 
(for example, see chapter 2 section 2.6.2 discussing the SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s). 
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suggest that Nicaragua's MCA programme once again fails to break from this 'official 
discourse'. The possible repercussions of this for poverty reduction are discussed in greater 
detail later in this chapter. 
7.3 Drawing parallels: The MCA, the PWC and the PRSPs 
The chapter has been focus sed thus far on outlining the evolution of dominant 
development discourse among the major IFIs. Some tentative links have been drawn, in 
places, to the MCA and it is this association that I would like to develop here. This section 
draws parallels between the MCA and the PWC, as a set of ideas and as policy in practice. As 
this chapter already illustrated, there is a clear gap between the rhetoric of the PWC and what 
is happening on the ground in parts of the South. This situation adds weight to the doubts 
already raised over the extent to which the PWC does represent a radical departure from the 
WC and its associated neoliberal thinking. However, before looking more specifically at the 
MCA and its relationship with the PWC, it is first necessary to explore how IFI policy 
prescriptions translate into bilateral donor priorities. 
7.3.1 The World Bank: A knowledge bank? 
As mentioned previously, the appointment ofStiglitz as the World Bank's Chief 
Economist in 1997 heralded a key moment in the 'reinvention' of the institution. This chapter 
has already discussed what this meant in broad policy terms with regard to the 'transition' 
from the WC to the PWC. However, in order to understand the wider implications of this 
shift, it is necessary to look at another aspect of the World Bank's reform process. In a lecture 
given in 1998, Stiglitz highlighted the World Bank's intention to become more than just a 
'resource provider': "The World Bank increasingly thinks ... of itself as a knowledge bank, 
with one of its central tasks being to help countries to' close the knowledge gap" (1998b: 28). 
This message was reiterated and reinforced in the World Bank's 1998/1999 World 
Development Report entitled 'Knowledge for Development', in which the argument was 
made for the World Bank, as well as other influential institutions, to take on the role of 
intellectual actors, responsible for closing the 'knowledge gap'. Whilst there may be some 
merit to the arguments in favour of promoting this sort of 'in-house' research, the question of 
whether an enormous financial entity such as the World Bank, involved in the selective 
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disbursement of money, should be in the business of closing knowledge gaps is highly 
debated (see Standing 2000: 751). Moreover, it raises important question marks over how 
knowledge is defined, valued and selected, and by whom. 
As discussed in chapter 3, understanding the power-knowledge nexus in discourse is 
extremely important. The situation outlined above is particularly pertinent in this regard. 
Whilst Stiglitz, in his capacity of Chief Economist at the World Bank, advocated a less 
narrow version of neoliberalism and the broadening of development objectives through the 
PWC framework, he did not question the idea that it was the World Bank's job to promote a 
consensus of some kind on development policy (Toye and Toye 2005: 5). In this respect there 
is, as Standing suggests, a danger of knowledge hegemony (2000: 752). For a long time now, 
as witnessed with respect to the WC, research and views emanating from the Washington-
based institutions have been disseminated and propagated in a way that has dominated policy 
within the global development arena. Today the World Bank Institute212 (WBI) acts as a 
conduit in facilitating this process, providing assistance to over two hundred partner 
institutions and think tanks around the world that subscribe to its values and ideologies. In 
this capacity, the WBI has increased the accessibility of societies in the South to its partner 
organisations, as well as to the World Bank (or 'knowledge bank' as referred to by the WBI), 
facilitating the formation of a transnational intellectual hub of knowledge, through which 
information and ideas are diffused and disseminated. 
Interestingly, in a book written after his much publicised resignation at the end of 
1999213, Stiglitz voiced his opposition to the notion that the World Bank should promulgate 
any package of development policy doctrines, stating that the opposition to globaIisation, 
visible in many parts of the world, is not against globalisation per se, but rather is about the 
particular set of doctrines imposed by the IF Is (2002: 22 I). As already noted above, Stiglitz 
212 The WEI, previously known as the Economic Development Institute, was created in 1955 and operates as the 
'learning arm' of the Bank, providing policy advice and technical assistance at the global level (World Bank 
website e). 
213 It is widely considered that Stiglil2 was forced out of the World Bank following his outspoken criticisms 
over key IMF-US policies. In particular ,US Department Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers was speculated 
to have requested that Stiglil2 be silenced (Uchitelle 1999). His criticisms, of the IMF in particular, became even 
more vocal following his resignation, as witnessed in a damning article he wrote on the IMF: "They'll say the 
IMF is arrogant. They'll say the IMF doesn't really listen to the developing countries it is supposed to help. 
They'll say the IMF is secretive and insulated from democratic accountability. They'll say the IMF's economic 
"remedies" often make things worse - turning slowdowns into recessions and recessions into depressions. And 
they'll have a point. I was Chier Economist at the World Bank from !996 until!ast November, during the 
gravest global economic crisis in a half-century. I saw how the IMF, in tandem with the US Treasury 
Department, responded. And I was appalled" (Stiglitz 2000). 
188 
Chapter 7: The Millennium Challenge Account and Poverty Reduction 
did not, whilst employed in the World Bank, question this issue openly. In fact, it appears he 
was only able to voice his opinions openly once free from the constraints placed on him as an 
employee of the IF!. As he stated following his departure from the Bank, "Rather than 
muzzle myself, or be muzzled, I decided to leave,,214 (cited in Paterson 2001). Consequently, 
as Toye and Toye discuss, it appears that "even defiant bureaucrats, or 'rebels within', cannot 
escape from the Bank's institutional imperative to preach a doctrine, and that the United 
States will act to reinforce this imperative when it thinks it is under threat" (2005: 5). Within 
this context, one must question the degree to which the IFIs were, and still are, serious about 
opening themselves up to new ideas, moving beyond the conventional approaches enshrined 
within the WC. Thus, whilst the construction of the World Bank as the 'knowledge bank' 
may well have reinforced the institution's 'legitimacy' within the international development 
arena, the extent to which this represented a fundamental departure away from the traditional 
orthodoxy among policymakers in Washington D.C. is debateable. As the following section 
discusses, the PRSPs, which were promoted by the World Bank and IMF to replace the 
highly controversial and much contested SAPs, give some indication as to how this rhetoric 
of change has been reflected in practice. 
7.4 Exploring the PRSPs and drawing connections to the MeA 
The PRSPs have been discussed already within this chapter and therefore the primary 
focus here is to start making connections between these programmes and the MCA. Not 
surprisingly, bearing in mind the MCC's geographical and ideological proximity to the World 
Bank, clear similarities can be drawn between the MCA and the PRSPs. In fact, it was 
suggested in a 2003 report to Congress on the MCA that the PRSPs might serve, where 
appropriate, as a guiding framework for MCA programme goals (see Nowels 2003). 
Consequently, it is important here to start considering where parallels can be drawn between 
the two programmes and, similarly, examine areas in which there may be divergence. This 
discussion begins by analysing the important issue of conditionality which, as stated earlier, 
was the hallmark of the WC. 
214 According to Bebbington et aI, the World Bank could be viewed as a 'battlefield of knowledge' , where 
contests are waged within different arenas, including; between World Bank staff, externally with non-World 
Bank actors, and in 'cross-border battles' that engage large communities whose "membership transcend 
institutional boundaries" (2004: 38). This corresponds with what Sharp et al refer to as the 'entanglements of 
power', which is discussed in section 3.1.5 of chapter 3. 
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7.4.1 Conditionality repackaged 
In chapter 3, there was a discussion on the MCA's pre-emptive approach to delivering 
aid, whereby countries must meet a range of criteria before becoming eligible for MCA 
funds21s (see section 3.7.1). These indicators fall into three categories: 'Economic Freedom', 
'Ruling Justly' and 'Investing in People', and this combination reflects, to a large degree, the 
shift in emphasis towards broadening development objectives associated with the apparent 
transition to the PWC. However, as witnessed with regard to the PRSPs in which the World 
Bank's 'Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative' (HIPC) operates as an incentive for country 
adherence to the programmes, the MCA funds act as an incentive for countries to pursue 
sound policy environments. This approach adopted by the MCC follows, as demonstrated in 
the following interview extract, the lead of the World Bank: 
"David Dollar at the World Bank wrote a book a couple of years back called 
Assessing Aid and it looked at economic growth assistance in the world. It was an 
empirical study and the conclusion was that if you want to invest to bring about 
economic growth you really only get a return on that investment if the countries 
themselves are trying to put in place the policies and environment for economic 
growth. So if you invest in countries that have bad policy environments you get very 
little economic growth return" (research interview with Jim Vermillion216). 
Inclusion within the MCA is contingent upon a country's performance at meeting a 
predefined set of criteria which are seen, according to the philosophy driving the initiative, as 
being conducive to 'economic growth'. Misleadingly, some have referred to the transition 
towards greater 'selectivity' in the delivery of aid as representing the 'abandonment' of 
conditionality (see Chhotray and Hulme 2007). This, however, is far from the truth. If 
anything, the approach adopted by the MCA symbolises the next phase in conditionality 
strategy. This remoulding of conditionality, instigated by the World Bank, is indicative of the 
new 'consensus' in development in which the promotion of sound policy environments has 
gained significant ground within policy objectives. According to Chhotray and Hulme, 
21S That being said, in the first year selection process Mozambique and Georgia were selected despite not 
~assing the indicator test. 
16 Jim Vermillion, Managing Director for Latin America in the MCC - Interview held in Washington D.e. on 
5th October 2005. 
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however, the MeA took the recommendation of the World Bank's report on 'Assessing Aid' 
to give assistance selectively to its 'logical extreme,217. 
7.4.2 Ownership. consultation and participation 
According to the World Bank, one of the core principles underlying the PRSPs is that 
they are country-driven, involving "broad-based participation by civil society and the private 
sector in all operational steps" (World Bank website 1). As discussed in chapter 3, the MCA 
adopts a similar philosophy in its emphasis on 'country-ownership', in which recipient states 
are responsible for designing and implementing their own MeA programmes. Once again, 
this shift in rhetoric, evident in both the PRSPs and the MCA, is a product ofthe 'new' 
consensus on development. In the World Bank's report on 'Assessing Aid', which as 
mentioned above was hugely influential in shaping the MeA's approach to country 
selectivity, it states that a painful lesson from past experience is that "govermnent and 
community ownership of projects is crucial" (Dollar and Pritchett 1998: 79). However, as 
alluded to earlier in discussing the PRSPs, the extent to which this change in rhetoric was 
reflected in practice has been the subject of much debate: 
"P RSPs vary widely in quality, 'coverage and depth. .. Some are honest reflections of 
government strategies, with input from a range of civil society groups, while others 
are largely written by consultants or donors and involve much less government 
commitment" (Radelet 2003: 85) 
Ambiguity surrounding these strategies has clear implications for the MeA, especially in 
terms of 'consultation' and 'ownership', with many of the MeA programmes appearing to 
build upon the country's PRSPs. This relationship is highly visible in several of the MeA 
compact agreements, in which direct and indirect links are drawn between the two initiatives 
(for example see the compacts for Armenia, Benin, Honduras and Nicaragua218, to name just 
a few). Although I fully recognise the need for consistency between the MeA proposals and 
217 Furthermore, they argue that the recognition in the report that "aid can nurture reform in even the most 
distorted environments, but it requires patience and a focus on ideas not money", is blatantly missing from the 
MCA (Chhotray and Hulme 2007: 11). 
218 These documents can be accessed on the MCC website (www.mcc.gov). With regard to Nicaragua, the 
National Development Plan (NDP), which was established by the government to compliment the country's 
PRSP, served as a foundation for the consultation effort to develop the MCC proposal. 
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the PRSPs in recipient countries, one cannot ignore the dangers that such a relationship may 
entail. The following extract adds weight to this concern: 
"The Honduran Government contends that the MCC proposal is based on the 
consultations underlying the Poverty-Reduction Strategy Paper ... and that it, 
therefore, enjoys broad popular consensus. However, the PRSP process in Honduras 
was widely criticized by civil society groups; and, therefore, it should not so much 
serve as a model for effective citizens' participation but, rather, as a cautionary 
lesson of what can go wrong" (Walsh 2005: np). 
The issues of consultation, participation and ownership are explored in much greater 
detail in the following chapter on 'democracy' and the MCA. For now, however, it is 
important to iterate that these themes were identified, within the framework ofthe PWC, as 
being crucial in pursuing the central goal of 'poverty reduction'. Yet despite this positive 
rhetoric, events on the ground continue to raise questions about their implementation in 
practice. The possible reasons for this situation are many, ranging from conceptual ambiguity 
over, for example, what 'participation' should mean in practice, to problems resulting from 
civil society-state relations219• In terms of the MCA, therefore, it is important to recognise 
that although it is being promoted as a 'new' initiative, it is not unrelated to the World Bank's 
PRSPs220• Consequently, in looking at Nicaragua's experience in the MCA during this 
chapter and the next, further consideration is given to the PRSPs as and when appropriate. 
7.4.3 Situating the MCA within development discourse: Concluding comments 
It is clear from the discussion thus far that the general philosophy enshrined within the 
MCA is founded upon the World Bank's re-conceptualisation of development policy in the 
latter part of the 1990s. The initiative's stringent selection process, its emphasis on country-
ownership and its drive to propagate measurable results, are rooted in the influential 
'Assessing Aid' report which, as stated previously, examined how aid may be used more 
219 See the World Bank report on participation in the PRSPs for more information on the concerns raised over 
the issue of participation (2002a). 
220 This relationship was further clarified during a conference in 2004, in which the then Chief Executive Officer 
for the MCC, Paul Applegarth, stated the following in response to a question on the relationship between the 
two programmes: "I am certainly no expert on the PRSPs, but I understand some are quite good and some are 
not... we'll really focus on and try to implement some of the good ideas that are represented in the PRSP process 
and carrying them forth" (Applegarth 2004). 
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effectively. This document encapsulated the World Bank's new vision for 'development', 
through which the core tenets ofthe PWC were promoted as the solution to past failures in 
promoting neoliberal adjustments. The PRSPs, which gave practical expression to this new 
'consensus' have had mixed successes, with concerns being voiced over the discrepancies 
between rhetoric and reality on the ground. For reasons already discussed, this may have 
repercussions for some of the MCA compacts that build upon these programmes. Moreover, 
this issue of praxis stresses the importance of analysing how the MCA's defining principles 
equate to reality on the ground within the recipient countries. 
Finally, in light of the doubts already presented in this thesis over the PWC's 
departure from the WC, it is necessary to consider the actual extent to which the MCA does 
represent something fundamentally 'new'. In order to do this, the following discussion 
considers the initiative's focus on economic growth in achieving poverty reduction. 
Ironically, given its claims to novelty, the MCA appears to have more in common with the 
WC, in terms of its understanding of the relationship between economic growth and poverty 
reduction, than with the PWC. More specifically, whereas under the WC the task of 'poverty 
reduction' was generally left to the 'trickle-down' effect of economic growth (an association 
which greatly underestimated the complex realities faced by many countries in the South), the 
PWC identified "poverty reduction as an immediate objective of development assistance 
rather than as a consequence of the economic growth the assistance is designed to stimulate" 
(Hayami 2003: 57). As such, there was a shift in rhetoric from promoting a narrowly defined 
model of development based on the primacy of economic growth, to a more holistic 
approach, where issues such as education and healthcare were given greater emphasis. Whilst 
the MCC does purportedly, through its highly stringent selection criteria, induce progress in 
the three broad areas of 'Ruling Justly', 'Investing in People' and 'Promoting Economic 
Freedom', its core focus is much more constrained. As I was told in an interview with the 
MCC Managing Director for Latin America, Jim Vermillion, the MCA programme is "all 
about economic growth". Consequently, although 'reducing global poverty' is stated as the 
MCA's central objective, the funds are· focus sed primarily on promoting 'economic growth' 
in recipient countries. In light of past events, the relationship between economic growth and 
poverty reduction is highly contentious. Furthermore, the significant budgetary cuts made to 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), especially in Latin and 
Central America (as analysed in detail within chapter 6), prompt further questions about how 
US assistance is being orientated. 
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7.5 Exploring poverty reduction in Nicaragua's MeA 
The first part of this chapter located the MCA broadly within a theoretical framework 
of shifting development discourse, within which 'poverty reduction' has emerged as the 
number one priority in development policy rhetoric. Attention now turns toward looking 
explicitly at Nicaragua's experience in the new initiative, examining the relationship between 
the MCA and poverty reduction. However, it is useful in starting this discussion to reflect 
briefly upon how knowledge around poverty issues has been constructed and contested in 
Nicaragua. For example, as I experienced during the course of my research in Nicaragua, 
there is an interesting discourse around the issue of identity. In particular, several of the 
individuals I spoke to vigorously contested the notion that their country is 'poor' and argued 
instead that it is 'impoverished': 
"Now there is something I don't accept - that Nicaragua is poor. Nicaragua is not a 
poor country, it is an impoverished country ... " (research interview with Jilma 
8alladares221 ). 
Recognising the subtle difference between being 'poor' and being 'impoverished' is very 
important here. Whereas being 'poor' may simply refer to, for example, individuals without 
possessions or wealth, being 'impoverished' refers to the actual process through which such 
conditions are created, i.e. how these individuals were made poor and/or reduced to poverty. 
As a result, despite the fact that the terms 'poor' and 'impoverished' are frequently used 
interchangeably, there is a fundamental difference between them. As I witnessed in 
Nicaragua, this has substantial repercussions when it comes to issues of identity and 
representation (a theme explored in greater detail below). This is especially true when 
looking at Nicaraguan history in which, as previously discussed in chapter 4, power was/is 
monopolised by elite actors within society, leading to conditions of extreme inequality and 
social polarisation. Once again, Robinson's conceptualisation of'polyarchy' is particularly 
pertinent in this regard, as it refers to the process by which such relations were, despite being 
actively resisted and contested, maintained in many Latin American societies, including 
Nicaragua. What is more, the US was seen by many, especially during the Cold War period, 
to be complicit in strengthening and supporting these systems of control. Therefore, much 
221 Jilma Balladares, MCA·Nicaragua Civil Society Director in representation ofFUNDAPADELE - Interview 
held in the city ofLe6n on 21" June 2006. 
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consideration is given during this chapter and the next to examining the extent to which the 
MeA will help address these profound inequalities in Nicaragua. 
7.5.1 Contesting 'knowledge': A regional case study 
As suggested by the above discussion, how we understand 'poverty' is essential in 
shaping development discourse and, therefore, policy. To demonstrate the practical 
implications of this further, the chapter now draws upon a particular case study from 
Nicaragua where the prevailing discourse on poverty, established within the structure ofthe 
country's PRSP, was contested, resisted and deconstructed at a regional level. As already 
stated, despite the positive rhetoric surrounding the World Bank's PRSPs, these programmes 
were, in several cases, heavily criticised. Nicaragua was no exception in this regard. As I 
discovered during the course of my fieldwork in the country, an extremely interesting and 
unique process arose in response to Nicaragua's PRSP. When the Nicaraguan government 
formulated its analysis of poverty as part of the PRSP process, this area of the country was 
surprisingly designated as having only 'medium poverty' and, therefore, was not included in 
the programme. However, as the following interview extract reveals, there was confusion 
among individuals from the region as to how this categorisation came about: 
"Our municipalities were classified before the survey as a region of extreme poverty. 
Then Hurricane Mitch cami22 ... it destroyed roads, it destroyed buildings for 
drinking water ... it destroyed lots of other things. After there was the survey looking at 
the level of life and we, who were in extreme poverty before, were then classified as 
only living in medium poverty. So we were confused as to how we had stepped up two 
222 "To Nicaragua, Mitch meant 41,420 houses affected, with displacements and relocations of up to 30% of the 
population in some places and thousands of families living almost out in the open for months. This of course 
also meant unemployment. In environmental terms it meant landslides, the gouging out of deep new gullies, the 
widening of water channels, a loss offorest cover and topsoil (760,712 acres of soil for agricultural and forestry 
use), the covering of previously fertile river lowlands with sand, contaminated water sources and destroyed 
wells. In productive terms, it meant the loss of71 % of the second-cycle bean crop and 51 % of the corn crop, 
2.6% of the country's call1e, 6.9% of its horses, 7.5% of its pigs and 149,000 chickens. Worst of all, it meant the 
loss of thousands of human lives" (Rocha et al 1999: np). 
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levels ... How after Mitch did we go up?" 223 (research interview with Juan Jose 
Ray0224). 
As Bradshaw and Linneker note, clear differences in opinion exist in terms of "how poverty 
is defined, its causes and manifestations, between actors operating within the dominant global 
paradigm and those seeking to change it" (2003: 7). In the wake of this seemingly unfair 
categorisation (combined with the subsequent exclusion of civil society movements in the 
region from the country's national PRSP process), an extremely interesting process emerged 
within the municipalities of north Leon. In response to this situation, a parallel regional 
strategy for poverty reduction was drawn up by local actors and this became known as the 
PRSPcito ('our little PRSP'). The following extract from an interview with an individual 
heading this process in north Leon, sheds further light on this issue: 
"] told them generally about the ownership talk, about this PRSP ... and people got 
mad, and said 'they are talking about ownership and they are talking about poverty, 
and we are sitting out here and we didn't even know that they are talking about it '. So 
after we had those two workshops we decided that we would try to make our own 
PRSP startingfrom scratch ... " (research interview with Eva Rasmussen225). 
It is interesting to note that this regional process began by deconstructing an exc\usionary 
definition of poverty, creating a new definition based on local perceptions and needs. From 
there, individuals in north Leon were able to identify what they saw as the causes of poverty 
in their lives, around which the PRSPcito was formulated. Furthermore, this event 
emphasises the sensitive issue of 'knowledge' production (mentioned earlier in relation to the 
World Bank promoting itself as a 'knowledge bank'), which can both enable and potentially 
disable voices within development. As Cupples et a\ reflect, the national PRSP process 
revealed what Power (2003) refers to as the 'spatiality of power and discourse in 
development', which "determines who gets to have a voice in particular discursive spaces" 
(2007: 583). 
223 In the MCA compact between Nicaragua and the US it is written that the region of Leon and Chinandega is 
believed to have "some of the most extreme poverty" in Nicaragua (MCC-Nicaragua Compact 2005: annex 1-
2). How, therefore, did conditions of poverty in the region apparently improve in the immediate aftermath of 
hurricane Mitch in 1998 and then deteriorate back to extreme poverty in the run-up to the MCA? 
224 Juan Jose Rayo, Executive Director of AMULE6N - Interviewed in the town of El Sauce in north Leon on 
5th June 2006. 
225 Eva Rasmussen, Journalist - Interview held in Managua on 15th May 2006. 
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Although the actual impact of this regional strategy for poverty reduction on the 
country's national PRSP was limited, it did draw significant media attention at a national 
level and culminated in the eventual signing of the Achuapa Agreements mentioned in the 
previous chapter (section 6.7.3). In light of this success, one could argue that deconstructing 
dominant discourse on 'poverty' can, in fact, be a means of empowerment, through which 
such exclusionary spaces may be challenged and contested. This adds substance to the 
argument that power, as discussed in chapter 3, is not solely an attribute of the dominant, but 
it is also present in the ability to resist, in which situations, groupings and actions are 
established to resist the impositions of dominating power (see Sharp et al 2000). Moreover, 
this episode once again illustrates the importance of looking beyond policy rhetoric to 
exploring events on the ground. In light of this, attention now turns towards looking explicitly 
at Nicaragua's MCA and examining the extent to which the MCC's core mission to reduce 
poverty may be fulfilled in practice 
7.6 Nicaragua's MeA: Tackling poverty? 
The rest ofthis chapter is devoted to examining what impact Nicaragua's MCA is 
likely to have on regional poverty. It is arguably too early (bearing in mind the slow pace at 
which compact implementation is taking place in Nicaragua and the fact that when writing 
this chapter the country was less than halfway through its 5 year agreement) to be 
commenting on the actual impacts and results of the programme. Instead, this chapter 
examines Nicaragua's three MCA-components and discusses how, on the basis of 
explorations of both interview material and secondary sources, each of these may contribute 
to the central goal of poverty reduction. Although this analysis is framed within a regional 
context, i.e. in the departments of Le6n and Chinandega where the funds are being primarily 
invested, it is important to remember the MCC anticipates a nation-wide impact and, 
therefore, further consideration is given to the issue of scale in the overall thesis conclusion. 
For now, however, we focus on examining the largest MCA programme component, 
receiving well over half ofthe US$175 million compact total, which it the 'Transportation 
Project' . 
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7.7 The Transportation Project 
As clarified already in this thesis, the MCA is for all sense and purposes an economic 
fund, in which economic growth is identified as the key to poverty reduction. The 
prioritisation of this infrastructural component within Nicaragua's programme is, therefore, 
not unexpected. Indeed, it is a recurring theme throughout many ofthe MCA-countries. 
Accordingly, the desired outcomes of this component, such as reduced transportation costs, 
improved trade and new investment, fit very much within this broader model of economic 
development promoted through the MCA framework. In terms of the actual programme 
goals, 'income gains' from the construction and upgrading of roads will be used to measure 
the contribution of the project to the promotion of economic growth and, 'therefore.', the 
reduction of poverty. The savings made by the beneficiaries of the project (i.e. road users, 
business employees and surrounding communities) due to the anticipated reduction in 
transportation costs and travel times will, according to the 'Monitoring and Evaluation' 
section of Nicaragua's compact agreement, be disaggregated by gender, income level and 
age. This disaggregation is important in helping to determine changes in 'relative' poverty. 
In light of Nicaragua's history, in which 'development' has often been highly 
sporadic and unequal in its impact, it is extremely important to look beyond general figures 
on income levels, to examining the extent to which benefits resulting from a project such as 
this may be experienced throughout the cross-section of society. As a result, progress towards 
poverty reduction cannot simply be equated to regional increases in income levels, but must 
be situated within the context of combating widespread inequality. In this regard, the 
perspective taken within this thesis is that in order to achieve real and sustainable reductions 
in regional poverty, the MCA programme must be based on inclusivity and equitable 
development. It is not enough to assume, as the SAPs disastrously did, that the benefits of 
economic growth will simply 'trickle down' to the poor. The PWC, which located poverty 
reduction as the number one priority of development policy, was born, in part, through 
recognition of this fact. Therefore, much of the following analysis is devoted to exploring the 
degree to which Nicaragua's MCA will, through its narrow agenda of promoting economic 
growth, propagate meaningful reductions in poverty at the regional level. 
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7.7.1 Examining road selection: The NI road upgrade 
This section is primarily concerned with exploring the selection of the 58km NI road, 
which runs from Nejapa (located on the outskirts of Nicaragua's capital Managua) to Izapa in 
the south of the department of Le6n. Upgrading this one road utilises about US$32 million of 
the project funds and, therefore, represents a very large proportion of the MCA's overall 
budget. As a result, it is important to reflect upon why this particular road was chosen and 
consider what impact its development is likely to have on poverty levels within the region. 
Moreover, as stated in the previous chapter (see section 6.8.2), the decision to use MCA 
funds to develop this particular stretch of road was initially met by protest within the region. 
In fact, during the course of several interviews it came to light that an exercise had been 
undertaken in the occident of the country in which the NI road was actually voted to be 
lowest regional priority and a road to the north of Chinandega the highest. Why, therefore, 
were the central government and the MCC so determined to include it in the MCA? Out of all 
the roads to be built, this was the only one to be pre-selected within the compact agreement 
signed between the Nicaraguan government and the MCC. The potential motivations for this 
situation are explored in detail below. 
7.7.2 The MCA and the Plan Puebla Panama: Implications for poverty reduction 
As suggested in section 6.8.2 of the previous chapter, the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP) 
was one of the motives behind the road's prioritisation in the fund. In fact, this huge 
infrastructural project was identified as a potential reason for why the region of Leon-
Chinandega was selected to take part in the MCA in the first place, adding further weight to 
the importance assigned to the PPP by both the US and previous Nicaraguan government. 
Furthermore, if we turn our attention towards Honduras' MCA compact we can see a similar 
theme, in which the CA-5 highway (an important section of the PPP) is to receive over 
US$96 million (MCC-Honduras Compact 2005). In El Salvador, close to US$140 million in 
MCA funds has been assigned to improving the 'Northern Transnational Highway' (MCC-El 
Salvador compact 2006) and this route is one of the Inter-American Development Bank's 
(IADB) transportation mega-projects, contributing directly to the advancement of the PPP. 
Bearing in mind the economic model of development being promoted through the MCA, the 
prioritisation of these roads is not unexpected. However, it does, as discussed below, raise 
some important questions over the issue of poverty reduction. 
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The PPP, launched in 2001, is defined by the IADB as an 'integration initiative' that 
supports the three regional development goals of: 'equitable economic growth, the 
sustainable management of natural resources and human/social development' (see the IADB 
website). However, despite this positive rhetoric, the programme has been strongly criticised 
for promoting what is seen by many to be a highly contested neoliberal vision of 
development in the Mesoamerican area (O'Neill 2004). Pickard argues that the project, aimed 
at the region's insertion into corporate globalisation, "downplays the structural problems of 
underdevelopment related to the concentration of economic and political power in the hands 
of the elite and the corresponding lack of opportunities for the majority" (2004: 2). More 
generally, this mega-project clearly represents what chapter 3 defined as the hegemonic 
ideology of this epoch, 'transnationalliberalism', in which universal progress is seen to 
depend upon the "expansion and extension of capitalist markets across the globe" (6 Tuathail 
and Dalby 1998: 19). Within this context, Robinson's conceptualisation of 'polyarchy' is 
particularly useful, as it helps us to understand why, despite the abundance of rich natural 
resources, there continues to be such impoverishment within the affected countriel26• 
Accordingly, the MCA's contribution to poverty reduction must be measured, in part, by its 
support of this controversial trade corridor and its subsequent commitment to the contested 
development model being promoted through the PPP. 
In light of the above discussion, it is easy to see how the PPP will contribute to the 
advancement of a free trade area in the America's and it is of direct relevance to the 
Dominican Republic-Central American Freed Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).1t is not 
surprising, therefore, that as well as facilitating the creation of the PPP, Nicaragua's MCA 
programme is helping to generate the conditions necessary for the country's insertion into a 
regional free-trade area. The road component of the MCA is particularly important in this 
respect, as it is creating part of the infrastructure seen as necessary for this process to take 
place. However, as witnessed in debates around the PPP, DR-CAFTA has also, as discussed 
in chapter 4, been a highly divisive issue, reflecting polarised views on how its 
implementation will affect poverty and inequality in the Central American region. In terms of 
the impact ofthe NI road's construction on poverty levels in Lean and Chinandega, it is clear 
that the primary beneficiaries of the project will be the medium to large business 
organisations (especially those operating in an international context), that need the PPP 
226 According to Pickard, the PPP covers eight countries and a total of 65 million people, about 50% of which 
are classified as being in extreme poverty (2004: 2). 
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completed in order to minimise the costs and time involved in transporting their goods and 
services. These transporters are not, as one respondent from north Le6n commented, the poor 
and yet it has been "insisted that this road must be built because it is related to the Plan 
Puebla Panama" (research interview with Evert Delgadill0227). One must, therefore, question 
the inclusivity ofthe MCA programme which, as argued earlier, is a prerequisite for 
sustainable poverty reduction in Nicaragua. Nevertheless, before making any judgments on 
such issues, it is essential to examine the second part of the Transportation Project, in which 
US$60 million is to be utilised for upgrading and constructing secondary roads. 
7.7.3 Examining road selection: Secondary roads 
Bearing in mind the discussion thus far, it should come as no surprise that the 
inclusion of secondary roads in the MCA programme was driven by 'economic' reasoning. 
As illustrated in Nicaragua's MCA compact, the problems resulting from the poor conditions 
ofthese roads were couched in purely economic terms, with issues such as 'damaged goods' 
and 'high operating costs' being identified as direct impediments to trade at the regional, 
national and international level. The US$60 million investment is, therefore, part and parcel 
of the development model alluded to in the previous section. This economic mindset is 
furthermore illustrated in the conditionalities placed on the region in terms of secondary road 
selection, in which their inclusion is dependent upon several criteria, including meeting a 
minimal threshold for the 'economic rate of return' (ERR). The importance of the ERR in this 
process was apparently stressed upon the Nicaraguan government by the MCC, on the 
grounds that the US did not want to see tax payers' money being used to construct roads 
going to 'nowhere'. The following section explores this issue further and considers what 
impact it may have on poverty reduction in the region. 
7.7.4 Addressing poverty? The ERR and the roads to 'nowhere' 
Although every municipality within the departments of Le6n and Chinandega would 
inevitably like to see some of the US$60 million invested in improving transport 
infrastructure within their particular localities, the funds are restricted in terms of how much 
they can do. As one respondent discussed in an interview, "road selection is a very critical 
227 Evert Delgadillo, Mayor of El Sauce and Association of Municipalities from North Le6n (AMULE6N)-
Interview held in the town of El Sauce in north Le6n on 7th June 2006. 
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and sensitive thing. Each Mayor wants a road in their municipality included but the reality is 
that funds are limited and we are not going to be able to do all the roads that are proposed" 
(research interview with Julio Montealegre228). As a result, a set of technical criteria is used 
by MCA-Nicaragua to select eligible roads within the region, ranging from inclusion within 
the medium-term investment plan of Nicaragua's 'Ministry of Transportation and 
Infrastructure' (MTI) to, as mentioned above, meeting a threshold level in terms of the ERR 
(see MCA-Nicaragua compact 2005). Although all of these are important, it is the latter 
conditionality that is of greatest interest here. In fact, throughout the course of the research in 
Nicaragua, the use ofthe ERR in determining secondary road selection was a recurring point 
of concern in interviews, especially among individuals from the region itself. Consequently, 
this section now considers the logic driving this approach to regional development and draws 
upon the research material to consider what impact this focus may have on poverty reduction 
in Le6n and Chinandega. 
The ERR is conducive to the model of development being promoted through the 
MCA, which is aimed at ensuring the greatest 'bang for buck'. Bearing in mind the problems 
that this project component is aiming to fix, such as high transportation costs and excessive 
travel times, the selection of secondary roads that offer the greatest opportunity for economic 
impact is not unexpected. However, it is the correlation between this economic impact and 
regional poverty reduction that requires further analysis. If, as the ERR dictates, MCA funds 
are only to be invested in roads that meet a minimum economic threshold (based 
predominantly on traffic volume), then it is logical that the most impoverished parts of the 
region will be excluded from this process, as they are likely to fall short of the required 
economic requirements. These areas, situated on the so called 'roads to nowhere', are 
arguably the places where people have the most need for assistance. One can, therefore, 
question the merits of using a predominantly economically-driven approach to road selection. 
An interview undertaken with the Mayor of El Sauce in the north of Le6n, where poverty is 
particularly high, adds weight to this suggestion: 
" ... they say that the Millennium Challenge Account is to reduce poverty. It is to create 
access to trade in the peripheral communities so the producers can go sell their 
products. But the problem we have is that these sectors are poor. The 11 dry 
228 Julio Montealegre, Progranune Co-ordinator for the MCA-Nicaragua/Civil Society Director for Chinandega 
in MCA-Nicaragua - Interview held in Managua on 30th March 2006. 
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municipalities of Lean and Chinandega have conditions rangingfrom poor to extreme 
poor ... They surprise you when they start using the rate of return, which determines 
how much traffic is likely to use the road in a certain time period ... Then they tell you 
that the road doesn't fulfil the requirements and therefore will not be built because of 
this: .. This issue shouldn't be seen in terms of how many vehicles will be used, but 
that there are human beings whose lives depend on good communication networks. 
For example, Achuapa is 23km away and a bus takes an hour and a half to get there ... 
the life of a person lookingfor a hospital could depend upon that road" (interview 
with Evert Delgadillo). 
Additionally, several other interview respondents proposed replacing the ERR with a 'social 
rate of return' (SRR), on the grounds that resources should be channelled to areas where there 
is not already assistance, i.e. those places with the greatest need. However, despite these 
criticisms, it is unlikely that the economic logic behind secondary road selection will change: 
"Philosophically our view is that you have to step back and identifY how can you 
really get poverty reduction, because our belief is that without economic growth there 
is not going to be poverty reduction ... So there may be some cases, and these are the 
tough decisions that have to be made, where focussing resources on one area may 
have greater aggregate impact for the entire region ... it is something that is important 
for people to realise. It may be that you want to develop a road in one of the most 
remote poor poor areas but ... that may not have the greatest amount of impact ... " 
(research interview with Matt Bohn229). 
Arguably, the prioritisation of secondary roads according to their economic credibility is 
indicative of the MCC's agenda for strict selectivity in development, i.e. working with those 
areas or countries that have the greatest potential for economic growth. But what does this 
mean for those places that not included due to their 'lack' of potential? As one respondent 
discussed, "if we want to attack poverty, it needs to be remembered that the poorest cannot 
even get on a bus" (interview with Evert Delgadillo). In terms of Le6n and Chinandega more 
specifically, how will these areas that constitute 'nowhere', and currently have few 
opportunities for growth, engage with the MeA-process if they are marginalised for not 
229 Matt Bohn, MCC representative in Nicaragua - Interview held in Managua on 14"' August 2006. 
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meeting the required economic thresholds? There is clearly a danger that these areas will, 
without sufficient investment, be sidelined from this development process, potentially 
resulting in the formation of poverty hotspots and the exacerbation of regional inequality. 
Bearing in mind parallel concerns over the potential impact ofthe PPP and DR-CAFTA, 
doubts over changes in relative poverty are not unwarranted. 
7.7.5 Drawing conclusions: The Transportation Project and poverty reduction 
It is clear in concluding this discussion that the transportation component is part and 
parcel of the MCA' s ideological vision for 'transformational development', in which 
economic growth through trade is promoted as the panacea for widespread global poverty. 
The Central American MCA programmes which, as discussed earlier, support the PPP and 
strengthen DR-CAFT A, are a testament to this reality. Whilst the Transportation Project will 
undoubtedly facilitate regional economic growth, assisting individuals and businesses to 
access new markets both internally and externally, it is less clear as to how this will translate 
into poverty reduction on the ground. As noted already, history dictates that it is not enough 
to assume that the benefits reaped from economic growth will simply trickle down to the poor 
and Latin America's historical experience bears witness to this fact. It will, therefore, be 
interesting to see in the future how the anticipated income gains from this particular project 
component affect levels of relative poverty in the region. For now, however, it is important to 
remember that the Transportation Project is part of a package, in which there are three 
mutually enforcing components. Although each of these is examined individually here to 
facilitate clarity within the discussion, it is the combination of these programmes that will 
ultimately determine the impact of the overall project on economic growth and poverty 
reduction. As a result, whilst the next section does focus specifically on examining the 
potential contribution of the 'Rural Business Development Project' on poverty within the 
region, it is essential to bear these connections in mind. 
7.8 The Rural Business Development Project (RBDP) 
The RBDP is the second largest component of Nicaragua's MCA programme and has 
been allocated US$33.7 million. This project is predominantly focussed upon the 
development of 'higher-profit agriculture and agribusiness enterprise' within the region, with 
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the stated intention of directly benefiting relatively poor households employed in agriculture 
or with small fanns, as well as creating new and/or expanded market opportunities for 
agribusinesses and other micro/small/medium-sized enterprises (MeA-Nicaragua compact 
2005). This is to be achieved, according to the compact agreement, through a three-pronged 
approach involving the provision of rural business development services, technical and 
financial assistance, and grants to improve water supply for fanning and forestry. In terms of 
measuring programme success, income gains resulting from this component are once again to 
be used in determining progress at meeting the compact goal of poverty reduction through 
economic growth, with these figures similarly disaggregated by gender, income level and 
age. In tenns of chapter structure, analysis of this particular component is concentrated on 
two key inter-related areas of interest. The first section explores programme incIusivity and 
the second considers the issue of accessibility to credit. Both these areas are crucial in 
qualifying the programme's pro-poor credentials and their prioritisation in this analysis 
reflects what appeared to be the main points of concern for interview respondents over this 
particular component. 
7.8.1 Examining programme inclusivity 
As the previous discussion on road selection demonstrated, analysing incIusivity 
within Nicaragua's MeA programme is paramount to understanding the potential impact of 
this initiative on relative poverty levels within the region. Historically, governments in 
Nicaragua have tended to prioritise 'big producers' within the country's development, despite 
the fact that medium-small producers represent the large majority of the population. A key 
question must, therefore, be whether Nicaragua's MeA will adhere to this legacy of 
promoting 'big business' or reflect the positive rhetoric of the compact agreement in which 
'poor'households' and 'small fanns' are located as the direct beneficiaries of the RBDP. The 
following interview extract sheds further light on this issue: 
" ... the problem with the country is that the loans only benefit the large scale 
businessmen. That is the big problem, and it is philosophical problem. Our economic 
directors think that the big businessmen must be strengthened, so these people can 
generate more resources, and those resources will generate employment ... and that is 
not true. I hope that the leaders of the United States understand this - that they realise 
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this is a problem, because if they have the same mentality then the results will be the 
same" (interview with Rigoberto Sampson230). 
Between September and December 2005, a Nicaraguan programme funded by the 
Department for International Development (DflD) called the 'Promotion of Equity through 
Pro-Poor Growth' (PEMCE), undertook a comprehensive regional diagnostic across the 
twenty-three municipalities of Lean and Chinandega. Through this process they identified 
different areas of production, such as shrimp, sesame seed and peanut production, and 
mapped their relative strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats and so on. During an 
interview with an individual involved in this study, a very interesting discussion arose over 
two key areas of production and their potential inclusion within the MCA's RBDP: 
"The logic behind the MCA is to create a lot of employment and although there is a 
really good market for peanuts, not many people are actually employed in producing 
this product. Sesame seed is also a good product but it involves more than seven 
thousand producers, including small businesses, where as the peanut industry only 
involves about 200 ... However, the MCA is likely to go for the peanuts, because the 
market is increasing and they want assurances that the product will be viable and 
work. But sesame seed production will involve more areas, more people, and will 
ultimately improve the lives of more people" (research interview with Nelda 
Sanchez231 ). 
This sentiment was reflected during another interview with an individual from Lean, in which 
it was stated that under DR-CAFTA peanut production would have an advantage in exporting 
to the US, with the 'big producers' making large profits through an industry that is very 
mechanised and requires little in the way of manual labour. Fortunately it appears, from the 
information currently available, that project efforts are being focussed on areas of production 
that require large amounts of manual labour and, therefore, promote employment. For 
example, in the MCC's status report on Nicaragua produced in October 2007, it was stated 
that roughly 980 bean, cassava and sesame producers had received technical assistance in 
'marketing their products', with support in the way of 'technical and market access' also 
230 Rigoberto Sampson, Dean of the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN) and Civil Observer 
in MeA-Nicaragua - Interview held in the city ofLe6n on the 21" June 2006. 
23I Nelda S{mchez, consultant for DflD in Nicaragua - Interview held in Managua on the 3'" April 2006. 
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granted to cattle producers. The emphasis placed on these specific areas, as opposed to the 
highly mechanised industries of shrimp and peanut production, is clearly positive. However, 
that being said, there are a number of potential threats that must be highlighted in considering 
the future prospects of this project component. 
7.8.2 Representation and the Departmental Development Councils 
As discussed in chapter 6, the Departmental Development Councils (DDCs), which 
play a very important role in Nicaragua's MCA, are key actors within the region's 
development process. However, being relatively new entities, they are not without problems. 
In terms of the specific topic under discussion here, concerns were raised during the course of 
the research over the representation ofthe private sector within these councils, which 
according to some has been limited to participation of the 'local big businessmen'. Arguably, 
due to the location of these DD Cs, which are based in the cities of Lean and Chinandega, 
many small-medium producers and farmers operating in rural areas, particularly in the remote 
northern municipalities of these departments, are unable to participate directly in these 
bodies. Instead, their participation is often limited to representation by the municipal Mayor 
which, as discussed in the next chapter (see section 8.9), may have its drawbacks. As a result 
of this situation, there is a potential for bias within these entities, in which favour may be 
given towards the interests of big businesses participating within the councils. 
Additionally, one cannot overlook the critical issue of gender when examining 
programme inclusivity and the participation of the private sector in the programme. In a 
country that continues to be dominated by strong currents of 'machismo', women face 
unprecedented challenges to their inclusion within local, regional and national development 
processes. Although the DD Cs are discussed in much greater detail in the next chapter, it is 
important to mention within the context presented here that, as one respondent stressed to me 
in discussing CODECHI, "women had to claim this space" (research interview with Maria 
Castill0232), suggesting that the DDCs were not immediately open to them. In terms of the 
MCA more specifically, there was a strong process of mobilisation and organisation among 
women in the departments of Lean and Chinandega, in which they created a proposal entitled 
'Propuesta de las mujeres del occidente: Para su inclusion y participation en el programme 
232 Mafia Castillo, Co-ordinator for the Movement for Women in Chinandega - Interview held in the city of 
Chinandega on 25 th July 2006. 
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Cuenta Reto del Milenio' (proposal from the women of the occident: For their inclusion and 
participation in the Millennium Challenge Account)233. In this document, a strong argument 
was made for the inclusion of women within the MCA programme, highlighting the 
important roles women play in the economy, both as producers and as service providers. 
To date, these efforts appear to have been met by some success. For example, there is 
now a 'gender specialist' employed in MCA-Nicaragua, who has implemented a 'gender 
strategy' which, among other things, recognises the role of women as economic agents in the 
region's development process234• As the following extract explains, this gender perspective is 
extremely important: 
"The historical invisibility o/women and their exclusion/rom decision-making makes 
it indispensable that all plans, programmes and projects have a gender perspective. 
This perspective must aim to equalize the conditions in which they participate, and to 
eliminate the power inequities between men and women at all levels 0/ society" (Civil 
Coordinator for Emergency and Reconstruction 1999: 56). 
Nevertheless, despite these positive steps forward, one cannot ignore the cultural reality in 
which this initiative is being enacted. Nicaraguan society continues to be defined through the 
lens of machismo and this tradition is difficult to break. As was explained during an 
interview, "men fear us because they are used to having control over all the spaces of 
decision-making ... it is not easy for women to be involved in those spaces" (research 
interview with Maria Castillo). Ultimately, the success of the RBDP in combating poverty 
will depend, to a large degree, on the sustained inclusion of women within the project, not 
only as economic agents, but also as integral actors within the MCA itself. However, as the 
next section demonstrates, access to credit is one factor that could potentially undermine the 
inclusion of both small businesses and women within this project component. 
233 This document is available to download at www.cuentadelmilenio.org.ni. 
234 According to Lucas, "the focus on gender equity in the projects has already yielded results - a concerted 
effort to identify female producers as beneficiaries, training of all MCAN [MCA-Nicaragua] staff on gender 
sensitivity, and equal participation by men and women in a recent producers' training trip to Honduras" (2007c: 
8). 
208 
Chapter 7: The Millennium Challenge Account and Poverty Reduction 
7.8.3 The RBDP and access to credit 
The focus of the RBDP is not to provide credit to fanners and business men/women 
within the region, but it is targeted at the promotion of 'intelligent marketing', i.e. it is about 
how individuals within the region can market their goods, whether locally, nationally or 
internationally. This project therefore operates under the understanding that individuals 
should be steered towards existing means of finance. As a result, whilst the RBDP does 
include 'facilitating' access to credit and assisting farmers/producers in the search for 
additional finance, it does not do this itself. Despite this fact, however, there was according to 
one interview respondent a widespread belief that it would involve the distribution of credit: 
"People think that they [MCA-Nicaragua} are going to give usfunds to plant beans 
and to export them. And then they told us no. Instead we will have an office that is 
going to ... if you have an idea that you want to plant beans they are going to tell you: 
'ok, this is the type of beans and this is the period when you are supposed to plant the 
beans and we are going to help you to market it '. But, you have to get the funds to buy 
the beans from somebody else. So, people out there have the wrong idea about what 
the Millennium Challenge Account is supposed to do" (research interview with 
Alberto Aviles235). 
Misunderstandings such as these lead to ambiguity over exactly who it is that the RBDP is 
targeted at helping and also the efficiency and effectiveness with which information 
regarding the MCA is being made available to people in Le6n and Chinandega. Furthermore, 
as explained below, access to credit in Nicaragua can be highly problematic and these 
difficulties are rooted in Nicaraguan history. 
7.8.4 Accessing finance: Understanding the historical context 
Following the Sandinista revolution 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN) began adopting various reforms and policies aimed at assisting the historically 
ignored. One of the revolutionary government's first acts once in power was to nationalise 
the country's banking system, promoting the development of community banking and 
235 Alberto Aviles, businessmanlTreasurer of CODECHl/ex·Minister of Governance for Chinandega - Interview 
held in the city of Chinandega on 27th July 2006. 
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emphasising the availability oflow-cost credit to the country's poor majority. With the onset 
of the 1990s, however, things were to change dramatically, as a pro-US government was 
elected in Nicaragua and strict economic reforms were adopted by the ruling party, based 
upon the prescribed neoliberal SAPs of the IF Is. As one interviewee commented, this 
political transition coincided with the installation of private banks within the country, in 
which access to finance shifted in favour of the big producers (research interview with 
Nicolasa Laguna236). As discussed more generally in chapter 4, the policies adopted by the 
Chamorro administration tended to favour large businesses, strengthening the positions of 
monopolies, oligopolies and the business elite close to the government (Arana 1997: 84). 
Subsequently, although private banking in Nicaragua has grown considerably since the 
1990s, small agricultural producers have benefited little from this expansion (see Rocha 
1998) and the truth of this is still very much evident in Le6n and Chinandega today: 
"The other element is to do with the financing of the productive sector. There is not 
one cent to finance this sector ... it is focussed on intelligent marketing. I agree with 
intelligent marketing and agribusiness, but only when the conditions are there. If I 
can't produce products, then why the hell would I need intelligent marketing? The 
Mayor of Jinotega says this is about logic: 'what came first, the chicken or the egg?' 
First you need the pillars and then the roof" (research interview with Juan Jose 
Rayo). 
In terms of the specific issue of gender, whilst it appears that the access of women in 
Nicaragua to microfinance has improved considerably in recent years, they continue to have 
far less access to theJormal banking sector than men (Deugd 2002). This reflects the fact 
that, despite the enormous contribution of women to the national economy in Nicaragua, the 
perceived value of their work is "greatly discounted, not only by the dominant male 
population, but also by the formal financial sector in the country" (Skarlatos 2004: 9). In 
addition to this, one cannot discount, as the following interview illustrates, the impact of 
unequal land ownership on the ability of many women to access finance: 
"One of the main barriers [to women's involvement in development} is that the 
majority of the women don't own the land. The land is always in the hands of men ... 
236 Nicolasa Laguna, Vice-Mayoress of Iicaral-lnterview held in the town of Jicaral in north Leon on 14th June 
2006. 
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and those who work on the land are not the owners. When the bankers ask 'who is the 
boss of the house '. and the person says it is a woman, they close the doors, and that is 
the male chauvinist culture, and this culture is still very visible. We are working on 
that!" (research interview with Maria CastiIlo). 
The connections between land ownership and the ability of individuals to access credit are 
considered in greater detail below whilst examining the third component of the MCA 
programme in Nicaragua. For now, however, it is enough to recognise that the issue of 
accessibility is one potential impediment and barrier to women's inclusion within the MCA's 
agribusiness development model. 
7.S.5 Political transition: The 2006 elections and access to credit 
Since the inauguration of Daniel Ortega as Nicaraguan President at the beginning of 
2007, there have been some important shifts favouring the small and medium producers 
within Nicaragua. Most significantly, on October the 14th 2007 the National Assembly voted. 
in favour of creating a Development Bank (Banfopro), which is "expected to benefit over 
240,000 small and medium producers who currently have no access to credit" (Nicaragua 
Network 2007c). The creation of the bank was one ofOrtega's principal electoral promises 
and a demand of the agricultural/productive sectors for more than a decade. Such demands 
grew in the wake ofDR-CAFTA, which prompted fears that the trade agreement would 
undermine the competitiveness of Nicaragua's small and medium agricultural producers and 
their access to credit. For example in an article written in 2005 examining the imminent 
ratification ofDR-CAFTA in Nicaragua, calls were made for the creation of just such a bank: 
" ... we're suggesting the creation of a development bank. If they 're telling us to be 
more competitive and produce better quality products, then we need to install 
irrigation systems, for example. but to do that we need long-term investment credit, 
which the private banks don't offer. So we're calling on the government. which signed 
CAFTA and is telling us that we can and must take advantage of it, to support us so 
we can do just that. All countries with competitive agriculture have development 
banks" (Caceres 2005: np). 
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It is inevitably far too early to make any real judgements as to what impact this new bank 
could have on Le6n and Chinandega as a region, or whether it will specifically facilitate 
inclusion within the MCA's RBDP237. Furthermore, one cannot ignore, as discussed in 
chapter 4, the contradictions running riot within the Ortega camp. For example, in an article 
on the new administration it was stated that "the government is sticking to its anti-neoliberal 
discourse, right alongside compliance with the IMF's neoliberal policies. It's confronting the 
United States while seeking its benevolence .... it's juggling both ALBA and CAFTA, the 
prelude to the FT AA" (Nithlpan-Envio team 2007a: np). Consequently, whilst the proposed 
creation of Banfopro could represent an important step in potentially facilitating the inclusion 
of small-medium producers in the country's development, this is happening within an 
incredibly complex political and economic environment and, therefore, any prediction on 
impact here would be highly premature. 
7.8.6 The RBDP and poverty reductions: Concluding thoughts 
Analysis of the RBDP within this chapter was focussed around the fundamental issue 
of 'inclusivity'. It began by exploring the involvement of small-medium producers and 
agribusinesses within the project, which is essential in light of tendency for previous 
Nicaraguan governments to favour big businesses in the country's development. Despite 
initial concerns over this issue, the RBDP does appear, in these early stages at least, to be 
orientated towards assisting areas of production that are labour intensive and traditionally 
composed of many small-medium producers. This focus coincides with the 'pro-poor' 
rhetoric of the project component (as found within Nicaragua's MCA-compact agreement). 
However, there are, as already discussed, a number of potential impediments and barriers to 
inclusion within the RBDP, which could create some difficulties for certain groups in Le6n 
and Chinandega wishing to engage with the programme. These include potential bias within 
the region's DDCs, which are argued by some to be dominated by local big businessmen, and 
inaccessibility to credit. As such, it is important to bear these factors in mind when 
considering the MCA's ability to combat widespread poverty within the region. 
2J7 Indeed, bearing in mind the difficulties faced by the previous national development bank (BANADES) in 
Nicaragua, which was dismantled and eventually closed in the 1990s, an air of caution is warranted (see Rocha 
1998). 
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7.9 The Property Regularisation Project (PRP) 
The PRP is the smallest component of Nicaragua's MCA programme, receiving 
roughly US$26.5 million. However, whereas the Transportation Project and the RBDP 
include both the departments of Chinandega and Leon, the PRP is focussed predominantly in 
Leon. The primary reason for this situation appears to be, according to interviewees and the 
compact agreement itself, that MCA-Nicaragua is coordinating its efforts with other entities 
such as the World Bank and Nordic Development Fund, who are already working with the 
government to improve property registration and update records in the departments of 
Chinandega, Esteli and Madriz. The MeA project funds are, therefore, being utilised to help 
integrate Leon within this process. All ofthese departments are clustered in the northwest of 
the country, reflecting the government's agenda for developing this particular area. 
In terms of the motivations behind the PRP, the primary objective is to improve the 
investment climate of Leon, where 'insecure property rights' and 'high transaction costs' in 
the land and property registration system, are seen as direct impediments to economic growth 
(MCA-Nicaragua compact 2005). This corresponds with the World Bank's findings, in which 
they state that: 
"Land tenure insecurity, exacerbated by population pressure, escalates conflict over 
land use, inhibits land transactions, and discourages investment in farming, industry, 
housing, and the physical infrastructure necessary to support economic growth" 
(World Bank 2004: 397). 
As seen with the other two project components, 'income gains' (defined as 'annual increase 
in property value per manzana and the number ofmanzanas registered') resulting from the 
PRP, will be used to measure success at meeting the overall programme goal of poverty 
reduction (MCA-Nicaragua compact 2005). The project is composed of a range of activities 
(outlined in table 6.5 in chapter 6), aimed at facilitating land registration and titling within the 
region. Bearing in mind the stated intention for the MCA to have a nationwide impact in 
Nicaragua, the understanding appears to be that, in time, this process, aimed at formalising 
property rights, will be expanded to the rest of the country. 
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7.9.1 The PRP and poverty rednction 
It was clear whilst undertaking research in the region that the inclusion of this 
particular component in Nicaragua's MeA programme was very much a territorial demand. 
As one interviewee stated, "Land legalisation is an obvious thing. The problem is there. We 
know it and the goverrunent does too ... It was necessary to incorporate this component to deal . 
with the problem" (research interview with Juan Delgadill0238). Section 6.8.1 of chapter 6 has 
already alluded to the sort land ownership problems that exist in Nicaragua and identified the 
incomplete agrarian reforms in the 1980s, as well as country's traditional cultural model, as 
key reasons for the current situation. This chapter is primarily concerned with exploring how 
the PRP intends to deal with this issue and, more importantly, considers what impact the 
project is likely to have in terms of combating poverty in the region. To do this, the following 
discussion focuses on uncovering the likely beneficiaries of the project, with attention once 
again concentrated on examining the inclusion of small-medium producers and businesses: 
Some consideration is also given to how access to financial services may change as a result of 
greater security in land and property ownership. There are many households in Nicaragua that 
do not possess legal titles to their homes and land, and this not only creates enormous barriers 
in terms of accessing credit (COHRE 2003: 85), but it also exacerbates inequities in the 
distribution of land239. 
7.9.2 The PRP: Who benefits? 
According to Nicaragua's compact agreement, although the PRP will potentially 
benefit anyone with a 'property interest' over land in Leon, it should be of particular benefit 
to the poor, who have historically had "limited ability to resolve land tenure irregularities" 
(MCA-Nicaragua compact 2005). Arguably, the majority of Le on's poor constitute small-
medium producers and, therefore, one would expect project funds to be targeted at assisting 
this particular demographic. However, as the following interview extract exemplifies, 
concerns were raised during the course ofthe research over just who the programme's 
recipients would be: 
238 Juan Delgadillo, Coordinator for Municipal Operations - Interview held in the town of Jicaral in north Le6n 
on 14th June 2006. 
239 According to a report produced by the World Bank in 2002, "The spectre of land re-concentration and the 
reversion to the previous, less-equitable land distribution, will remain strong until land claims affecting insecure 
small farmers or indigenous communities can be legally validated and enforced" (2002b: 6). 
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"Our concern is that the legalisation 0/ property is not directed at those who really 
need it. For example, if the rich people are also benefited, this is something that they 
could do on their own. However, I am interested in the legalisation or the organising 
o/property for the medium and small producers, who can barely do it themselves. If 
that happens there will be better harmony. So what concerns us is the how" (research 
interview with Juan Jose Rayo). 
Although is it too early to make any meaningful judgements on the extent to which this has or 
will be the case, the fact that the PRP is not directed at dealing with the controversial political 
issue of land disputes resulting from the events of the 1980s and early 1990s, may restrict its 
engagement with the poor. Indeed, as stated in chapter 6, about 30% of the property in Le6n 
will not be touched by the MCA funds due to 'political problems,24o. Nevertheless, one could 
perceive, in light of the Sandinistas' controversial agrarian reform programme of the 1980s, 
that many of those currently living in these disputed areas are impoverished. Therefore, the 
exclusion of these families and individuals from the PRP will inevitably restrict the impact of 
the project on relative poverty levels. Despite such limitations, however, the scope of the 
project is still substantial, with 70% of rural properties and 50% of urban properties 
anticipated to have more secure and registered titles as a result of the programme. 
7.9.3 Women and the PRP 
In addition to the complex political dimension highlighted above, one cannot ignore 
the issue of gender when looking at the PRP and its potential impact. As already stated, 
despite significant gains made by women in the country, Nicaraguan society continues to be 
dominated by men. Consequently, it is incredibly important that safeguards are in place to 
ensure that the land/property titling process does not actually exacerbate such inequalities. 
However, as the following extract illustrates, this is no easy task in Nicaragua: 
240 The so-called 'pmata', referred to by some as the greatest scandal ever to stain Sandinismo (see Zamora 
1996), is particularly important in this regard. As stated in chapter 6, it refers to the highly controversial process 
by which the outgoing Sandinista government distributed confiscated and expropriated urban and rural 
properties, including; homes, agricultural plots and businesses, to supporters (including many small farmers) 
and goverrnnent officials (see Larson 1993). In fact, in an infamous act commonly referred to as Daniel Ortega's 
'personal Piftata', the Central Bank of Nicaragua paid $24 million to Ortega and his close associates during the 
FSLN's final weeks in office (Christian 1991). Arguably, many of the political problems today with land 
ownership, tilling and distribution were exacerbated by the 'Pmata' process; a reality made worse by the recent 
election of Ortega who, as one might expect, is a hugely polarising figure. 
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"From 1993 Nicaragua instituted joint titling of land to wife and husband. Sensitivity 
training was directed at high-level officials and at technicians involved in the land 
legalization process. Meetings were held with regional leaders and the local 
population. Radio and television spots and brochures written in clear language and in 
graphic format were developed to support training efforts. Despite sensitivity 
training, the titling programme ran into difficulties in its attempts to legalize women's 
rights to land. 1n 1997, an evaluation found that most titles issued were granted to 
individuals (64 percent), and that joint titting to family members (for example, father 
and son, two brothers) represented 25 percent of total titling. Joint titlingfor couples 
only reached 7.8 percent of the total number of titles issued" (World Bank 2004: 
399). 
It is expected that roughly 40% of the project beneficiaries will be women who either jointly 
or independently have land rights. In addition, it states that MCC funding will be used to 
support the final development and implementation of a 'draft gender strategy' by 
PRODEp24I , aimed at improving awareness around women's rights in the regularisation 
process (MCA-Nicaragua compact 2005). Ensuring the inclusion of women in this project 
will be incredibly important in determining the success of this particular component, as well 
as having broader ramifications for the MCA-programme as a whole. For example, it is 
widely expected that improving property/land security will increase the availability of credit 
for individuals in Le6n, which could potentially enable a greater number of women to obtain 
loans from formal credit markets. As discussed with regard to the previous component, the 
accessibility of women to finance from the formal sector is problematic in Nicaragua and this 
is one way in which the situation could be improved. That being said, there are other factors 
that may limit the impact of this project on credit availability. 
7.9.4 An issue of limited credit availability 
According to the Foundation for Sustainable Development (FSD), there were only six 
banks operating in Nicaragua at the end of 2002, compared to a Central American regional 
241"PRODEP, constituted by decree as a technical secretariat of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, was 
developed, and is supported, by the World Bank. PRODEP is responsible for, among other things, implementing 
donor programs to modernize Nicaragua's land registry and cadastral systems and to regularize land rights" 
(MCA-Nicaragua compact 2005). 
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average of one-hundred and seven per country, and this has important ramifications when it 
comes to financial lending: 
"The total assets o/these Nicaraguan banks (in millions o/US dollars) were $2,009 
compared to a Central American average 0/$30,133. Having 15 times less banking 
resources than its Central American counter-parts means that the Nicaragua 
struggles to provide enough lending opportunities/or its citizens" (FSD website). 
Whilst this situation remains, the impact of projects such as this on the accessibility of small-
medium producers to credit will be limited. Besides, it is likely that in a highly competitive 
market banks will tend to favour large industries and agribusiness over their smaller 
. counterparts, where the risk of investment may be higher. In a cyclical fashion this has, 
according to the World Bank, important consequences when it comes to the formalisation of 
property rights: "When ... markets (such as credit) are characterised by distortions that 
disadvantage small farmers, formalised individual property rights can lead to land transfers 
that cause greater inequity" (2004: 398). The danger of this happening was emphasised whilst 
talking to several respondents in Nicaragua, in which it was argued that, without sufficient 
access to finance, small farmers and businesses would have to sell their land to investors 
looking to take advantage of the new roads and improved accessibility to the regional ports. 
In summary, therefore, one cannot ignore the fact that starvation of credit has been one of the 
factors underlying a process ofland re-concentration across Nicaragua since the mid-1990s 
and whilst improving the security ofland ownership and titIing for small-medium 
farmers/producers should help improve this situation, access to financial assistance will not 
be determined by this factor alone. 
7.9.5 The PRP: Concluding thoughts 
Analysis of this final component focussed primarily on examining the potential 
beneficiaries of the PRP. Overall, it is clear that the vast majority of those individuals 
interviewed were in favour of this project component and believed that it would be of benefit 
to their lives. However, several interview respondents raised concerns that the programme 
would not be directed at those who really need it, i.e. those families and individuals who 
cannot afford to pay for the process themselves. The exclusion of roughly 30% of the 
properties in Lean from the PRP due to the political nature of the disputes, adds weight to 
217 
Chapter 7: The Millennium Challenge Account and Poverty Reduction 
these concerns. At the same time, however, one can appreciate, in light of Nicaragua's 
history, the great difficulties and dangers that would be accompany any attempt to solve this 
issue with funds derived from the US govemment242• In addition, this section looked at the 
inclusion of women within the project and it is clear from the information found within the 
compact agreement and the interviews conducted that some steps have been taken to facilitate 
women's involvement in the fund. The final issue examined was to do with the relationship 
between property regularisation and access to credit. This discussion identified limitations in 
Nicaragua's banking sector as a likely constraint to the potential benefits resulting from the 
project in terms of the accessibility of small-medium producers to finance and this could have 
a knock-on effect when it comes to reducing poverty in the region. 
7.10 Nicaragua's MeA programme: Will it combat regional poverty? 
The above analysis of Nicaragua's MCA involved examining each of the components 
individually and weighing up their potential for promoting regional poverty reduction, based 
upon the assumption that this can best be done through inclusivity and equitability. Whilst 
there are positive elements to each the three programmes, concerns have been raised over a 
number of issues that could limit the initiative's impact. More broadly, this chapter has 
critically analysed the narrowly defined model of development being promoted through the 
programme. Although the MCA is frequently represented by the US as representing a new 
and fresh approach to development, it ultimately fails to depart from the long standing belief 
that economic growth alone can lead to sustained poverty reduction. Consequently, in 
drawing this discussion together, the chapter considers the fundamental question of whether a 
project devoted purely to creating 'economic growth' can, in fact, successfully address and 
combat the complexities of impoverishment in Nicaragua. 
242 In the aftermath of the 'Piftata' process, claims were also made by US citizens, via the US govermnent, over 
land and property rights in Nicaragua (see The Carter Center 1995: 9). Interestingly, however, "only 31 % of the 
properties being claimed in Nicaragua by U.S. citizens were actually owned by U.S. citizens at the time of 
expropriation; the remainder were owned by Nicaraguans who subsequently became naturalized citizens" (see 
Kaufmann and Zimmerman 1997). It is reported that, in a list of US citizens with property claims drawn up by 
'Republican staff ofthe US Senate', there were at least twenty-one 'high-ranking officers of the Somoza 
National Guard' (see COHRE 2003: 41). Consequently, the use of MC A funds to deal with political property 
disputes such as these would have been highly controversial. 
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7.10.1 Economic growth: The key to poverty reduction? 
In a paper written by the CC ER in response to the devastating impact of Hurricane 
Mitch in 1998, it was argued that the 'transfonnation' and 'reconstruction' of Nicaragua had 
do be based upon 'sustainable human development', entailing the "transfonnation of unequal 
power relations at all levels, indispensable for overcoming the social and economic 
vulnerability of the population, the sustainable management of natural resources and a high 
degree of citizen participation in the decisions that affect their lives" (1999: 54). Although . 
presented in direct response to Hurricane Mitch, this push for a more holistic and equitable 
approach to the country's development preceded the catastrophic event and was rooted in a 
longstanding discontentment over the exclusionary and polarising neoliberal economic model 
of development adopted by the country's ruling parties following the 1980s. Within this 
context, Hurricane Mitch came to represent an opportunity for transfonning not only the 
'material conditions' under which large parts of the popUlation were living, but also the 
framework through which such conditions were produced and reproduced (Bradshaw and 
Linneker 2003: 2). However, as the emphasis of national policy shifted in 1999 from the 
'reconstruction' of Nicaragua to focussing on 'poverty reduction' via the implementation of 
the PRSP, it became clear that, despite such ambitions, official policy outlook in Nicaragua 
remained committed to following the lead of the IFls. 
Although in the 1990s the World Bank shifted its rhetoric in favour of promoting a 
more 'consensual' model of development (based on concepts such as 'country-ownership' as 
previously discussed), it continued to provide 'guidance' to low-income countries in drawing 
up their PRSPs. Although not imposed by the World Bank as prescriptive policy, its 'Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Sourcebook' produced in 2002 clearly emphasised the centrality given by 
the IFls to economic growth in combating poverty: 
"Economic growth. .. remains the single most important factor influencing poverty, 
and macroeconomic stability is essential for high and sustainable rates of growth" 
(2002c: 4). 
"In countries that are preparing a PRSP, economic growth is more important than 
redistribution for improving well-being and reducing poverty" (2002c: 95). 
219 
Chapter 7: The Millennium Challenge Account and Poverty Reduction 
Not surprisingly, therefore, in creating its PRSP the Nicaraguan government adopted a 
somewhat narrow economic conceptuaiisation of poverty and this interpretation was heavily 
contested at the regional level, as illustrated earlier with regard to the PRSPcito in Loon, and 
at a national level by the CCER. 
In 2001 the CCER produced the results of its own poverty consultation process 
entitled 'La Nicaragua que Queremos' ('The Nicaragua that we want'), in which they 
provided a much broader conceptuaiisation of poverty, based on a range of economic, 
political, social and ideological criteria. They identified a wide variety of issues as being 
responsible for impoverishment in Nicaragua, including: the distribution of economic and 
political power, the prioritisation of exports over the development of the internal market, an 
over-dependency on external resources, the exploitation of natural resources, the SAPs of the 
IFIs, inequality (relating to issues of gender, age, ethnicity, race and class), the constant 
violation of human rights, high levels of corruption, poor levels of education, and the absence 
of effective mechanisms for citizen participation. Consequently, in contrast to simply viewing 
poverty as an outcome of insufficient economic growth in Nicaragua, it located a 
combination of diverse factors as being responsible for the high levels of impoverishment 
within the country. This, in turn, would necessitate a comprehensive and multidimensional 
strategy for poverty reduction, aimed at improving the economic, social and political context 
required for sustainable development to take place. 
7.10.2 The MCA: Making new ground? 
In light of the two very different visions of poverty reduction set out above, it is 
useful now to consider where the country's MCA programme may fit within this dual vision 
of development. As discussed in chapter 3 (section 3.7.1), the MCC adopts an incentivised 
approach to development, where financial rewards are provided to certain countries in return 
for pursuing 'sound policies'. Eligible countries must in most cases score above the median 
on more than half of the seventeen indicators, as well as pass the corruption test, in order to 
be considered by the MCC board of directors. As stated previously, these indicators fall 
within the three broad categories of 'Ruling Justly', 'Investing in People' and 'Encouraging 
Economic Freedom'. One could, therefore, broadly argue that the MCC does, through its 
incentive strategy, promote economic, social and political 'progress', creating what some 
consider as the sound policy environments needed in order to ensure that foreign aid is most 
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effective at combating poverty243. This approach clearly falls within the realm of the PWC 
framework, of which the pursuit of 'good governance' is a fundamental tenet. However, if we 
look beyond this pre-emptive development strategy and examine the nature of the MCA 
programmes themselves, we can see that the initiative is unashamedly 'economic' in its 
orientation. 
Within the context set out above, the primacy traditionally given to economic growth 
by the IFIs and international donors based in the US is far from being a thing of the past, 
despite rhetoric to the contrary. What is more, one could argue that these 'sound policy 
environments' have largely been defined through the lens of the neoliberal economic policy 
model (Santiso 2001: 14), adding weight to Jayasuriya's suggestion that the PWC should 
more properly be viewed as an attempt to re-embed the structural adjustment policies of the 
WC (2001: I). As illustrated in this chapter, Nicaragua's MCA has clear connections to DR-
CAFT A and the PPP, which are seen by many as epitomising neoliberal ideology. Therefore, 
whilst on the surface the MCA appears to represent a 'fresh' approach to combating poverty, 
underneath it fails to depart from a discourse that prioritises economic growth and free-trade 
above and beyond anything else. In analysing Nicaragua's MCA, we must therefore consider 
the extent to which a purely economic programme such as this can really provide the solution 
to widespread impoverishment not only in the region of Le6n-Chinandega but throughout the 
country as a whole. 
7.10.3 Poverty: More than just economics? 
As suggested above, the way in which we conceptualise poverty very much defines 
our interpretation of how it can best be combated. In terms of this particular research, 
therefore, responses to the question of whether the MCA programme will reduce poverty in 
the region were inevitably varied. However, generally speaking the answers given to this 
question by interview respondents fell into two broad categories and these are explored here. 
With regard to the first of these, several of those interviewed believed the initiative would 
have a positive impact, but only as long as it adheres to its 'pro-poor' rhetoric: 
243 As indicated already in this thesis, there are numerous debates around the issue of promoting sound policy 
environments (for example see Santiso 200 I). 
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"If the fund is applied in the way that reaches the poor it will be of benefit. However, 
there is uncertainty as to whether these funds will directly address poverty and 
improve production, or whether this is something only 'discussed' at a consultative 
level. There is a lot of doubt in the population. The people are afraid that these funds 
will not reach the poor, but will remain at a consultative level. So if the investment is 
about people I think there will be a level of impact where the poverty will be reduced. 
But. if it does not happen in this way we will remain in the same situation as always". 
withfew resources" (interview with Nubia Luni44). 
The presence of doubt over the programme's pro-poor agenda came to be expressed through 
a play on words, in which individuals in Nicaragua, and especially in Leon and Chinandega, 
referred to the fund as the 'Cuento del milenio' - meaning 'fairytale'. As one interviewee 
discussed, "when the gringos first came with the MCA, the Nicas were calling it the 'fairytale 
of the millennium' because it was very clear that the principal interest is DR-CAFTA or free 
trade24S" (interview with Pablo Zufiiga246). 
As mentioned previously, there are deep reservations over the free-trade agreement in 
Central America and its potential negative impact on small-medium producers in the region. 
The following interview extract highlights the essence of these concerns in Nicaragua: 
"We have a musical theatrical group in this zone and they have a performance called 
The untied tiger against the tied donkey'. In this play you see the big North American 
producers with their subsidies, and the means of production, using all their resources 
against the skinny Nicaraguan producer" (research interview with Trinidad 
Garcia247). 
244 Nubia Luna, INGES and ex-Mayoress of El Sauce - Interview held in the town of El Sauce in north Le6n on 
10'" June 2006. 
245 In contrast, other respondents gave different reasons for why the MCA was being referred to as a 'fairytale'; 
one of which included people not believing that the programme will reduce poverty (research interview with 
Santos Mendez, Civil Observer in MCA-Nicaragua, held in the city of Chinandega on 24'" July 2006). In section 
8.6 of the following chapter, another respondent suggests that this title results from the MCA being seen as a 
y,0litical tool in the run-up to the 2006 national elections. 
46 Pablo Zuiiiga, Assistant President of the Association of Municipalities from north Chinandega 
(AMUNORCHI) - Interview held in Somotillo on 18th of July 2006. 
247 Trinidad Garc!a, Executive Director of the Association of Municipalities from north Chinandega 
(AMUNORCHI) - Interview held in Somotillo on 18.h of July 2006. 
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Therefore, in order for the region's population to participate effectively within the framework 
ofDR-CAFTA and reap the benefits produced, it is essential that the country's MCA 
programme target those individualslbusinesses that are most vulnerable to the negative 
effects of free-trade. The analysis provided previously in this chapter, examining each of the 
project components in Nicaragua, gave an indication as to the extent of programme 
inclusivity and, whilst there were some positive elements, concerns were raised over the 
initiative's orientation. In summary, therefore, the MCA will, according to this first 
perspective, successfully combat poverty, but only so long as it is truly committed to helping 
the region's poor. 
The second category of response is closely aligned to the CCER's multidimensional 
interpretation of poverty outlined earlier. In the context of the MeA's narrow economic 
focus, many interviewees failed to see how a programme focussed predominantly on road 
infrastructure could answer the social, political and ideological aspects of impoverishment: 
"To reduce poverty there must be less child mortality andfor that we have to improve 
the sanitation and hygiene of the cities and communities. We also have to improve the 
environment. So that means that we have to protect water resources to have good 
quality water. Reducing poverty means that families will have a rise in their income, 
so that means that the extreme poverty is being measured by the impact on families 
who may have $2 a day. If we could generate greater job opportunities for the poor, if 
we could increase the gross internal product of the municipalities, if we could keep 
the children in the school we would be meeting the objectives of the MCA.Ifthefunds 
were directed to solve these problems 1 would say yes: 1 would say that the funds are 
targeted at the reduction poverty. But then 1 start to think, just the road component is 
taking $92 million from the total $175 million. So that means that one component is 
using a third or almost fifty percent of the funds ... So 1 mean one of the objectives is to 
reduce the poverty, but the reality is that we are not really targeting the 'reduction of 
poverty 'H (research interview with Justino Fonseca248). 
"1 don't think that with $175 million, and with a large proportion of this being 
focussed on infrastructure and property, the MCA will solve the poverty problem. 1 
248 Justino Fonseca, Director of Social Work in Malpaisillo City Hall- Interview held in the town of Malpaisillo 
in the department of Le6n on 13th June 2006. 
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think there are other important sectors to fight if we are to deal with poverty, you 
need to improve education and access to health and this is not part of the MCA. So 
the MCA has focussed more on infrastructure and productive sectors, which are 
really important, but not enoughfor the eradication of poverty here in the region" 
(research interview with Emesto Medina249). 
Whilst the document produced by the CCER in 2001 entitled 'The Nicaragua that we want' 
does propose improving 'infrastructure', 'legalising land titles' and promoting 'rural 
agribusiness' as part of its 'economic' strategy for the development and reduction of poverty 
in Nicaragua, these components only represent a very small fraction of a proposal aimed at 
combating not only the economic, but also the social and political dimensions of poverty. 
Consequently, although the MCA will probably leave strong regional infrastructure, and this 
will be very important in shaping Lean and Chinandega's future development, it is difficult to 
see how the programme will, on its own, address the conditions through which poverty is 
produced and reproduced in Nicaragua. As one interviewee highlighted, "to get rid of poverty 
we need more than that because Nicaragua is not only Lean and Chinandega" (research 
interview with Maria CastiIIo). 
Conclusions 
This chapter began by locating the MCA within development discourse, placing 
particular emphasis on unpicking the relationship between the MCA and the World Bank's 
PRSPs. As discussed above, the MCA's driving philosophy is, to a large extent, founded 
upon the IFl's re-conceptualisation of 'development' towards the end of the 1990's 
(illustrated clearly in the' Assessing Aid' report alluded to previously). This 'transition', 
which was represented by the emergence of a 'new' consensus, corresponded with the 
apparent repositioning of 'poverty' as the central goal of development assistance, in which it 
was no longer identified as a simple consequence of economic growth (an assumption 
underlying the unsuccessful SAPs). Despite this rhetorical shift, however, the PRSPs, which 
gave practical expression to the PWC, failed in many cases to depart from a trend prioritising 
economic growth in development policy. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the MCC, through its 
core objective of reducing poverty through economic growth, clearly adheres to a doctrine in 
249 Emesto Medina, Ex-Rector of the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN) - Interview held 
in the city ofLe6n on 5th July 2006. 
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development that, despite statements to the contrary, is still very much evident in the policies 
and actions of official donors. 
After contextualising development discourse and practice, attention was turned to 
examining how poverty is conceptualised. A specific case study from Nicaragua was used to 
demonstrate how 'knowledge' on poverty can be resisted and contested in a way that 
empowers local citizens to challenge exclusionary practice. This was followed by a close 
exam'ination of each of Nicaragua's MCA project components, beginning with the 
Transportation Project. In doing this, particular emphasis was placed on the associated issues 
of'inc1usivity' and 'equitability', which are argued in this thesis to be essential in ensuring 
sustainable poverty reduction. Although there are clearly positive elements in each of the 
three projects, there are a variety of factors that could possibly limit the effectiveness of the 
programme at combating poverty within the departments of Lean and Chinandega. To a large 
degree, one could argue that many of these problems are related to the economic model of 
development being promoted in this initiative, which prioritises areas of economic 
'potential'. This has implications beyond the region as a whole when we consider the MCC's 
expectation of achieving nation-wide impact through Nicaragua's MCA. 
Finally, this chapter examined the relationship between economic growth and poverty 
reduction, and revisited the way in which poverty is defined and by whom. During the 
research process, some respondents raised doubts over the extent to which a project such as 
this can answer the complex multidimensional characteristics of 'poverty'. In light of these 
comments, it is important to recognise the connections that exist between Nicaragua's MCA, 
DR-CAFTA and the PPP. As discussed above, the MCA will clearly contribute to 
Nicaragua's insertion into a regional free-trade area and also directly assist in the 
construction the highly controversial PPP, thereby facilitating the institutionalisation of 
'transnationalliberalism' within the isthmus. Indeed, a similar process appears to be 
occurring in the other two Central American countries, Honduras and El Salvador, selected to 
take part in the MCA (see section 7.7.2). As a result, it is clear that the model of economic 
development being pursued by the initiative is conducive to that of the highly contested 
mega-projects indicated above and this raises fundamental questions over the credentials of 
the MCA in terms of combating poverty. The following chapter develops this analysis further 
by looking at Nicaragua's MCA in relation to the issue of 'democracy' and draws upon 
Robinson's conceptualisation of 'polyarchy' which, as stated in chapter 3, is part and parcel 
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of the hegemonic project being promoted across the Americas. Furthermore, it examines the 
spaces and places of participation in Nicaragua's MeA, revisiting the important issue of 
'country ownership', the emergence of which was synonymous with the shift towards the 
PWC2SO• 
250 It is important to restate here that, although analysed in two different chapters, the themes of 'poverty 
reduction' and 'democracy' are not unrelated and, therefore, frequent links will be made back to this chapter 
when and where appropriate. 
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Chapter 8: The Millennium Challenge Account and Democracy 
Chapter 7 examined the relationship between the Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA) and poverty reduction in Nicaragua, locating the project within the broader context of 
recent transitions in official development discourse. The following discussion should be seen 
as an extension of this analysis, in which attention is now turned to the specific issue of 
'democracy', a contested concept that has significantly influenced the United States' (US') 
foreign policy towards Central America since the 1980s. In undertaking this task, the chapter 
is divided into two main sections. The first sets the theoretical and historical framework for 
the discussion, revisiting democracy's multifaceted qualities, as well as its elevation to a 
centre-piece in contemporary development policy and practice. The MCA is situated within 
this context, with a particular focus placed on examining the connections between Robinson's 
conceptualisation of 'polyarchy' (as examined in chapters 3 and 4) and the initiative's agenda 
for promoting 'sound policy environments'. This is then followed by a close examination of 
the relationship between the MCA and democracy, in which there seems to have been, until 
recently, a sense of reluctance on the part of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
towards drawing direct connections between the two. 
The second part of the chapter shifts the focus of analysis towards the specifics of 
Nicaragua's MeA, beginning with a retrospective look at the highly politicised environment 
in which the programme was defined and implemented in the run-up to the 2006 national 
elections. This is very important, bearing in mind the historical significance of such elections 
in defining the nature of the country's relationship with the US and it has direct implications 
for 'operationalising polyarchy'. Attention is then turned towards understanding the 
established system for citizen participation in Nicaragua, through which engagement in the 
MeA has been facilitated. In doing this, specific attention is given to understanding the role 
of the Departmental Development Councils (DOes) in the MCA. The chapter concludes by 
examining the recent efforts of the new administration to 'refonn' the country's system for 
participation and considers what Daniel Ortega's project for implementing 'direct 
democracy' in Nicaragua may tell us about both the country's future and the future of the 
MeA. 
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8.1 Revisiting 'democracy' 
In beginning this discussion, it is useful to briefly revisit the analysis of 
'democracy,251 presented in chapter 4, which looked at how the concept was promoted, 
defined, repackaged and contested, both from within Nicaragua and from without. More 
specifically, chapter 4 tracked Nicaragua's democratic transition from the infamous Somoza 
dynasty, which represented roughly forty-three years of dictatorial rule and oppression, to the 
eventual consolidation of 'electoral democracy' in the early 1990s. Significant attention was 
placed on exploring the role of the US during these different epochs, with the 1980s 
identified as representing a key turning point in US foreign policy towards not only 
Nicaragua, but Latin America as a whole. In an effort to understand why, after years of 
bolstering undemocratic and oppressive regimes within the region, the US shifted its position 
to actively promoting 'democracy', Robinson applies the concept of 'polyarchy'. He draws 
upon a neo-Gramscian perspective to locate the turnabout in foreign policy within the context 
of a shift in the way that dominating power is exercised by the US. With regard to Nicaragua 
more specifically, he identifies the 1979 Sandinista revolution as a key moment in this 
metamorphosis, pre-empting the transition to a new package of 'strategies, modalities and 
instruments' for political intervention, propagated under the broad banner of 'democracy 
promotion' (Robinson 2007: 32, 33). 
To some, the holding of formal and internationally recognised elections in 1990 
represented a key moment in the consolidation of 'democracy' in Nicaragua. For others 
however, it symbolised the establishment of a system of rule that was at odds with the very 
essence of democracy. Indeed, as mentioned previously, it was rather ironic that throughout 
much of Latin and Central America the process that is commonly referred to as 
'democratisation' has been accompanied by growing inequality. In Nicaragua, the elections 
saw the inauguration of a government that was not only heavily supported by the US, but also 
strongly committed to the principles of neoliberal discourse. Consequently, Robinson 
suggests that the US' agenda for promoting democracy has been used to legitimise those 
states adopting such reforms, endorsing a model of development that is perceived by many to 
251 The conceptual ambiguity regarding 'democracy' has already discussed in detail in chapter 4 and this 
discussion builds upon the understanding of the concept established there. That being said, however, we do 
return to some of these more fundamental debates surrounding how we define democracy later in this chapter, 
whilst looking more directly at the MCA. 
228 
Chapter 8: The Millennium Challenge Account and Democracy 
be disempowering and unsustainable. As stated in chapter 4, this situation is illustrative of the 
fact that polyarchy and neoliberal discourse are mutually inclusive and, arguably, it is 
through this complimentary relationship that power has become concentrated in fewer and 
fewer hands. The following section develops this analysis further by locating democracy 
within the context ofthe Post Washington Consensus (PWC) which, as illustrated in chapter 
7, represented the ideological staging ground for the MCA. 
8.2 The PWC: A theoretical framework for democracy? 
It has been argued within this thesis that the promotion of 'democracy' by the US in 
Nicaragua, and in Latin America more generally, towards the end of the Cold War, went hand 
in hand with the propagation of neoliberal discourse and vice versa. This intertwining of 
democracy and neoliberalism led to the active proliferation of 'free-market democracies', 
through which democracy and neoliberalism have come to represent two sides of the same 
coin. This conceptual amalgamation is a product of what was argued in chapter 3 to be the 
hegemonic ideology of this epoch, 'transnationalliberalism', in which the "expansion and 
extension of capitalist markets across the globe" is seen as the key to universal progress (6 
Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 19). Although, as previously stated, one can debate the extent to 
which the US remains a 'hegemon' itself, it is clear that it remains a very important actor and 
sponsor of this capitalist project. In terms of the PWC, there is growing evidence contesting 
the notion that neoliberal ideology was somehow discarded or replaced alongside the 
unsuccessful SAPs. Indeed, whilst the way in which neoliberalism is expressed in practice 
has clearly changed, as witnessed by the repackaging of the phenomenon's defining feature 
conditionality, its fundamental tenets still appear to be at the heart of the development 
policies promoted by the IFIs. The emergence of 'good governance' within official policy 
rhetoric which, as discussed in chapter 2, paved the way for a new package of conditionalities 
aimed at institutional and political reform, is a defining feature of the 'new' consensus on 
development and is discussed in greater detail below. 
As Demmers et al comment, the discourse of good governance emerged at a time 
when the promotion of 'democracy' had moved to the forefront of the "dominant 
international development agenda" (2004: 7). This transition to promoting 'democracy' was 
triggered by the dramatic shift in US foreign policy during the mid-1980s. As referred to 
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previously, the form of 'democracy' promoted by the. US and the IFls has tended to be 
somewhat restricted, based on a conceptualisation of democracy that reduces the 
phenomenon to the political arena - separate from the social and economic. As a result of this 
conceptual detachment, aid targeted at 'democracy' building has often failed to recognise or 
address the concept's social or economic dimensions, ignoring the underlying issue of power 
and the 'intricacies of politics' (Santiso 2001b: 14). Consequently, it overlooks the realities 
faced by many countries in the South, where the manipulation and monopolisation of power 
by governing elites has been a frequent source of oppression and deprivation. Moreover, 
whilst crudely separating the economic/social from the political sphere in the promotion of 
'democracy' , proponents of this approach have not hesitated in connecting the two areas by 
claiming an "affinity between democracy and free market capitalism" (Robinson 1996: 54). 
As Foley comments, "there is an implicit and often explicit theoretical linkage between 
capitalism and democracy, which implies that democracy must be accompanied by 
capitalism" (2007: 12). It is this understanding of democracy that has come to be defined as 
'polyarchy': a process through which a "small group actually rules, and mass participation in 
decision making is confined to choosing leaders in elections that are carefully managed by 
competing elites" (Robinson 2000: 43). 
8.2.1 Good governance: The hallmark ofthe 'new' consensus 
It should come as no surprise, bearing in mind the above context in which the good 
governance agenda arose, that the IFls have typically confined themselves to the economic 
aspects of the concept. Consequently, as Santiso comm.ents, "the approaches used to 
strengthen good governance in developing countries remain strikingly similar to those used to 
promote economic reform", with conditionalities placed on recipients in terms of accessing 
aid being "extended from the economic realm to the political arena" (2001a: 3). Although, as 
stated in chapter 2, 'good governance' and 'democracy' are not the same thing, with the first 
referring to the way in which power is exercised and the second relating to the legitimacy of 
government, they are clearly related, with neither one being sustainable without the other 
(ibid: 2). Yet despite the obvious connections between the two, both in conceptual and 
practical terms, official policymakers continue to focus their attention on areas such as the 
'efficiency of public administration' and 'rule oflaw', as opposed to questioning fundamental 
issues such as the legitimacy of government and/or the equitability of the economic system. 
As a result, organisations like the World Bank fail address the underlying issues of power and 
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democracy in development2S2, thereby ignoring the structural problems of 
'underdevelopment' faced by many countries in the South. 
8.2.2 Politics matter: Redefining the role ofthe state 
The transition to promoting good governance as a central component of donor policy 
was symbolic of the recognition among policymakers that politics do matter in development. 
This is clearly visible within the general framework of the PWC, where 'reforming the state' 
and 'strengthening public institutions' are distinctive goals of the consensus. In contrast to 
'first generation' economic reforms (such as those administered through the SAPs), which 
were focussed on, for example, stabilising and liberalising the economy, 'second generation' 
reforms are targeted at embedding the neoliberal agenda through the political sphere. This 
transition involved a dramatic shift in terms of donor priorities, away from promulgating state 
contraction, as witnessed with the Washington Consensus (WC), to adopting policies aimed 
at getting the state 'onboard'. Arguably, this coincided with what Gill refers to as the 'politics 
of new constitutionalism', which involves "the need to attenuate or incorporate and co-opt 
democratic forces and potential opposition to globalisation" (2000: 6). Robinson's work on 
'operationalising polyarchy' represents a useful framework with which to understand this 
process, as it explores the different tiers through which the US has pursued its transnational 
agenda. With this in mind, whilst the governance agenda does appear to depart from the 
neoliberal economic model enshrined within the WC, it clearly does not abandon neoliberal 
ideology altogether. As Santiso mentions in discussing the IFIs, "almost all the statements 
about the policy priorities of the post-Washington consensus include a strong preface 
clarifying that sound macroeconomic fundamentals are indispensable" (2001 a: 16). As 
explored below in looking at the issue of selectivity (a defining characteristic of the MCA), 
achieving these 'sound policy environments' is not only the objective of aid, but it is now 
also a frequent precondition for countries wishing to access it. 
25'It is important to reflect upon how we would want the World Bank to tackle such issues, as any attempt by 
the World Bank to directly addres's the 'legitimacy' of governments is likely to be met by substantial opposition, 
especially in the South. Indeed, who is to say that the World Bank's definition of what may constitute legitimate 
government is actually the right one? Consequently, whilst it is clear that more needs to be done to address the 
underlying causes of impoverishment in the South, there is no quick fix or easy solution to the problems of 
'underdevelopment' . 
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8.3 Locating the MeA 
Whereas the previous chapter located the MCA within the framework of the PWC by 
focussing on the specific issue of poverty reduction, the aim here is to concentrate on the 
'democratic' aspects of the new consensus and draw connections to the initiative. In order to 
do this, the following analysis is divided into two main parts. First the chapter revisits the 
issue of promoting 'sound policy environments' , reflecting upon the use of greater selectivity 
as a mechanism for encouraging confonnity among countries in the South. The chapter looks 
at the debates surrounding the promotion of democracy in the MeA and examines shifts in 
official rhetoric. Second, we reconsider the central issue of 'country-ownership', integrating 
ideas already raised within this chapter to help deconstruct and critique what is a defining 
characteristic of the MCA. For both of these discussions, the analysis is framed around the 
theme of promoting 'democracy', integrating the ideas of 'polyarchy' and 'new 
constitutionalism' to help ground the analysis. 
8.3.1 The MCA: Pursuing 'sound policy environments' 
As argued previously in this thesis, the 'sound policy environments' promoted by IFIs 
and international donors have largely been defined through the lens of the neoliberal 
economic policy model. It is not surprising, therefore, that the influential' Assessing Aid' 
report produced by the World Bank in 1998, upon which the MCA was largely founded, 
advocated for a more selective allocation of aid to the South. This recommendation was 
based on the belief that aid is more effective when it is invested in environments with sound 
policies and effective institutions: 
"Aid effectiveness largely depends on the institutions and policies of recipient 
countries. Where economic management is sound, aid leads to higher private 
investment, more rapid growth, lower infant mortality, and a faster decline in poverty. 
Where economic management is poor, aid has little effect on development" (Dollar 
and Pritchett 1998: 28). 
The MCC is driven by the logic expressed in the above extract and uses a variety of 
indicators to define and shape who is included in the fund. These have already been examined 
232 
Chapter 8: The Millennium Challenge Account and Democracy 
in detail in chapter 3 (see section 3.5), however, it is useful now to revisit the three broad 
categories of 'Ruling Justly', 'Investing in People' and 'Promoting Economic Freedom' in 
our analysis on the MCA and democracy. In fact, one could argue that it is through this 
selective framework that the connection between 'democracy' and 'development' has been 
elevated (see Windsor 2002). Before looking explicitly at this relationship, it important to 
highlight that, initially at least, there was a degree ofreIuctance among those in the MCC to 
link the MCA directly to democracy promotion. A key reason for this is rooted in the 
initiative's theoretical and philosophical proximity to the World Bank. 
8.3.2 Staying clear of the 'D' word 
As discussed in chapter 2, the World Bank advocates a doctrine of political neutrality, 
embracing the "functionalist logic that technical and economic questions can be separated 
from politics" (Bl1Ias cited in Santiso 2001a: 6). For reasons already provided in this chapter, 
the crude separation of these areas is a contentious issue. Nevertheless, given that the MCA 
was essentially developed in the Treasury Department of the US, it should come as no 
surprise that "it reflects the World Bank's reluctance to use the 'D' word, even whilst 
incorporating indicators that move further into political conditionality for development 
assistance" (Clark 2005: 32). Despite not referring directly to 'democracy' whilst discussing 
the MCA, there were frequent occasions in which indirect connections were drawn to its 
promotion. For example, President Bush stated that the programme would link new aid to 
"clear standards of economic, political, and social reform" making sure that "governments 
make the right choices for their people" (Bush 2004). On another occasion, the previous CEO 
of the MCC, Paul Applegarth, talked about 'developing institutions' and building the capacity 
of developing countries to 'govern wisely', and yet made no mention of democracy (see 
Applegarth 2004). This situation is indicative of the situation previously set out in this thesis, 
in which 'good governance' has enabled entities, such as these, to pursue an agenda of 
political reform, whilst simultaneously maintaining their apparent apolitical position. Indeed, 
it was frequently emphasised whilst undertaking interviews with individuals heading the 
MCA in the US that the initiative is about 'policy' not 'politics'. Arguably, this separation is 
illustrative of a perspective in which 'politics' do not matter, so long as governments in the 
South are adopting the 'right' policies. Within this context, one could suggest that the value 
of formal 'democracy' is, in this respect, essentially limited to reproducing governments that 
are willing to pursue the sound policy environments prescribed by the IF Is and bilateral 
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donors. This process is clearly demonstrative of 'polyarchy' and the MCA can be located as 
one possible way in which it is being operationalised by the US. 
8.3.3 Democracy: A condition of MeA eligibility? 
It is interesting to note that, in the midst of this apparent reluctance to draw an explicit 
connection between the MCA and democracy, there were caIls from within the development 
community for the MCC to include 'democracy' as a condition for eligibility. In a testimony 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, MCA-expert Steve Radelet raised this issue, 
asking whether the MCA should be "aimed at all low-income countries that are committed to 
use aid effectively to fight poverty and stimulate growth, or limited to democracies with that 
commitment" (2003b: 5). In the same year, Thomas Palley wrote a paper recommending that 
the Bush administration elevate 'democracy' as a criterion for MCA eligibility, citing the fact 
that US foreign policy towards the South has "long emphasised the twin goals of economic 
development and democracy" (2003: 3). This embedded relationship has already been 
referred to in discussing the promotion of 'free-market democracies' and yet, despite these 
calls for democracy's inclusion, the original system for eligibility and selectivity has 
remained relatively unchanged. There are several possible reasons for this situation, one of 
which, as already alluded to, is rooted in the proximity of the Treasury Department to the 
World Bank. In addition to this, it could be argued that for many the inclusion of a 
'democracy' criterion was not only largely irrelevant, but also potentially counterproductive. 
With regard to the first of these, the ultimate goal of formal democracy is, according to the 
perspective outlined in the preceding paragraph, to reproduce and legitimise governments 
committed to the neoliberal orthodoxy. Accordingly, by utilising the stringent criteria 
originally established within the framework of the MCA, the MCC bypasses the highly 
contentious issue of 'democratic' process and moves straight to the desired end product, i.e. 
the production of the sound policy environments. 
In terms of being counter-productive, the introduction of 'democracy' as a condition 
for engagement within the MCA would have potentiaIly limited country inclusion. According 
to Radelet, for example, the introduction ofa 'democracy hurdle' would have reduced the 
number of MC A-qualifying countries during the first three years from 19 to 14 (2003b: 5). 
This is especially significant bearing in mind the fact that the MCA is all about working with 
the South's 'best performers'. In chapter 3, a table was provided showing all thirty-nine 
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countries involved in the initiative, ranging from those being eligible for the MCA and/or the 
associated 'Threshold Programme', to those countries with agreements already signed. 
According to a list produced by the Freedom House in 2007, nine of these countries fail to 
qualify as 'Electoral Democracies', four of which have MCA programmes. Table 8.1 below 
clarifies this situation further. 
Table 8.1: MCA/threshold-engaged non-electoral democracies 
Country Programme phase 
Armenia MCAcompact 
Burkina Faso MCA compact and Threshold Agreement 
Jordan MCA eligible and Threshold Agreement 
Kyrgyz Republic Threshold eligible 
Morocco MCAcompact 
Rwanda Threshold Agreement 
Tanzania MCA compact and Threshold Agreement 
Uganda Threshold Agreement 
Yemen Threshold* 
• Yemen's Threshold Programme assistance was suspended in 2005 following slippages in policy performance 
and then reinstated in 2007 after undertaking a series of 'impressive reforms'. However in October 2007 the 
awarding of the assistance to Yemen was postponed and a review undertaken to "determine the country's future 
status with the MCC" (MCC 2007 j). 
Source: Compiled using MCC and Freedom House data 
Consequently, one could argue that, based on these findings, roughly one quarter of all the 
MCA/threshold eligible countries do not, in fact, qualify as electoral democracies. This adds 
weight to the suggestion that 'democracy', within the framework of this initiative, is only 
valued so far as it produces governments willing to adopt the policies seen as necessary for 
aid to be 'effective'. 
8.3.4 The MCA: More than just economics 
One cannot, as stressed several times within this thesis, ignore the fact that, despite 
rhetoric to the contrary, political considerations may also play a part in the MCC's selection 
process. Indeed, HerrIing suggests that, for some MCA observers, the selection of 
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Mauritania253 for a 'Threshold Programme' was actually about supporting an "ally in the 
global war on terror" (2007a: np). According to Jourde, the ruling elites in African countries 
such as Mauritania have "framed their policies according to the basic principles of the War 
on Terror discourse", improving their status in the eyes of their western partners (receiving 
substantial military and financial aid), whilst simultaneously weakening the "domestic and 
international pro-democracy movements" (2005: np). The MCC's selection of Jordan as both 
a threshold and MCA-eligible country was also seen by many to be rooted in the country's 
position as an important US political ally. What is more, its inclusion was criticised on a 
variety of grounds, ranging from Jordan's position as one of the largest recipients of US 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), to the fact that the country does not qualify as a 
'democracy' (see Herrling et al 2006). In September 2008, the MCC decided to top-up 
Georgia's existing US$295 million compact by an additional US$1 00 million, in what was 
undoubtedly a politically motivated response to the conflict involving Russia. As Herrling 
comments, "the MCC was established to champion and support development motivations not 
political ones" and it is "a slippery slope toward making the MCC the ATM of State 
Department when it needs money fast for political purposes" (2008b: np). In light of these 
decisions, I would argue that whilst democracy is, so far as the promotion of sound policy 
enviromnents is concerned, valued for its ability to reproduce governments committed to 
towing the official development line, it is additionally valued, within this highly politicised 
9/11 world, for its ability to produce and strengthen govermnents and states that support the 
War on Terror254• This reinforces the fact that although polyarchy promotion is important, it 
is always only "one component of overall foreign policy" (Robinson 2007). 
8.4 The MCA and democracy: Changing rhetoric? 
Despite the aforementioned reluctance to draw connections between the MCA and 
democracy promotion, an event held at Freedom House in early 2007 on 'democracy and 
development', saw the MCC CEO John Danilovich do just that. In his speech, Danilovich 
stated that "the synergy between democracy and development produces results that are 
253 Mauritania has since been deemed ineligible for assistance through the threshold programme in the 2009 
selection process, following the overthrow of Mauritania's first democratically-elected president in a coup 
(African Press International 2008). 
254 However, as witnessed in the 2006 elections in Palestine, when Hamas came to power (despite open US-
support for Fatah) and in the recent elections held in Pakistan, 'democracy' can at times work against US policy 
and interests. 
236 
Chapter 8: The Millennium Challenge Account and Democracy 
mutually enforcing" (2007: np), adding weight to the previous statement made by Palley that 
US foreign policy towards the South has long emphasised the 'twin goals' of economic 
development and democracy. However, whereas Palley calls for the inclusion of a democracy 
criterion as a condition of MC A eligibility, Danilovich's approach is less direct, identifying 
three potential areas in which the development programme could, in its current form, be seen 
to be promoting 'democracy'. These are looked at in greater detail now. 
8.4.1 Improving policy performance and motivating policy reforms 
Danilovich states that the MCA promotes democracy and development by linking aid 
to policy performance and by acting as a strong catalyst for policy reforms within the 
recipient countries. Although identified in his speech as two separate issues, the basic 
argument underlying both is the same, i.e. that by promoting 'good performance' in the three 
broad areas of 'Ruling Justly', 'Investing in People' and 'Economic Freedom', the MCC is 
encouraging countries to adopt the policies and reforms seen as necessary for achieving 
"democratic and prosperous societies" (ibid). Within the specific context of the MCA, this 
process has come to be known to as the 'MCC effect', referring to the way in which the 
programme acts as an incentive system for delivering policy reform. With regard to the 
'Investing in People' criterion, for example, whilst the general principle behind its inclusion 
for eligibility may be worthy of praise, the raison d'etre of the category can be found, 
according to Foley, in the "crudely economistic and reductionist assumptions derived from 
human capital theory" (2007: 4). Rather than exposing and revealing the fundamental causes 
underlying poverty, many of which are political in nature, the MCA can be seen as a 
mechanism for maintaining the capitalist production process. Consequently, although the use 
of indicators measuring, for example, Girl's Primary Education Completion Rate, may be 
very laudable, their inclusion continues to be based upon underlying neoliberal assumptions. 
This resonates with the suggestion made by Demmers et al that "political, human and social 
rights are hardly valued beyond their instrumental role in economic and socio-economic 
development", representing an approach to democracy that "fits well into the functional 
neoliberal theory of politics" (2004: 8). 
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8.4.2 Promoting democracy through country ownership? 
The second way in which the MCA may contribute towards the twin goals of 
development and democracy is, according to the MCC CEO, through its emphasis on 
'country ownership,255. It is stated that the MCC process "encourages broad consultation and 
jumpstarts critical thinking about the policies necessary for development and democracy to 
take root", whilst also building "local capacity to make democracy and development 
sustainable" (Danilovich 2007b: np). In examining the validity of this statement, it is useful 
to begin by reiterating that the MCA is, as discussed in chapter 3, all about working with 
those countries that have already demonstrated the willingness and commitment to pursue the 
'right' policies. Although recipient countries are responsible for drawing up their own MCA 
plans, this is being done within a pre-established framework that allows for little deviance 
away from the prescribed neoliberal economic model256• Consequently, countries that veer 
too far away from the sound policy environments promoted through the initiative may find 
themselves cut off from further funding257 (as seen in the case of Yemen and its Threshold 
Programme). Therefore, whilst the concept of 'country-ownership' infers that the recipient 
countries involved retain ultimate control over their individual MCA programmes, the reality 
is that this 'ownership' is limited to approval by the US and there are mechanisms in place to 
ensure this relationship is maintained258• As a result, overall power remains, despite 
suggestions to the contrary, in the hands of the US-policy makers and MCC programme 
administrators. This, in turn, has important ramifications for how we interpret the MCA's 
democratic credentials, especially in light of the concept's basic definition as meaning 'power 
of the people'. 
For reasons established earlier, there are also grounds for questioning the issue of 
consultation and participation within the MCA. For example, in chapter 7 fears over 
'" The World Bank's 'Assessing Aid' report, which as already mentioned was hugely influential in shaping the 
MCA's approach to country selectivity, identified country ownership as being crucial for achieving successful 
r,rojects. 
56 Indeed, this is one potential reason why, despite all this talk on 'country ownership', there are such striking 
similarities between the different MCA programmes in terms of content (see chapter 3 section 3.7.2). 
257 It is interesting to note that currently (January 2008) nine out of the sixteen countries which the MCC has 
approved or signed compacts with do not now pass the indicator test. Although Nicaragua is not included in this 
group, the two other Central American recipient countries, Honduras and El Salvador, are. This raises additional 
questions over the implications of this situation and, also, over whether the 'MCC-effect' is as successful as 
suggested. 
258 For example, the MCC retains certain rights over the MCA decision-making process in recipient countries, 
including the right to 'veto'. 
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Honduras' MCA consultation process, based primarily upon the programme's proximity to 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), were highlighted. If we add to this equation 
the highly politicised pre-electoral environments259 in which some of the MCA programmes 
were, and are being, constructed and implemented, then one begins to appreciate that the 
situation is far from simple. The relationship between the MCA and democracy is, therefore, 
not clear cut, warranting greater analysis at the country level. Subsequently, the issue of 
consultation is explored in much greater detail whilst looking at Nicaragua's unique 
experience in the initiative, in which we also examine the spaces and places of participation 
through which this process has occurred. This is especially important in light of Danilovich' s 
comment that the MCC helps make 'democracy and development' sustainable by building 
'local capacity'. Before doing this, however, attention is turned to examining the political 
backdrop upon which Nicaragua's MCA programme was implemented, with suggestions 
presented as to how politics may, or may not, have influenced the initiative. 
8.5 Do politics matter? The case of Nicaragua and the MeA 
In contrast to the first part of this chapter which focussed on locating the MCA 
initiative within a broader theoretical and historical understanding of 'democracy', the 
following section narrows this analysis down by concentrating specifically on Nicaragua's 
experience in the programme. The bulk of this discussion centres on exploring the way in 
which individuals from the country were able to engage with the MCA, with a particular 
emphasis placed on the participative structures through which inclusion was potentially 
enabled. This focus on 'participation' is especially important due to the historical context 
through which discourses around 'democracy' have emerged in Nicaragua. 
Chapter 4 argued that in the immediate period following the 1979 Sandinista 
revolution there was a dramatic shift towards the promotion of 'popular participation' within 
the country. Not only did this transition symbolise the opening up of political space but, more 
importantly, it represented the introduction of a form of democracy that went far beyond the 
concept's formal understanding. This was reflected in a speech made by revolutionary leader 
Daniel Ortega in 1980, in which he stated that "democracy neither begins nor ends with 
elections", with it being a myth to try and reduce the phenomenon to that kind of condition 
259 In Honduras, for example, Presidential elections were held just two months after the MCA compact's 'entry 
into force' . 
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(cited in Ruchwarger 1987: 3, 4). As suggested in chapter 4, this interpretation of the concept 
represented a more genuine reflection of democracy's true meaning and this suggestion is 
supported by the statement by Close that, "of all the political systems that have embraced 
constitutional government in the last quarter of the twentieth century, Sandinista Nicaragua 
had the best claim to be called democratic itself' (1999: 4). With this in mind, the focus on 
participation in Nicaragua's MCA programme is not only warranted but essential, rooted in 
the country's unique history and relationship with the US. 
8.6 The 2006 elections: Politicising the MeA? 
Before exploring the central issue of participation further, the chapter sets the political 
context to the MCA in Nicaragua, by reflecting upon the highly politicised conditions within 
which the programme was composed and implemented in the run-up to the 2006 Presidential 
elections. Particular consideration is given to the role of the US during the pre-electoral 
period, which is important due to the US' historical affinity for political intervention, 
especially in Nicaragua. Chapter 4 already highlighted some ways in which the US attempted 
to influence the 2006 Nicaraguan elections and actually identified one instance where the US 
Ambassador to Nicaragua reportedly threatened to cut-off assistance through the MCA if the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) won the elections. Ironically, such efforts were 
qualified in the name of 'defending democracy', which demonstrates the malleability of 
'democracy' as a concept. In the wake of such actions, and through a historical distrust of the 
US, it is clear that some individuals from Nicaragua were concerned that the MeA would be 
used as political leverage to influence the outcome ofthe elections. The following interview 
extract illustrates this point: 
.. The truth is that the majority of the population believes that this is a way to buy 
votes for the liberals ... Most of them don't believe in the MCA, and think it is the 
'Cuento del milenio ,260, and they have been saying this because for them it is a lie ... 
something political to encourage people to vote for the bourgeoisie. That is the 
opinion which is being passed around and it is difficult to convince people otherwise" 
(research interview with Petrona Sandovae61). 
260 M stated in the previous chapter, this expression is used to refer to the MCA as a 'fairytale'. 
261 Petrona Sandoval, Founder and Co-ordinator of the Msociation of Women with Disabilities - Interview 
conducted in the city of Le6n in north Chinandega on 27th June 2006. 
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According to another source, however, there was a lot of 'unnecessary hot air' over this issue 
and, to a large extent, this opinion was proven true when, following the election of FSLN 
candidate Daniel Ortega, the MCA programme continued to be implemented. Consequently, 
despite concerns raised over the potential politicisation of the initiative in the pre-electoral 
period, it is now clear that the MCC's stated commitment to policy and not politics is, in this 
instance, proven true. This is not to say, however, that there was not a sense of foreboding 
over Daniel Ortega's possible re-election, as the following interview extract reveals: 
"We are concerned ... if you look at the past performance of some candidates who are 
still on the scene today, you can sort of make assumptions about ... if they were to 
operate how they did in the past that would clearly have a negative impact" (research 
interview with Matt Bohn262). 
Regardless of such concerns, many of which are entrenched in the historical 
animosity between Daniel Ortega and US administration officials, Nicaragua has performed 
relatively well under the new President. For example, Nicaragua failed just four out of the 
seventeen scorecard indicators in 2008, thereby performing much better than its Central 
American MCA counterparts263• To a large degree, this 'success' is indicative of Daniel 
Ortega's leadership in which, despite an apparent commitment to anti-neoliberal discourse, 
he continues to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and commit to the 
controversial Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). 
As stated in chapter 4, such contradictions appear to be running riot within the new 
government. That being said, whatever the personal sentiment may be over this 'moderated' 
approach, it is clear that politics have not, on this specific occasion, derailed the MCA. This 
is not to say, however, that there will not be some problems down the line. Indeed, this was 
seen most recently in the reported efforts of the new administration to politicise the country's 
spaces of participation by creating the highly contested 'Councils of Citizen Power' (CPCs). 
This could have deep implications for democratic participation across the country, with 
potential ramifications for the way in which citizens engage with the MCA. This issue is 
discussed below, but for now we turn our attention to understanding the established spaces 
262 Matt Bohn, MCC representative in Nicaragua - Interview held in Managua on 14"h August 2006. 
263 As stated earlier, both Honduras and El Salvador are currently failing the indicator test (see the MCC 
website, www.mcc.gov). 
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and places of consultation through which participation in the initiative has largely been 
achieved to date. 
8.7 El Sistema: A framework for participation 
In beginning this discussion, it is useful to start by providing a very brief outline of 
the system of participation that exists in Nicaragua (not including any recent changes that 
may have been made by Daniel Ortega). The 'National System for Participation and 
Agreement', referred to as 'El Sistema', represents a framework for planning and citizen 
participation that includes institutions of the central and municipal government, civil society 
actors, and producer organisations. It was created in 2003 by the government of Nicaragua, 
with the intention of facilitating greater levels of citizen participation in the creation and 
evaluation of public policies. This organisational system incorporates entities operating at a 
range of scales, from the very local to the municipal, departmental and national. Figure 8.1 
below shows a simplified version of this participative structure. 
Figure 8.1: El Sistema and the spaces of participation 
PRESIDENT OF NICARAGUA 
! 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL PLANNING (CONPES) 
! 
DEPARTMENTAL DEVELOPMENT 
COUNCILS (DDCs) 
! 
MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT 
COMMITTEES (MDCs) 
! 
. I COMMUNITY COMMITTEES (LCCs) 
Source: Adapted from http://www.pase.gob.ni/estructura.htm 
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At the very local level there are 'Community Committees' (otherwise known as 
Village Development Committees) and these are located throughout each municipality. Ifwe 
take El Sauce, for example, which is situated in the north of Le6n, there are reportedly 
sixteen Community Committees representing the sixteen villages of the municipality. Each 
committee is made up of seven board members including a Coordinator and President, one of 
which must be a woman and the other a man. These individuals then represent their villages 
at the municipal level by participating in the' Municipal Development Committees' (MDCs). 
The MDCs constitute the next level within this participative framework. These 
entities supposedly integrate all actors within the municipality, including government 
institutions and ministers, civil society groups, businessmen and women, teachers, syndicates 
and so on, with their specific composition varying, as the following interview extract reveals, 
according to the reality of each territory: 
"The private sector is represented by the farmers, the producers, and not by the big 
businessmen. So the situation is different from the big cities where you would find a 
chamber of commerce and the big businessmen. As this region is very rural, the 
private sector is primarily composed offarmers and small producers ... .. (research 
interview with Juan Jose Ray0264). 
The committees themselves are organised into different 'tables of consultation', which should 
reflect the diversity ofthe council's members. For example, there may be a table on 
production, another on the environment, another for women, and so on, depending upon the 
interests of those groups, organisations and individuals involved. Each of these 'tables' then 
has a representative who is on the directive board, which is headed by Mayor of the 
municipality. The 'Citizen Participation Law' (Law 475), which was passed by the 
Nicaraguan government in October 2003, played a key role in institutionalising citizen 
involvement within these structures and, furthermore, represented a determined effort by the 
state to improve social accountability at all levels of El Sistema. This is the same law that 
many believe is being violated under the controversial implementation of the CPCs, 
discussed later. 
264 Juan Jose Rayo, Executive Director of AMULEON - Interviewed in the town ofE! Sauce in north Leon on 
5th June 2006. 
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The next level of Nicaragua's participative framework is headed by the 
'Departmental Development Councils' (DDCs), which have already been discussed in some 
detail within the thesis. These entities, which were formalised through the passing of Law 
475 mentioned above, act as essential intermediary spaces between the municipalities and the 
central government. As one interview respondent commented, it is impossible for the central 
government to negotiate with roughly one hundred and fifty-two different municipalities, and 
vice versa (research interview with Irving Larios265). The DDCs facilitate citizen participation 
at the departmental level, where the development priorities for territorial development are 
defined and investment plans consulted upon. In terms of composition, the departmental 
councils are much like the municipal committees before them, involving a range of different 
actors from civil society, the business sector, local/central government (including the Mayors 
of each municipality) and so on, whose right to participate within these structures was 
supposedly ensured through the passing of Law 475. However, their actual representativeness 
reportedly varies from one case to the next, reflecting the fact that, as several interview 
respondents commented, significant differences exist between these entities from one region 
to the next, with some being stronger than others: 
"I think that the majority of these councils are getting stronger, with the exception of I 
would say Granada and Masaya ... these are probably the weakest. The strongest ones 
are in Lean, Chontales, Boaco and Rivas. There are variabilities, but ... most of them 
are doing a good job. So the only thing is to do a better job in Granada and Masaya, 
where the councils are very new ... the other ones have more experience and more 
years of being organised,,266 (research interview with Edgar Sotomayor267). 
Although the precise reasons for this situation are not entirely clear, it appears from the 
research conducted in Nicaragua, that funding is a crucial issue in determining council 
effectiveness. Finally, in terms of structure, the DD Cs are composed of a General Assembly', 
where all of the council's members can be found, and a directive board, which is elected by 
the assembly. However, the presidency of any given DDC is always held by a Mayor from 
265 Irving Larios, Executive Director ofINGES - Interview held in Managua on 2S~ April 2006. 
266 These comments reflect the findings of an analysis conducted between 2003 and 2005 in Nicaragua on ten of 
the country's DDCs, in which it was stated that, whilst sector representation and the balance of actors is 
relatively good, variations were noted between the different territories in terms of the quality and amount of 
p,articipation involved (Moncada and Wallace 2005: 38). 
67 Ed&ar Sotomayor, National Co-ordinator for PASE in Nicaragua's government - Interview held in Managua 
on 12 May 2006. 
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the region in which it is based and this was ensured through national decree. As the chapter 
later reveals, this has been problematic in some cases. 
The 'National Council on Economic and Social Planning' (CONPES) is 
identified by many as being a bridge between civil society and local government on the one 
hand, and central government on the othd68• It was created by presidential decree in 1999, 
with the entity's formation being driven by civil society in Nicaragua and this process was 
accelerated in the wake of Hurricane Mitch. Although there have been calls since then for 
CONPES to be understood as civil society's 'real representative' at the national level, its 
primary role has been, in theory at least, to act as an advisory body to Nicaragua's various 
Presidents on social and economic programmes and policies. In practice, however, this has 
not always been the case: 
"CON PES is an advisory elementfor the President, but normally the President of the 
Republic doesn't consult with them, and many of the opinions of CONP ES concerning 
the budget and internal debt are not taken into consideration" (research interview 
with Mario Quintana269). 
This situation has been complicated further by the historically volatile relationship between 
CONPES and Nicaragua's National Assembly. Simply put, the National Assembly was, at 
the time of this research, composed primarily of the FSLN and PLC and these parties were 
politically opposed to the ruling Bolafios administration. CONPES, through its capacity as an 
advisory body to the former President, was subsequently identified as an instrument of the 
Executive and this undermined the organisation's perceived legitimacy and apolitical image. 
This had severe implications for CONPES, as witnessed when, according to the former 
Executive Secretary of CONPES, the organisation's budget was almost taken away by the 
National Assembly (research interview with Violeta Granera270). Although comments raised 
during the course of research did suggest that efforts were being made to rectify this situation, 
the perceived politicisation of this space within El Sistema does raise additional doubts over 
the framework's other participative structures. 
268 It is important to note that, since 2005, representatives from each of the country's DDCs participate within 
CONPES. 
269 Mario Quintana, Director of the Civil Co-ordinator (previously named CCER) - Interview conducted in 
Managua on 20th April 2006. 
270 Violeta Granera, Executive Secretary of CONPES - Interview conducted in Managua on 15th May 2006. 
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8.8 The MCA and the DDCs 
Although it would be interesting to explore each one of the entities discussed 
above in greater detail, the focus here is placed on analysing the DDCs. These entities 
constitute the most active 'democratic' spaces of participation within Nicaragua's MCA 
programme. As stated previously in the thesis, the initiative is focussed on the region to the 
northwest of the country, where the two departments ofLe6n and Chinandega are situated. 
Consequently, there are two DD Cs involved in the initiative, referred to as CONDELEON in 
Le6n and CODECHI in Chinandega. These intermediary spaces have been engaged in the 
MCA from the beginning, having a direct input into the decision-making process of MCA-
Nicaragua through their presence on the board of directors271 • Due to their incisive role, it is 
essential to look closer at the DDCs and investigate their democratic credentials as a space 
for citizen participation in the region. In order to do this, we begin by reflecting upon the 
process of 'decentralisation' and consider what this has meant for the country's councils. 
8.8.1 Pursuing decentralisation 
As demonstrated in chapter 4, Nicaragua has a long history of centralised power, 
in which local government has traditionally been a weak player within the country's 
development. Whilst the revolutionary Sandinista party of the 1980s did make some limited 
progress towards rectifying this situation following many years of dictatorial rule272, the 
government retained a centralised command structure in the wake of growing US hostilities 
towards the country. According to Oquist and Delgado, this actually worsened after the 
conflict ended, with the Chamorro administration reportedly opting for a greater 
centralisation of power, rather than any form of decentralisation (1996: np). Although there 
were signs, initially at least, that things would change with the election of Arnoldo Aleman in 
1997273, the new administration clearly failed to live up to its pro-democratic rhetoric. Indeed, 
towards the end of his highly controversial presidency, it was argued by some that Aleman 
271 As clarified in chapter 6, MCA-Nicaragua's board of directors is composed of seven voting members, two of 
which are civil society directors from each of the DDCs, and one a Mayor from the region. In addition, there are 
two civil observers from the development councils and one Mayor observer. Consequently, the councils have a 
si¥nificant presence in the MCA's decision-making body. 
27 As witnessed by the creation ofa system of regional govermnents (see Oquist and Delgado 1996). 
273 In his inauguration speech, Alerruin reportedly promised to create permanent institutions "with municipal 
autonomy and economic reinforcement, the cornerstone of democracy and community life, the primary 
institution closest to the citizen and daily life", adding that "the people want decentralisation and state 
modernisation in all its facets" (cited in Cortes 1997: np). 
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had actually implemented a three-year plan to 'financially strangle municipal government', as 
the government had effectively cut-off central government transfers to the municipalities 
(NitIapan-Envio team 2000b: np). In contrast, Enrique Bolafios' success in the 2001 national 
elections ushered in a government that appeared to be far more committed to decentralising 
power than its predecessor, with 'decentralisation' becoming an integral part of both the 
government's National Development Plan (NDP) and its poverty reduction strategy. 
Despite the Bolafios administration's stated commitment to decentralisation, real 
progress towards this end has remained somewhat 'theoretical', with reportedly little being 
achieved in practice (research interview with Maria Jarquin274). The reason for this situation 
appears to have been rooted within central government itself, with key individuals reportedly 
resisting attempts to divert decision-making powers to Nicaragua's various territories. The 
following interview extract sheds further light on this situation: 
"For some institutions of the government it is difficult. They feel they are losing 
power, because their decisions are being taken in the territory ... so at the central level 
they are losing power ... and they don't like this much" (research interview with Edgar 
Sotomayor). 
This has important ramifications for the operation of the DOes, especially in terms of 
funding, as revealed now in looking at CONDELEON and CODECHI. 
8.8.2 CONDELEON, CODECHI and the issue offunding 
Although one could consider the passing of Law 475 as an important step 
towards empowerment at the municipal and departmental level, there are, as this discussion 
reveals, reasons for questioning the practical implications of such decentralisation. With 
regard to the DD Cs, for example, this is illustrated most clearly in a severe lack of funding 
and resources, which is potentially undermining the councils' ability to work effectively. This 
was seen most vividly in the case ofChinandega, where under-funding appears to be 
particularly severe: 
274 Maria Jarquin, Governance Advisor in DflD Nicaragua - Interview held in Managua on 5th May 2006. 
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..... at the beginning INIFOM275 had an office here in Chinandega ... and CODECHI 
was in INIFOM. Then they closed the office in Chinandega ... and so CODECHI had 
to find a new place to go. We were going to transfer the office to the Interior Ministry 
but were told that they were going to open up passport services and so that space was 
no longer available ... So CODECHI is now in MAGFOR276, but we don't have an 
office. At the moment the three or four people that work here haven't been paidfor 
June ... we don't have the money to pay them" (research interview with Alberto 
Aviles277). 
According to one respondent, many agencies and individuals believe that the government is 
responsible for funding the DDCs, as they were essentially created by presidential decree 
(research interview with Pablo Medina278). However, in reality this is clearly not happening 
/ 
and, what is more, I got the strong impression from those individuals I spoke with from 
central government that it had no intention of doing so either. One could, therefore, argue that 
this situation represents a tradition in Nicaragua of promoting decentralisation, whilst 
simultaneously failing to supply the necessary resources with which to make this process a 
reality. Fortunately, however, some donor organisations, such as the Department for 
International Development (DflD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
the Oerman Technical Corporation (OTC) and the European Commission, do offer some 
support to the DD Cs and the participative structure of which they are part279: 
"We are supporting the creation andfunctioning of intermediate figures [the DDCs] 
to improve communication and the flow ofiriformation between the central 
government and the municipalities ... it aims to strengthen the capacity and the voice 
of civil society in policy making and give an opportunity to not only the big NGOs or 
associations of NGOs that you find in Nicaragua, but also to the small associations of 
citizens ... with the aim of supporting democratic governance" (research interview 
with Maria Jarquin). 
275 INIFOM slauds for the 'Nicaraguan Institute of Municipal Management'. 
276 MAGFOR stands for the 'Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry'. 
277 Alberto Aviles, businessmanlTreasurer of CODE CHIle x-Minister of Governance for Chinaudega - Interview 
held in the city of Chinaudega on 27th July 2006. 
278 Pablo Medina, Lawyer and Director of the Association for Survival aud Local Development (ASODEL)-
Interview held in the city of Chinandega on 25th July 2006. . 
279 See Moncada aud Wallace (2005) for a detailed aualysis of El Sistema aud the role of donors organisations in 
supporting the structures found therein. 
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Whilst this assistance has been crucial in maintaining the councils in Leon and Chinandega, 
their dependence on foreign assistance is clearly not enough to ensure their continued and 
effective operation within the future. Bearing in mind the fact that Nicaragua's MCA 
programme is being implemented over a five year period, and that the councils of 
CONDELEON and CODECHI are playing a fundamental role within this process, this could 
potentially present problems down the line in terms of participation in the initiative. 
Consequently, there is clearly a need to strengthen these entities in order to guarantee 
continued and meaningful involvement within the fund, which is essential if the MCA is to 
adhere to its 'country ownership' approach. As one respondent commented, "our programme 
is going to be more effective if the development councils themselves are more effective" 
(research interview with Julio Montealegre28o). 
8.8.3 The DDCs: Do politics matter? 
In exploring the government's reluctance to give financial support to the 
departmental councils, one of the main reasons provided was that doing so would somehow 
compromise the independence of these entities. As the former director for PASE (which is a 
government support programme for El Sistema) commented in response to a question on 
funding the DD Cs, "I always opposed the idea of giving direct support to the development 
councils from a conflict of interest point of view. I think it is very healthy to keep the 
independence of the development council as much as possible. But if I start putting them on 
the pay-roll where is this independence going to be?" (research interview with Juan Sebastian 
Chamorr0281 ). Bearing in mind the experience of CON PES where, despite its apolitical 
stance, it became adversely associated with the Bolaiios administration, perhaps these 
concerns are warranted. In fact, as discussed in a moment, several of the respondents 
interviewed actually felt that the departmental councils had already been politicised, to 
various degrees, and this was voiced as a clear point of concern. At the same time, one must 
question the degree to which the dependence of the DDCs on external donors is healthy and, 
furthermore, whether it is sustainable in the long-term. 
280 Julio Montealegre, Programme Co-ordinator for the MCA-Nicaragua/Civil Society Director for Chinandega 
in MCA-Nicaragua - Interview held in Managua on 30th March 2006. 
281 Juan Sebastian Chamorro, Director of MCA-Nicaragua - Interview held in Managua on 30th July 2006. 
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Although the majority ofthose I spoke to from the region told me that they did 
not believe that the DDCs had been politicised, some individuals did raise doubts about their 
political neutrality. In particular, concerns were voiced over the influence of the Mayors 
within the councils, in which it was suggested that "political parties try to manipulate the 
process to further their own interests" (research interview with Ernesto Medina282). The vast 
majority of the Mayors from the departments of Leon and Chinandega belong to the FSLN 
and, as the following interview extract reveals, their overwhelming presence within the 
council has, according to some individuals, politicised the space: 
"Ifeel that the council is being kidnapped and that stops itfrom working as it should. 
I wasn't invited to the last meeting because I have expressed my view that I don't like 
the way they have been handling things in public. It is being politicised. Here the ten 
Mayors of Leon are Sandinista and they are dominating the space. They even fired the 
technical secretary of the council just because the Mayors didn't like her and they 
said that they didn't like working with her ... The truth is that most of us are not 
comfortable, but we have to be there to represent the people" (research interview with 
Petrona Sandoval). 
In the wake of such discontent, there have been calls from some sectors of civil society to 
change the rule that states that the President of the DDC must be a Mayor. Instead, it is 
argued that this position should be open to people from civil society as well. Alternatively, 
however, Mayors are, as another respondent suggested, seen to have the greatest 
repres~tation as they have been elected (research interview with Rigoberto Sampson283). 
Consequently, there are split views on this issue and such divisions are indicative of the 
politicised environment in which the MCA is being implemented. 
8.8.4 Exploring representativeness 
In light of the above discussion, it is important here to revisit the central theme of 
representation within the DDCs, which is essential to our understanding of 'democracy' in 
Nicaragua's MCA programme. Chapter 7 already looked at some aspects of this issue in 
282 Emesto Medina, Ex·Rector of the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN) - Interview held 
in the city of Leon on 5th July 2006. 
283 Rigoberto Sampson, Dean of the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN) and Civil Observer 
in MCA-Nicaragua - Interview held in the city ofLeon on the 21" June 2006. 
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examining the Rural Business Development Programme (RBDP) component, where specific 
attention was given to the participation of small-businesses and women within the 
departmental councils. With regard to the first of these, the point was made that private sector 
representation has tended to be dominated by the local 'big businessman' and this has the 
potential to inject a degree of bias into the councils (thereby favouring the interests of such 
groups). However, as the following discussion reveals, the reason for this situation appears to 
be less to do with any kind of restrictive membership rules (indeed participation within the 
DDCs is theoretically ensured through law 475), and more to do with the locations of the 
councils themselves. 
8.8.5 The importance oflocation 
CONDELEON and CODECHI are situated in the cities of Le6n and Chinandega 
respectively and these constitute the two most developed urban areas within the departments. 
It is not, therefore, surprising that council membership tends to be dominated by groups and 
individuals from the municipalities closest to DDCs, where accessibility to this space is 
greatest. In contrast, organisations and groups from the municipalities towards the more 
remote northern parts of the departments face many more difficulties in accessing these 
councils, with participation limited by insufficient infrastructure, high transport costs and 
greater levels of poverty (the very problems that the MCA is trying to fix). This has lead to 
concerns that some areas are being under-represented at the departmental level, with one 
respondent arguing that "CONDELEON has represented Le6n as a municipality and not Le6n 
as a department" (research interview with Nubia Luna284), and another calling for 'greater 
municipal participation' (research interview with Justino Fonseca285). Although each 
municipality is technically represented on the DDC by their municipal Mayor, this does not 
compensate for direct participation by civil society and the private sector. Furthermore, the 
inability of the region's most impoverished to participate effectively within the bodies 
primarily responsible for ensuring civil societies inclusion in the MCA, adds weight to the 
concerns presented in the previous chapter which questioned the initiative's pro-poor 
credentials. 
28. Nubia Luna, INGES and ex-Mayoress of El Sauce - Interview held in the town of El Sauce in north Le6n on 
lOth June 2006. 
285 Justino Fonseca, Director of Social Work in Malpaisillo City Hall- Interview held in the town ofMalpaisillo 
in the department of Le6n on 13th June 2006. 
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8.9 AMULEON, AMUNORCHI and the role ofthe Mayors 
As indicated above, the Mayors play a very significant role within the DD Cs, 
especially in representing civil society in the northern municipalities. As a result, it is 
important to take a closer look at the mechanisms through which they participate on the 
councils and highlight any potential areas in which concerns were raised over their 
involvement in the DDCs. In beginning this process we start by looking at two similar 
organisations: AMUNORCHI, which is the' Association of Municipalities from north 
Chinandega', and AMULEON, which is the' Association of Municipalities from north Le6n'. 
As discussed previously in chapter 6 (section 6.7.3) there has, since the signing of the historic 
Achuapa Agreements in 2002, been an opening up of political space within the region, as 
witnessed by the creation of these inter-municipal alliances. This process began with the 
creation of AMULEON, but was swiftly followed in Chinandega with the formation of 
AMUNORCHI (which, like its Le6n counterpart, is led and headed by the region's Mayors). 
Since then, a strong relationship has, as the following interviewee discusses, developed 
between the two organisations and this has acted as a key mechanism for pursuing and 
promoting shared interests286: 
"A strong alliance exists between AMULEON and AMUNORCHI. AMULEON helped 
us to organise and work as an association. Now that we have grown as an association 
we continue to be brothers. because ... we are connected by the same qualities. 
difficulties. weaknesses and needs. Therefore. when we speak about AMULEON and 
AMUNORCHI we speak about a block of municipalities that work together. that 
always work together" (research interview with Trinidad Garcia287). 
Similarly, another respondent talked about AMULEON and AMUNORCHI as being 
'brothers in this project of development'288, having the 'same identities, the same land, the 
same visions, and the same dreams' , and that this unique relationship has "translated into the 
greatest advocacy process the region has ever had" (research interview with Agresio 
286 As witnessed with the formulation ofa strategic plan for the 'dry zones', which involved the five 
municipalities of north Le6n and the six from Chinandega. 
287 Trinidad Garcia, Executive Director of the Association of Municipalities from north Chinandega 
(AMUNORCHI) - Interview held in Somotillo in north Cbinandega on 18th of July 2006. 
288 The use of 'brothers' here is particularly interesting in light of the fact that these alliances are essentially run 
by men; a reality that has not, as discussed later, gone un-noticed by the women in the region. 
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Osej0289). It is, therefore, no surprise to hear, in light of the region's growing organisational 
capacity, that these entities have taken the lead in representing the interests of the northern 
municipalities in both the departmental councils and the MCA. This is witnessed by the fact 
that the Mayor of Somotillo, Agresio Osejo, is President of AMUNORCHI, Vice-President of 
CODECHI and on the directive board of MCA-Nicaragua. Consequently, whilst local groups 
from the northern parts of Le6n and Chinandega are clearly limited, for reasons already 
suggested, in their ability to engage directly with the DDCs, the municipalities from these 
areas have compensated for this, to a degree, by creating these inter-municipal alliances. 
8.9.1 Identifying the dangers 
Whilst I am in no doubt that both AMULEON and AMUNORCHI have been positive 
forces within the region's development, one should not ignore the potential dangers that 
accompany the elevated roles of the Mayors within this process. Indeed, as stated earlier, 
concerns were voiced during the course of research over the potential politicisation of the 
departmental councils, which were seen as being vulnerable to political manipulation by the 
Mayors. Within this context, one could argue that these influential inter-municipal alliances 
could, theoretically, add to the likelihood of this happening. In addition to this issue, one 
could question the extent to which the over-dependence of people within the northern 
municipalities on the Mayors is healthy. For example, it is highly likely that local knowledge 
of the MCA will be limited to whatever information the Mayor is able and willing to divulge 
at a given time, and as the following interview extract reveals, not everyone is happy with 
what this has meant in practice: 
"I know that the association of municipalities are more involved in this, but there is a 
weakness concerning the lack of information shared with people ... We need this to 
happen and that is why we are insisting that the local government, civil society and 
AMULEON, sit down with the local actors and civil society, so they can let us know 
about the situation with the MeA ... because we only had one presentation about it" 
(research interview with Manue! Rostran290). 
289 Agresio Osejo, Mayor of Somotillo and President of AMUNORCHI - Interview held in Managua on 21" July 
2006. 
290 Manuel Rostn\n, Teacher and Co-operative President - Interview held in Santa Rosa del Peii6n in north Le6n 
on 13th June 2006. 
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This lack of infonnation is obviously incredibly important in tenns of affecting how 
individuals, especially in the poorer northern municipalities, are able to engage and 
participate in the programme. For many local actors in these areas, their only real 
involvement with the initiative appears to be indirectly through their elected Mayor, in which 
the MDCs, discussed earlier, act as important spaces for municipal consultation and dialogue. 
However, what happens if the Mayor is not fulfilling their obligations as an essential conduit 
of infonnation or indeed as a local ambassador within the DDCs? Ultimately, if dialogue is 
not happening at the municipal level, it is hard to see how local demands and interests are 
being represented at the departmental level and this presents difficulties in gauging what 
participation in the MCA has actually meant in practice291 • 
Although concerns over the availability and dissemination of infonnation regarding 
the MCA at the local level are warranted, it is important to note that the Mayors are only one 
part of this process. Clearly, they can only divulge as much infonnation to their. 
constituencies as they are given themselves and this, as the following interview extract 
reveals, is not always deemed enough: 
.. We already have some facts. but we should have more defined concepts regarding 
the execution of the funds. There are so many clouds and the information is falling 
like drops, little by little, and that is scary. It doesn't create confidence and we have 
said that" (research interview with Agresio Osejo). 
Therefore, whilst infonnation may not have been made as available at the local level as some 
may have liked, this is not necessarily indicative of any kind of short comings by a given 
Mayor. Instead, the problem may be located higher up the infonnation chain. According to 
Julio Montealegre, however, who at the time of being interviewed was Programme Co-
ordinator for the MCA in Nicaragua, expectations for infonnation on the initiative have been 
unreasonably high, with individuals requesting infonnation that just was not there: 
"One piece of the feedback we often get is that they want more information. 
Sometimes they feel that they don 'f have enough information, but it is hard for them to 
291 This situation sheds additional light on the issue of 'country-ownership' , which is a defming principle of the 
MCA and a mechanism through which, according to MCC CEO Danilovich, 'democracy' is being promoted by 
the initiative. 
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actually judge how much information there is. Sometimes there just isn't any 
information and they have unreasonable expectations that they should have more 
information when there just isn't ... but I think it is constructive. In general we have 
had very limited resources. We would love to be able to just have somebody giving 
them information the whole time, but our team is very small, so we do what we can 
with what we have" (research interview with Julio Montealegre). 
In summary, therefore, whilst it is clear that infonnation at the local level on the MCA 
may not have been as high as some may have liked, the precise reason for this situation is less 
obvious. Inevitably, conditions vary spatially between the different municipalities, with some 
MDCs working better than others and some Mayors being more open to local dialogue than 
their neighbouring counterparts. Whatever the precise reasons may be, it is apparent from this 
research that the Mayors, especially those from the municipalities to the remote north ofthe 
departments, are essential and influential actors within the DDCs and the MCA. They 
represent crucial conduits of communication, through which local groups and organisations 
can learn about developments in the MCA and engage, albeit indirectly, with the programme. 
However, with the Nicaraguan municipal elections being held in November this year, it will 
be more important than ever to monitor the effectiveness with which such lines of 
communication are being maintained, especially to the municipalities in the north of the 
departments. 
8.10 Revisiting the issue of gender 
Although the issue of gender was looked at in chapter 7 examining poverty reduction 
and the MCA, it is also directly relevant to the discussion of , democracy' presented here. 
Indeed, MCC CEO Danilovich himself recently stated that "helping women realise their 
political and economic rights is central to any discussion of democracy and development" 
(2007: np). Consequently, the chapter now focuses on examining the experience of women in 
the DD Cs and draws connections to what this has meant for their ability to engage with the 
MCA. Before doing this, however, it is interesting to note, in reflection of the above 
discussion on the inter-municipal alliances, that the DDCs are not the only spaces where 
women are looking to achieve equal status. For example, one respondent commented on the 
fact that AMUNORCHI is only linked to the Mayors, who are men, stating that this "is 
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another fight where we want to achieve a balanced space for women" (research interview 
with Maria Castill0292). The same respondent also suggested that many women do not know 
about the MCA because they are unable to participate in the municipal committee meetings 
due to other commitments, such as purchasing food, preparing meals and working the land. 
Therefore, whilst the passing of Law 475 may have, in theory at least, given women greater 
opportunities to be involved in the country's development, their ability to engage in these 
participative structures, whether at the local, departmental of national level, continues to be 
shaped by the cultural reality in which they operate. It is therefore essential in discussing the 
DDCs here, not to forget the broader historical and cultural context in which Nicaragua's 
programme is being implemented. 
8.10.1 Women and the DDCs 
As alluded to in chapter 7, the DO Cs were not, as one respondent commented, 
initially 'open' to women from the region: 
"In the first election for CODECHI's board of directors, women's representation was 
not stated ... producers, youth groups, civil society but not women. So the women 
started to claim this space. We are more than 50% of the population and therefore we 
must be represented. To accomplish this we had to hold many meetings with 
organisations of men and women to obtain enough votes to be represented" (research 
interview with Maria Castillo). 
There was, therefore, a process of organisation and mobilisation in both Le6n and 
Chinandega, as women demanded greater representation in the DDCs. This is important in 
light of some of the potential weaknesses within the structures themselves. More specifically, 
the councils tend to be, as one respondent commented, 'dominated by their own board of 
directors' , an opinion held by other individuals within the region: 
"The directive board ... in theory, and I stress in theory, represents the entire spectrum 
of the general assembly. But I don't think they are doing what they are supposed to 
do. For the directive board to function well it needs faster channels of communication 
292 Maria Castillo, Co-ordinator for the Movement for Women in Chinandega - Interview held in the city of 
Chinandega on 25th July 2006. 
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with the different organisations. The directive board is only representing those sectors 
that are part of the directive board ... not everybody in the assembly is represented" 
(research interview with Emesto Medina). 
Whilst these perceived weaknesses are somewhat worrying, it is important to bear in mind 
that these entities are relatively new and despite these teething problems are still widely 
perceived by those in the region to be important, and relatively balanced, spaces for 
strengthening democracy. For example, in terms of gender, it was argued that having a 
woman on the board of directors would give greater voice to women's groups, ensuring that 
they are "taken into account and respected" (research interview with Petrona Sandoval). 
8.10.2 Women and the MCA 
As noted above, chapter 6 has already looked at the involvement of women in 
Nicaragua's MCA within the specific context of analysing the initiative's project 
components. This was particularly useful in exploring the key issue of 'poverty reduction'. 
However, whilst this section expands and draws upon that discussion, the focus here is to 
examine the actual process through which women's inclusion in the initiative came about. Iri 
order to do this, we draw upon a number of key events through which women have been able 
to participate in the MCA. 
At the start of the MCA process there was, as discussed in section 6.6 of chapter 
6, a process of consultation within the region of Leon and Chinandega, in which the 
departments began to establish their regional priorities and elaborate potential projects. 
Although several different target areas were identified through regional dialogue, such as 
roads, irrigation and technology, there was reportedly little or no mention of gender: 
"It was great to hear about our partners from CONDELEON and CODECHI 
speaking about work, development projects and how to get rid of poverty. But where 
were women producers in the MCA? There are women producers who own land and 
women who have organised greatly, but they had not been included" (research 
interview with Mana Castillo). 
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In the wake of this omission, women from the region took advantage of a meeting held in 
Lean to voice their concerns to a visiting Congresswoman from the US. In response to a 
question on whether there was something in the MCA for women, the following was said: 
"We told her there was nothing ... they don't speak about gender in the MCA, they 
come with a sexist language ... and we want to be part of the MCA ... Women are the 
pillars of development, especially in a country like ours ... where women are 
responsible for the home and where women are the motor of development" (research 
interview with Petrona Sandoval). 
It was not long after this happened that the individuals heading the MCA in Nicaragua 
returned to the region and requested a meeting with the women's groups, and they were asked 
to create a proposal for the MCA on the theme of gender. It was in this moment that the 
women from the region, including producers, businesswomen and women from many 
different backgrounds, gathered to create the 'Proposal from the women of the occident: For 
their inclusion and participation in the Millennium Challenge Account', referred to 
previously in chapter 7 section 7.8.2. Whilst this was undoubtedly a positive step in securing 
the inclusion of women within the MCA, it appears that those heading the programme in the 
country were not, as one respondent commented, interested in doing this until the US 
Congresswoman came and heard the women's concerns. This situation is illustrative of the 
difficulties still faced by many Nicaraguan women living in a country that continues to be 
dominated by machismo. Arguably, the signing ceremony for Nicaragua's MCA held in 
Washington D.C. in 2005 was also, as the following extract reveals, indicative of this reality: 
"When the agreement was being signed in Washington D.C. they said that each 
development council choose somebody to go there and in that election I was chosen to 
participate in the signing of the agreement. So I was to go to Washington D. C. When 
the government sent information about who was going to go Ifound out that there 
was a problem with my passport and so they senta deputy from the National 
Assembly instead of me. As a result, the women mobilised to protest. There was 
actually a moment when the women were saying 'we are going to buy your ticket and 
you will go to the event', but I said no because at that time I wasn't an official guest 
of the government and so I.wouldn 't have been able to enter the event. Everyday we 
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women realise that we have a constant fight, because we are not seen as a priority" 
(research interview with Petrona Sandoval). 
Despite such setbacks, significant progress has been made in promoting a gender 
perspective in the MCA, as witnessed by the fact that a gender specialist has now been 
employed in MCA-Nicaragua. What is more, a council of women was formed at the regional 
level to monitor and ensure the continuation of women's involvement in the initiative and 
create proposals for projects looking at the impact of women. This has involved running 
workshops to help female producers identify their major crops and to encourage greater 
organisation. At the time of conducting this research, I was told that they were preparing a 
basket of projects in the region, from which MCA-Nicaragua could choose the best one. 
According to Maria Castillo this means that "women can actively and effectively participate 
in the programme and ensure that they receive the benefits". Moreover, she states that "in this 
way the women will be able to provide economic development for this country and also help 
reduce the levels of poverty, whicl] we have had for many years". In this respect, one can 
argue that, for many women within the region, the MCA signifies a mechanism of 
empowerment, through which they can engage in the country's development and begin to 
take equal status on the development stage. It is within this context that we can now turn our 
attention to considering how the processes and spaces of participation within the specific 
region ofLe6n and Chinandega may have changed as a result of the MCA. 
8.11 The MCA: Strengthening voice and accountabilitv in Leon and 
Chinandega? 
The discussion, thus far, has primarily been concerned with examining inclusivity 
within Nicaragua's MCA programme, placing particular emphasis on understanding the 
spaces and places of participation through which regional engagement with the initiative has 
been facilitated to date. It has not, however, explicitly questioned the impact of the 
programme itself on these crucial structures and, as discussed now, this ignores one of the 
MCA's greatest strengths. More specifically, I believe that this initiative has, through its 
utilisation of the DD Cs in particular, acted as a focal point for regional coordination and 
cooperation, bringing together the many different groups and individuals operating in Loon 
and Chinandega, under the shared goal of combating regional poverty. Of course, this has 
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not, as illustrated above, been a perfect process, but it has nonetheless been positive, building 
upon the substantial progress already made across the region in recent years towards 
mobilising and empowering civil societym. This has helped to strengthen the DDCs and 
raised their profile as effective and 'democratic' actors in the departments' development. 
Whether or not this translates into the additional funding they need is yet to be seen, however, 
it is not inconceivable that this could happen294• 
In addition to this, I would argue that the MCA has helped to improve and 
strengthen the relationship ofthe region with central government, acting as an important 
. platfonn for dialogue around the issues of poverty, investment and regional development. 
Although this programme is being implemented at a departmental level in Nicaragua, it was, 
as discussed in chapter 6, negotiated at a national level between the government of Nicaragua 
and the MCC and, therefore, represents a process that transcends geographical and 
ideological boundaries295. In this respect, the MCA builds upon the progress made in 2002 
when the Bolaiios administration signed the historic Achuapa Agreements with north Le6n, 
which put in place the foundations for a constructive and progressive relationship between 
the region and central government. However, the election of Daniel Ortega in 2006 may put 
these relations in jeopardy and could potentially undennine the hard fought progress that has 
been made in the region. For example, there has been significant opposition in the region to 
the decision of the new Ortega administration to create the 'Councils of Citizen Power'. As 
discussed below, these 'new' councils could potentially politicise the spaces in which 
participation and public dialogue occurs, and it may undennine those structures already in 
place, such as the MDCs. This would have a detrimental impact on the way in which 
individuals and groups within the region engage with the MCA. It is within this context that 
we now focus our attention on understanding these recent developments in Nicaragua and 
consider the extent to which politics can, in reality, be left at the door. 
293 By this I am referring to both the PRSPcito discussed in chapter 7 section 7.5.1 and the Acbuapa Agreements 
discussed above, both of which facilitated, and bore witness to, the region's growing organisational capacity. 
294 For example, it is possible that the incisive role CONDELE6N and CODECHI play in the MCA could attract 
~reater levels off'lnancial support from donors such as DfID and the UNDP. 
95 By this I am referring to the fact that, at the time of being created, the departments ofLe6n and Chinandega 
were a stronghold for the central government's political rival, the FSLN. 
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8.12 Changing spaces of participation: Ortega and the Councils of Citizen 
Power 
The discussion thus far has been structured around the framework of citizen 
participation that existed whilst undertaking this research in Nicaragua. However, as 
suggested earlier in this chapter there have, since the election of Daniel Ortega, been 
significant developments in the spaces through which participation occurs, witnessed most 
notably in the decision to create the Councils of Citizen Power (CPCs), which are similar to 
Venezuela's Community Councils (see Baltodano 2007). This could, down the line, have 
repercussions for the MCA and the way in which people from the region engage with the 
initiative. More fundamentally, however, there are fears that these new spaces may 
undermine the country's democratic potential. The following section begins exploring this 
issue by looking at the hugely volatile process through which the CPCs came into force. 
8.12.1 The CPCs: A volatile beginning 
The path to creating the CPCs has been a particularly turbulent one, with disputes 
between opposition and proponents having been visibly played out in Nicaragua's political 
arena. More specifically, there has been a tug-of-war between the different structures of 
government, with the FSLN controlled executive and judicial branches on the one side, and 
the legislative branch on the other. Arguably, this situation is indicative of how incredibly 
divisive an issue the CPCs have been, not only at the level of central government, but 
throughout the country as a whole. Table 8.2 below, which shows some of the key events in 
this ongoing power struggle, is illustrative of the political volatilities surrounding these 
controversial entities. 
Table 8.2: Creating the CPCs - A timeline of events 
January 2007 
November 19th 2007 
November 20th 2007 
CPCs created by national decree. 
National Assembly passes Law 630, which declares that the CPCs 
cannot be 'instruments of political control', i.e. a structural part of 
the state. 
The Managua Appeals Court orders the President of the National 
Assembly, FSLN Rene Nuiiez, not to publish the law until the 
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Supreme Court rules on two challenges from the Council of 
Directors of the CPCs. 
November 26th 2007 The Managua Appeals Court, composed primarily of Sandinista 
judges, ruled in favour of the CPCs, re-establishing their legality 
by ruling against the National Assembly. 
November 30th 2007 President Ortega officially installs the CPCs within the 
reorganised National Council of Social and Economic Planning 
(CONPES), of which his wife, Rosario Murillo, is Executive 
Director. 
December 5th 2007 National Assembly leadership decides to publish a law banning 
the CPCs, after opposition parties threaten to remove Assembly 
President Rene Nuiiez from his position. At 9 pm on the same 
day, six Sandinista justices declare the CPCs to be legal and law 
630, which banned them, "unconstitutional". 
December 7th 2007 Four opposition benches in the National Assembly announce the 
creation of a 'Block against the Dictatorship', in response to the 
decision to reinstate the legality of the CPCs. 
December 8th 2007 Daniel Ortega makes a speech in which he referred to the 'Block 
against the Dictatorship' as 'Senators of Empire' , who are 
'beating the war drum'. 
Continuing hostilities... Ongoing power struggles, including reported threats by those in 
opposition to the CPCs to make profound changes to the 
Executive's 2008 budget proposal. 
Source: This timeline was compiled primarily from information produced by the Nicaragua 
Network (www.nicanet.org) 
As table 8.2 illustrates, the decision to create the CPCs has been highly contested by the 
opposition parties in Nicaragua and both sides appear to have drawn upon historically rooted 
animosities to voice their ange~96.Whilst, according to President Daniel Ortega, the objective 
of the CPCs is to allow Nicaraguans to "actively and directly participate in the decisions 
concerning the integral development of Nicaragua" (cited in Nicaragua Network 2007d), 
others have suggested that this represents the return of the Sandinista Defence Councils 
(CDCs) of the 1980s - known then as the 'eyes and ears of the revolution' (Noticias Aliadas 
2% As discussed, the four CPC opposition benches in the National Assembly created a 'Block against the 
Dictatorship', which draws clear connections to the brutal Somoza dynasty. On the other hand, Ortega has 
referred to these individuals as the 'Senators of Empire', establishing a clear link to the historic role of the US in 
the country. 
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2008: np). This has lead to concerns that the creation of the CPCs is an attempt to politicise 
the spaces of participation, within which members of the FSLN will have unfair influence 
and control. The following section takes a closer look at why there has been so much 
controversy over these structures. 
8.12.2 The CPCs: Politicising space? 
As indicated above, a central point of concern regarding the creation of the CPCs 
is that they will be dominated by members of the ruling FSLN party. Although Ortega has 
tried to assure Nicaraguans that the CPCs will not be controlled by members of his party, it is 
impossible to ignore the clear potential for politicisation that these structure have. First and 
foremost, the CPCs are controlled by the so called 'Communications and Citizenship 
Council', who's only known member is reported to be Rosario Murillo - Daniel Ortega's 
wife. The CPCs themselves are then reported to be headed and chaired by FSLN political 
secretaries and leaders, functioning within the party offices and organised by FSLN structures 
(NitIapan-Envio team 2007b). In addition to this, the CPCs were brought into CONPES 
which, as mentioned previously, represents a bridge between civil society and local 
government on the one hand, and central government on the other. However, changes made 
by President Ortega following his election have eroded the political neutrality of this space. 
This is seen most visibly with the appointment, once again, ofRosario Murillo as the 
Executive Director of CONPES, accompanied with the naming of sixteen individuals linked 
to the Sandinista unions to head the council (Muiioz 2007). According to Sergio Ramirez, 
who was Daniel Ortega's Vice President between 1984 and 1990, "what is occurring before 
the eyes of the entire country is the transfer of power structures set up before Daniel Ortega's 
rise to power into his and his wife's personal hands ... " (cited Nithipan-Envio team 2007c). In 
the wake of these changes, it appears that there has been an effort by the ruling FSLN party to 
exert political control over the country's spaces of participation, not only at the local level as 
seen with the creation of the CPCs, but also at the national level with the injection of partisan 
interests into CONPES. The following section examines what this may mean for the existing 
spaces of participation located in El Sistema and most noticeably the MD Cs and the DDCs. 
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8.12.3 Restructuring El Sistema: The MDCs and the DDCs 
The passing of Law 475 by the Bolafios administration was seen as a positive 
step by many civil society organisations throughout Nicaragua and since then a significant 
amount of time and effort has gone in to developing and maintaining the municipal and 
departmental spaces of participation. This situation was evident whilst talking to individuals 
from the region, especially in Chinandega, where good will and commitment has been 
paramount to the success of the DDCs297. However, in the wake of the kind of dramatic 
changes outlined above, there appears to be, as the following extract suggests, growing 
concerns over the future of these spaces, at both the local and departmentalleve1: 
"Ever since Ortega took office these organisations [civil organisations} have been 
questioning government officials about the role of the councils [of Citizen Power} and 
the future of both what has already been constructed under protection of law, 
particularly the 2003 law itself: whether it will be reformed or even possibly repealed. 
They have urged the strengthening of what already exists instead of organising 
parallel structures. People, who have learned to participate in the existing legal 
spaces around the country, working with neighbours of all ideologies, have been 
asking similar questions. Everybody wants to know, but the response has been either 
silence or an ambiguous message that explains nothing" (Nithipan-Envio team 
2007b: np). 
It is widely recognised in Nicaragua that established spaces do already exist, whether at the 
municipal or departmentalleve1, where citizens can participate and engage directly with 
authorities. Indeed, from the research conducted in this study, the MDCs and DDCs have 
greatly facilitated this process by enabling individuals and organisations to makes demands 
and present project ideas to their peers and elected officials. Of course, this process is not one 
hundred percent effective throughout the country and there are problems, but they are, 
nonetheless, developing and evolving in a positive way. As Muiioz states: 
"We've begun to chip away at the ice that paralyzed us during the 1990s, when social 
organisations that worked with people mistrusted municipal government. We've done 
297 This makes reference to the lack of funding discussed above, where employees in CODECHl had not, at the 
time of being interviewed, been paid for the previous month's work. 
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it through rapprochement, dialogue and participatory methodology to the point that 
many municipal governments now understand the importance of civic participation" 
(2007: np). 
Whilst Law 475, which some perceive is being violated through the implementation of the 
CPCs, does not prevent the creation of other spaces of participation, there is clearly a danger 
that creating these new entities will undermine and potentially replace those councils and 
committees that are already functioning legally. Moreover, it has been commented that in 
Lean and Chinandega the advocates of the CPCs are already calling citizens to join, "telling 
them that the Municipal Development Committees are going to disappear" (ibid). The affect 
ofthis could be divisive, with public dialogue fractured along party lines and regional 
organisational capacity potentially weakened. This could, as suggested above, have a 
detrimental impact on the way in which the region's population can participate and enter into 
dialogue on the MCA. 
Reports suggest there is a lot of opposition in Lean and Chinandega to replacing other 
existing forms of organisation with the CPCS298• This situation is particularly interesting as 
Lean and Chinandega are viewed by many to be Sandinista strongholds, with the majority the 
region's Mayors belonging to the FSLN299• Arguably, for a region that has advanced 
massively over the last ten years or so in terms of organisational capacity, the introduction of 
these CPCs are, perhaps, largely irrelevant and, worse still, counterproductive. Instead, a 
strong argument could be, and is being, made for strengthening those entities that are already 
functioning in the region, as opposed to setting up parallel structures that would inevitably 
weaken them. In this respect, Nicaragua's MCA could, in fact, act as a powerful incentive for 
ensuring that citizen participation and representation in the region does not deteriorate in 
Lean and Chinandega. As one respondent commented more generally in discussing the 
upcoming 2006 national elections in Nicaragua, "the political parties are conscious that the 
funds are important for the region and ... everything will be done to maintain ... the 
programme" (research interview with Emesto Medina). In this respect, one could suggest that 
the MCA may operate as an effective tool for resisting the attempts of the new administration 
298 For example, Mayor Agresio Osejo who, as mentioned earlier, plays an active roJe in the region's 
development, is reported to be fighting these new structures. 
299 As one interviewee commented, "the MCA has been developed in a region where twenty-two of the twenty-
three municipalities have Sandinista mayors. All the municipalities ofthe two departments ofLe6n and 
Chinandega are Sandinista, but one ... We are Sandinistas ... everybody is Sandinista" (research interview with 
Rigoberto Sampson). 
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to impose its political will on the region300 and maintaining the relative 'neutrality' of the 
existing participative structures. 
8.12.4 Instigating 'participative democracy' 
Daniel Ortega's unwavering commitment to creating the CPCs is arguably part of a 
larger project for implementing and establishing what has come to be referred as his 'direct 
democracy'. As discussed in chapter 4, one can identify two very distinct forms of democracy 
in Nicaragua: 'representative' or 'electoral' democracy, and 'participatory' democracy 
(otherwise known as 'direct democracy'). The predominant focus in the second part of this 
chapter has been on the latter ofthese, with attention given towards understanding and 
analysing the existing spaces of participation through which individuals have been able to 
engage with the MCA. However, since conducting this research there has, as demonstrated 
above, been a change to the apparatus and mechanisms through which participatory 
democracy is being exercised in the country. Ironically, whilst these changes are being made 
in the name of 'direct democracy', the CPCs themselves seem to contradict the core 
principals of the concept. For example 'autonomy', which is undoubtedly a key theme when 
"trying to give the concept of direct democracy some content" (Nithipan-Envio team 2007c), 
is clearly absent from these 'new' councils. Consequently, the chapter now explores what 
form of 'direct democracy' Daniel Ortega and his wife Rosario Murillo are promoting 
through the CPCs and, furthermore, reflects upon what this means for Nicaragua's future. 
8.12.5 Democracy derailed? 
It is clear from the information already presented on this issue that the 'Ortega-
Murillo' project is, despite claims to the contrary, a far cry from what one might expect from· 
a genuine movement for participatory democracy. Indeed, it is suggested that whereas an 
"authentic project of direct democracy should have evaluated and buttressed what already 
existed", the approach taken by Ortega and Murillo has been to essentially disregard and 
ignore the "preceding structures" and "accumulated experiences of earlier years" (Nitlapan-
300 I think the point that the MCA could actually work as a mechanism for resisting the attempts of the Ortega 
administration to impose the unpopular cpes is particularly interesting, especially with regard to the discussion 
of power presented in chapter 3. More specifically, it reinforces the discussion in section 3.1.5 on the 
'entanglements' of power and the 'terrains of resistance' , where 'hegemony' is located as "an active site upon 
which the contestation between forces of resistance and domination are enacted" (Routledge 1996: 511). 
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Envio team 2007c: np). This situation is readily apparent in the reported attempts ofFSLN 
members in Le6n and Chinandega to replace the established MDCs with the CPCs. In 
addition to this, there have been suggestions that other forms of social organisations are also 
being sidelined by the CPCs, most noticeably the women's groups around the country (ibid). 
This is particularly worrying in light of the substantial difficulties already faced by many 
women in Nicaragua in securing their rights and engaging with the country's development. 
With regard to the specific example of Leon and Chinandega, there is clearly a danger that 
some of the progress already made by women in accessing and participating within the 
region's decision-making processes wiII be undermined by the creation of these new 
structures. This, in turn, could have repercussions for women's engagement in the MCA. 
Despite warranted concerns over the reorganisation of participative spaces throughout 
Nicaragua, any attempts by civil society to question the new administration over the 
reasoning behind such actions have largely been met by silence. This has prompted concerns 
that Ortega's project for 'direct democracy' is, in effect, helping to establish an authoritarian 
and potentiaIIy paternalistic state: 
"The state appears to be weakening all entities of representation and intermediation 
that could show any sign of rebellion. More concretely, by eliminating the 
mechanisms for uniting autonomous civic demands, the two people running the state 
have signalled since they came to power that it is they who will establish the rules of 
. the game within which their "direct" model of democracy will operate. This isn't 
direct democracy; it's a vacuous imitation, presumably designed to hide the top-
down, centralist and authoritarian government project" (Nit]{lpan-Envio team 2007c: 
np). 
In this sense, one can perceive that a key goal of the political strategy adopted by Ortega and 
MuriIIo is self-preservation. No doubt this effort to build up a strong social base of support 
wiII be important in shaping the outcome of the municipal elections held later this year in 
Nicaragua. In this respect, the CPCs are, despite hoIIow promises to the contrary, in place to 
help consolidate 'Orteguismo' (or Danielismo) and establish 'MurilIismo'. This is not the 
first time that Daniel Ortega has taken steps to ensure his place as a 'caudillo' (political 
overlord), as witnessed by the creation of the counter-democratic 'pact' between himself and 
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corrupt ex-President Aleman in 1998, which forced the country into a two party political 
monopoly. 
Conclusions 
This chapter began by setting the broader theoretical and historical context for 
this discussion on the MCA and democracy, revisiting the concept's emergence and evolution 
as a centre-piece in US foreign policy. We revisited the phenomenon referred to as 
'polyarchy', through which it is argued that the US has been able to legitimise states adopting 
neoliberal reforms, thereby promoting 'free-market democracies'. This analysis was then 
located in the framework of the PWC which, as already clarified, acted as a staging ground 
for the MCA. Following a detailed discussion in which the chapter reflected upon the 
, 
restricted approach to 'democracy' adopted by the IFIs, the focus turned towards examining 
the specifics ofthe MCA. This involved looking at a variety of relevant issues, such as the 
promotion of 'sound policy environments' through selectivity and the programme's affinity 
for encouraging 'country-ownership'. We also examined some of the debates surrounding 
democracy promotion in the MCA and considered why, despite the fact that US foreign 
policy has long emphasised the twin goals of economic development and democracy, the 
MCC has been somewhat reluctant to draw direct links between the two. This was followed 
by a close examination of a speech made by MCC CEO Danilovich in early 2007 at Freedom 
House, where he broke with tradition and identified specific areas in which the MCA 
potentially contributes to democracy in recipient countries. 
The second half the chapter turned its attention to analysing the specific 
experience of Nicaragua in the initiative, beginning with a reflection upon the highly 
politicised environments in which the MCA was created and implemented during the run-up 
to the 2006 elections. Following this introduction, a brief overview was given on the 
framework for participation that existed in Nicaragua during the time of the research, with a 
particular emphasis placed on the role of the DDCs as the most active structures in the MCA. 
In undertaking this task, a range of different themes and issues were explored, beginning with 
a very brief historical account ofthe way in which decentralisation has taken place in the 
country. Whilst the DD Cs are indicative of some of the progress made towards 
decentralisation, their lack of funding is arguably illustrative of a reality in which much of the 
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supposed commitment to decentralisation has often failed to translate into meaningful results 
on the ground. At the same time, however, there is, according to some individuals, a real 
danger that directing government funds towards these entities would potentially lead to their 
politicisation. Such concerns resonate with the statement made earlier that 'autonomy' is 
central to any project of genuine participatory democracy. Within this context, the issue of 
'representation' is particularly poignant and significant attention was given to exploring this 
theme during the chapter. Indeed, a key part of this involved revisiting the issue of gender, 
examining the actual process through which women's inclusion in the initiative came about. 
Although this has not been a particularly easy process, it is important not to forget the 
cultural and historical reality in which the programme is being implemented in Nicaragua. 
Furthermore, it is also essential to recognise that whilst the DDCs are not perfect and 
arguably need to be strengthened, they are widely recognised by those in the region to be 
important spaces for cultivating democracy. Perhaps this is why there is, despite the fact that 
the area is a Sandinista stronghold, so much resistance in the region to imposing the CPCs. 
Before examining the CPCs, attention was given to understanding what impact 
the MCA may have had on the existing spaces of participation in Leon and Chinandega. 
Despite not providing funds to the development councils themselves, it is clear that the 
initiative has helped strengthen and reinforce these structures by promoting greater dialogue, 
inter-municipal cooperation and participation among the region's residents. This process has, 
for some groups, acted as a mechanism of empowerment, through which they have been able 
to gain greater voice and representation at the departmental level. Although, this has not been 
a perfect process, it undoubtedly marks an important step forward, helping to promote greater 
equality and inclusivity in a culture that continues to disadvantage certain groups. 
The final part of the chapter examined the changes being made to the structures 
of participation in Nicaragua since Daniel Ortega's election in 2006. As iIIustrated above, the 
decision to create the CPCs has been highly controversial and heavily contested, both in the 
political arena and by civil society. Under Rosario Murillo' s control, these new entities could 
politicise the spaces through which individuals can voice demands and engage in decision-
making processes, whilst also weakening existing structures of participation. Within this 
context, the MCA could act as a vital weapon for defending 'democracy' in the region, 
providing a rally point for those opposed to the CPCs and what they represent. At the same 
time as imposing these new entities, CONPES has also been restructured, with Murillo now 
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acting at the entity's Executive Director. Bearing in mind the connections between the 
different elements of El Sistema, these changes could clearly have a knock-on effect when it 
comes to the operation of the DDCs and their ability to retain their relative political 
neutrality. Moreover, there are signs that other forms of civil organisation, such as women's 
groups, are also being adversely affected by these developments. This could have 
ramifications when it comes to participation in the MCA, which is largely dependent upon 
the existing structures of citizen representation. Although it is too early to draw any 
substantive conclusions regarding the possible impact ofOrtega-Murillo's project for 'direct 
democracy' on the MeA, one could suggest that the country's prospects for genuine 
participatory democracy are being derailed by this process. As such, we must ask whether it 
is in fact possible to promote sustainable economic andlor social development through a 
programme such as the MCA, without first addressing the underlying issues of power through 
which unequal and disempowering relationships are maintained and strengthened. Such 
questions are especially important in looking at a country such as Nicaragua, where politics 
infuse every aspect of life and power is often exploited by the country's elites for personal 
gain and preservation. 
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Chapter 9: Thesis Conclusion 
The purpose of this final chapter is to draw together the main ideas and findings of the 
thesis, and examine the contribution of this work to our understanding of the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA) and also to a number of key interrelated themes that were 
explored during this thesis. In terms of structure, this discussion is divided into two main 
sections. The first provides a brief overview of each of the chapters and identifies their core 
contribution to the thesis as a whole. The second examines the study'S major findings and this 
involves critical engagement with our core aim, which is: To examine the extent to which the 
MCA lives up to its 'transformational' rhetoric or whether it is simply another case of ' old 
wine in new bottles'. Within this section, we revisit a number of key themes identified 
through this investigation and consider areas where further research could be conducted. 
Before beginning, however, it is useful to reflect upon what I consider to be the most 
important contributions ofthis thesis to the ideas/debates surrounding the MCA and 
development discourse more broadly. First and foremost, it should be stated that, to my 
knowledge, this thesis represents the first detailed examination of the MCA in Nicaragua and 
one of very few independent evaluations of MC A programmes in individual countries. Thus 
it provides a unique and in-depth insight into the mechanics and workings of the MCA within 
a single recipient country, thereby helping to fill the gap between policy and practice. 
Moreover, this study has contextualised the initiative within a thorough treatment of the 
historical relationship between the United States (US) and Nicaragua, which has itself been 
re-interpreted through engagement with the discourses around polyarchy, democracy, 
neoliberalism and development doctrine. As part of this, the thesis has also contributed to the 
broader dialogue and debates surrounding the Washington Consensus (WC) and Post-
Washington Consensus (PWC), and questioned their role as conceptual frameworks for the 
construction of dominant development policy. This process has helped to inform our 
understanding of the MCA and identify its conceptual underpinnings. What is more, by 
locating this study within the Central American region, this thesis has been able to draw 
connections and linkages between the MCA and other projects/programmes affecting the 
isthmus, such as the Dominican Republic- Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-
CAFT A) and the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP). This association has further illuminated the 
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ideological motivations and origins of the MCA, through which we can better comprehend its 
position within US foreign policy and its role in development practice more broadlYOl. 
9.1 Chapter overview 
This thesis began by examining the evolution of development discourse over the last 
sixty or so years and took a famous speech given by President Truman in 1949 as the starting 
point for this. The importance ofTruman's speech was rooted in the fact that it was the first 
time in which 'underdevelopment' had been used to categorise those areas in the world seen 
by many in the North to be economically backward. The application of this tenn 
fundamentally altered the meaning of 'development' itself, creating a new sense of 'self and· 
'other', whereby half the world's population was essentially "transmogrified into an inverted 
mirror of others' reality" (Esteva 1993: 7). Within this context, progress in the South came to 
be defined through the lens of receiving 'guidance' and 'assistance' from the 'developed' 
North and this set the pretext for the so called 'development era'. Since this speech, a number 
of different development theories have emerged, some of which build upon Truman's 
conceptualisation of development, such as 'Modernisation Theory', and others, such as 
'Dependency Theory', that critique it. Consequently, chapter 2 was primarily concerned with 
tracing the contours of development discourse over this period, providing the theoretical 
backdrop to the thesis and its focus, the MCA. 
Chapter 2 played an essential role in setting the context to the ideas and ideologies 
driving the MCA, and in helping to ascertain whether or not the initiative does, in fact, 
represent something fundamentally 'new'. Hence, the detailed examination ofneoliberalism, 
the WC and the PWC carried out in this chapter was of particular importance as, for reasons 
developed throughout the thesis, they represent a set of ideas that have been particularly 
persuasive in shaping the direction of the MCA and its guiding principles. More specifically, 
whilst chapter 2 identified the PWC as the general staging ground for the initiative's defining 
characteristics, it also contested the notion that the PWC was a new 'consensus' on 
development. Instead, it argued that 'conditionality', the hallmark of the WC, is still very 
much evident in the actions of official donors and has simply been "renegotiated in line with 
the changing emphasis of the World Bank's definition of development" (Pender 2001: 408). 
30lThese key contributions will be touched on throughout the conclusion and particularly in the sections drawing 
out the main themes and fmdings of the research. 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that despite the MCA's clear connection to the ideas enshrined 
within the PWC, the initiative also seems to have much in common with the WC and this 
relationship was explored in much greater detail in chapter 7. 
In order to truly understand the MCA and the reasons behind its creation, one cannot 
rely on analyses of development discourse alone. One must look at, among other things, the 
broader geopolitical context within which the initiative was conceived and put into practice. 
In recognition of this fact, chapter 3 began by locating the MCA within a framework of 
'power', through which US policy and practice could be better understood and 
contextualised. It put particular emphasis on examining the relationship between power and 
space, utilising the work of critical geopolitical writers to deconstruct and critique the 
visions/representations of global space portrayed by individuals such as Fukuyama and 
Huntington. Part and parcel of this process involved contesting orthodox accounts of power, 
where the phenomenon is limited to the act of 'dominating' others, thereby ignoring the fact 
that power is also present in the ability of groups and individuals to 'resist'. In this respect, 
chapter 3 identified the concept of 'hegemony' as being particularly important, as hegemony 
is argued to represent "an active site upon which the contestation between forces of resistance 
and domination are enacted" (Routledge 1996: 511). 
Although traditionally associated with the so-called 'Great Powers', such as Great 
Britain in the mid-nineteenth century and the US from 1945 to the 1970s, one can strongly 
contest the suggestion that there is a single state hegemon today. Instead, chapter 3 argued 
that it is perhaps more fitting to talk about 'transnationalliberalism' as the 'hegemonic 
ideology' of this epoch - of which the US is an important sponsor, but not necessarily a 
hegemon itself. In qualifying this suggestion, the chapter drew upon William Robinson's 
conceptualisation of 'polyarchy' to understand how the US' agenda for 'democracy 
promotion' has been used as a mechanism for legitimising those states adopting neoliberal 
reforms, particularly in Latin America. The 'good governance' agenda of the PWC which, as 
mentioned in chapter 2, has paved the path for yet more aid conditionalities, is inextricably 
linked to this broader project of promoting and maintaining transnationalliberalism, and this 
has explicit implications for how we interpret and understand the MCA. Frequent links were, 
therefore, made to this discussion throughout the thesis, in which it acts as an incisive and 
effective framework for analysing the initiative, especially in Nicaragua where DR-CAFTA 
and the PPP are helping to institutionalise transnationalliberalism within the region. 
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The rest of chapter 3 was primarily concerned with providing detailed information on 
the MCA and its core components. Before doing this, however, the initiative was located as 
part of the broader US agenda for transforming the economic development paths of the South 
through the selective use of development assistance. This process, commonly referred to as 
'transformational development' , represents a far more selective approach to delivering aid, 
where the distribution and volume of assistance channelled to the South is essentially 
determined by the willingness of countries to adopt those reforms and 'sound policies' 
prescribed by governments and institutions in the North. Towards this end, the MCA has 
been established as the core US programme for transforming countries in the South and it is 
not, therefore, surprising that the MCA adopts a very selective approach to delivering aid. In 
fact, the mechanism adopted by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which 
administers the fund, is clearly linked to the PWC and the associated good governance 
agenda discussed in chapter 2. In line with this approach, countries wishing to participate in 
this fund must pass a number of hurdles before being deemed eligible for assistance. 
Consequently, the initiative adopts an incentivised approach to delivering aid, in which 'good 
behaviour' may be rewarded by financial assistance. For reasons given in chapter 3, however, 
inclusion in the programme is not determined by these eligibility hurdles alone, as the MCC 
may, and often does, take other factors into account when selecting participant countries. 
Chapter 4 was written with the intention of bringing greater geographical and 
historical context to the study, by evaluating the somewhat volatile and turbulent history of 
US-Nicaraguan relations. It began by examining the major themes driving US intervention in 
Nicaragua, drawing upon a number of different historical events to help. ground the analysis. 
After establishing the rationale for US intervention in Central America, and in Nicaragua 
more specifically, attention was turned to exploring some of the defining moments in what I 
termed 'pre-crisis' US-Nicaraguan relations. Of particular interest, was the support granted 
by the US to the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua and, more generally, to authoritarian 
regimes across the Latin American continent as a whole. If anything, US support for 
despotism deepened with the emergence of the Cold War, as US relations with the region 
came to be defined through the lens of containing the communist 'threat'. As a result, policy 
towards Central America became increasingly paradoxical, with the US being "engaged in 
alliances with undemocratic regimes" in the fight against "communist totalitarianism" 
(McGrew 1992: 66). Within this context, the dramatic shift in US policy during the 1980s 
away from actively suppressing 'democracy' in Central America to actively promoting 
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'democracy' was particularly interesting. Democracy promotion became a powerful 
legitimising force for political intervention within the isthmus, through which change could 
be better managed and a polyarchic system of rule established. In examining this further, 
chapter 4 looked at the mechanisms through which polyarchy was operationalised within 
Nicaragua and identified the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
as a key actor in this process. 
Contrary to what one might expect, neoliberalism was first introduced to Nicaragua 
by the revolutionary Sandinista government in the latter parts of the 1980s. However, as 
argued in chapter 4, this was perhaps more indicative of the crippling and costly impact of the 
US sponsored civil war in Nicaragua, than any kind of fundamental acceptance of the 
neoliberal reforms being imposed on the country by powerful external forces. With the 1990 
election of Violet a ChamoITo, whose campaign had received substantial financial support 
from the US, there was a further deepening of commitment to the core principles of 
neoliberal ideology. The subsequent Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and 
neoliberal policies adopted by the new administration had a devastating impact on large 
swathes of Nicaragua's population, in areas already ravaged by the crippling effects of civil 
war and economic stagnation. Indeed, it was argued at the time that neoliberal adjustment had 
"hit the Central American isthmus with the force of a tropical storm" (Nithipan-Envio team 
1992: np) undermining the hard fought gains towards greater equality made in Nicaragua 
during the 1980s. As stated in chapter 4, this process of 'democratisation' and 
neoliberalisation was clearly linked to the broader US strategy of consolidating polyarchy in 
the region. 
The US' agenda for consolidating polyarchy and institutionalising transnational 
liberalism in the isthmus continued, and even strengthened, under the Clinton administration, 
which deviated little from its predecessor's "twin preoccupations with economic 
liberalisation and formal limited democratisation" (Brown 2000: 551). This was reflected by 
the actions of USA ID, as 'encouraging broad-based economic growth' and 'building 
democracy' became located as two of the agency's core objectives in Nicaragua. At the same 
time, however, the way in which USAID went about pursuing these objectives changed 
dramatically under the Clinton administration, with the agency adopting a less politicised 
approach to its activities in Nicaragua. For example, in contrast to the early 1990s when 
USAID's activities were primarily focussed upon the implementation of strict neoliberal 
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reforms and undermining the Sandinista govermnent's political legacy, the mid-late 1990s 
represented a much more moderated approach to development in Nicaragua. Whilst this 
transition could be identified as being indicative of the Clinton administration's less heavy-
handed approach to US-Latin American relations, it could also be understood within the 
context of the growing controversy surrounding the SAPs and their failure to produce the 
results they promised. As argued in chapter 4, the 'transformation' of USA ID over the 1990s 
was, therefore, largely synonymous with the emergence of the PWC and, in this respect, the 
agency's growing focus on good governance in Nicaragua is not surprising. However, one 
cannot ignore the fact that, despite a change in rhetoric, the fundamental neoliberal 
assumptions underlying the WC remain intact and this raises question-marks over the true 
extent of USA ID's transformation. 
Of particular interest in chapter 4's discussion of US-Nicaraguan relations was the 
US' agenda for creating a 'Free Trade Area' in the Americas. Significant progress was made 
towards this goal during the Clinton administration, under which the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was formulated and the first Free Trade Summit held on the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).However, in terms of Central America, it was the 
implementation ofDR-CAFTA under the Bush administration that represented one of the 
most important developments in post-Cold War US-Central American relations. Whilst 
proponents have touted DR-CAFTA as being conducive to economic growth, poverty 
reduction and, of course, democracy promotion in the region, opponents have raised concerns 
that it will do the exact opposite, generating higher levels of poverty and exacerbating 
inequalities. Within this context USAID has, through Trade Capacity Building (TCB) 
assistance, played an incisive role in preparing the region for DR-CAFTA and is directly 
implicated in the region's insertion into polyarchy and the institutionalisation of transnational 
liberalism across the isthmus. 
Chapter 5 focussed on the research process and methodology applied during the 
fieldwork. The study adopted a qualitative approach, which involved a combination of semi-
structured interviews and the discourse and content analysis of key documents (both in 
English and Spanish). The interviews were an especially important part of the research 
process, as they enabled an in-depth understanding and insight into individuals' connections 
and engagements with the MCA, and provided a mechanism with which to gauge 
respondents' opinions on the initiative, as well as on interrelated themes (such as DR-
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CAFTA, US-Nicaraguan relations and the Nicaraguan national elections). The utilisation of 
interviews therefore facilitated the accumulation of rich and varied data, through which the 
rhetoric and discourses surrounding the MCA could be challenged, contested and debated at a 
variety of levels. Of particular importance in chapter 5 was reflecting upon the key issue of 
positionality, which had direct implications for the research conducted and the 'knowledge' 
produced in this thesis. In particular, the process of reflexivity was used to thoroughly 
examine the production of data, the interpretation of data and the writing-up of the thesis, 
with specific focus was placed on examining the interplay of power during the fieldwork. 
The primary purpose of chapter 6 was to bring focus to the discussions thus far and 
set the foundations of analysis within the following two results chapters. In order to do this, 
chapter 6 was divided into two distinct sections. The first of these built upon the analysis of 
US-Nicaraguan relations presented in chapter 4 by concentrating upon shifts in the quantity, 
composition and distribution of US development assistance to Nicaragua. This began by 
examining and unpicking statistics on development aid, through which the intricacies of US 
foreign assistance could be better understood. With regard to Latin America more broadly, it 
is clear that its share of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) has decreased dramatically 
since 2001 and this could be a reflection of the region's growing obscurity within US foreign 
policy, first discussed in chapter 4. The proportion of US ODA being administered through 
multilateral agencies has also fallen significantly over recent years and this is likely to be 
indicative of the country's broader agenda for fighting the War on Terror. In light of this fact, 
the chapter analysed the shifts in ODA management among US bilateral agencies between 
1998 and 2005 and, in doing so, focussed on qualifying and quantifying USAID's 
diminishing role within development. Once again, specific attention was given to 
understanding Nicaragua's experience and the changes to the agency's activities in the 
country. 
Interestingly, there has been quite a dramatic fall in USAID's Development 
Assistance (DA) account, especially in those programmes directed at economic growth and 
agriculture, and this coincides closely with the focus of Nicaragua's MCA. This could 
suggest that the MCA has detracted from USAID's operations in Nicaragua, thus 
contradicting President Bush's promise that the fund would go 'above and beyond existing 
aid requests' and potentially conflicting with the MCC's reward-system approach. Moreover, 
further examination revealed that Nicaragua is not alone in this regard. Indeed, a similar trend 
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has been witnessed across many of the other compact-countries. Interestingly, this has been 
most noticeable in the Central American region, where there have been significant cuts to the 
agency's DA programmes in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. The first part of chapter 
6 explored the possible reasons for this situation and identified the MCA as one of the 
potential factors behind this trend. However, it also highlighted the fact that one cannot 
ignore the broader context within which the initiative is being implemented, as a combination 
of factors could be responsible for this situation. 
The second section of the chapter was essentially focussed upon examining and 
providing factual background information on Nicaragua's MCA. This began with an 
overview of the country's programme, touching upon its core objectives and components, and 
providing a brief explanation of the process through which it came about. This was followed 
by an in-depth look at the initiative's regional focus and an examination of the logic behind 
adopting this highly selective geographical approach to the country's development. As 
discussed in chapter 6, Nicaragua adopted a model for economic growth in which resources 
and investment are targeted at developing specific geographical zones. In justifying this 
approach, the country drew upon the experiences of much larger countries, such as China, 
Brazil and, as one respondent noted, even the US. Bearing in mind the MCC's broad agenda 
for achieving 'transformational development' in recipient countries, the motivations behind 
replicating this sort of model are clear. At the same time, however, one should not 
underestimate the dangers that accompany such an approach and, as discussed in chapter 6, 
one can question whether this strategy is, in reality, sustainable in the long-term or indeed 
replicable in a country such as Nicaragua, where the economy is incredible fragile and there 
are already substantial inequalities across the population. 
After discussing some of the key reasons for Lean and Chinandega' s selection in the 
MCA, which included: the departments' economic potential, their strategic position in DR-
CAFTA and the PPP, and their relationship with the central government, chapter 6 focussed 
on examining the programme's three main components and their expected outcomes. Each of 
these individual, yet interrelated, projects were discussed and the foundations were laid for 
the detailed analysis that was to follow in the ensuing chapters. After providing this general 
overview, the discussion shifted to exploring the actual structures and mechanisms through 
which the initiative is being managed in Nicaragua. Of particular interest in this respect was 
the decision to use an independent fiscal agent in managing Nicaragua's programme funds 
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and the creation of a separate legal entity to implement and manage the MCA. Whilst 
operating outside of existing financial structures and systems can have its potential 
advantages, especially in circumstances where there may be doubts over their accountability 
and transparency, there is a real danger of weakening, or even undermining, government 
capacity. As discussed in chapter 6, the MCC's practice of creating separate implementing 
units in many, but not all, of the recipient countries, does appear to be inconsistent with its 
stringent approach to selectivity and, furthermore, its 'ownership' principle. Moreover, it 
seems to go against the general consensus established in the signing of the Paris Declaration 
in 2005, when it was agreed that donors would use country systems and procedures to the 
maximum extent possible. 
Chapter 7302 was primarily concerned with exploring the relationship between the 
MCA and poverty reduction. In order to do this, the chapter started by locating the 
examination of the MCA within the broader context of development discourse. This process 
began by revisiting the PWC which was highly influential in shaping the MCA and its 
defining characteristics. Chapter 7 was particularly concerned with unpicking the central 
issue of 'poverty' and exploring how it has been conceived, conceptualised and presented 
through the framework of the PWC. The World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs), which gave practical expression to the development 'consensus', presented a useful 
entrY point with which to do this. Although the World Bank has long been in the business of 
preaching development doctrine, it is the institution's apparent 'transformation' into 
intellectual actor and self-professed 'knowledge bank' over the last ten years or so, that has 
provided the greatest indication of how the organisation conceives itself and also how 
bilateral donors increasingly look to the World Bank for' guidance'. Of course, one should 
not forget that many of the northern governments who are host to these donor bodies are also 
key financial and ideological sponsors of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and, 
therefore, the fact that the World Bank does take the lead in laying down the 'rules of the 
game' is not surprising. 
The conceptual linkages between the MCA and the PRSPs described in chapter 7 are, 
for reasons suggested above, to be expected. It is not, therefore, unforeseeable that the MCA 
302 As one would expect, the main findings of the research for this study were first presented and explored in the 
results chapters and, therefore, whilst the following discussions of chapter 7 and 8 outline their basic content and 
line of thought, the core findings of this thesis are presented in section 9.2. 
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may, in certain cases, share some of the PRSPs' perceived weaknesses. In order to explore 
this relationship further, the chapter looked at a specific case study in Nicaragua, where the 
definition of 'poverty' encompassed within the World Bank's PRSPs was contested and 
. resisted at the local level in north Le6n. Whilst the discourse of resistance and subsequent 
empowerment that emerged from this process was encouraging, this example highlighted 
some of the difficulties still faced by much of the South's 'poor' in engaging with 
development programmes which are, ironically, specifically targeted at reducing poverty. In 
tenns of the MCA more specifically, this case study highlighted the importance of examining 
the extent to which the assistance delivered through this 'pro-poor' initiative is, in practice, 
targeted at those who really need it. With this in mind, a core focus of chapter 7 was to 
analyse the MCA's adherence to its pro-poor rhetoric in Nicaragua, from which conclusions 
could be drawn about whether the initiative really does offer the possibility of 
'transfonnational' development within the country. 
In order to understand the relationship between Nicaragua's MCA and poverty 
reduction, chapter 7 analysed each of the three projects, beginning with the largest 
component - the Transportation Project, which was discussed in detail in section 7.7. Of 
particular interest was the inclusion of the NI road which, despite not appearing to be a 
priority for many of those in Leon and Chinandega, utilises a large proportion of the 
programme's budget. When questioned about this, many respondents identified the 
controversial PPP and DR-CAFTA, discussed earlier, as the driving motivations behind this 
road's inclusion in Nicaragua's MCA. A brieflook at Honduras' and El Salvador's MCA 
programmes revealed a similar situation, in which prioritisation has clearly been given to key 
sections ofthe controversial trade corridor network. In light of this focus on trade routes, it is 
not particularly surprising that the selection of secondary roads in Nicaragua appears to have 
been driven by a similarly economic logic, with their inclusion in the MCA being dependent 
upon their economic potential. As discussed later, this economic bias will undoubtedly have 
ramifications for poverty reduction in Nicaragua. 
The key issue of inclusivity was identified as being particularly important in exploring 
the Rural Business Development Project (RBDP). As discussed in section 7.8.1, previous 
Nicaraguan govermnents have tended to favour big businesses in the country's development 
and this bias was accelerated through the country's transition into polyarchy. As part of this 
research, therefore, I wanted to identify what type of producers/fanners would be able to 
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engage with this particular component and gauge the degree to which the MCA actually 
departs from this tradition of favouring big business. In addition to this, chapter 7 considered 
a number of other factors that could limit individuals' engagement with the RBDP. This 
included analysing the 'democratic' spaces through which participation within the MCA has 
largely been achieved in Nicaragua, i.e. the Departmental Development Councils (DDCs). 
Whilst it is clear that the DDCs have come a long way since gaining formal recognition with 
the passing of Law 475, it became evident during the research that 'their representativeness 
can and should be questioned. Indeed, several interview respondents criticised these spaces 
for being dominated by the 'local big businessman', heavily influenced by the local 
municipalities, and biased towards men. Although some steps have been taken to overcome 
these short-comings, these limitations do raise doubts over the actual level of inclusiveness in 
the MCA. What is more, if we add to this situation the controversial issue of accessibility to 
credit in Nicaragua (discussed in section 7.8.3) which, since the adoption of strict neoliberal 
reforms in the 1990s, has largely favoured the country's big producers, concerns over the 
RBDP's 'pro-poor' credentials are not unwarranted303 • 
The third and smallest MCA component explored in chapter 7 was the Property 
Regularisation Project (PRP). As discussed, the US$26.5 million designated for this 
particular project is aimed at improving the investment climate in the region, by combating 
the problems associated with insecure property rights and high transaction costs. Research 
revealed that the inclusion ofthis particular component in Nicaragua's MCA was very much 
a territorial demand, driven by local needs. Consequently, it was extremely important in 
examining this project to explore exactly who the PRP is likely to benefit and how. In 
analysing the PRP, chapter 7 also revisited the key issue of gender, which was essential in 
determining the equitability of the programme. It is estimated that women could constitute 
roughly 40% of the beneficiaries for this component and, bearing in mind the culture of 
machismo in Nicaragua (see section 7.8.2), this could represent an important step forward for 
women's rights in the region. In terms of the specific issue of credit, for example, this could 
provide women with the equity necessary for accessing financial support from the private 
sector, thereby increasing their independence and unlocking their economic potential. 
Unfortunately, however, the existing sources of credit in Nicaragua are incredibly limited 
303 Further consideration is given to the key issue of credit later, 
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(see section 7.8.4) and this may constrain the potential impact of the PRP on accessibility to 
credit. 
Chapter 8 moved the detailed analysis of the MCA on from its relationship with 
poverty reduction to explicitly questioning the initiative's relationship with 'democracy'. In 
order to do this, the chapter revisited the PWC which, as already mentioned, represents a set 
of ideas that have been highly influential in shaping the MCA' s defining characteristics. Of 
particular importance in this regard is the 'good governance' agenda, which has enabled 
donors to exert further conditionalities aimed at re-embedding neoliberalism through the 
political sphere. Consequently, the first part of chapter 8 placed significant stress on 
unpicking the relationship between the defining aspects of the MCA, such as selectivity, and 
the core principles of the PWC. This was followed by a discussion on how the relationship 
between the MCA and democracy is conceptualised by the MCC's CEO, who states that the 
initiative is helping to create the conditions for more 'democratic' and prosperous societies 
by linking aid to policy performance (see section 8.4.1). This process oflinking aid to 
countries' policy performance, commonly referred to as the 'MCC-Effect', consists ofa 
reward-structure approach, whereby substantial financial incentives are offered to countries 
in exchange for undertaking the economic/political reforms deemed necessary for free-market 
democracies to take place. As stated earlier in the thesis, this apparently inseparable marriage 
between neoliberalism and democracy has been subject to considerable debate, especially in 
the South where the negative effects of neoliberalism have been felt most acutely. 
The second part of chapter 8 shifted away from a broad discussion of the MCA and 
democracy, to look specifically at the processes of participation through which individuals, 
especially in the departments of Le6n and Chinandega, engaged with and had an input in 
Nicaragua's MCA programme. This was particularly important in examining the extent to 
which 'the initiative in Nicaragua lives up to its ownership principle and, along the same lines, 
adheres to its democratic credentials. Particular emphasis was placed in this part of the 
chapter on examining the DDCs in the region, as it is through these spaces that participation 
in the MCA has largely been achieved. This research provided a useful insight into these 
entities and unveiled a number of areas where the DD Cs are perhaps not performing as well 
as they could. This process led me to question the representativeness of these entities, as well 
as the key issue of 'democracy'. Of particular interest in this respect, was the role ofthe 
municipal Mayors, who play an extremely important role in giving voice to their constituents 
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and in operating as conduits of infonnation for the MCA. Their capacity to do so is 
strengthened significantly in the north of Le6n and Chinandega by the inter-municipal 
mayoral alliances, AMULEON and AMUNORCHI, which help to amplify the demands of 
the northern municipalities and operate to ensure that these more peripheral areas are taken 
into account in the initiative. However, as discussed in chapter 8, one should not discount the 
potential dangers that accompany the elevated role of the Mayors in this process (see section 
8.9). 
In evaluating the democratic credentials of a development programme such as this, it 
was essential to explore the key issue of gender. Although this was examined when analysing 
poverty reduction in chapter 7, the emphasis in chapter 8 shifted to looking specifically at the 
involvement of women in Nicaragua's MCA. It is interesting to note that whilst on the one 
hand I was half expecting, due to the strong currents of machismo that continue to run 
through Nicaraguan society, there to be barriers to women's inclusion in the fund, on the 
other I felt that a modern initiative such as this - that prides itself on innovation, ownership 
and transfonnational impact, would break from this tradition. Initially, however, it seems that 
this was not the case, with women apparently having to compete with a sexist language and 
fight for their inclusion within the MCA. These kinds of problems are not, unfortunately, one 
off occurrences in Nicaragua. Indeed, women appear to have faced similar problems in 
gaining fair representation in the region's DDCs, having to claim a space that was not, 
despite its supposed openness, initially available to them. Fortunately, significant progress 
has, as discussed in chapter 8, been made in both the MCA and DDCs since those initial 
problems and women are now playing an increasingly active role in the region's 
development. Nevertheless, these barriers are not, by any stretch of the imagination, a thing 
of the past and, therefore, sustaining long-term inclusivity throughout the duration of the 
initiative and beyond is essential if the MCA is to reach its full potential. 
Chapter 8 concluded by reflecting upon President Ortega' s decision to create the 
Councils of Citizen Power (CPCs), which have the potential to undennine and politicise the 
spaces of participation across Nicaragua. These highly controversial structures, which appear 
to be aimed at replacing the Municipal Development Committees (MDCs), are indicative of 
Daniel Ortega's growing efforts to bring these spaces under his and Rosario Murillo's 
control. Ironically, whilst this is being done in the name of 'direct' or 'participatory' 
democracy, it appears to be derailing genuine democracy in the country by replacing it with a 
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'vacuous imitation' that is designed to consolidate Orteguismo and Murillismo (Nitl<lpan-
Envio team 2007c). In tenns of the MCA, this process could undennine the ability of certain 
individuals at the local level to engage with the initiative, as organisational capacity may 
become diminished and participation potentially fractured along party lines. Moreover, there 
are indications that some women's groups are also being weakened by the CPCs and, bearing 
in mind the progress already made by women in accessing and participating in the existing 
spaces of participation, this could represent a substantial blow to such efforts. Fortunately 
there does, in Lean and Chinandega at least, appear to be substantial resistance to these 'new' 
structures and this is especially interesting due to the fact that the area is considered by many 
to be a Sandinista stronghold. As discussed in chapter 8, in a region where organisational 
capacity and dialogue has progressed significantly in recent years, the imposition of these 
new and potentially polarising structures are not only unnecessary but counterproductive. 
9.2 The MeA: Old wine in new bottles? Major themes and findings 
The first part of this conclusion revisited the thesis chapters and outlined their content 
and contribution to the study as a whole. This process has been useful in drawing together 
many of the diverse and complex ideas that were developed and drawn upon during this 
investigation of the MCA. In following on from that discussion, this section pulls out what I 
consider to be the major themes and outcomes of the thesis. In doing this, the chapter 
elucidates how this study has contributed to our understanding of the MCA. The ensuing 
analysis is divided into four core themes, the first of which considers the specific experience 
of Nicaragua in the MCA. This is then followed by a more general discussion of how the 
research conducted for this thesis adds to, and engages with, the debates surrounding the 
MCA. In leading on from this, we look at what this study has to say about the PWC, WC and 
the current state of neoliberalism, and development theorising more generally. The final 
theme then builds upon this re-examination of development doctrine by looking explicitly at 
what this research tells us about the relationship between democracy promotion and 
development discourse. However, whilst these four themes are discussed separately for the 
sake of clarity, they are not unrelated, and each engages with similar themes and ideas. 
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9.2.1 The mechanics of the MeA in Nicaragua 
By looking at Nicaragua's experience in the MCA, this research has provided a 
unique and in-depth insight into how a relatively new and un-researched development 
initiative has been implemented in practice. The broader implications of these findings on, for 
example, how we interpret the MCA or development policy more broadly, are discussed in 
detail later. For now, however, this section concentrates on discussing how the initiative may 
impact on Nicaragua's development, especially in terms of poverty reduction. 
In beginning this discussion, we cannot ignore the implications of the programme's 
limited geographical focus in which, despite the MCC's expectations of achieving a nation-
wide impact (see chapter 6 section 6.7), the initiative is concentrated in only two of 
Nicaragua's seventeen departments/autonomous zones. The core reasons for adopting this 
approach appear to be rooted in both a tradition within Nicaragua of favouring particular 
geographic zones304 and the MCC's agenda for prioritising development efforts in areas that 
have the greatest potential for achieving 'transformational' results. In terms of the latter, not 
only is this evident in the MCA's highly stringent approach to country selectivity, but also, 
with regard to Nicaragua more specifically, in the MCA's regionalised approach to 
development. Indeed, the driving logic behind the decision to focus programme funds 
specifically in Loon and Chinandega is, as discussed in chapter 6, the region's potential for 
economic growth and its strategic importance in relation to DR-CAFTA and the PPP. In the 
long-term, therefore, it is envisioned that the MeA will help to transform this section of the 
country into an economic motor for the national economy, through which a nation-wide 
impact will be realised. For reasons already given in this thesis, however, I have doubts over 
whether this kind of geographically concentrated approach to the country's development is 
sustainable in the long-run or suitable in a country such as Nicaragua, where widespread 
socio-economic inequalities already exist. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how this 
programme, which is clearly limited in both scope and scale, will ever translate into the kind 
of nation-wide impact that is expected. Instead, it is perhaps more realistic here to talk about 
departmental impact. With this in mind, attention now turns to considering the MCA's 
potential impact within the occident. 
304 For example, the World Bank's 'Poverty and Social Impact Analysis' (PSIA), which was included as part of 
the International Monetary Fund's Nicaraguan Country Report, revealed that the geographical distribution of 
government expenditure through the Public Investment Program (PIP) was markedly biased in favour of 'better-
off' municipalities in the country (IMF 2005: 177). 
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The MCC's single-minded economic approach to development, which is expanded 
upon more broadly later, is very much evident in the content and mechanics of Nicaragua's 
MCA. Indeed, each of the project components has clearly been developed with an economic 
agenda in mind and this will inevitably have ramifications when it comes to the programme's 
ability to address the complexities of impoverishment in Loon and Chinandega. In terms of 
the Transportation Project, for example, it is possible that some of those areas that have the 
highest levels of poverty and, therefore, have the greatest need of development assistance, 
will not directly benefit from this component, because the roads where they live will fail to 
meet the required economic thresholds (see chapter 7 section 7.7.4). Similarly, whilst the 
RBDP component is focussed on marketing products, it does not supply the financial support 
that is greatly needed by many within Le6n and Chinandega to actually produce these goods 
in the first place. Instead, it works under the 'recognition' that there are existing means of 
finance that people can be steered towards, underestimating the problems of inaccessibility to 
credit in Nicaragua. Furthermore, there is a real danger that, in the absence of sufficient 
financial support, the formalisation of property rights, which is being facilitated through the 
PRP, could actually lead to land transfers that cause greater inequalities. Such concerns are 
especially poignant in light ofDR-CAFTA, through which the level of market competition in 
Nicaragua is set to increase dramatically. Due to the region's important strategic position as a 
transit route within the PPP, the populations of Le6n and Chinandega are perhaps more 
vulnerable than others within the country. 
For me, these fundamental issues raise serious question-marks over the initiative's 
pro-poor credentials and its ability to induce the kind of 'transformational' changes needed to 
address the social, cultural, political, environmental and economic dimensions of 
impoverishment in Nicaragua. Whilst Nicaragua's MeA may accelerate economic 
development in the occident of the country and, in doing so, hasten the area's transition into 
the free-trade area, its failure to address the underlying causes of underdevelopment will 
inevitably limit its ability to encourage and facilitate the kind of changes needed for real and 
fundamental progress to take place. Moreover, the programme's unwavering agenda for only 
working with those areas that are considered to have economic potential runs the risk of 
alienating the most vulnerable sectors of the population. This situation could exacerbate 
existing inequalities within the region and potentially culminate in the formation of poverty 
hotspots. 
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Bearing such concerns in mind, examining inclusivity in Nicaragua's MCA was 
another key point of concern within this study. As alluded to above, this research was 
interested in the mechanisms and processes through which individuals and groups in Lean 
and Chinandega have been able to engage with the programme. In this respect, understanding 
the function of the DDCs in the MCA was particularly important, as these spaces have played 
a lead role in facilitating participation in the initiative. Whilst I do believe that these councils 
are a positive and progressive force within the region, this thesis has questioned the extent of 
their representativeness. As noted earlier, for example, several respondents raised concerns 
over the inclusion of women in the DDCs, stating that they had to work hard to claim these 
spaces. Other respondents felt that the region's Mayors had too much influence in the 
councils and that the councils could, therefore, be manipulated by political parties to further 
their own interests. Furthermore, the participation of the more remote municipalities in these 
departmental councils is clearly constrained by the time, cost, distance and difficulties 
involved in travelling to and from the DDCs. Consequently, there does appear to be a 
potential bias towards the wealthier and better developed municipalities, through their close 
proximity to these 'democratic' entities. All of these issues will, in turn, influence the ability 
of different groups and sectors in Lean and Chinandega to engage with the MCA. Therefore, 
steps should be taken, where possible, to reinforce and support these key structures, so that 
their representativeness and role within the departments can be improved. Indeed, this is now 
more important than ever, as Daniel Ortega's controversial project for 'direct democracy' 
continues to put political pressure on entities such as these. 
In summary, this study has provided a unique insight into how the MCA operates in 
practice and has engaged with the issues and debates affecting Nicaragua's development. 
It has put to the test the programme's core aim of reducing poverty through economic growth 
and considered how this approach may translate into real change, specifically in Lean and 
Chinandega. This thesis has located the MCA's agenda for achieving 'transformational 
development' within the context of reality on the ground in Nicaragua and found that a lot 
more would need to be done, at a much larger scale, to produce the kind of results it infers. 
What is more, by questioning the initiative's raison d'etre within Nicaragua and the model of 
development being promulgated through it, this study has created a platform for critically 
engaging with debates on dominant development discourse and policy30s. However, before 
30S Section 9.2.3 explores this issue in greater detail. 
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engaging with those specific issues, the chapter looks at what this study contributes to our 
understanding of MC A more broadly and its 'innovative' approach to international 
development. 
9.2.2 The MCA: Debates and issues 
Over the course of this thesis, we have engaged with many of the key debates and 
issues surrounding the MCA and its creation. Of particular interest was the decision to house 
the initiative in a new entity called the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which is entirely 
separate from the body traditionally responsible for delivering the US' international 
development programmes, USAID. As discussed in section 3.3 of chapter 3 and expanded 
upon later in section 6.1 of chapter 6, this decision was seen by some as a sign of distrust 
and/or discontentment by the Bush administration over the agency's role in the delivery of 
US foreign assistance. Additionally, concerns were voiced that its creation would further 
weaken USAID's activities and add to the fragmentation of the country's foreign aid system. 
Due to the agency's hugely influential role in the delivery of development assistance and its 
presence within Nicaragua, the first half of chapter 6 was devoted to examining the nature of 
the relationship between the MCC and USAID, especially in tenns of funding distribution. 
The analysis conducted on this issue gave weight to the concerns highlighted above and 
suggested that there does appear be a correlation between reductions in USAID's budget in 
Nicaragua, and within many other compact-countries, and the MCC's activities there. It is 
clear that I am not alone in these findings. A report by the Congressional Research Service 
stated that "some critics continue to express concern that MCA funding is not always 
additive, as had been the pledge, but will substitute for portions of previous USAID bilateral 
development aid programs" (Tarnoff2008: 19). Consequently, one could question whether 
the initiative does, in fact, adhere to President Bush's promise of going 'above and beyond 
existing aid requests'. Whilst this study was not able, due to its scope and general time/cost 
constraints, to give any definitive answers on this key issue, it has nevertheless pointed the 
way and made a case for further research on the subjeceo6• 
306 It would be particularly interesting to investigate how the relationship between these two entities changes 
under Barack Obama, who is likely to want to put his own stamp on US foreign assistance. Indeed, there are 
already suggestions that a new international development agency could emerge under the Obama administration 
(see Lunney 2008). 
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Whilst there may be doubts over whether or not the MCC has detracted from 
USAID's operations within the compact-countries themselves, it is clear that President 
Bush's pledge to deliver an extra US$5 billion a year through the new initiative has failed to 
transpire. In fact, the yearly amount allocated to the initiative since its creation in 2004 has 
never even come close to this figure, prompting fears that it will not be able to offer the kind 
of transformational development originally envisioned. Chapter 3 has already highlighted 
what this severe under-funding could mean in general terms in discussing the MCC's future 
prospects and its ability to generate the transformational changes originally envisioned in the 
recipient countries. In addition to this, the fieldwork and research conducted in Nicaragua has 
highlighted just how much assistance would actually be needed to create the kind of 
fundamental nation-wide impact inferred by the MCC. In reality, whilst the US$175 million 
awarded to Nicaragua is significant, this figure falls well short of what is required to address 
the complexities of underdevelopment in the country and, in this respect, one could argue that 
the bar has been set too high. Although, some of the most recent compacts signed with, for 
example Tanzania and Morocco, are much larger than Nicaragua's, I still have doubts over 
whether this will, when faced with the complexities and conditions on the ground, be enough 
to deliver the kind transformational results aspired to. In this regard, one could suggest that 
perhaps the MCC is trying to do too much with too little resources. Once again, there is an 
opportunity for further research on this issue and it would be extremely interesting to see the 
experience of recipient countries elsewhere. 
In response to the funding shortages highlighted above, it is evident that the MCC has 
opted to work with fewer countries, maximising the level of funds distributed to individual 
MeA recipients. Therefore, rather than diluting the assistance available by dividing it among 
a larger number of recipients, there has been a drive towards even greater selectivity and, as 
discussed in section 3.6.1 of chapter 3, this is in line with the initiative's agenda for 
delivering 'transformational' development in the South. Whilst the logic behind the MCC's 
highly selective style of development is clear (see chapter 7 section 7.4.1 which discusses the 
influential role of the World Bank and its agenda for improving aid effectiveness), some have 
argued that the MCA takes the recommendation that donors be more selective to an extreme 
(see Chhotray and Hulme 2007). Indeed, one could suggest that the initiative's use of 
scorecards to grade countries' performances and help determine eligibility is indicative of a 
situation where the drive to maximise aid effectiveness and deliver 'transformational' results 
has perhaps gone a step too far. As discussed in section 9.2.1, Nicaragua's experience in the 
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MCA illustrates the potential dangers that can accompany embracing a 'bang for buck' 
philosophy in development, in which the drive to maximise 'results' can actually come at the 
expense of marginalising those most in need. What is more, there is ample evidence 
contesting the notion that greater selectivity does necessarily improve the effectiveness of aid 
at combating poverty (for example see Berg 2002 and Santiso 2001) and this presents doubts 
over the initiative's ability to deliver on its promises. Consequently, further research on this 
relationship within the specific context of the framework of development adopted in the 
MCA would not only contribute to the wider development literature on aid effectiveness, but 
also help to inform our understanding ofthe initiative and its potential impact at the 'global' 
level. 
In concluding this section, it is important to reflect upon how the research conducted 
for this thesis contributes to our understanding of 'country-ownership' and its expression 
through the MCA. In beginning this discussion it is useful to reiterate the point first made in 
chapter 3 section 3.7.2 that whilst it is the individual recipient countries that are responsible 
for developing, implementing and monitoring their MCA programmes, this is ultimately 
being done within a pre-established framework of development that has been defined through 
the lens of operationalising transnationalliberalism in the South. It is not, therefore, 
surprising to discover thilt there have been clear similarities between recipient countries in 
terms of programme orientation, in which the overall focus has, as witnessed in Nicaragua's 
case, tended to be on agriculture and transport infrastructure. This uniformity has clearly 
surprised some observers who had, bearing in mind the diversity of conditions in each of the 
countries, anticipated greater variation between the MCAs. According to Tarnoff, "some 
believe that social sectors, including those in health and education, should be receiving 
greater attention in compact design" (2008: 19). The absence of these social projects in the 
recipient countries is, as argued throughout this thesis, illustrative of the primacy that 
continues to be placed on economic growth in official development discourse and this will 
undoubtedly have repercussions when it comes to the MCA's ability to address the intricacies 
and complexities of impoverishment in Nicaragua (see chapter 7 section 7.10.3). There are 
indications, however, of greater diversity in some of the more recent compacts that have been 
signed. For example, Namibia's compact has a substantial Education Project and the MCA 
programmes in Lesotho, Mozambique and Tanzania incorporate water and sanitation 
components (see the MCC website). In terms of further research, therefore, it would be 
interesting to investigate the reasons behind this apparent shift towards more diverse MCAs 
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and explore the extent to which it really does represent a fundamental departure from the kind 
of econocentric programmes being implemented in other compact-countries such as 
Nicaragua. 
Finally, this research has contributed to our understanding and interpretation of the 
MCC's ownership principle by emphasising the importance oflooking beyond simple 
rhetoric to examining specific processes and practices within the compact-countries 
themselves. For example, this thesis has highlighted the influential and significant role of the 
DDCs in facilitating engagement with Nicaragua's MCA, and it is these 'democratic' 
structures that really give substance to the concept of 'ownership'. Consequently, 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of entities such as these, as well as their role in 
the development process, is essential in qualifying exactly how ownership is expressed in 
practice. In this respect, I would argue that a key contribution of this research has been to 
illustrate the importance of engaging with processes occurring within the recipient countries, 
whether it be at the national, regional, or local level, and reflecting upon how these relate to 
the MCA's core principles. Only then can we begin to gauge the extent to which the initiative 
does live up to its positive rhetoric. 
9.2.3 The PWC. WC and neoliberalism 
A key aspect of this thesis has been questioning if the econocentric model of 
development being promoted through the MCA does, in fact, represent something 
fundamentally 'new' and 'transformational', or whether it is simply yet another case of 'old 
wine in new bottles'. Whilst I would hesitate to label the initiative's defining 'innovations' as 
mere gimmicks, one cannot escape the feeling that underneath all of this glitz and glamour 
the core logic and assumptions driving the MCA are far from original. In fact, this thesis has 
argued they are derived from the ideas and concepts enshrined within the IFIs and, most 
noticeably, the World Bank (or self-proclaimed 'knowledge bank'). Although for some the 
World Bank's apparent 'transformation' and re-conceptualisation of itself at the end of the 
1990s, in line with the emerging PWC, was indicative of a shift towards a more consensual 
and moderated approach to development, the underlying assumptions driving its activities in 
the South remain quintessentially neoliberal in origin. In terms of the MCA, this is witnessed 
most visibly in the fund's narrowly conceived approach to poverty reduction, in which 
'economic growth' is promoted as the panacea to the South's complex problems. 
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This economic model of development is highly visible in the focus and orientation of 
Nicaragua's MCA which, despite embracing pro-poor rhetoric, is unlikely to address the 
complexities of the country's underdevelopment. Respondents from the region were clearly 
not oblivious to the initiative's conceptual limitations, with many having doubts over whether 
a programme devoted purely to combating the economic dimensions of poverty can, in the 
end, offer a real solution to their problems and, more broadly, Nicaragua's problems. Instead, 
this research has demonstrated that the initiative can be better understood as part of a broader 
US strategy aimed at institutionalising transnationalliberalism in Nicaragua and across the 
Central American region as a whole. The MCA's ideological proximity to DR-CAFTA and 
the PPP is a testament to this fact. Indeed, in all three of the compact-countries within the 
isthmus, MCA funds are set to bolster these neoliberal mega-projects, thereby facilitating the 
region's transformation into a free-trade area. This relationship has led me to conclude that 
this 'different model for development' (Danilovich 2008) is yet another instrument of US 
foreign policy, through which polyarchy is being operationalised in Nicaragua. Consequently, 
a key contribution of this research has been to illustrate how this reportedly 'new' and 
'transformational' development initiative ultimately fails to depart from the neoliberal 
assumptions enshrined within the WC and PWC. That being said, however, there are 
indications that greater diversity has crept into some of the more recent MCA-compacts and, 
as discussed above, this apparent shift warrants further research and analysis. 
9.2.4 Development and democracy 
This final section reflects upon how this research has contributed to our understanding 
of the relationship between development and democracy; a theme which was considered in 
detail within chapter 8. In particular, this thesis was interested in examining the seemingly 
inseparable marriage between 'democracy' and free-trade, which has led some to believe that 
one cannot be achieved without the other. This association has acted as a powerful 
legitimising tool in the reproduction of governments in the South that adhere and conform to 
neoliberallogic and are, therefore, willing to take direction from the North. Within this 
context, the emergence of the 'good governance' agenda during the 1990s, symbolic of the 
shift to the PWC, provided an effective means of re-embedding neoliberalism in the South 
following the failure of the IFl's SAPs. Moreover, it set the precedence for the imposition of 
further conditionalities in the delivery of foreign aid, aimed at producing' sound policy 
environments' through a mixture of political and economic reforms. To a large extent I 
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believe that the MCA, with its stringent rules on selectivity and reward-structure approach, 
was created with the explicit intention of accelerating and streamlining this process in the 
South. As a result, contrary to representing something fundamentally new and original, this 
research has shown that the MCA can be better understood as an attempt to improve the 
. efficiency and speed at which policy prescriptions from the North, and most noticeably from 
the IFIs, translate into reform and change in the South. Thus, Nicaragua's MCA can be 
located as an additional mechanism for institutionalising transnational liberalism and 
consolidating a polyarchic system of rule in Nicaragua and across the Central American 
region as a whole. 
In addition to contributing more broadly to the discussions and debates around 
development and democracy, this thesis has illustrated the importance of understanding and 
recognising the potential implications of political processes on the MCA. With regard to 
Nicaragua more specifically, consideration was given during this research to the highly 
politicised environment in which Nicaragua's MCA was being implemented in the run-up to, 
and aftermath of, the strongly contested 2006 national elections. Whilst it is clear from this 
research that the initiative passed relatively unscathed from the electoral volatilities (see 
chapter 8 section 8.6), it would be very interesting to look at the experience of other compact-
countries and explore the extent to which their programmes have remained guarded from 
political interests and influence. This is especially important in light of the fact that the MCA 
was created, in part, to ensure that development aid is kept separate from political interests 
(see chapter 3 section 3.3). Furthermore, one cannot, as illustrated throughout this research, 
ignore processes and events occurring at a more local level within recipient countries, as 
these can have significant repercussions for the way in which individuals engage with the 
MCA. As such, a large part of this research was focussed upon analysing the mechanisms and 
'democratic' spaces through which participation in Nicaragua's programme has been 
facilitated and enabled. As chapter 8 demonstrates, understanding the strengths and 
weaknesses of entities such as the DDCs, is essential in gauging the degree to which the 
MCA adheres to its ownership principle and builds the local capacity that, according to 
DaniIovich, makes democracy and development sustainable (2007: np). Consequently, a key 
contribution of this thesis has been to show the importance of exploring and engaging with 
local processes in the recipient countries, as only then can we begin to bridge the gap 
between development policy and practice. In terms of further research, therefore, it would be 
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extremely interesting to compare and contrast Nicaragua's participative processes and 
structures with those of other compact-countries. 
9.3 Possibilities for future research 
This final chapter has engaged with the main findings ofthis thesis and identified its 
core contributions to debates around the MCA and development discourse more broadly. 
Through this process, a number of possible avenues for further research have been suggested 
and these are drawn together in this final section. 
First and foremost, this thesis has highlighted the need for greater research into the 
relationship between the MCC and USAID, especially within countries that receive 
development assistance from both entities. As discussed in chapter 3, housing the MCA in a 
newly created entity was largely driven by the desire to avoid some of the perceived 
weaknesses/pitfalls of the traditional US aid system. At the same time, however, the decision 
to do so was interpreted by some to represent a vote of no confidence in USAID and this is 
argued to have weakened the agency by undermining its authority, whilst also contributing to 
the fragmentation of the US' foreign aid programmes (see Radelet 2008: 7). It would, 
therefore, be extremely interesting to explore the nature of this relationship further, both in 
broad terms with regard to the general role and position ofthese entities within the US 
foreign aid system, and in more specific terms by analysing how they operate and coordinate 
activities at the country level. Not only would this add to our understanding of the MCA and 
its relative impact in recipient countries, but it would also give us a better idea of how far US 
foreign assistance has come over the years and, more importantly, where it may be heading in 
the future307• 
Secondly, whilst this research focussed on examining the experience of a specific 
country in the MCA, it would be incredibly useful to look at the experience of other countries 
in the initiative and examine the extent to which some of the issues discussed in this study are 
indicative of situations elsewhere. For example, it would be interesting to compare and 
contrast the experience of Nicaragua with Honduras and El Salvador. Due to the regional 
applicability of some of the key themes analysed in this thesis, most noticeably DR-CAFTA 
307 It is important to restate here that this relationship will inevitably shift under the new Obama administration, 
which as already mentioned, is already talking about a new development organisation. 
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and the PPP, and the fact that these countries are likely to be experiencing similar 
impediments to economic growth, one would expect there to be similarities between the 
MCA programmes. Indeed, this has already been illustrated by the shared focus of the 
countries' transportation projects, in which key sections of the controversial trade corridor 
network have been prioritised. At the same time, however, one should not forget that 
although these countries do share a common political heritage, each of them has their own 
distinct histories and, therefore, it would be a mistake to assume complete uniformity. 
Ultimately, the complex political, economic, social, cultural and environmental conditions 
within which the MCA was constructed and implemented have been specific to each of the 
countries involved. As such, I believe an important avenue for future research would be to 
examine the extent to which there are shared commonalities between the MCAs in the 
isthmus and also identify where there may be differences. 
In addition to focussing on the Central American region, research could also be 
broadened further to incorporate the full range of compact-countries, thereby providing a 
more 'global' interrogation ofthe initiative's transformational potential. In doing this, a 
number of different themes could be explored, including the recent trend towards more 
diverse MCA programmes. More specifically, it would be interesting to gauge the level and 
extent of the apparent growth in diversity and examine what this means in practice for the 
countries involved, especially in terms of poverty reduction. Another possible avenue of 
research could involve looking at the experience of other recipient countries during politically 
volatile and sensitive periods, and exploring how these politicised environments may have 
affected their MCAs. As witnessed in Nicaragua, guarding the MCA against political 
interests and influence is not always easy and it is therefore essential to try and understand 
the potential impact of political processes on the initiative within the countries involved. 
Finally, in order to deepen analysis of the MCA and take the research forward it would, as 
stated in section 9.2.4 above, be interesting to examine the mechanisms and structures 
through which participation in, and engagement with, the MCA has been achieved in other 
compact-countries. Understanding such variations would not only inform our understanding 
of the MCA and its ownership principle, but also provide a more complete global picture of 
the experience of different stakeholders in the initiative. 
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